for such causes only as have been designated by the Legislature. For the reason thus stated, we are of the opinion that the court below committed no error in refusing to give the instructions numbered 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7, which were asked by the complainant.

The appellant assigns as error that the trial court refused to give the second instruction asked by the complainant, and gave the eighteeth instruction asked by defendant. The second and last clause of said second instruction is as follows: "Wherever force and violence, preceded by deliberate insult and abuse, have been once or twice, wantonly and without provocation, used by the wife to her husband, then the wife would be guilty in law of extreme and repeated cruelty." This clause announces the proposition that one act of force and vio lence, preceded by insult and abuse, constitutes extreme and repeated cruelty. The eighteenth instruction given for the defendant announced the contrary of such proposition. We do not think that the error thus complained of is well assigned. In the late work of Bishop on Marriage, Divorce and Separation, (vol. i, § 1608), it is said: The words in Illinois are extreme and repeated cruelty:' and it is plain that a single act, though it may be 'extreme' in point of cruelty, is not therefore repeated.' The consequence of which is that there can be no one act of violence which alone will bring a case within this statute." In Vignos v. Vignos, 15 Ill. 186, one act of violence, together with unkind treatment and the use of harsh language, was held to come far short of what the statute means by "extreme and repeated cruelty.” In Harman v. Harman, 16 Ill. 85, we said: "This court in Birkby v. Birkby, 15 Ill. 120, and in Vignos v. Vignos, 15 Ill. 186, has held that one instance of personal violence did not constitute a statutory cause, although coupled with abusive and derogatory language." In De La Hay v. De La Hay, 21 III. 252, we said: And when the Legislature has said that cruelty must be extreme and repeated, to constitute a ground, the courts cannot say that a single act will suffice." See also Turbitt v. Turbitt, 21 I. 438. In Embree v. Embree, 53 Ill. 394, this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Walker, said: "It is a positive requirement of the statute that there shall be extreme and repeated cruelty to authorize the courts to dissolve the marriage tie. One act has not, in this State, been held to answer the requirements of the statute; and the uniform construction given to the Act by this court

violence to the wife were clearly proven. In Henderson v. Henderson, 88 Ill. 248, we again said: This court has held that it [extreme and repeated cruelty] must be bodily harm, in contradistinction to mere harsh, or even opprobrious, language, or mere mental suffering; that the cruelty must be grave, and endanger life or limb, or, at any rate, subject the person to danger of great bodily harm.' See also Coursey v. Coursey, 60 Ill. 186. In Ward v. Ward, 103 Ill. 477, although it was said that extreme and protracted suffering might be produced primarily by operating on the mind alone, and that threats of physical violence and false charges of adultery, maliciously made, were competent evidence to prove cruelty, yet it is at the same time the plain doctrine of that case that the threats must be such as raise a reasonable apprehension of bodily hurt, and must be accompanied or followed by acts of actual, malicious, physical violence, and must serve to magnify the atrocity of such acts. It is also there said that any willful misconduct of the husband which endangers the life or health of the wife, which exposes her to bodily hazard and intolerable hardship, and renders cohabitation unsafe, is extreme cruelty, and that " many acts are not necessary to constitute such extreme cruelty; yet it is nowhere intimated that there can be repeated cruelty without more than one act of violence. On the contrary, the Farnham Case is quoted with approval in the Ward Case, and the proof in the latter case showed that the husband had committed four or five distinct assaults and batteries upon his wife, apparently without provocation, and, in addition thereto, had insulted and abused her constantly for three years. Even in Sharp v. Sharp, 116 Ill. 509, where the circumstances were peculiar and of an unusual character, it was shown that the husband had been guilty of at least two acts of physical violence, although they were separated from each other by a considerable period of time. In the case at bar the husband is charging the wife with extreme and repeated cruelty, and, in such case, it is not sufficient to show acts of violence on her part towards him, so long as there is no reason to suppose he will not be able to protect himself_by_a proper exercise of his marital powers." De La Hay v. De La Hay, supra.

After a careful examination of all the instructions in connection with the evidence, we find no sufficient reason for disturbing the result reached by the lower courts.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is af

firmed.

44

The law in regard to names is perhaps as good an illustration as may be found of the elasticity of the common law and its capacity to meet the requirements of increasing population and civilization and the demands of business.

Formerly the Christian name was the more important of the two. Re Snook, 2 Hilt. 568.

Coke states that in grants it was requisite that the purchaser be designated by his name of baptism and his surname, and that special heed be taken to the name of baptism, for that a man cannot have two names of baptism as he may have diverse surnames. But if the grant was to one by description he might take although his Christian name was mistaken. And he might receive a new name at confirmation which could be lawfully used instead of the Christian name. Co. Litt. 3a.

And that seems to have been the limit of his power to change his Christian name. The rigor with which a person was held to the use of the name received at baptism is illustrated by the following decisions:

An indictment against Elizabeth Newman alias Judith Hancock was quashed because a person could not have two Christian names. Rex v. Newman, 1 Raym, 562.

A process against Evanum alias Ievanum Loyd is void because he cannot have two Christian names. Loyd's Case, Noy, 135. See also East Skidmore v. Vaudstevan, Cro. Eliz. 56.

A bond entered into by Edmund Leusage under the name of Edward Leusage is void. Kent v. Wichall, Owen, 48.

And where Edward Watkins was obligated and Edmund Watkins sued, there could be no recovery. Watkins v. Oliver, Cro. Jac. 558.

One signing a bond must be sued by the name which he signed. Ryckman v. Shotbolt, 3 Dyer,

279.

Chief Justice Popham in Button v. Wrightman, Poph. 56, in speaking of grants, said: "The law is not precise in the case of surnames but for the Christian name this ought always to be perfect."

