walk was thus unnecessarily and unreasonably interrupted and interfered with by the defendant, and that in consequence thereof the rental value of plaintiff's premises had been diminished, and he had sustained special damages to a nominal amount. Judgment was ordered for the damages so found, and for an injunction restraining the defendant "from unnecessarily or unreasonably obstructing the sidewalk" in front of said factory, but a stay of proceedings for three months was directed, to enable him to change the arrangement of his premises, if he so desired.

Mr. Frederick C. Dexter, for appellant:

The plaintiff has failed to show any substantial injury resulting from the acts complained of, or any injury that is not common to the public, and was not entitled to recover.

Wood, Nuisances, $$ 619, 632, 654, 678: High, Inj. § 762; Pierce v. Dart, 7 Cow. 609; Doolittle v. Broome County Suprs. 18 N. Y. 155; Jutte v. Hughes, 67 N. Y. 271; Bergmann v. Jones, 94 N. Y. 51.

The walk is intended for the use of pedestrians, but their right to the same is by no means absolute or exclusive. It must be exercised in harmony with the rights of the adjacent occupant. Any unnecessary or wanton occupation of the sidewalk for business by the adjacent proprietor is an invasion of the public right and is unlawful, while it must be an exceptional and extraordinary case in which the court is justified in holding that any necessary use of it required by the exigencies of legitimate trade is unreasonable.

Welsh v. Wilson, 2 Cent. Rep. 749, 101 N. Y. 257, 54 Am. Rep. 698; Callanan v. Gilman, 9 Cent. Rep. 900, 107 N. Y. 360.

Ind. 185, 38 Am. Rep. 117.

And to have the use unobstructed.
Dam, 81 N. Y. 52.

Clifford v.

An abutter is allowed, however, to exercise some privileges on the sidewalk which he may not exercise elsewhere in the street. Halsey v. Rapid Transit St. R. Co. 47 N. J. Eq. 380.

from the court to public streets, but defendant for | street, including sidewalks. State v. Berdetta, 73 his own convenience used the one on which plaintiff's shop was located so as to practically devote it to his exclusive operations and render it unsafe for the use of strangers, the use was held to be unreasonable. Fritz v. Hobson, 42 L. T. N. S. 225. Where a property owner for the purpose of whitewashing his fence used a small barrel mounted on wheels and left the same standing in the road by the side of the beaten track over Sunday, whereby plaintiff's horse was frightened, he was held not liable for injuries unless the appearance of the barrel was such as to tend to frighten horses of ordinary gentleness or it was left in the road for an unreasonable time. Piollet v. Simmers, 106 Pa. 96, 51 Am. Rep. 496.

Private ways.

There is no right to obstruct a private passage. Thorpe v. Brumfitt, L. R. 8 Ch. App. 650.

One who erected a cider mill abutting on a private right of way, and carried it on in such manner that the patrons of the mill stationed wagons along and across the way materially obstructing the same, he was held liable in damages. Dennis v. Sipperly, 17 Hun, 69.

One doing business on a street in a populous city has the right to temporarily obstruct the sidewalk in front of his place of business for the purpose of loading merchandise, providing he acts in a reasonable manner so as not to unnecessarily incumber the sidewalk; and he is not bound to furnish those passing upon the walk a safe passage around the obstruction. Welsh v. Wilson, 2 Cent. Rep. 749, 101 N. Y. 254, 54 Am. Rep. 698.

No one can rightfully obstruct a sidewalk under any plea, whether of convenience or necessity, except for such time as is actually needful to get his goods in and out of his store. McCloughry v. Finney, 37 La. Ann. 31.

The necessity required to justify the use of a sidewalk by placing skids thereover in front of a store for the purpose of unloading heavy barrels from a wagon need only be reasonable; so held where it appeared there was an alley at the back of the store which might have been used for that purpose. Jochem v. Robinson, 1 L. R. A. 178, 72 Wis. 199.

