to commit you to co-operate with Russian despotism to keep silence and respect the decision of the overwhelming majority of the people, who will have neither part nor lot in such infamy. The success of Russia at the present day would be a curse to the world. There is no time to lose. Already, by secret agreements and understandings, of which the democracies of the civilized world know only by rumor, steps are being taken which may fling us all into the fray. Workers, stand together therefore for peace. Combine and conquer the militarist enemy and the self-seeking imperialists to-day, once and for all.

THE INDEPENDENT LABOR PARTY MANIFESTO

The resolution of the Independent Labor Party (issued about the same time) took up a still more radical position against the war:

Instead of striving to unite Europe in a federation of states, banded together for peace, diplomacy has deliberately aimed at dividing Europe into two armed, antagonistic camps, the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance.

For the present Sir Edward Grey issues his White Paper to prove Germany the aggressor, just as Germany issues a White Paper to prove Russia the aggressor, and Russia to prove Austria the aggressor. Even if every word in the British White Paper be admitted, the wider indictment remains. Let it be acknowledged that in the days immediately preceding the war, Sir Edward Grey worked for peace. It was too late. Over a number of years, together with other diplomats, he had himself dug the abyss, and wise statesmanship would have foreseen, and avoided, the certain result.

It was not the Servian question or the Belgian question that pulled this country into the deadly struggle. Geat Britain is not at war because of oppressed nationalities or Belgian neutrality. Even had Belgian neutrality not been wrongfully infringed by Germany we should still have been drawn in. If France in defiance of treaty rights had invaded Belgium to get at Germany, who believes we should have begun hostilities against France? Behind the back of parliament and people, the British Foreign Office gave secret un

derstandings to France, denying their existence when challenged. That is why this country is now face to face with the red ruin and impoverishment of war. Treaties and agreements have dragged republican France at the heels of despotic Russia, Britain at the heels of France. At the proper time all this will be made plain, and the men responsible called to account.

We desire neither the aggrandizement of German militarism nor Russian militarism, but the danger is that this war will promote one or the other. Britain has placed herself behind Russia, the most reactionary, corrupt, and oppressive power in Europe. If Russia is permitted to gratify her territorial ambitions and extend her Cossack rule, civilization and democracy will be gravely imperiled. Is it for this that Britain has drawn the sword?

The recruiting campaign on the part of the government forced all the parties-the Independent Labor Party, the British Socialist Party-to restate their position during the month of September. The declaration of the I. L. P. showed that it had not altered in any essential way its opposition to the war, as may be seen from the following paragraph of its manifesto against the recruiting campaign:

To the Branches of the I. L. P.: At a specially summoned meeting your National Council considered the matter, and, for the following reasons, recommends branches to take no part in the proposed [recruiting] campaign. If advice has to be given to the workers, we hold it should come from our own platforms, preserving the character and traditions of our movement, and we refuse to take our stand by militarists and enemies of labor with whose outlook and aim we are in sharpest conflict, and who will assuredly seize this opportunity to justify the policy leading up to war. Now that the country has been drawn into a deadly and desperate war, which may involve, in the end, our existence as a nation, it is not a matter for speech-making, least of all from those who will not themselves be called upon to face the horrors of the trenches.

A REPLY TO SIR EDWARD GREY

By J. R. MACDONALD, in the Labor Leader, August 13th At the session of Parliament on August 4th, when Sir Edward Grey made his celebrated statement of the British case, laying special emphasis on Belgium, J. R. MacDonald made for the Labor Party a brief speech deploring war under any circumstances. This statement was elaborated ten days later and we reproduce it at length. This "Reply to Sir Edward Grey" by the man who was then Chairman of the Labor Party, (published in the Labor Leader of August 13th) is perhaps the most important Socialist document emanating from Great Britain since the outbreak of the war. We, therefore, give it at some length. There can be no doubt that his view, fixing the entire responsibility for the war on a relatively small group of the governing class, is the view both of the Independent Labor Party, of which he is a leading member, and of a considerable number of Socialists and Laborites outside of that body.

