from experience and education. Its disadvantages are, dissensions among themselves, oppression to the lower orders.

The advantages of democracy are, liberty, equal, cautious, and salutary laws, public spirit, frugality, peace, opportunities of exciting and producing abilities of the best citizens. Its disadvantages are, dissensions, the delay and disclosure of public counsels, the imbecility of public measures retarded by the necessity of a numerous consent.

A government may be composed of two or more of the simple forms above-mentioned. Such is the British government. It would be an improper government for the United States; because it is inadequate to such an extent of territory; and because it is suited to an establishment of different orders of men. A more minute comparison between some parts of the British constitution, and some parts of the plan before us, may, perhaps, find a proper place in a subsequent period of our business.

What is the nature and kind of that government, which has been proposed for the United States, by the late convention? In its principle, it is purely democratical: but that principle is applied in different forms, in order to obtain the advantages, and exclude the inconveniences of the simple modes of government.

If we take an extended and accurate view of it, we shall find the streams of power running in different directions, in different dimensions, and at different heights, watering, adorning, and fertilizing the fields and meadows, through which their courses are led; but if we trace them, we shall discover, that they all originally flow from one abundant fountain. In this constitution, all authority is derived from THE PEOPLE.

Fit occasions will hereafter offer for particular remarks on the different parts of the plan. I have now to ask pardon of the house for detaining them so long.

474

COLONEL HAMILTON'S SPEECH,

IN THE ASSEMBLY OF NEW YORK, ON THE 18th OF FEBRUARY, 1787, WHEN THE IMPOST WAS UNDER CONSIDERATION.

To have brought nearly to a close a volume of American Eloquence, without offering a single specimen from the Speeches of Hamilton, will naturally have excited in the reader strong emotions, not of surprise merely, but of regret and disapprobation; and until a satisfactory explanation is given, the omission will in all likelihood be regarded with censure, and perhaps with suspicion. To those who entertain such feelings, our answer is, that we do not yield to them or to the most ardent panegyrists of that great man, either in respect for his virtues, or admiration of his talents. Indeed we may go farther and truly say, in personal affection also. Had it been possible to give effect to the wishes of our hearts, the eloquence of Hamilton would have stood foremost in place, and in quantity the largest. But after diligent inquiry among persons most conversant with the subject, we were fain to content ourselves with the uniform assurance of every individual, that none of the speeches of that illustrious personage had ever been faithfully reported. In the ardour and industry of this pursuit, we can safely affirm that no library, public or private, to which we could gain access was left unexplored. What strenuous labour failed to accomplish, however, mere accident at last partially effected. Endeavouring to while away a tedious hour of indisposition and confinement, with an old torn

volume, the following speech of our favourite orator presented itself. Though a very sorry specimen of those won-' derful talents, in an evil hour lost to the country, and perhaps never to be supplied, we yet offer it to the public with the most perfect conviction that it will be received and hoarded like a sacred relic. The enthusiastic veneration which impels grateful and good men to treasure up even a pebble that helped to cover the benefactor of his country, and to deposit in the most sacred part of their cabinets, a blade of grass that grew upon his grave, will endear this sketch, imperfect as it is, of our Hamilton's eloquence, to every man who sincerely feels that it is an American heart which beats within his bosom.

The subject upon which this speech was delivered, must be familiarly known to every man acquainted with the history of the United States. Before the establishment of the Federal Constitution, the power of providing for the public exigencies by laying duties and imposts, resided only in the assemblies of the different states. When therefore it became necessary to defray the expenses of the general government and to pay the debts incurred by the Union, the congress of that day had no further power than that of making requisitions for the amount upon the several state assemblies. Through the misconduct of those assemblies, requisitions actually became a nullity, or, to adopt the words of Washington, were "little better than a jest and a bye-word throughout the land." Among the many efforts made by congress and by the best men of the union, to save the country from the ruin and disgrace it seemed likely to incur from this delinquency on the part of the state legislatures, was a proposal to them to confer upon congress the prerogative of laying an impost.-It was upon this important question, the speech was made by General, then Colonel Hamilton, of which the following is a fragment.

[The beginning of this speech went to obviate an objection raised against granting the impost to congress,

viz. that the measure was inconsistent with the constitution of the state. After a long and eloquent discussion of that point, Col. Hamilton proceeded as follows:]

MR. CHAIRMAN,

FLATTERING myself it will appear to the committee that the constitution at least offers us no impediment, I shall proceed to other topics of objection. The next that presents itself, is a supposed danger to liberty, from granting legislative power to congress.

But before I enter upon this subject, to remove the aspersions thrown upon that body, I shall give a short history of some material facts relating to the origin and progress of the business. To excite the jealousies of the people, it has been industriously represented as an undue attempt to acquire an increase of power. It has been forgotten, or intentionally overlooked, that, considering it in the strongest light, as a proposal to alter the confederation, it is only exercising a power which the confederation has in direct terms reposed in congress; who, as before observed, are by the thirteenth article, expressly authorised to propose alterations.

But so far was the measure from originating in improper views of that body, that, if I am rightly informed, it did not originate there at all: it was first suggested by a convention of the four eastern states and New York, at Hartford: and I believe was proposed there by the deputies of this state. A gentleman on our bench, unconnected with congress, who now hears me, (I mean judge Hobart) was one of them. It was dictated by a principle which bitter experience then taught us, and which in peace or war will always be found true-that adequate

supplies to the federal treasury, can never flow from any system, which requires the intervention of thirteen deliberatives, between the call and the execution.

Congress agreed to the measure, and recommended it. This state complied without hesitation. All parts of the government, senate, assembly, and council of revision, concurred. Neither the constitution nor the public liberty presented any obstacle. The difficulties from these sources are a recent discovery.

So late as the first session of the legislature after the evacuation of the city, the governor of the state, in his speech to both houses, gave a decided countenance to the measure: this he did, though not in express terms, yet by implications not to be misunderstood.

The leading opponents of the impost, of the present day, have all of them, at other times, either concurred in the measure in its most exceptionable form, and without the qualifications annexed to it by the proposed bill; or have, by other instances of conduct, contradicted their own hypothesis on the constitution, which professedly forms the main prop of their opposition.

The honourable member in my eye, (Mr. Jones,) at the last session, brought in a bill for granting to congress the power of regulating the trade of the union. This surely includes more ample legislative authority than is comprehended in the mere power of levying a particular duty. It indeed goes to a prodigious extent, much farther than on a superficial view can be imagined. Can we believe that the constitutional objection, if well founded, would so long have passed undiscovered? Or is it fair to impute to congress, criminal motives for proposing a measure, which was first recommended to them by five states; or for persisting in that measure, after the unequivocal experience they have had, of the total inefficacy of