ACT OF 1898, CH. 1, § 1a. Definitions.- (24) "States" shall include the territories, the Indian Territory, Alaska, and the District of Columbia; (7) "court" shall mean the court of bankruptcy in which the proceedings are pending, and may include the referee; (8) "courts of bankruptcy" shall include the district courts of the United States and of the Territories, the supreme court of the District of Columbia, and the United States court of the Indian Territory, and of Alaska; and (3)" appellate courts" shall include the circuit courts of appeals of the United States, the supreme courts of the Territories, and the Supreme Court of the United States.

§ 2. That the courts of bankruptcy, as herein before defined, viz., the district courts of the United States in the several States, the supreme court of the District of Columbia, the district courts of the several Territories, and the United States courts in the Indian Territory and the District of Alaska, are hereby made courts of bankruptcy.

§ 23. Jurisdiction of United States and State Courts. (a) The United States circuit courts shall have jurisdiction of all controversies at law and in equity, as distinguished from proceedings in bankruptcy, between trustees as such and adverse claimants concerning the property acquired or claimed by the trustees, in the same manfer and to the same extent only as though bankruptcy proceedings had not been instituted and such controversies had been between the bankrupts and such adverse claimants.

(b) Suits by the trustee shall only be brought or prosecuted in the courts where the bankrupt, whose estate is being administered by such trustee, might have brought or prosecuted them if proceedings in bankruptcy had not been instituted, unless by consent of the proposed defendant.

(c) The United States circuit courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the courts of bankruptcy, within their respective territorial limits, of the offenses enumerated in this Act.

ACT OF 1867, § 563.- Eighteenth.

*

The district courts are constituted courts of bankruptcy, and shall have in their respective districts original jurisdiction in all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy.

Statute revised March 2, 1867, ch. 176, § 1, 14 Stat. 517. Prior Statutes - April 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19; Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 6, 5 Stat. 441.

Where a question arises involving right of national banks to make loans of a particular character upon mortgage, the assignee should be permitted to litigate such questions in the Federal courts, and should not be sent to State courts to try it upon the distribution of surplus moneys in a foreclosure suit; or in a suit brought by the party holding the alleged invalid mortgage. In re Duryea, 17 B. R. 495.

As to bankrupt and his wife, the bankruptcy proceedings do not divest the State court of jurisdiction of an action to foreclose a mortgage given by them. McHenry v. La Société Française, 16 B. R. 385.

A State court has no jurisdiction of an action brought against a trustee or assignee in bankruptcy to enjoin the collection of the assets of the bankrupt. Southern et al. v. Fisher, 16 B. R. 414.

Where assignee has a defense to a judgment which is available in equity, but not at law, it should be asserted by an independent suit on the equitable side of the court. Stillwell v. Walker, Assignee, 17 B. R. 569.

Under the law of 1867, upon a bill filed by an assignee in bankruptcy, the Circuit Court has power to enjoin the prosecution of an action of trover in a State court against the marshal for seizing the property of a third person under his warrant in bankruptcy. Hudson v. Schwab et al., 18 B. R. 480.

Where an injunction was granted in a cause over which the court had clear jurisdiction, a writ of mandamus would not lie to vacate it, and the remedy was by appeal from the first decree. Ex parte Schwab, 18 B. R. 507.

An objection to a bill in which the complainant describes himself as an assignee, that he is not legally such assignee, must be made by plea and not demurrer. Nicholas v. Murray, 18 B. R. 469.

Assignees may sue to recover assets of the bankrupt in courts of a district other than that in which decree of bankruptcy was entered. Dutcher v. Wright, 16 B. R. 331.

State courts have jurisdiction of actions brought by an assignee in bankruptcy to set aside mortgages alleged to have been made in fraud of the bankruptcy act. Isett v. Stuart, 16 B. R. 191.

Section 711 of the United States Revised Statutes, which gives exclusive jurisdiction to the Federal courts over "all matters and proceed

ings in bankruptcy," does not extend to actions brought by assignees to collect the assets of bankrupts. Wente v. Young, 17 B. R. 90; Kidder v. Horrobin, 18 B. R. 146.

Concurrent jurisdiction in State and Federal courts over actions brought to collect assets of bankrupt, whether legal or equitable or of whatever amount. Ibid.