The most remarkable feature of this extremely important statement is that MacDonald excuses Germany's declaration of war against Russia and France, puts upon England the chief responsibility for the war between England and Germany, and that he takes a view of the invasion of Belgium which, if it does not actually take the German view, comes very near to it. We quote the leading paragraphs:

The White Paper begins with a conversation between Sir Edward Grey and the German Ambassador on the 20th of July regarding the Austrian threat to punish Servia, and finishes with the delivery of our ultimatum to Germany on the 4th of August. From it certain conclusions appear to be justified, the following in particular:

1. Sir Edward Grey strove to the last to prevent a European war.

2. Germany did next to nothing for peace, but it is not clear whether she actually encouraged Austria to pursue her Servian policy. The mobilization of Russia drove Germany

to war.

3. Russia and France strove both by open pressure and by wiles to get us to commit ourselves to support them in the event of war.

4. Though Sir Edward Grey would not give them a pledge,. he made the German Ambassador understand that we might not keep out of the conflict.

5. During the negotiations, Germany tried to meet our wishes on certain points so as to secure our neutrality. Sometimes her proposals were brusque, but no attempt was made by us to negotiate diplomatically to improve them. They were all summarily rejected by Sir Edward Grey. Finally, so anxious was Germany to confine the limits of the war, the German Ambassador asked Sir Edward Grey to propose his own conditions of neutrality, and Sir Edward Grey declined to discuss the matter. This fact was suppressed by Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Asquith in their speeches in parliament.

6. When Sir Edward Grey failed to secure peace between Germany and Russia, he worked deliberately to involve us in the war, using Belgium as his chief excuse.

That is the gist of the White Paper.

That Sir Edward Grey should have striven for European peace, and then when he failed, that he should have striven with equal determination to embroil Great Britain, seems contradictory. But it is not; and the explanation of why it is not is the justification of those of us who for the last eight years have regarded Sir Edward Grey as a menace to the peace of Europe and his policy as a misfortune to our country. What is the explanation? (Our italics.)

The justifications offered are nothing but the excuses which ministers can always produce for mistakes. Let me take the case of Belgium. It has been known for years that, in the event of a war between Russia and France on the one hand and Germany on the other, the only possible military tactics for Germany to pursue were to attack France hot foot through Belgium, and then return to meet the Russians. The plans were in our War Office. They were discussed quite openly during the Agadir trouble, and were the subject of

some magazine articles, particularly one by Mr. Belloc. Mr. Gladstone made it clear in 1870 that in a general conflict formal neutrality might be violated. He said in the House of Commons in August, 1870:

"I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine of those who have held in this house what plainly amounts to an assertion that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee is binding on every party to it, irrespective altogether of the particular position in which it may find itself at the time when the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises."

Germany's guarantees to Belgium would have been accepted by Mr. Gladstone. If France had decided to attack Germany through Belgium Sir Edward Grey would not have objected, but would have justified himself by Mr. Gladstone's opinions.

We knew Germany's military plans. We obtained them through the usual channels of spies and secret service. We knew that the road through Belgium was an essential part of them. That was our opportunity to find a "distinterested" motive apart from the obligation of the entente. It is well known that a nation will not fight except for a cause in which idealism is mingled. The Daily Mail supplied the idealism for the South African War by telling lies about the flogging of British women and children; our government supplied the idealism for this war by telling us that the independence of Belgium had to be vindicated by us. Before it addressed its inquiries to France and Germany upon this point, knowing the military exigencies of both countries, it knew that France could reply suitably whilst Germany could not do so. It was a pretty little game in hypocrisy which the magnificent valor of the Belgians will enable the government to hide up for the time being. (Our italics.)

The country had been so helplessly committed to fight for France and Russia that Sir Edward Grey had to refuse pointblank every overture made by Germany to keep us out of the conflict. That is why, when reporting the negotiations to the House of Commons, he found it impossible to tell the whole truth and to put impartially what he chose to tell us. He scoffed at the German guarantee to Belgium on the ground that it only secured the "integrity" of the country but not its independence; when the actual documents appeared it was found that its independence was secured as