Burden of proof; question of fact or law. Whenever the owner of premises hinders or obstructs travel upon the sidewalk or street in front It is not sufficient that the obstructions are necof his premises he has the burden of showing that the obstruction was reasonably necessary and tem-essary with reference to the business of one who porary. Jochem v. Robinson, 66 Wis. 638, 57 Am. Rep. 298.

But if the alleged obstruction was under permission of a city ordinance, the one responsible for it need not show its necessity or temporary nature. Denby v. Willer, 59 Wis. 241.

Whether or not the obstruction is a nuisance is a question for the jury which must depend upon whether or not it did or did not unnecessarily obstruct the free passage of the public over any part of the highway. Graves v. Shattuck, 35 N. H. 257, 69 Am. Dec. 536.

But in case of very heavy and ponderous packages or articles the court may, upon certain facts and under certain circumstances, be justified in holding as a matter of law that the necessity existed in fact; or, in case of very small and light articles, there was in fact no necessity. Jochem v. Robinson, 66 Wis. 638, 57 Am. Rep. 298.

Obstruction of sidewalks.

erects and maintains them; they must also be reasonable with reference to the rights of the public. Callanan v. Gilman, 9 Cent. Rep. 900, 107 N. Y. 360.

Maintaining skids across the sidewalk for not to exceed five minutes, for the purpose of removing cases of merchandise, is not unreasonable. Welsh v. Wilson, 2 Cent. Rep. 749, 101 N. Y. 254, 54 Am. Rep. 698.

Keeping a person on a sidewalk for a space of four hours or more to deliver printed advertisements to persons passing is not unlawful. Rex v. Sarmon, 1 Burr. 516.

It is unlawful to place on the foot-way of a public street a stall for the sale of fruit and confectionery. Com. v. Wentworth, Brightly, 318.

It is not reasonable to keep horses and wagons upon the sidewalk the greater portion of the day, and thus make persons having occasion to use the walk turn out on the street in order to get around the obstruction. Flynn v. Taylor, 53 Hun, 167. Where a dealer in loading and unloading goods

The term "street" includes sidewalks. Ely v. taken to and from his store placed a bridge across Campbell, 59 How. Pr. 333.

The public are entitled to the use of the whole

the sidewalk, which entirely obstructed it, which was usually removed when not in use but left in

There can be no doubt that plaintiff's use of the sidewalk is unreasonable, and therefore unlawful.

Mr. Josiah T. Marean, for respondent: | struction must be reasonably necessary for the The court will always enjoin a grave public transaction of business; (2) it must not unreanuisance though the peculiar damage which sonably interfere with the rights of the public. the plaintiff himself sustains be not proved Callanan v. Gilman, 107 N. Y. 360, 9 Cent. with such definiteness as to warrant a judg- Rep. 900; Welsh v. Wilson, 101 N. Y. 254, 2 ment for any specific sum. Cent. Rep. 749, 54 Am. Rep. 698. The foundation upon which the exception seems to rest is that it is better for the public to suffer a slight inconvenience than for the adjacent owner to sustain a serious loss. Any unnecessary or unreasonable use of a street, however, is a public nuisance, and is declared by statute to be a crime against the order and economy of the State. Penal Code, § 385. A remedy for the wrong against the public may be found in the indictment of the offender, or in a suit by the proper officer in behalf of the people to compel him to abate the nuisance. People v. Lochfelm, 102 N. Y. 1, 2 Cent. Rep. 874; Peo

See Callanan v. Gilman, 9 Cent. Rep. 900, 107 N. Y. 360.

Vann, J., delivered the opinion of the

court:

The owner of land abutting upon a public street is permitted to encroach on the primary right of the public to a limited extent and for a temporary purpose, owing to the necessity of the case. Two facts, however, must exist to render the encroachment lawful: (1) the ob-ple v. Horton, 64 N. Y. 610; People v. Cunning

position sometimes for ten or fifteen minutes, and when in use sometimes remained in position from one to two hours, and thereby obstructed the sidewalk from four to five hours of each business day, the obstruction was unreasonable. Callanan v. Gilman, supra.

