ous parties on the matter of recruiting, not because we wish to take up this subject in itself, but only because these manifestoes throw light on the position of these parties toward the war. Finally, we give a report of the speech of James Larkin in America as organizer and chief founder of the Irish Labor Party; his publicly expressed desire for the victory of German arms was an important event, the most extreme point reached by the anti-war Socialists of Great Britain.

THE INDEPENDENT LABOR PARTY

The Independent Labor Party view is expressed in the Labor Leader. We quote from two editorials, the first written at the beginning of August, the second at the end of October. The first concerns itself not only with the Russian peril, but also with the menace of British navalism.

The Labor Leader says that the motive of the British Government was merely to crush Britain's commercial rival:

German militarism is, of course, arrogant, and no one hates it more than we do. But to suggest that all the war lords, naval or military, are resident in Prussia, and none in England, is either prejudice or cant. We are fighting Germany not because we think the mailed fist of her military caste is a danger to Europe or to small peoples or to German democracy. We are fighting Germany because we are jealous and afraid of her increasing power; for that reason, and that reason only. If we were in this war to uphold European civilization, the liberties of minor nationalities, and the freedom of the German masses, should we be allies of Russia? The defeat of Germany means the victory of Russia, and a Europe under the heel of Russia would be worse tenfold than a Europe under the heel of Germany.

It is all very well to speak of Germany's military arrogance, but what of Britain's naval arrogance? At The Hague Conference in 1907 the German representatives sup

ported a proposal by which merchant vessels would, had it been accepted, have been made immune from attack in time of war. Because Great Britain had a supreme navy, the British delegates at the conference opposed this proposal; they knew that the British fleet, armed to the teeth and patrolling the trade routes of the world, could make short shrift of the unprotected ships of other nations peacefully carrying food, and the material and products of trade, from one land to another. The defeat of the proposal to remove merchant vessels from the stage of war made it inevitable that Germany should build a strong navy to protect her trading vessels.

The second article, of October 29th, deals chiefly with the violation of Belgian neutrality, and demands the fullest possible indemnity-a conclusion with which, as we have shown, German Socialists do not agree. The Labor Leader does not believe, however, that the war will lessen militarism or that the British Government can be relied upon to protect the rights of small nations:

The action of Germany in violating the neutrality of Belgium we passionately condemn, and our hearts bleed for the Belgian people in the terrible disaster which has befallen them. When the war is over we shall urge that Germany must make the fullest possible reparation for the crime she has committed, and the independence of Belgium must be wholly recovered. But, again, we cannot pretend that our own country is entirely free from blame. More than this, the British record in respect to small nations is not so clean that we can afford to adorn ourselves in any robe of righteousness. We have retained our power over Egypt, although we pledged ourselves in 1882 to evacuate that land when the native rising of that time, which threatened the security of the loans of British financiers, had been suppressed. We have encouraged the people of Persia to submit to the tyranny of Russia, although in the agreement of 1907 we pledged ourselves to maintain the independence and integrity of their nation. We have supported France in her violation of the independence of Morocco. With the memory of these crimes so fresh in our minds, can we accept unreservedly the protestations of our own government?

war.

With these facts before us we cannot possibly justify this We are not pro-German. We are not anti-British. We are pro-peace. We are anti-war. Militarism, whether it be German or British, we hate; the intrigues of diplomats, whether they be German or British, we hate; the machinations of armament firms, whether they be German or British, we hate. We wish to see German militarism overthrown, but only the German people can accomplish that—and they were well on the way to doing it when this war broke out. Virtue cannot be forced on an individual, nor can it be forced on a nation. If the Allies are to defeat German militarism, they can only do so by a more powerful militarism, and the grave danger is that this war, so far from ending the menace of militarism, will extend the rigor and tyranny of Germany's militarism to all the nations of Europe. That is the disaster with which we are faced. It will only be averted by the democracies of Europe shattering forever the power of the militarists, the diplomats, and the armament makers. (Our italics.)