A State court has jurisdiction of an action brought by an assignee in bankruptcy to foreclose a mortgage belonging to the estate. Burlinghame, Assignee, v. Parce, 17 B. R. 246.

Acts of State courts done in the due exercise of their jurisdiction, not conflicting with the proper decrees and jurisdiction of the Federal courts, are valid and binding on the Federal courts. In re Keiler et al., 18 B. R. 10.

Rule of Interpretation. The words of the bankruptcy act were, in most parts of it, wisely taken from the English statutes of 1849 and 1851, and from the insolvent law of Massachusetts. In applying the rule that the interpretation of a law forms a part of it, the construction of a statute by the courts of the country whose legislature enacted it, is adopted. The Supreme Court has more than once applied this rule where an Amerlean statute has been taken from a prior English one, and has followed its English construction where the meaning might otherwise have been doubtful. Barnes v. Rettew, 8 Phila. 133.

Ex antecedentibus et consequentibus fit optima interpretatio, is one of the most important canons of construction. Every part of a statute should be brought into action in order to collect from the whole one uníform and consistent sense, if that may be done; or, in other words, the construction must be made upon the entire statute, and not merely upon disjointed parts of it. Hall v. Deshler, 71 Penn. 299.

In the construction of the law the principle of uniformity must not be out of sight, for such construction ought to be put on a statute as may best answer the intention the makers had in view. Barstow v. Adams, 2 Day, 70.

While a construction of a Federal law by the Federal courts other than Supreme, is not conclusive, it is entitled to careful consideration in the State courts. Frank v. Houston, 9 Kans. 406.

The English decisions properly apply as rules of construction. Roosevelt v. Mark, 6 Johns. Ch. 266; Livermore v. Bagley, 3 Mass. 487; Murray v. De Rottenham. 6 Johns. Ch. 52; Tucker v. Oxley, 5 Cranch, 34; s. c. 1 Cranch C. C. 419; Globe Ins. Co. v. Cleveland Ins. Co., 14 B. R. 311; 3. c. 8 C. L. N. 258.

Character of the Jurisdiction.- Courts of bankruptcy, as they existed in England at the time the act was passed, were, and still are, separate, distinct organizations, with powers and jurisdiction separate and distinct from all other courts, and it is undoubtedly in this sense that the words are used in the act; that is, courts possessing power and jurisdiction peculiar to themselves. The only difference is, that here, instead of creating a new organization, an organization already existing, known as the district court, is taken up and made use of in lieu of such new organiza

tion. But the district court, when acting as a court of bankruptcy, is none the less a separate and distinct court, exercising powers and jurisdiction separate and distinct from its powers and jurisdiction as a district court, than if it were such separate and distinct organization. In re Norris, 4 B. R. 35; s. c. 1 Abb. C. C. 514; s. c. 1 L. T. B. 227.

Congress, in passing the act, in pursuance of its constitutional power, not only intended to make it uniform, but operative, throughout the United States. It does not stop at State lines. Property, wherever situate, which is not exempted from the operation of the act, passes to the assignee. This is equally true of property under mortgage, as of that which is unincumbered. Debts, whenever payable, and creditors, wherever residing within the United States, are within the operation of the act. The bankruptcy court is invested with this jurisdiction over the bankrupt and his estate, and over creditors who are brought involuntarily into it, in order to administer the estate for the benefit of all the creditors according to their respective rights. Thus, it is plain beyond controversy, that the property of the bankrupt, though situate in another State, and though mortgaged by the bankrupt, prior to the institution of proceedings in bankruptcy, is within the jurisdiction and under the control of the bankruptcy court. Markson et al. v. Heaney, 4 B. R. 510; s. c. 1 Dillon, 497.

The district court, as a court of bankruptcy, is the creature of statute, and has no powers except those conferred upon it, either expressly or by necessary implication, for the just and full execution of the law. In re Robert Morris, Crabbe, 70; Clark v. Binninger, 3 B. R. 518; s. c. 38 How. Pr. 341; s. c. 3 L. T. B. 49.

In administering the statute, the functions of the district court, as a court, are employed; and the jurisdiction is not a jurisdiction conferred on the judge, as a commissioner, in the nature of the appointment by which the chancellor formerly executed the bankruptcy law in England. In re Barney Corse, 1 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 231.