The use of the part of the sidewalk in front of a store in such a manner as to make it practically a part of the store for the purpose of displaying goods, there being a permanent awning structure resting on iron columns extending the full width of the sidewalk and having canvass wings to be used on rainy days, which, when down, close in a part of the walk, goods being placed on the walk and suspended from the awning, was held unlawful. Lavery v. Hannigan, 20 Jones & S. 464.

tions for purposes of building and repairing. King v. Ward, 4 Ad. & El. 405.

The public must submit to the inconvenience necessarily occasioned in repairing a house; but if this is continued an unreasonable time the party may be guilty of a nuisance. Rex v. Jones, 3 Campb. 230.

Building materials may lawfully be placed in the highway for temporary use so long as the free use thereof is left for vehicles and animals and the use is not negligent or unreasonable. Mallory v. Griffey, 85 Pa. 275.

Placing timber and other materials in the street preparatory to building on the land is not unlawful provided the street is not improperly obstructed and the materials are removed within a reasonable time. Van O'Linda v. Lothrop, 21 Pick. 297; Callanan v. Gilman, 9 Cent. Rep. 900, 107 N. Y. 360.

Leaving a number of barrels and counters stacked on the sidewalk in a tottering condition so as to occupy a considerable portion of the walk and interfere with safe passage, and permitting them to remain there for several weeks, is unrea-done in the most convenient manner. Chicago v. sonable. Kerr v. Forgue, 54 Ill. 482.

Where the owner of a grain and feed store piled sacks filled with grain in front of the store, and one of them fell and injured a passer-by, he was held liable for the injuries. McCloughry v. Finney, 37 La. Ann. 31.

Defendant must be responsible for the obstruction to render him liable. Denby v. Willer, 59 Wis. 241.

One using a sidewalk in accordance with the provisions of an ordinance permitting the leaving of goods, etc., on the outer edge of the walk for a period not exceeding six hours while receiving or delivering them is not liable for accidents resulting from such use unless guilty of negligence; and the burden is not on him to show the necessity of the use or that the goods were removed within a reasonable time. lbid.

Stones, brick, lime, sand and other material for building may be placed in the street provided it be

Robbins, 67 U. S. 2 Black, 418, 17 L. ed. 298; Com. v.
Passmore, 1 Serg. & R. 217.

It has been held that the excuse for this is want of room for such material elsewhere so as to render it necessary to deposit it in the street. And that defendant must show a reasonable necessity for placing the material in the street; the court cannot infer such necessity from the fact that the building is being erected in a populous and thriving city. Wood v. Mears, 12 Ind. 516, 74 Am. Dec. 222.

In contrast, it has been held that the practice of placing building materials in the street has become a custom of such long standing that it is regarded as lawful, and the right will not be defeated by an investigation into the necessity of so doing in any particular case. Palmer v. Silverthorn, 32 Pa. 68. The right is to be exercised, however, under a responsibility for all injuries arising from an unrea

It is properly submitted to the jury to determine whether a temporary placing of skids across a side-sonable or negligent use of it. lbid. walk for the purpose of unloading barrels of sugar, each weighing three hundred pounds, was reasonable. Jochem v. Robinson, 1 L. R. A. 178, 72 Wis. 199.

In the absence of a law prohibiting obstructions, whether or not one who temporarily places articles used in his business on the outer edge of the sidewalk leaving ample room for passage is guilty of negligence is a question for the jury. Denby v. Willer, supra.

Placing building materials in street.

Every way to which houses adjoin must be considered as set out subject to occasional interrup

A license is not necessary to authorize the placing of building materials in the street. Clark v. Fry, 8 Ohio St. 375, 72 Am. Dec. 590.

The right extends to placing earth excavated from a cellar in the street to be carried away. Hundhausen v. Bond, 36 Wis. 38.

But if the earth is unnecessarily or dangerously extended into the street, or raised to an unnecessary or dangerous height or insufficiently guarded or suffered to remain an unnecessary length of time, the owner will be liable. Ibid.

It need not be removed as soon and as fast as is absolutely possible, but must be done with reasonable care and diligence. lbid.

