restrains a state from engaging in war, except when actually invaded,—and that which requires congress to protect the states against domestic violence, all concur to render it impossible, that a state can have power to intermeddle with them. Will not congress find refuge for its own conduct in these clauses? With respect to the concurrent jurisdiction, it is a political monster of absurdity. We have passed that clause which gives congress an unlimited authority over the national wealth; and here is an unbounded control over the national strength. Yet notwithstanding this clear and unequivocal relinquishment of the power of controlling the militia, you say the states retain it for the very purposes given to congress. Is it fair to say, that you gave the power of arming the militia, and at the same time say you reserve it? Sir, I say this great national government ought not to be left in this condition. If it be, it will terminate in the destruction of our liberties.

Sir-as to the power of making treaties vested by this government, I beg gentlemen to consider the condition this country will be in, if two-thirds of a quorum shall be empowered to make a treaty:-they may relinquish and alienate territorial rights, and sacrifice our most valuable commercial advantages. In short, if any thing be left us, it will be because the president and senators are pleased to allow it. The power of making treaties by this constitution, ill-guarded as it is, extends farther than it has ever done in any country in the world. Treaties are to have more force here than in any part of christendom. For I defy any gentleman to show any thing so extensive in any strong energetic government in Europe. Treaties rest on the laws and usages of nations. To say that they are municipal, is to me a doctrine totally novel. To make them paramount to the constitutions, and laws of the states, is unprecedented. I would give them the

same force and obligation here that they have in Great Britain, or any other country in Europe. Gentlemen are going on in a fatal career:-but I beseech them to stop and not to concede this dangerous power unguarded and unaltered.

PATRICK HENRY'S SPEECH,

ON THE

QUESTION OF RATIFICATION.

A RESOLUTION to proceed at once to a ratification of the constitution, being made by Mr. Wythe and read by the clerk, Mr. Henry rose and spoke for the last time, on this ever important, and interesting subject, in the following terms.

MR. CHAIRMAN,

I AM justified in entering my protest against this proposal of ratification as premature and improper. The importance of the subject, sir, requires the most mature deliberation, and the honourable member must forgive me for declaring my dissent from it, because, if I understand it rightly, it admits that the new system is defective, defective most capitally. For immediately after the proposed ratification, there comes a declaration, that the paper before you is not intended to violate any of these three great rights-the liberty of religion, the liberty of the press, and the trial by jury.-Then what is the inference, when you enumerate the rights which you are to enjoy, but that those not numerated are relinquished?

There are only three things to be retained:-Religious toleration, freedom of the press, and trial by jury. Will not the ratification carry every thing, without excepting these three things? Will not the whole world pronounce, that we intended to give up all the rest? Every thing it speaks of by way of right is comprised in these three things. Your subsequent amendments, only go to these three amendments. Sir, I feel myself perplexed and troubled, because the necessity of securing our personal rights, seems not to have entered into the minds of those men: For many, many other valuable things are omitted. For instance: General warrants, by which an officer may search suspected places, without evidence of the commission of a fact, and seize any person without evidence of his crime; these surely ought to be prohibited. But as they are admitted, any man may be seized; any property may be taken, in the most arbitrary manner, without the least evidence or reason. Every thing the most sacred, may be rifled and searched and ransacked by the strong hand of power. We have infinitely more reason to dread general warrants here, than they have even in England; because there, if a person be confined, liberty may be quickly obtained by the writ of habeas corpus. But here a man living many hundred miles from the judges, may rot in prison before he can obtain a writ for his relief.

Another most fatal omission, is that with respect to standing armies. In your bill of rights of Virginia, they are said to be dangerous to liberty, and that valuable in, strument tells you, that the proper defence of a free state consists in militia; and so I might go on to ten or eleven things of immense consequence secured in your bill of rights, concerning which that proposal on your table is silent. Is that the language of the bill of rights in England? Is it the language of the American bill of rights, that these three privileges, and these only, are valuable?

Is it the language of men going into a new government? Is it not necessary to speak of these things before you enter into this awful compact? How do these three things stand? As one of the parties, we declare we do not mean to give them up. This is very dictatorial. Much more so, than the conduct which proposes alterations as the condition of adoption. In a compact there are two parties,-one accepting, and another proposing. As a party, we propose that we shall secure these three things; and before we have the assent of the other contracting party, we go into the compact, and leave these things at their mercy. What will be the consequence? Suppose the other states should call this dictatorial? They will say, Virginia has gone into the government, and carried with her certain propositions, which she says, ought to be concurred in by the other states. They will declare, that she has no right to dictate to other states, the conditions on which they shall come into the union. According to the honourable member's proposal, the ratification will cease to be obligatory unless they accede to these amendments. We have ratified it. You have committed a violation, they will say. They have not violated it. We say we will go out of it. You are then reduced to a sad dilemma: To give up these three rights, or to leave the government. This is worse than our present confederation, to which we have hitherto adhered honestly and faithfully. We shall be told we have violated it, because we have left it for the infringement and violation of conditions, which they never agreed to be a part of the ratification. The ratification will be complete. The proposal is made by one party. We, as the other, accede to it, and propose the security of these three great rights; for it is only a proposal. In order to secure them, you are left in that state of fatal hostility, which I shall as much deplore as the honourable gentleman. I exhort gentle

men to think seriously, before they ratify this constitution, and to indulge a salutary doubt of their being able to succeed in any effort they may make to get amendments after adoption. With respect to that part of the proposal, which says, that every power not specially granted to congress remains with the people; it must be previous to adoption, or it will involve this country in inevitable destruction. To talk of it, as a thing to be subsequently obtained, and not as one of your unalienable rights, is leaving it to the casual opinion of the congress who shall take up the consideration of that most important right. They will not reason with you about the effect of this constitution. They will not take the opinion of this committee concerning its operation. They will construe it even as they please. If you place it subsequently, let me ask the consequences? Among ten thousand implied powers which they may assume, they may, if we be engaged in war, liberate every one of your slaves if they please. And this must and will be done by men, a majority of whom have not a common interest with you. They will therefore have no feeling for your interests. It has been repeatedly said here, that the great object of a national government, was national defence. That power which is said to be intended for security and safety, may be rendered detestable by gross oppression. If you give power to the general government to provide for the general defence, the means must be commensurate to the end. All the means in the possession of the people must be given to the government which is intrusted with the public defence. In this state there are 236,000 blacks, and there are many in several other states. But there are few or none in the northern states, and yet if the northern states shall be of opinion, that our numbers are numberless, they may call forth every national resource. May congress not say, that every black