The strict rule of construction, which is applied in cases where a statute gives to a court power to do a particular thing, has no application to the bankruptcy law, where full and complete jurisdiction over an extensive subject is given to a court constituted for the purpose. In re California Pacific R. R. Co., 11 B. R. 193; s. c. 3 Saw. 240.

In enjoining upon the district court to take cognizance of, and administer the bankruptcy law, Congress must be accepted to intend that, in every particular not otherwise designated by the statute, those courts should proceed with the new jurisdiction upon the principles appropriate to like proceedings under any other branch of their power. The lawgiver, in adding to the range of their employment, must be supposed to contemplate that they will continue the use of their customary powers, unless he specially limits and restricts that use. In re Barney Corse, 1 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 231; in re California Pacific R. R. Co., 11 B. R. 193; s. c. 3 Saw. 240.

The district court has jurisdiction of two distinct kinds: 1st. As a court of bankruptcy, over the proceedings in bankruptcy initiated by the petition and ending in the distribution of assets among the creditors, and the

discharge or refusal of a discharge to the bankrupt; 2d. As an ordinary court over suits at law or in equity, brought by or against the assignee in reference to alleged property of the bankrupt, or to claims alleged to be due to or from him. Lathrop v. Drake, 13 B. R. 472; s. c. 91 U. S. 516. The jurisdiction of the district courts extends to all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy, without limit. When the act says that they shall have jurisdiction in their respective districts, it means that the jurisdiction is to be exercised in their respective districts. Each court within its own district may exercise the powers conferred, but those powers extend to all matters of bankruptcy without limitation. Lathrop v. Drake, 13 B. R. 472; s. c. 91 U. S. 516; Burbank v. Bigelow, 14 B. R. 445; s. c. 92 U. S. 179.

The words, "in their respective districts," must receive their usual ordinary signification, and manifest a purpose and intent in Congress to restrict and limit the authority and jurisdiction of the district courts in bankruptcy within their own districts, in accordance with the practice as it then was, and not to confer upon them a jurisdiction throughout the United States, in utter conflict with all prior legislation and the settled policy of Congress. While their authority does extend to all matters in bankruptcy, and there is no limit to the subject-matter over which the court has jurisdiction, yet they are expressly confined and restricted in its exercise to the limits of their own territory, and enjoy no other or greater power or authority outside of their own districts than they had before the bankruptcy act was passed. They can not summon parties before them from without their districts. Paine v. Caldwell, 6 B. R. 558;

s. c. 29 Leg. Int. 284; in re Hirsch, 2 B. R. 3; s. c. 2 Ben. 493; s. c. 1 L. T. B. 92; Markson et al. v. Heaney, 4 B. R. 510; s. c. 1 Dillon, 497, 511, note.

An assignee can not proceed by attachment against a party in a district where the latter neither resides nor is found at the time of serving the writ. Nazro v. Cragin, 3 Dillon, 474.

The whole tenor of the bankruptcy act shows that Congress intended to provide for the complete administration of the bankrupt system in the Federal courts, and through the instrumentality of Federal officers. This section does not contain any words which justify the conclusion that the jurisdiction conferred by it is limited to the district court for the district in which the proceedings in bankruptcy are pending. District courts should be naturally auxiliary to each other to perfect and accomplish the object of the act. An assignee elected in one district may institute proceedings in the district court of another district to recover money paid by the bankrupt to a preferred creditor contrary to the provisions of the act. Shearman v. Bingham, 5 B. R. 34; s. c. 7 B. R. 490; s. c. 3 C. L. N. 258; Goodall v. Tuttle, 7 B. R. 193; s. c. 3 Biss. 219; in re James Martin, 5 Law Rep. 158; Moore v. Jones, 23 Vt. 739. Contra, Jobbins v. Montague, 6 B. R. 509; in re Richardson, 2 B. R. 202; s. c. 2 Ben. 517; s. c. 2 L. T. B. 20; Markson v. Heaney, 4 B. R. 510; s. c. 1 Dillon, 497.

The petitioning creditor who has filed a petition against the debtor in one district, may apply to the district court of another district to restrain