The quarterly publication of the I. L. P., the Socialist Review, feels that the Socialist Parties that have supported the war have abandoned both Socialism and Internationalism. It declares:

The Socialist movement could not prevent the governments from declaring war. No reproach can fairly rest with it on that score. But how has the movement itself stood the shock of the war? Has our great International proved true to its principles, proved worthy of our hopes in it, now that the first real testing hour in its history has come?

Alas! No. The International has given way lamentably under the strain. Its ties have snapped, the chief national sections have ranged themselves with their governments in the fratricidal strife. For the present, the International is become a spirit, a hope, a faith, a cause, deserted of all but a remnant of the millions of all nations whose love and enthusiasm but a month or two ago made Socialism seem the most powerful and glorious embodiment of human brotherhood the world had ever known. Like Christianity, free thought, science, art, literature, education-like all the great expected means of human deliverance, international Socialism has, at

this stage of its growth, at any rate, failed to endow men with invulnerability to the appeal of war.

The Socialist movement could not prevent war; it strove hard to avert it, and is in no degree responsible for its outbreak. The failure of international Socialism does not lie there. It lies simply in the fact that it has not been able to prevent the Socialist leaders and rank and file in the belligerent countries from participating in a war which they believed to be wrong and strove to prevent, and from murdering their fellow Socialists on the battlefield at the behest of their rulers. International Socialism which cannot prevent Socialists murdering each other and inflicting death, wounds, and misery on defenseless women and children, and in wreaking awful havoc upon cities and precious buildings, is not international Socialism at all, is not Socialism at all. The international Socialist movement has failed, therefore, because its internationalism and its Socialism gave way even as Christianity and culture gave way at the first blast of the capitalist trump of war. (Our italics.)

J. RAMSAY MACDONALD

(Chairman of the British Labor Party)

We give considerable space to the opinions of Mr. MacDonald and make a number of citations for several reasons. He was chairman of the largest labor organization in Great Britain, the Labor Party, when the war broke out, and he spoke for that organization at the session of Parliament at which war was declared. He is also one of the leaders of British Socialism. And in the next place, he has written and spoken more copiously on the war than any of the other British leaders, and his pronouncements are distinguished by the characteristic that they deal with facts and take up many different phases of the situation. Finally, his position has led to a very considerable controversy. By September, as his letters and speeches to his Leicester constituents (which we shall quote) show, he favored ac

tive support of the war; his opponents among the Socialists claim that this meant a fundamental change of opinion, which he denied. We have naturally been forced to give his expressions, therefore, at some length, and without comment.

We first quote MacDonald's pessimistic views as to the probable results of the war from the Labor Leader in August:

I want to go right down to the foundation of things. German military autocracy was bad for Europe so is British secret diplomacy. But to try and break either by a war is stupid and criminal. Is it really true that in Anno Domini 1914 the only way to dethrone the German military caste is for Britain, France, and Russia to fight it? It is not. The end cannot be secured in that way, and, if it could, the price is too dear. I would rather that militarism had flourished for another ten years than that we should have sent thousands of men along the path of privation, hate, and pain to death, that we should have clouded thousands of happy firesides, that we should have undone our social reform work for a generation, that we should have let loose in Europe all the lusts of battle and all the brutalities of war.

We

And that is not the full price. For a generation or so Europe will be paying for this war in an arrested civilization and a weakened population, an increased poverty. We are but replacing one European menace by a greater one. hope to remove the fiend with blood-splashed foot from Berlin and take in exchange the dreaded rider on the white horse as the monarch of Europe.

Well, when Germany is down who will be up? We can gain little. A colony or two to add to our useless burdens perhaps. France will also have a colony or two, maybe, and Alsace-Lorraine. It may or may not claim money payments. This will rankle in the German heart just as the loss of Alsace-Lorraine rankled in the French heart. But with strong democratic movements these things might be adjusted in a scheme of lasting peace. With Russia the case is different. It, too, will want something, but above all its autocracy will be rehabilitated, its military system will be strengthened, it