sary to enforce the surrender and appropriation of his property. Beecher v. Binninger, 7 Blatch. 170.

The claim to relief on the grounds of the right to a discovery can not be maintained when the complainant knows that the property transferred consists in a stock of merchandise, for this constitutes data amply sufficient to enable a competent pleader to frame a declaration at law, with all the particularity necessary in such a case. It would, no doubt, be convenient to know the exact items and quantities and numbers of each kind, but this is not necessary, because the pleader may cover the whole range of items of each kind, and may state the numbers, quantities, and values broadly enough to cover any possible proofs that may be made. Garrison v. Markley, 7 B. R. 246.

The assignee, by an examination of the grantee, may obtain all the information which he could possibly obtain by an answer to a bill in equity. Ibid.

Since the law has been changed, so as to allow parties to be called and examined as witnesses in trials at law, bills for discovery in aid of trials at law, or to enforce purely legal rights, have become entirely unnecessary — have, in fact, fallen into disuse, and may be considered practically obsolete.

Ibid.

A bill for discovery should allege that the facts can not be proven by any other witness, and this allegation can not be truthfully made in the case of a transfer by the bankrupt, for the bankrupt is a competent witness. Ibid.

A mortgagee may file a bill to foreclose a mortgage in the circuit court. Buckingham v. McLean, 3 McLean, 185; s. c. 13 How. 151.

The assignee may file a bill to vacate a transfer of property, although he is in possession thereof. Kellogg v. Russell, 11 B. R. 121; s. c. 11 Blatch. 519.

Parties. Prior to the adjudication, the petitioning creditor may file a bill in equity in the district court to enjoin a preferred creditor from disposing of the property. In re J. J. Fendley, 10 B. R. 250; s. c. 1 Cent. L. J. 433.

If the assignee is dead, and no one has been appointed in his stead, a creditor has a right to file a bill to detain property of the bankrupt, to be administered by an assignee subsequently appointed. Clark v. Clark, 17 How. 315.

It is immaterial whether the creditor who files the bill has proved his debt or not, for he may subsequently prove it. Ibid.

The assignee has the right to file a bill in the circuit court against all the incumbrancers claiming liens on a piece of property, to test the validity, priority, and amount of their claims. McLean v. Lafayette Bank, 3 McLean, 415.

Where the bill alleges preferences, several creditors claiming by distinct conveyances may be joined if they have a common interest in one or more leading facts in the bill, though in some other things there is no common interest. Ibid.

Parties who have received the property of the bankrupt under fraud

ulent conveyances may be joined, although the conveyances were separate and distinct acts. Spaulding v. McGovern, 10 B. R. 188.

If the object of the suit is to affect property held by a trustee in trust for a minor or feme covert, the trustee is a necessary party. O'Hara v. MacConnell, 93 U. S. 150.

If a junior mortgagee merely seeks to obtain a sale of the equity of redemption, a prior mortgagee is not a necessary party. Jerome v. McCarter, 15 B. R. 546.

If two executions have been levied upon the property of the bankrupt, under such circumstances as make them void as a preference, and the proceeds placed in the possession of one of the execution creditors, the court will require the other creditor to be made a party to the suit, if he is within its jurisdiction, and his interest and absence are formally brought to the attention of the court; but if this can not be done, it will proceed to administer such relief as may be in its power between the parties before it. The organization of the Federal courts has always required them to dispense with parties in chancery not within their jurisdiction, unless their presence is an absolute necessity. Traders' Nat'l Bank v. Campbell, 3 B. R. 498; s. c. 6 B. R. 353; s. c. 2 Biss. 423; s. c. 14 Wall. 87. In a proceeding to set a transfer aside for fraud or illegality, the bankrupt has a direct interest in the question whether the property shall be taken from the grantee, and is, therefore, a proper party. Verselius v. Verselius, 9 Blatch. 189.

The holder of a part of the mortgage notes is a necessary party to a suit in equity to foreclose the mortgage. In re Edward A. Casey, 8 B. R. 71; s. c. 10 Blatch. 376.

The district court has jurisdiction over a party who is served with process in the district, although he does not reside therein. Babbit v. Burgess, 7 B. R. 561; s. c. 2 Dillon, 169.

If a party, who is out of the district, voluntarily appears and answers, he thereby makes himself a party to the suit. McLean v. Lafayette Bank, 3 McLean, 415.

The appearance of a party who was personally served with process can not be withdrawn. Fenton v. Collerd, 11 B. R. 535.

