should be empowered to exact from the foreign minister a detailed report of his proceedings. leaders of the Right seem to think that intended that this right shall reside in the nomination of separate consuls for the Swedish and Norwegian ParliaNorway - and a fortiori for Sweden- ments separately, and that each nation is compatible with united action in the-through her representatives or sphere of foreign affairs. But it is through committees nominated ad hoc evident that the overthrow of the existing system under which one consul, Norwegian or Swede, as the case may be, represents both nations -will destroy the joint diplomatic service in the first place, and the joint management of foreign affairs in the second. And this is precisely what the Left desires. Therefore, as a preliminary to discussing the proposal to convert the Foreign Office into a joint institution, Sweden is bound to insist that it be based on the unalterable principle of absolute unity as regards all foreign business; and, therefore, as regards all consular and diplomatic appointments. Such a course of procedure might lead to a vote of censure, to an outery for the minister's dismissal, or even to an impeachment; and the tendency of our politics makes it likely that this species of ostracism will be exercised more frequently in the future. With critics in two Parliaments, the responsibility of a joint department for foreign affairs must be divided, and the possible consequences are obvious. On the self-same day, the Norwegian Parliament at Christiania might be clamoring for the dismissal of a minister while The proposal of the Left, that each the Swedish Assembly at Stockholm country should manage its own foreign was expressing its entire confidence in affairs, implies a legal cleavage in the him. The acceptance or rejection of a present responsibility of the foreign minister's policy would depend on the minister; in other words, it implies amount of pressure brought to bear at that just as the Swedish foreign min-headquarters. And, in this connection, ister is responsible solely to the Swed-one must emphasize the different relaish Parliament, so the Norwegian tions in which the sovereign stands to foreign minister shall be responsible the two representative bodies. The solely to the Norwegian Parliament. ample resources of the Norwegian ParThe programme of the Right, advocat-liament, and thanks to a Single ing the joint nature of the Foreign Chamber system—the remorseless unOffice, implies withdrawal from ex- scrupulousness with which that Parliaclusively Swedish control; in other ment habitually abuses its powers, leave words, it implies that the foreign no doubt as to results. In every disminister shall be responsible to both puted case the Norwegians would carry nations combined. But it is extremely their point. In practice, the proposal doubtful if this is what is meant by the of the Norwegian Moderates would be Norwegian Right. When it speaks of more disastrous for Sweden than the a foreign minister responsible to both programme of the Radicals. The latter nations, it may merely mean that Nor- would give to Norway plenary power way should share with Sweden the over Norway's foreign affairs; the right of censuring those who are en- former would make Norway mistress trusted with the management of the of her own destiny, and of Sweden's foreign affairs of both nations; a very as well. In view of such possibilities proper claim, if the right of censure be Sweden must perforce maintain her lodged in a body representative of both position as predominant partner in the nations. In fact, to judge by their management of the Union's foreign speeches, the proposal involves the affairs, unless and this is an indiscreation of a special tribunal, composed pensable condition - the prospective of both races, with the right of calling re-organization of the Foreign Office to account the conjoint foreign min- be so handled that its control be vested ister. On the other hand, it may be in the hands of a special body repre senting both nations. Neither Parlia-ereign to yield to Parliament; and if ment, that is, shall possess the power this advice be rejected, the Cabinet of inspecting the Foreign Office Re-may be compelled to resign. And, as ports; and Clause 75 of the Norwegian the same threat may be used against Constitution under which all minis- every possible ministry, the king is ters may be examined upon their con- placed in this dilemma: either he must duct of official business - shall lapse as regards the Union officials, and, further, as regards the members of the Joint Council for Foreign Affairs. rule, in defiance of the law, without Norwegian ministers; or he must sanction a Parliamentary decree which he believes to be disastrous to the country's welfare. By This is no mere speculation. such tactics the Norwegian Radicals, Again, the proposed special Council for