H. P. F.

ham, 1 Denio, 524, 43 Am. Dec. 709; Atty-ly held guilty of creating a nuisance, for the Gen. v. Cohoes Co. 6 Paige, 133, 3 L. ed. 928; habitual use of a sidewalk or highway in an Wood, Nuis. § 729; Will. Eq. Jur. (Potter's unreasonable manner, to the serious inconed.) 389, 401. venience of the public, is a nuisance per se. 16 Whenever any person sustains a special and Am. & Eng. Encyclop. Law, p. 937. The evipeculiar loss in consequence of an unlawful ob- dence was ample to support the finding, as the struction to a public street, he may maintain use of the sidewalk by the defendant was sysan action in equity in his own behalf for dam- tematic and exclusive during a substantial part ages and an injunction. Such was the case of of the business day. The primary purpose of Callanan v. Gilman, supra, upon which the the sidewalk was violated, and the people who court below relied in rendering judgment in wished to use it to walk upon were compelled this action, and which we also regard as an- to walk around through the street, and avoid alogous and controlling. In that case, as in the passing vehicles as best they could. This this, the obstruction consisted in unloading is scarcely denied by the learned counsel for trucks over a sidewalk, and pedestrians were the defendant, who contends that no unreasonforced by the inconvenience to take the oppo- able use or occupation of the sidewalk was site side of the street. The proof of special shown so far as the plaintiff is concerned, and damages sustained by that plaintiff was slight, that he cannot complain, although the public but the court held that direct proof of pecu- might. It is true that no direct interference with liar damage was not needed if the circum- the plaintiff's premises or business was shown. stances showed it, and that he suffered some The pecuniary loss to him was caused by the special damages not common to persons merely indirect effect of the obstructions to the sideusing the street for passage was declared to be walk upon the public; but when an unreasontoo obvious for reasonable dispute. The right able use of a public highway is shown, and it to maintain the action does not depend on the also appears that such unreasonable use causes amount of the special damage, provided the special damages to an individual, he has a perplaintiff suffered some material injury peculiar sonal right of action to compel the abateto himself. Pierce v. Dart, 7 Cow. 609. We ment of the nuisance. Doolittle v. Broome think that, in a populous city, whatever un- County Suprs. 18 N. Y. 155; Corning v. Lowlawfully turns the tide of travel from the side-erre, 6 Johns. Ch. 439, 2 L. ed. 178; Spencer v. walk directly in front of a retail store to the London & B. R. Co. 8 Sim. 193; Sampson v. opposite side of the street is presumed to cause Smith, Id. 272; Crowder v. Tinkler, 19 Ves. special damage to the proprietor of that store, Jr. 617. because diversion of trade inevitably follows diversion of travel. The nature of this case was such that the amount of damages could not be shown, and hence the remedy at law would not only be inadequate, but would lead to a multiplicity of suits. While the defendant was doubtless careful to interfere with the rights of the public no more than was necessary for the convenient transaction of his business with the facilities that he had, still he could not lawfully supply the defects in his premises by virtually monopolizing the sidewalk for several hours every day. As the court said in Rex v. Russell, 6 East, 427, he "could not legally carry on any part of his business in the public street to the annoyance of the public,' nor could he "eke out the inconvenience of his own premises by taking in the public highway. Rex v. Jones, 3 Campb. 230. Whether a particular use of a street is an unreasonable use or not is a question of fact depending on all the circumstances of the case. Hudson v. Caryl, 44 N. Y. 553; St. John v. New York, 6 Duer, 315; Wood, Nuisances, § 251.

The trial court found as a fact that the defendant's use of this sidewalk was an unreasonable interference with the passage of the public along the same. Hence he was proper14 L. R. A.