Whether the bankrupt is a proper party to a bill in equity, filed by the mortgagee against the assignee and the bankrupt, will not be considered where the bankrupt has appeared and answered. Lockett v. Hill, 9 B. R. 167; s. c. 1 Woods, 552.

Pleadings. The bill need not point out the particular section of the bankruptcy law which gives the complainant a right to assail a transfer. The bill is to set out facts, and it would be bad pleading to allege the law. Pratt v. Curtiss, 6 B. R. 139.

Affirmative relief will not be granted in equity on the ground of fraud, unless it be made a distinct allegation in the bill, so that it may be put in issue by the pleadings. Voorhees v. Bonesteel, 7 Blatch. 495; s. c. 16 Wall. 16.

A bill to set aside a preference must allege that the preferred creditor knew that the preference was made in fraud of the provisions of the bankruptcy law. Crump v. Chapman, 15 B. R. 571.

When the bill seeks to set aside a preference, all the persons connected with the transaction should be made parties. Harmanson v. Bain, 15 B. R. 173.

A bill to set aside a preference should pray in terms for a recovery of the property, or should allege the value and pray in terms for the recovery of the value. Ibid.

An assignee in his bill need not allege the details of the facts by which he becomes entitled to maintain the suit. Lakin v. First Nat'l Bank, 15 B. R. 476; s. c. 13 Blatch. 83.

When fraud is a necessary part of a complainant's case, the facts constituting the fraud should be set forth so that the opposite party may be advised of the case he has to meet. Smith v. Auerbach, 2 Mont. 348.

An allegation that a transfer is void under the bankruptcy law is not sufficiently specific. The pleading should set forth the clause under which it is void, and state the necessary facts. Ibid.

A charge of fraud or illegality in the alternative is sufficient. Verselius v. Verselius, 9 Blatch. 189.

If the bankrupt, being the owner of a vessel, transferred a part thereof, an action to set aside the transfer can not be united with an action for the appointment of a receiver, on the ground that there is an irreconcilable difference between the assignee and transferee, because they proceed on entirely different grounds, and are repugnant to each other. Wilkinson v. Dobbie, 12 Blatch. 298.

A bill in equity may be verified by the oath of the agent or attorney in fact of the petitioning creditor. In re J. J. Fendley, 10 B. R. 250; s. c. 1 Cent. L. J. 433.

If the bill alleges the consideration for a transfer, the respondent should, if the allegation is not true, deny it positively, and set up the real consideration. Burpee v. Nat'l Bank, 9 B. R. 314; s. c. 5 Biss. 405.

A general denial of fraud in an answer is equivalent to nothing more than a denial of a conclusion of law. Lathrop v. Drake, 13 B. R. 472; s. c. 91 U. S. 516.

If a respondent, on information and belief, denies an allegation of matters which may be, or can be, assumed to be within his personal knowledge, the allegation will be taken to be true. Burpee v. Nat'l Bank, 9 B. R. 314; s. c. 5 Biss. 405.

The rule that a respondent can not deny on information and belief those matters which may be, or can be, assumed to be within his personal knowledge, applies ac a corporation. Ibid.

Any informality in the answer may be overlooked on final hearing, if the answer denies the material allegations of the bill in such a manner as to constitute an issue within the established rules of equity pleading. Ibid.

A denial on information and belief, of matters that are within the personal knowledge of the respondent, does not meet the charge in the bill. If he does not know anything on the subject he should say so directly. Ibid.

If the respondent may not know, or can not be assumed to know, the

matters charged in the bill, he may answer on information and belief. Ibid.

The rule in chancery pleading is not that every allegation of a bill be taken as true, simply because it is not denied in the answer. If any allegation is to be taken as true, simply because it is not denied, it is only an allegation of some fact which is presumed to be within the knowledge of the party answering. White v. Jones, 6 B. R. 175.

When the answer denies certain allegations of the bill and the plaintiff does not contest the denial by a replication, the truth of the denial is to be taken as admitted, and the denied allegations as entirely unsustained. Vogle v. Lathrop et al., 4 B. R. 439; s. c. 4 Brewst. 253.

No defendant is bound to answer any interrogatories, except such as by the note at the foot of the bill he is required to answer. French v. First Nat'l. Bank, 11 B. R. 189; s. c. 7 Ben. 488.

A corporation must answer a bill under its common seal, and not on oath; but the answer must be stated therein to be according to the know!. edge, information and belief of its officers, ascertained from all proper sources of information. Ibid.

The officers and agents of a corporation can not be compelled to answer the interrogatories in a bill unless they are parties to the cause. Ibid.