Foreign Affairs would, presumably, consist of members of both Scandinavian Cabinets with the foreign minister in '84, compelled the king to abdicate as president. But this arrangement, his functions and to surrender his prewhile entrusting foreign affairs to a rogative of veto as regards the fundabody nominally independent of both mental law of the Constitution. To representative assemblies, would still this pretension the Swedish governenable the Norwegian Parliament to ment replied by a solemn declaration exercise an undue influence on the that the royal veto is distinctly implied foreign policy of both nations. Under in the very terms of the Act of Union. the Norwegian Constitution, the Par- Again, in '92, the Norwegian Radicals liamentary responsibility of ministers played the same game. The king reis defined in such terms that Parliament fused to sanction a Parliamentary vote may act as at once accuser and judge. in favor of separate Norwegian conOf the two divisions of the Norwegian suls; whereupon the political machine House, the Lagting, or Upper Section, was paralyzed for a month. Nor did pronounces sentence, while the Odels- the Norwegian ministers abandon these ting, or Lower Section, undertakes the tactics, of enforcing surrender by makimpeachment. If in a House of one ing all government impossible, till the hundred and fourteen one party num- Opposition humbly implored them to bers sixty-nine, judicious management resume office. In the spring of '93, will give that party a majority in both the same strategy was only checked by sections and will enable it to impeach the formation of a Conservative Cabiand punish at will. Should its voting net; and even so, the new administrastrength be insufficient the accusation tion declared that, like its Radical can be postponed till the necessary forerunner, it would not counsel remajority be secured at a general elec-sistance to the motion in favor of a tion. Both in '82 and in '94 this course separate Norwegian consular service. was actually followed. Nor is it as The question was then left over until in Sweden-merely illegal procedure the general election of '94. The Left on the Council's part which comes secured a majority which makes it imwithin the powers of the Norwegian possible for the Right to hold office; Constitution. That the king's minis- and, being once more in possession of ters act on other principles than those the tremendous machinery of Norweof an existing majority is enough to gian politics, it will direct a peremptory justify their impeachment and punish- address to the king. The Conservative ment. And the sentence may be a minister, Stang, has told how this ruinous fine, or a declaration of in- address will run: "Since the Radicals, capacity for office, or imprisonment by such and such a majority, so desire with hard labor, or punishment for it, you [the king] must arrange the high treason. To all practical purpose, matter, even though the Union be imthen, an unscrupulous majority is om- perilled, by conceding our demands and nipotent. Its menace of impeachment by ignoring Sweden. Otherwise no may force ministers to advise the sov-form of government will be tolerated ment. in Norway at all." This being the | tution of a paragraph conferring on the position, it must be said plainly that, king the power of dissolving Parlia so long as the Norwegian law defining the relation between ministers and Parliament remains in force, Sweden will resolutely oppose any such re-organization of the Foreign Office as would tend to increase Norwegian influence. More Sweden must take hostages against the possibility of such safeguards being annulled after the reorganization has taken place. And she must further guard against the modification of the Norwegian law in other respects, e.g., by any transference from the king to the Parliament of the right of nomination to the Council. It will doubtless be said that so much prevision denotes an insolent mistrust on the part of Sweden. The answer is that such mistrust is amply justified by It would be possible to draft an enactment making the Joint Council as irresponsible to either Parliament as is the foreign minister himself; but this would not be enough. The policy of the Norwegian members of the Council would become known and their fate would depend upon the vigor with which they pushed Norwegian inter- Norway's mode of escaping her treaty ests. To avoid the impeachment of obligations as regards the defence of Norwegian ministers on the one hand, the Union. The essential guarantees and on the other to escape the risk of must also include a proviso that no "no form of government being toler- change in the Fundamental Law of ated in Norway at all," the sovereign Norway can take effect without the would, in effect, be compelled to attach royal assent. It is beyond dispute that a greater importance than is right to this was taken for