While the general welfare is promoted by manufactories such as the defendant carries on and they should not be interfered with for light or trivial causes, still the right of the public to the use of the sidewalk is paramount, and he must so arrange his business as not unreasonably to interfere with it. The decree against him conforms in every respect to the precedent established by this court in Callanan v. Gilman, 107 N. Y. 360, 373, 9 Cent. Rep. 900, when it modified the judgments of the courts below by restraining against an unnecessary or unreasonable obstruction. While the language of the injunction is somewhat indefinite, owing to the care taken not to interfere with important private rights, still a reasonable man will have little difficulty in determining what is a reasonable use of a public street. A prudent man will resolve doubtful questions in favor of the public, and against himself, and the wrong to the public is the basis of the plaintiff's right to relief, although a special injury to himself was also required before he could succeed.

36

We see no reason for reversing this judgment, which is therefore affirmed with costs. All concur.

WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT.

Statement by Cassoday, J.:

was served only by the publication of notice for three successive weeks, commencing October 22, 1889, and ending November 5, 1889, and mailing copies thereof, etc., to the plaintiff in Wisconsin, where she resided during all the times mentioned; that upon the trial of said action the court found, in effect, the facts stated; and also that the said Boston company had not paid the plaintiff anything on said judgment, except $1,200, paid thereon July 1, 1889; that this plaintiff had not been personally served with summons or other process in the proceedings in the Superior Court of Cook County, and had not appeared in said proceedings; that the judgment so recovered in said Brown County was exempt from seizure on attachment or execution, under the laws of Wisconsin, during all the time mentioned, but was not exempt under the laws of Illinois; and, were entitled to judgment against the plaintiff, as a conclusion of law, that the defendants abating this action. From the judgment entered thereou accordingly the plaintiff brings. this appeal.

Mr. George G. Greene, for appellant: A debt due on a judgment in one State cannot be garnished in another.

Drake, Attachm. § 625; Shinn v. Zimmer

bethtown Sav. Inst. v. Gerber, 35 N. J. Eq. 153; Henry v. Gold Park Min. Co. 15 Fed. Rep. 649; American Bank v. Snow, 9 R. I. 11, 90Am. Dec. 364; Thomas v. Wooldridge, 2 Woods, 667; Franklin v. Ward, 3 Mason, 136; American Bank v. Rollins, 99 Mass. 313; 8 Am. & Eng. Encyclop. Law, 1170, 1171; Young v. Young, 2 Hill, L. 426; Burrill v. Letson, 2 Speer, L. 10 L. ed. 95; Wood v. Lake, 13 Wis. 94; 2 Wade, 378; Wallace v. M'Connell, 38 U. S. 13 Pet. 136, Attachm. § 498.

It appears from the record that September 26, 1888, the plaintiff recovered judgment up-man, 23 N. J. L. 150, 55 Am. Dec. 260; Elizaon a policy of insurance in the Circuit Court for Brown County against the Dwelling-House Insurance Company, a corporation created and organized under the laws of Massachusetts, and having its principal place of business at Boston, by reason of loss by fire of a dwelling-house, barns, and property therein, for $3,416.76; that the said Boston company appealed from said judgment to this court, and upon such appeal the defendants, Hurlbut and Boaler, executed an undertaking to the plaintiff, wherein and whereby they agreed and undertook, pursuant to the statute, that they would pay all costs which might be awarded against said Boston company on said appeal, not exceeding $250, and also undertook that, in case said judgment should be affirmed, they would pay the amount thereof; that said judgment was affirmed on said appeal, April 25, 1889, (74

Wis. 89) that the remittitur thereon was not filed in the trial court until November, 1889; that August 1, 1890, this action was com menced, upon said undertaking, against said Hurlbut and Boaler; that the defendants herein answered, and admitted all the allegations of the complaint, and in effect, alleged that June 28, 1889, the Saint Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company created and organized under the laws of Minnesota, commenced an action in the Supreme Court for Cook County, in the State of Illinois, against this plaintiff, on a claim for $2,256, and in said action served garnishee process upon the said Boston company's agent at Chicago; that the process in said last-named action against this plaintiff was made returnable November 4, 1889, and NOTE.-The extensive review of the authorities by the court and counsel in the above case seems to make any annotation of the case unnecessary.

his residence cannot be garnished in another A debt payable to a creditor in the State of State, at least, unless he is personally served with process or appears in the garnishee action.