If a party in his answer lays no claim to the property in controversy, he in effect makes none in the cause, and can not complain of a decree for not awarding to him what he did not claim. Buckingham v. McLean, 13 How. 151; s. c. 3 McLean, 185.

An answer by a creditor in respect to a debtor's state of mind, though responsive to the bill, is entitled to but little weight, unless the reasons for the belief are given.

Ibid.

An answer which is responsive to the bill, must prevail, unless it is overcome by the testimony of two witnesses to the substantial facts, or at least by one witness and other attending circumstances. Lonergan v. Fenlon, 7 Pitts. L. J. 266.

The answer of one defendant is not evidence against his codefendant. Phoenix v. Ingraham, 5 Johns. 412.

A demurrer for the misjoinder of parties defendants can only be taken by those who are improperly joined. Spaulding v. McGovern, 10 B. R. 188. A plea to the jurisdiction averring that the cause of action occurred out of the district, and that the defendant resided out of the district, is bad where the cause of action is not local, unless it avers that the defendant was not found and served in the district. Babbitt v. Burgess, 7 B. R. 561; s. c. 2 Dillon, 169.

An objection that the complainant has a complete remedy at law can not be taken at the hearing. It can only be taken by demurrer, or by way of answer. Post v. Corbin, 5 B. R. 11.

If an assignee files a bill for a satisfaction of a mortgage given to two parties, and a reconveyance from one of them, who took an absolute deed of a portion of the property as security for a debt, when both debts are paid, the party who took the absolute deed can not demur on the ground of multifariousness. Hill v. Bonaffon, 2 W. N. 356.

Practice. If the answer sets up a title to certain property which the assignee seeks to reach by his bill, and no evidence is introduced by either party, his claim can not be allowed. Buckingham v. McLean, 13 How. 151; s. c. 3 McLean, 185.

Where there is a coassignee who is not made a party complainant, and the complainant absconds, the bill will not be dismissed until proper proceedings are taken on notice to the coassignee to bring him in and compel him to elect whether he will or not be made a party complainant. Fenton v. Collerd, 11 B. R. 535.

If the loan on which a corporation reserved a greater rate of interest than was allowed by its charter, has been repaid, the assignee of the borrower in a court of equity can only recover the excess. Tiffany v. Boatman's Sav. Inst., 4 B. R. 601; s. c. 9 B. R. 245; s. c. 1 Dillon, 14; s. c. 18 Wall. 376.

A contract whereby a corporation reserves a greater interest than is permitted by its charter, is void, and can not be enforced in a court of justice. Tiffany v. Boatman's Sav. Inst., 4 B. R. 601; s. c. 9 B. R. 245; s. c. 1 Dillon, 14; s. c. 18 Wall. 376.

If the execution creditor consents, the sheriff may be allowed to sell the property and deposit the proceeds, less the amount of his fees, in the district court, to abide the result of the litigation to determine the validity of his lien. In re William H. Shuey, 9 B. R. 526; s. c. 6 C. L. N. 248.

When the creditors have requested the assignee to contest the validity of a levy under an execution, an injunction granted upon the petition of a creditor will be continued until the assignee can file a bill in equity. Ibid.

If the court decides that the assignee has no title to the property, it will dismiss the bill, and not retain it to decide controversies between other parties to the cause. Smith v. Little, 9 B. R. 111; s. c. 5 Biss. 269. If the assignee, acting under an order of the district court in a case where it had no jurisdiction, takes possession of goods and sells them, the claimant, under a bill in equity, is entitled to recover the full value of the goods, clear of all expenses, whether the assignee realized that full value or not. Marshall v. Knox, 8 B. R. 97; s. c. 16 Wall. 551.

A receiver may be appointed where the apparent titles to property are such on their face that the marshal can not act efficiently under the usual warrant. He will be limited to collecting rents and the interest on securities. Keenan v. Shannon, 9 B. R. 441; s. c. 31 Leg. Int. 85.

No notice of a motion for the appointment of a receiver is necessary where the parties to be affected by the appointment are in court represented by counsel who appear to resist the motion. McLean v. Lafayette Bank, 3 McLean, 503.

A receiver may be appointed when such appointment is proper and necessary. Sedgwick v. Place, 3 B. R. 139; s. c. 3 Ben. 360; McLean v. Lafayette Bank, 3 McLean, 503.

A receiver may be appointed to take charge of property in the hands of a receiver appointed by a State court, in a proceeding against an insolvent corporation. Platt v. Archer, 6 B. R. 465; s. c. 9 Blatch, 559.