I have said what I have as to the binding force of this statute without the remotest regard to this miserable menace, but with sole reference to the interests of my client and the maintenance of my own self-respect.

With these remarks, Gentlemen, I leave that man in your hands, standing here and appealing to you to deal out to him, at least, in this one instance, equal justice, as you would to a man whose complexion was of another hue. It is, as I have already said, almost the only case where, under the rulings of our Courts, and under the laws of the land, he is entitled to demand equal justice with a white man at the hands of his fellow men; but your oath obligates you to deal impartially by him, and your inclinations, I have no doubt, sanction that oath; and I leave him in your hands, therefore, with the utmost confidence, that upon neither of the issues made, and especially upon all of them, will you ever be able, under your oaths, to find a verdict of Guilty against him.

in slaves may be an unpleasant one to contemplate, and we may regret that such an institution exists, but it is not our sin, and the people of Ohio are not guilty of its commission, and so long as it is recognized as an institution of one portion of the country by the laws of the country, so long must we respect the right of those who hold property in slaves. The right of the residents of Kentucky can no more be broken down by such men as Charles Langston than can the institution in the Island of Cuba, and why, then, should they take up arms and follow the man who seeks upon our soil to exercise his own proprietary right to secure his own property?

The reasons of the adoption of the original resolution for the rendition of fugitive slaves, were shown and dilated upon by the Counsel, and the history of the "peculiar institution" briefly passed over.

In 1802 the people of Ohio deliberated upon taking upon themselves the Constitution with all its provisions and clauses, including this one which distinctly provides that fugitive slaves shall be rendered up to their owners, and having deliberated upon it, applied for admission into the Union and were admitted, thereby

CLEVELAND, May 10, 1859. Court convened at 9 o'clock. Judge BLISS commenced the closing argument for the Gov-binding themselves to support and abide by all

ernment.

Whether the offence charged upon the defendant, Charles Langston, was one against the moral ideas or simply against the civil statute, it was immaterial in the consideration of this case, and if he was guilty of this offence, he as truly merited punishment as if it was wrong in itself, for this laxity in respect to the laws of the land will lead to perilling if not subverting the privileges and rights which the laws grant to every citizen. In cases like this, where the crime is not prompted by feelings of momentary revenge, an offence is as truly committed as if such was the case.

the provisions of that Constitution. How, then, can they stand up to-day and repudiate and impugn this same Constitution?

Passing then to the evidence, the Counsel considered the testimony brought to bear against Langston for rescuing the slave John. The prosecution had no possible malice against the defendant, and assuredly did not desire to have him wrongfully convicted, but if it was conclusively proved that he was guilty of the crime for which he was indicted, then the agents of the Government asked for a punishment as a warning to those who wilfully violate the laws

of the land.

It was known by the defendant and his asso- Judge BLISS then discussed the nature of ciates that this negro was satisfied with his rela- the crowd which assembled at Wellington, tions with his master, for it was so said by the boy setting forth that Jennings, Mitchell, and himself. It was not, then, a feeling of sympathy Lowe, had gone to Oberlin for this slavefor John, that prompted Langston and his asso- had obtained possession of him by some little ciates to rescue him from the hands of the party finesse—had taken him to Wellington that which was taking him back to the South. No, the Oberlin people pursued them, determined his purpose, fixed and determined, was to vio- to have him whether he had been taken with late and set at defiance one of the laws of the or without authority, and whether he was or land a law which they were determined was not a slave. He then went on to show by should never be executed, and their end and the testimony that it was generally known in aim was to show that that law could be success-that crowd at Wellington that the boy was a fully opposed by force. This spirit which would slave, but that they "did not care for the law," tear down and annihilate the Government of that they "made their own laws." these United States, and which would prostrate the civil fabric of this country, was the spirit which actuated the defendant and his associates on that day. The students who attend that Oberlin College are taught sedition and treason in connection with science and literature, and they graduate from that institution to go forth and preach opposition and treason. The right of a portion of our inhabitants to hold property

If Langston was in that crowd that was determined "to have him any how," without doing some act or making some protestation against the evident design of the rest, then he was guilty; and it has been shown that he was circulating in that crowd and actively engaged. He expressed himself at one time satisfied with the papers which Lowe and Jennings held. With the scheme of the warrant which Meacham

held, and which John Watson had caused to be made out for the arrest of the keepers of the slave, Langston was so connected by his advice to Meacham to serve it, as to make him one of the rescuing party, for the statute prohibits taking away a slave from the officers of the law.