State cannot be reached by this process, alIt is generally held that property in another though within the control of the garnishee.

Bates v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 60 Wis. 296, 50 Am. Rep. 369; Bowen v. Pope, 14 West. Rep. 673, 125 II. 28.

A debt payable to one residing in another State is not within such statutes.

Sawyer v. Thompson, 24 N. H. 510; Hamil ton v. Rogers, 10 West. Rep. 903, 67 Mich. 135; Keating v. American Refrigerator Co. 32 Mo. (Ala.) May 5, 1891. App. 293; Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Chumbey,

The situs of a debt is the domicil of the creditor where payable.

82 U. S. 15 Wall. 300, 21 L. ed. 179: Birdseye Cleveland, P. & A. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, Connecticut Peat Co. 35 Conn. 303; Guillander v. Baker, 2 L. R. A. 99, 82 Ga. 142; Clark v. V. Howell, 35 N. Y. 662; McDougall v. Page, 55 Vt. 187, 45 Am. Rep. 602; Brown, Jurisdiction, § 150; State v. Gaylord, 73 Wis. 325.

This principle determines the taxability, assignability and descent of debts, and the ap

plication of insolvent and bankrupt laws to | U. S. 529, 27 L. ed. 424; New York L. Ins. Co. them. It likewise determines their garnishability.

Brown, Jurisdiction, & 150; Hamilton v. Rogers and Keating v. American Refrigerator Co. supra; Todd v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. 33 Mo. App. 110; Green's Bank v. Wickham, 23 Mo. App. 663; Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Chumbey and Sawyer v. Thompson, supra.

Substituted service, where actions are brought against nonresidents, is effectual only where, in connection with process against the person for commencing the action, property in the State is brought under the control of the

court.

Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. ed. 565; Waples, Attachm. 249; Bates v. New Orleans, J. & G. N. R. Co. 4 Abb. Pr. 72; Willet v. Equitable Ins. Co. 10 Abb. Pr. 193.

Mooney v. Union Pac. R. Co. 60 Iowa, 346, and Burlington & M. R. R. Co. v. Thompson, 31 Kan. 180, 47 Am. Rep. 497, relied on by the court below are against principle, and are overborne by authority.

v. Bangs, 103 U. S. 435, 26 L. ed. 580; Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U. S. 185, 30 L. ed. 372; Smith v. Grady, 68 Wis. 215; Witt v. Meyer, 69 Wis. 595; Eliot v. McCormick, 3 New Eng. Rep. 871, 144 Mass. 10.

The appellant could not have brought the action to recover her loss in Wisconsin, in Illinois, nor could this Wisconsin judgment have been sued there.

St. Clair v. Cox, Central R. & Bkg. Co. v. Carr and Chicago C. Nat. Bank v. Chicago, M.& St. P. R. Co. supra.

The Illinois proceeding is no defense to this action, because it did not garnish or attach the debt or undertaking of the defendant.

Bullard v. Gilette, 1 Mont. 509; Farrell v. Finch, 40 Ohio St. 337; Drake, Attachm. § 703; Oakley v. Van Noppen, 100 N. C. 287. Mr. H. W. Chynoweth, for respondents: A debt due on a judgment in one State can be garnished in another.

There is no reason for any distinction between a judgment and any other debt.

A debt payable to a creditor in the State of his residence can be garnished in another State even though he be not personally served with process, and even though he does not appear in the garnishee action.