granted when the the views of the Norwegian councillors, existing law was drafted. And its imwith the result that, in most cases, portance to the stability of the Union Norwegian interests would outweigh was shown by the above-mentioned those of Sweden. Such a state of declaration of the Swedish Cabinet in things would be so intolerable that, '84: that under the Treaty of Union no before entertaining the idea of transferring the guardianship of foreign affairs to a Joint Council, Sweden must insist on the remodelling of that Norwegian law (Clause 86 of the Constitution) which bears upon ministerial impeachment. change of Fundamental Law can be made either in Norway or Sweden without the sovereign's sanction. For the protection of Swedish interests, the king's veto, established by law in the fabric of the Norwegian Constitution, is an indispensable preliminary condition to the removal of foreign affairs to the hands of a Joint Council. Another gross blot on the Norwegian Constitution is that it does not empower the king to dissolve Parliament If Sweden consent to yield her estabat all. Once elected, the triennial As- lished position as prime agent in the sembly must complete its term. There system of foreign politics, or if this may have been a great change in public legal right be shared with Norway, the opinion; there may be overwhelming relation of the two branches of the reasons for a fresh appeal to the Scandinavian race will be radically country. In any case the king is pow-changed. To justify this innovation, erless. For a year or more he may it is not enough to say that Sweden have a hostile Cabinet thrust upon cannot lose by it. We know where him, whose existence is bound up with we are to-day; we cannot forecast the that of a scratch majority which has morrow. The present system has been outlived its mandate. To prevent Nor-proved; the possibilities of the new wegian influence on Swedish business one may be still worse. In the interest from being greater than it actually is, the proposed transformation of the Foreign Office must be accompanied by the insertion in the Norwegian Consti of self-preservation, a State may not forego its rights for the satisfaction of its neighbor's ambition. If it does so forego its rights-save at the sword's point it exacts conditions assure it a position no whit less advantageous to the national honor and the national prosperity. The contention is that the new proposals afford just such an opportunity. The Union, founded by Sweden for her own security, will gain it is urged-in strength and stability by admitting Norway to an equal share in the administration of Union business. Norway's interests would then be inseparably bound up in the continuance of the Union; while the prolongation of the present system tends to exasperate Norwegian disaffection to a point that may reach disruption. This is the old argument; we in Sweden know it too well. How stands it in the past? By the Treaty conciliation, we in Sweden hold that, of Union Norway was granted local autonomy; in such grave matters as the choice of the sovereign and of the heir to the throne, she was raised to an equality with Sweden. And from the first day to the last the history of the Union is one eternal record of Swedish concessions in the hope that a magnanimous policy would amalgamate two kindred races and consolidate their alliance. And the result? Every effort to weld the two nations into one by means of common laws and common institutions has been baffled. Every change within the Union has been separatist in tendency. And the original sentiments of aversion and of fear, with which the Norwegians regarded Sweden, have changed for the worse the aversion has deepened, the fear has turned to contempt. otherwise can you explain the arrogance of Norway; not otherwise can you account for the threat to rend the Union in twain if her demands be not paid in full. which remarking that the existence of the Union is not, after all, a matter for the Norwegians alone. Into that Union Norway was brought almost by force; and it in no way depends on her wishes whether that Union shall, or shall not, continue. Of course, as a discontented Norway weakens the Union, all genuine grievances must be relieved. But we must see to it that the remedy be not worse than the disease. Important as it may be that Norway should be on good terms with her ally, it is at the lowest-not less important that the Union should redound to Swedish prosperity and to Swedish honor. And as every day shows more clearly the abject failure of the simple, old policy of Νοι before abandoning our few remaining (2) (3) - The proper maintenance of the Rulers who represent the Union in relation to other powers (Estimates for the support of the Throne). The Department of Foreign Politics (Estimates for the Foreign Office, the Diplomatic Corps, and the Consular Service). The execution of