Recess taken until two o'clock.

AFTERNOON SESSION.

Court convened at one o'clock. Judge BLISS continued his argument for the Government, reviewing the course of Langston at Wellington, where he pretended friendship to Lowe, but at the same time urged the execution of the writ for his arrest. He claimed that from the very commencement the defendant had had one steady aim to set the slave at liberty, and that he encouraged and sympathized with the rescuing crowd. He told Lowe that he could do nothing with the crowd, that they were determined to have the boy, and afterwards made the proposition to let the boy go peaceably. Lowe refused, when Langston said, " we will have him any way," and from this moment he showed his true purpose and design.

CHARGE TO THE JURY BY THE COURT.

The United States,

V.

Charles Langston,
WILLSON, Judge.

The defendant, Charles Langston, is indicted for rescuing a fugitive slave, alleged to be the property of John G. Bacon, of Kentucky. His plea is not guilty, and it is upon the issue made by this plea that you are sworn to return a verdiet according to the evidence.

There is, perhaps, no severer test to a juror's integrity, or a greater demand upon his impartial judgment, than when called upon to act in a case where political partialities or prejudices are invoked to sway his conduct. The very nature of our Federal system is such, that all men become more or less interested in the legislative policy of the Government. This has resulted in political organizations, in which, at different periods, the great masses of the people have been arrayed in parties, antagonistic to each other, and often characterized by strong prejudices and bitter animosities. Hence, congressional legislation often becomes distasteful to a portion of the people of the country. It is so at the South with reference to laws enacted to suppress the slave-trade, and peculiarly so at the North, with reference to the fugitive slave law of 1850. Yet ours is a representative Government, where the people themselves control its legislation. It is indispensable to good order and to the well-being of society, that acts of Congress, placed upon the statute book, should command obedience, and that partisan feeling should cease and prejudice be forgotten, in the observance of the law. Courts and juries especially are bound to impartially administer and enforce the laws, and this sacred obligation is imposed with the most solemn sanctions.

Here reviewed the evidence of witnesses, showing that Langston had said in answer to a remark that there was a large crowd, "Yes, they have turned out well." Yes, they had turned out well, for that old buzzard's nest of Oberlin, where the negroes who arrive over the underground railroad are regarded as dear children that nest had been broken into, and one of the brood had escaped. And these Oberlin men, who had been taught to set at defiance the laws of the United States, rushed off to rescue the boy who had been taken. That was an army that old General Satan himself might have selected from the chief spirits of Hell to fight against the power of Earth and Heaven. Langston said, after returning to It is the first duty of a juror, who is sworn Oberlin, "We got the boy and brought him to determine the guilt or innocence of one home." Now, Gentlemen, has it not been charged with crime, to divest himself of any clearly and unquestionably shown that the and all prejudices he may have against the law defendant was actively engaged in the rescue? itself, or of any partiality or ill-will he may Leaving the question of the evidence, the counsel then spoke upon the legal questions which give the right of process to owners or agents to pursue and recover their fugitive slaves, holding that the rescue was made from Jennings assisted by Lowe. But even if from Lowe, then the second count of the indictment charges that the rescue was made from Lowe.

The counsel closed with remarks upon the interest which Charles Langston had in the purpose of the rescue, being determined that at all events and all hazards, John should be rescued and should never be taken South, and leaving the case for the Jury to decide upon.

The Court then gave the case to the Jury in the following charge:-

have towards the accused. It is enough to know that the law alleged to be broken is the law of the land, and that the accused is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is proved. A jury that yields to any other influences than those legitimately produced by the law and the testimony, is recreant to its trust, and unworthy of occupying the seats of twelve honest men.

:

This caution is given, Gentlemen, not because it is feared that you will intentionally swerve from a true and just line of duty, but simply that you may guard and brace yourselves against any undue influences, while considering and weighing the evidence in the case.

What, then, is the case you are sworn to try, and what are the material facts necessary for

the Government to establish in order to work a | of John G. Bacon, under the laws of the State conviction of the defendant? of Kentucky.

attorney, if executed by Bacon, as valid in law, and effectual to accomplish the purpose for which it was given.