Alabama i. S. R. Co. v. Chumbey, supra; Jones v. St. Onge, 67 Wis. 520; Chicago C. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Dooley, 78 Ala. 524; Nat. Bank v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 45 Keating v. American Refrigerator Co., Todd Wis. 172; Luton v. Hochn, 72 Ill. 81; Minard v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., Green's Bank v. Wick-v. Lawler, 26 Ill. 302; Allen v. Watt, 79 Ill. ham and Sawyer v. Thompson, supra; Law- 284; Young v. Cooper, 59 Ill. 121. rence v. Smith, 45 N. II. 533, 86 Am. Dec. 183; Lovejoy v. Albee, 33 Me. 414, 54 Am. Dec. 630; Sutherland v. Second Nat. Bank of Peoria, 78 Ky. 253; Green v. Farmers & C. Bank, 25 Conn. 452; Hamilton v. Rogers, 10 West. Rep. 903, 67 Mich. 135; Towle v. Wilder, 57 Vt. 622; Bates v. New Orleans, J. & G. N. R. Co. and Willet v. Equitable Ins. Co. supra; Miller v. Hooe, 2 Cranch, C. C. 622; Nye v. Liscombe, 21 Pick. 263; Ray v. Underwood, 3 Pick. 302; Gold v. Housatonic R. Co. 1 Gray, 424; Tingley v. Bateman, 10 Mass. 343; Chicago C. Nat. Bank v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 45 Wis. 172; Wa ples, Attachm. 227, 249; Freeman, Executions, 410; Drake, Attachm. § 473 et seq.; 8 Am. & Eng. Encyclop. Law, 1129.

Some of these authorities hold that a debt cannot be reached by this process, because not payable in the State where the proceeding is brought, and the garnishee did not reside there. This was a Massachusetts corporation, could only be in Illinois to do business there, and was only domiciled and suable there, in respect to such business.

St. Clair v. Cor, 106 U. S. 350, 27 L. ed. 222; Central R. & Bkg. Co. v. Carr, 76 Ala. 388, 52 Am. Rep. 339; Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Chumbey (Ala.) May 5, 1891.

But the real ground is that the situs of the debt is the domicil of the creditor, and, hence, the court has no more jurisdiction of it than of tangible property out of the State.

If a debt payable in one State is garnishable at all in another State, it cannot be garnished there without personal service of process upon or the voluntary appearance of, the creditor. The Supreme Court of the United States has clearly determined the limit of a State's power, under the Federal Constitution, to authorize substituted service on a nonresident.

Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. ed. 565, Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U. S. 476, 25 L. ed. 237; St. Clair v. Cox, supra; Hart v. Sansom, 110 U. S. 151, 28 L. ed. 101; Pana v. Bowler, 107

The situs of this debt is any place where the debtor may be found, that is, found in the sense of located.

M'Carty v. Emlen, 2 U. S. 2 Dall, 277, 1 L. ed. 380; Fithian v. New York & E. R. Co. 31 Pa. 114; Gager v. Watson, 11 Conn. 168; Chicago C. Nat. Bank v. Chigcao, M. & St. P. R. Co. supra; Blake v. Williams, 6 Pick. 286, 17 Am. Dec. 372; Sturtevant v. Robinson, 18 Pick. 175; Roche v. Rhode Island Ins. Asso. 2 Ill. App. 362; Mitchell v. Shook, 72 Ill. 492; Mooney v. Union Pac. R. Co. 60 Iowa, 348; Allen v. Watt, supra; Morgan v. Neville, 74 Pa. 52; Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Crane, 102 Ill. 249, 40 Am. Rep. 58; Burlington & M. R. Co. v. Thompson, 31 Kan. 180, 47 Am. Rep. 497; Johnson v. Brant, 38 Kan. 754; Plimpton v. Bigelow, 93 N. Y. 596; Griffith v. Langsdale, 53 Ark. 71; Carson v. Memphis & C. R. Co. 8 L. R. A. 412, 88 Tenn. 646; Newland v. Reilly, 85 Mich. 151.

We know of no cases that hold to the contrary as to the situs of the debt for the purposes of garnishment or attachment. At all events, we insist if there are such cases, they are against the great weight of authority and are not good law. The rule is to the contrary here.

Chicago C. Nat. Bank v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. supra.

The Dwelling House Insurance Company, having offices and doing business in Illinois is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of that State, and as much so as if it had been an individual having his domicil there.

Being a resident of Illinois in contemplation of the law the debt it owed was here.

Roche v. Rhode Island Ins. Asso. 2 Ill. App. 360; Elizabethtown Sav. Inst. v. Gerber, 35 Ñ.