the policy sanctioned by the Sovereign on the initiative of the single Foreign Ministers for both nations (Supplies for the Defence of the Union). Doubtless it is our duty to allay, as In other words, regard being had to far as may be, the Norwegian disaffec- her resources, on Norway shall fall tion; for the maintenance of the such burdens as shall correspond to the Union brought about, as it was, by new privileges conceded by Sweden. costly sacrifices is to us a matter of And, as regards (1) the Estimates for mortal importance. But if we give ear the support of the Throne: her contrito the Norwegian vaunts and menaces, bution need not exceed its present it is evident that all Swedish interests amount. But in '93 and '94, her Parwould have to yield to those of Nor-liament took upon itself to curtail the way. It is, moreover, worth while annual grant for this purpose, on the ground that, in matters affecting both | nations. And of these proposalsnations, the sovereign had not given finally included in Clause 25 of the effect to the Norwegian view. It will, Norwegian Constitution—the general therefore, be necessary for us to exact drift is that neither the Norwegian an enactment which shall prevent the army nor the Norwegian coast flotilla Norwegian Parliament from thus abus- is available for aggression save with ing their power of granting supplies. the express consent of the Norwegian Then, in respect to (2) the Foreign Parliament. Further, that portion of Office Estimates: the contribution the army called the Landvärn (militia) made by Norway up to '92 would suffice; with an addition inseparable from the proposed re-organization. Norway must pay her share of the salary of the future foreign minister in his capacity of joint official. Here, again, in '93 and '94 there was tampering with regard to the Foreign Office grant. And, as this tampering was attempted, in flagrant disregard of Swedish opinion, with the aim of subverting-or at least reconstructing—the institution to which this grant was destined, we must pass a statute which shall deprive the Norwegian Parliament of its right to decide these questions separately. Last of all, in so far as concerns (3) the Supplies for the Defence of the Union it is notorious that the Norwegian Parliament has made a bad use of its power in the interest of the two nations. All the same, this is not our chief reason for insisting that any radical change at the Foreign Office must be accompanied by the stringent definition of Norway's obligations in view of the defence of the Union. Our chief reason is the intimate, indissoluble connection between (a) the right of sharing the diplomatic administration, and (b) the duty of sharing the perils which the exercise of such right may entail. In entering the Union, Norway's chief fear was that the Swedish alliance would involve her in war; and—to Norwegian eyes the risk loomed all the larger since Sweden's predominance in foreign policy was unquestioned. Hereupon the Norwegians cast about for some means of avoiding such dangers as seemed most incident to the Swedish administration of foreign affairs. First there came certain proposals to restrict the king's right of employing the Norwegian forces in the cause of the allied cannot —even did Parliament give its sanction - be sent across the Norwegian frontier; and this enactment applies equally to all arms save the Line. This is not the place to argue whether it be wise or not to hamper the disposition of an army by enacting that a Parliamentary sanction is needed before certain troops can be used aggressively. What concerns us here is this: that by law the king is free to handle, as seems best, the whole Swedish force by land and sea, while his right in that of Norway is limited to the fleet. Army and coast flotilla he cannot move, unless assured that the Norwegian Parliament does not regard the war as aggressive. And, inasmuch as the Norwegians are so fond of hairsplitting, it is fair to ask: What war a Norwegian Parliament would not be able to declare aggressive if need were? Not only thus did the Norwegian draughtsmen of the Treaty of '14 seek to shelter Norway from the dangers of a too adventurous foreign policy. Lest her army be exhausted in the Swedish cause, it was decreed as we have seen - that none but the Line should be employed beyond her frontier. Thus, at a stroke, one whole section of her army was exempted from all part in the defence of Scandinavia; and the decree was so worded that her Parliament could not, even if it would, empower such employ. Moreover, a closer examination of these evasions shows the more flagrantly how consistently she has sought to shirk her share in the burden of the common defence. By ill hap, in consenting to these clauses of the Norwegian Constitution, we failed to exact a plain definition of what was meant by Line and what by Landvärn; at the same time that we |