This brings you, Gentlemen of the Jury, to the consideration of an important question of fact, namely, did Jennings hold the fugitive, at the time of the rescue, by virtue of the power of attorney?

When the agent acts under this law by power of attorney, the statute provides that he may pursue and reclaim the fugitive, either by procuring a warrant from some one of the courts, judges, or commissioners (named in the act), for the apprehension of such fugitive from service or labor, or by seizing and arresting such fugitive, when the same can be done without process, and by taking or causing such person to be taken forthwith before such court, judge," etc.

The fugitive may be seized and held upon the warrant, or by virtue of the power of attorney. Both modes of capture and detention have but the single purpose of bringing the fugitive before the judge or commissioner. The person making the arrest, has the same power and authority in the one case as in the other. And yet the agent may, at the same time, resort to both modes of capture and detention. The agent may himself take the fugitive before the judge or commissioner, or he may cause him to be taken before such officer by virtue of the warrant. The authority of the agent holding the power of attorney is paramount to that of the officer holding the warrant. The warrant, if obtained, is procured at the instance of the agent, and when used is merely auxiliary to the authority conferred upon the agent by virtue of the power of attorney. The Marshal, in executing the warrant, may act under the direction of the agent, and in the matter of holding the fugitive when so arrested, the agent has complete control over the whole subject, and may unquestionably set the fugitive at liberty before the return of the writ.

It is not the case of the execution of process, emanating from different and conflicting jurisdictions. In such a case, the officer first making the seizure has, by virtue of his process, exclusive control and possession of the thing seized. Under this statute, it is clear that the warrant is auxiliary to the power of attorney. If, then, the proof shows that at the time of the rescue at Wellington, Jennings and Lowe had a joint control over the fugitive, the former in virtue of a good and sufficient power of attorney for his reclamation, and the latter assisting him as the agent of the owner of the slave, by means of a warrant or otherwise, such proof sustains the allegation in the indictment, that said negro was in the custody and under the control of Anderson Jennings, as agent and attorney of John G. Bacon, together with one Jacob K. Lowe, then and there lawfully assisting him in the custody and control of the said negro slave called John.

I have been thus explicit upon this point, because it is one that has been the subject of much discussion by counsel, and because it was proper that the instructions given to you upon it should be the result of careful consideration.

Should you find from the testimony, that Jennings held the fugitive by virtue of the power of attorney, and that the negro was the identical slave that escaped from Bacon, there still remains the all-important inquiry in the case, did the defendant unlawfully, knowingly, and willingly rescue the fugitive from his lawful captors?

The rescue could not be obnoxious to the provisions of the statute, unless it implicated the defendant as acting knowingly and willingly in the matter. That is to say, it must appear in proof that he knew the negro was a fugitive from labor, and was lawfully held by those who had possession and control over him at the time of the rescue, or that the defendant acted under such circumstances as to show that he might have had such knowledge by exercising ordinary prudence.

It is claimed by the prosecutor that this knowledge, on the part of the defendant, is established by the positive testimony of Jennings, Lowe, and others, and that, upon this point, the proof permits of no doubtful inference or conjecture.

It is asserted (and whether truly or not is for you to determine from the evidence) that Lowe, as Deputy-Marshal, acting under the direction of Jennings and in virtue of a Commissioner's warrant, seized and arrested the fugitive near the village of Oberlin; that he conveyed the slave to Wellington and there surrendered the principal control over him to the authorized agent of the owner, and thereafter acted in subordination to, and as an assistant of, that agent; that the defendant was fully informed by Lowe, at two several interviews, of the relation which the negro bore to Bacon, and of the authority by which he was captured and held.

But the defendant contends that, notwithstanding the proof may show his knowledge of the servitude due from the negro to Bacon, his master, and of the authority by which he was held, that yet, it fails to establish the defendant's guilt as a participator in the rescue charged in the indictment. And it is further insisted, in view of all the evidence in the case, that, on acquiring the knowledge that the negro was a slave and lawfully held, the defendant not only abstained from the commission of any unlawful act himself, but was, in fact, really active and sincere in persuading others to a peaceful course of conduct, and to a faithful observance of the law.

In regard to the legal implication of the defendant's guilt and his complicity in the rescue of the fugitive charged in the indictment, the instructions of the Court, given on a former occasion, may properly be repeated here, as

they enunciate the principle of law which is deemed to be applicable to this branch of the

case.

If the persons who constituted the assemblage at Wellington on the 13th of September, 1858, had come together for the purpose, or when there were engaged in rescuing a fugitive slave from those authorized to capture and hold him, under the laws of 1850, they were engaged in an unlawful act, and whatever was said and done by one in the prosecution of the enterprise, were, to all intents and purposes, the declarations and acts of all. But to charge one, against whom there is no specific proof, of things done by him, with what was done and said by others in the prosecution of the unlawful enterprise, concert of action, between him and those others, for the unlawful purpose, must be shown. And for this purpose it was competent for the prosecutor to give in evidence the defendant's declarations to others, encouraging the rescue before it was accomplished, and of his statements in the meeting at Oberlin, immediately upon his return after the rescue. What was said by others that were engaged in the unlawful act, after the assemblage at Wellington had broken up and dispersed, is not evidence against the defendant. Accordingly what Shephard and others said at the meeting at Oberlin on the evening of the 13th of September, is excluded from your consideration, on the ground that it is incompetent testimony.

The inquiry, then, becomes important, Was there concert of action between the defendant and those actually engaged in the rescue of the fugitive? If there was, the defendant is guilty, and as much so as if he had rendered manual service in the act.

ture, is claimed as conclusive of the defendant's complicity in the rescue.

In a free State like Ohio, every human being in it, whether white or black, is presumed to be free until a different status is shown. And hence when one is restrained of his freedom by another, a resort to the ordinary forms of proceeding under the State laws, to inquire into the cause of such restraint or imprisonment implies no wrong. But when a fugitive from labor is captured and held in any of the modes and under the authority designated by the Act of Congress of 1850, any interference by the State authorities has no justification, nor can those be justified who invoke their interference, when they know the fugitive is thus held.

If Jennings seized and held the fugitive by virtue of a good and sufficient power of attor ney executed for that purpose and was lawfully assisted by Lowe, the Justice of the Peace at Wellington, who issued a State warrant against them for kidnapping such fugitive, was acting in a matter over which he had no jurisdiction. And if the defendant was informed and had knowledge of this condition of things, and afterwards urged the execution of the warrant for the purpose of liberating the fugitive, his conduct in this particular implicated him as much in the common design of the mob, as if he had given his aid to the rescue by physical force.

What the defendant said and what he did, in relation to the rescue, has been detailed in the testimony of various witnesses, and this testimony has been so minutely brought to your attention by the counsel on both sides, as to require no further recapitulation.

I have throughout regarded it as an acknowledged fact (and so conceded by the defendant's counsel) that an unlawful rescue of the negro was made. For, in legal contemplation, it matters not whether he was released from capture by the manual force of the mob, or whether that release was effected by threats and demonstrations of violence. It would be an unlawful rescue as much in the one case as in the other.

The rule of law is, that every one who enters into a common purpose or design, is deemed a party to every act which had before been done by the others, without regard to the time in which he entered into the combination, and, also, a party to every act which may afterwards be done by any of the others, in furtherance of such common design. This concert of action, on the part of the defendant with the rescuers, With these rules of law for your government, if it existed at all, is to be determined by his Gentlemen, the case is now committed to your declarations and conduct. If he advised and hands. Treat it as you would any other case urged others into the commission of the unlaw-involving the question of the guilt or innocence ful act, he made their conduct his own in effect- of a man charged with a criminal violation of ing the rescue. He thereby acted in concert the law. All matters of fact in this controversy with them in the common design, to wit, the are exclusively for your consideration. And if rescue of the slave. from a careful and impartial review of the It is contended by the counsel for the Gov-proofs, you come to the conclusion, beyond a ernment, that the defendant, by his words and reasonable doubt, that the defendant is guilty conduct, evinced a determined (though cau- of the offence charged, you will say so by your tious) purpose of effecting the escape of the verdict. But if the proof fails to produce that fugitive in violation of law. That his preten- conviction upon your minds, you will return a sions for suggesting a resort to the forms of law, verdict of acquittal. was but another more subtle and effectual mode of accomplishing the rescue; and his urging the constable to serve the State warrant against | of Jennings and his assistants for kidnapping the negro, after being informed of his lawful cap

The Jury after being out about half an hour returned to their seats and rendered a verdict

"GUILTY!"