A PPEAL by defendants from a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, No. 1, for Allegheny County, in favor of plaintiff in an action brought to render defendants personally liable for debts due by a firm which they alleged to be a limited partnership. Reversed.

The schedule of the property contributed to the capital stock of the concern set out several tracts of land described separately, but valued together in a lump as a coal mine, and also buildings, tools, vehicles, machinery, etc., and was signed by all but one of the partners with initials, followed by the surname, without giving the Christian and middle names in full. Further facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. W. F. McCook and James C. Doty, for appellants:

At common law, a man may adopt any name he pleases. He may change it from time to time, and may accept and make conveyances, "contract, sue and be sued by his reputed or his adopted name."

Linton v. First Nat. Bank of Kittanning, 10 Fed. Rep. 894: Bell v. Sun Print. & Pub. Co. 10 Jones & S. 567.

We have been unable to find any case growing out of the partnership (limited) statutes in New York, Virginia or England, where such

A person might have different surnames and he would be held to be estopped to deny that a surname which he used in a deed is his. Bacon, Abr. Misnomer A, citing 3 Henry VI. 25; 2 Rolle, Abr. 146.

Form of the Christian name.

The doctrine that there could be but one Christian name seems to have been broadened so as to exclude the acquisition of a name consisting of two words or of a word and a letter or initial.

By the common law a full name consists of one Christian or given name and one surname or patronymic, and the two constitute the legal name of the person. The middle names or initials do not affect the legal name and they may be inserted or not, or a wrong initial may be inserted in a deed or contract without affecting its validity. Schofield v. Jennings, 68 Ind. 232.

The law knows of only one Christian name. Franklin v. Talmadge, 5 Johns. 84; Roosevelt v. Gardinier, 2 Cow. 463.

The Christian or first name is in law denominated the proper name; and a person can have but one, for middle or added names are not regarded. Re Snook, 2 Hilt. 568.

The middle name of a person is no part of his name. State v. Martin, 10 Mo. 301.

An initial letter between the Christian and surname is no part of either. Bratton v. Seymour, 4 Watts, 329; Isaacs v. Wile, 12 Vt. 674; Hart v. Lindsey, 17 N. H. 235, 43 Am. Dec. 597; Allen v. Taylor, 26 Vt. 598; Bletch v. Johnson, 40 Ill. 116; Thompson v. Lee, 21 Ill. 242.

Of course if the middle initial is no part of the name its use or omission, or even a mistake in regard to it, is immaterial, and so it has been held.

The omission or insertion of the middle name or of the initial letter of that name in a deed is immaterial. Games v. Stiles, 39 U. S. 14 Pet. 327, 10 L. ed. 478; Fink v. Manhattan R. Co. 29 N. Y. S. R. 153.

That one described as Margaret A. Giddings in a deed signed it as Margaret S. Giddings is immaterial. Erskine v. Davis, 25 Ill. 255.

Where it was doubtful whether the middle letter

Sheble v. Strong, 128 Pa. 315.

A general description of the extent of the property, or a lumping valuation, is not such a schedule as the Act requires.

Maloney v. Bruce, 94 Pa. 249.

The law contemplates property available for the business of the company and the payment of its debts.

Vanhorne v. Corcoran, 4 L. R. A. 386, 127 Pa. 265.

The question of what constitutes the full name is further developed in a brief filed by Messrs. John S. Ferguson, E. G. Ferguson and James H. Porte, in the case of Carroll v. Gearing, argued at the same term with this

one.

The effect of designating a candidate for election by his initials has been variously decided.

People v. Cicott, 16 Mich. 283, 97 Am. Dec. 141; People v. Ferguson, 8 Cow. 102.

On examination, however, it will be found that where the initials were held to be sufficient such ruling was based upon the proposition that, the identity of the person being established, the citizen voting should not be disfranchised by reason of the informality.

Men sue and are sued every day by their initials. After judgment no advantage can be

plaintiff, the defendant at the beginning of the suit could compel him to amend by setting out his Christian name.

Walgamood v. Randolph, 22 Neb. 493; Fisher v. Northrup, 7 L. R. A. 629, 79 Mich. 287.

In this State it was said that an initial letter interposed betwixt the Christian and surname is no part of either.

Bratton v. Seymour, 4 Watts, 329.

On the other hand, it is held in Massachusetts that the middle name is part of the name. Com. v. Shearman, 11 Cush. 546.

Even in Pennsylvania the omission of the middle letter in a name in the judgment index is fatal to a lien.

Hutchinson's App. 92 Pa. 186.

A man may have divers names at divers times, but not divers Christian names. Co. Litt. 3a.

Mitchell, J., delivered the opinion of the

court:

The Limited Association Act of 2d June, 1874, was a wide departure from the principles of the common law governing partnerships and the liability of the individual partners to the firm creditors. It was not the first, nor has it been the last, of such changes. On the contrary, it is but one step in a line of concessions to the business views and habits of a commer

The younger of two persons bearing the same name may properly be enrolled in a militia company under his name with the word "Second" added as well as with the name "Junior," as neither word is a part of his name. Cobb v. Lucas, 15 Pick. 7.

A road commissioner elected under his name with the appellation "Jr.," added, may lawfully sign his returns with that word omitted. People v. Collins, 7 Johns. 549.

One who has brought an action without adding "Jr.," to his name upon a written promise to him as "Jr.," may lawfully amend so as to show that he was the payee. Kincaid v. Howe, 10 Mass. 203.

There is no variance between a declaration on a note made to Samuel Headley and proof of one made to Samuel Headley, Jr. Headley v. Shaw, 39 Il. 354.

Right to change name.

There is an early case which tended to relax the strict rule of the common law as stated above. An action was brought against Benjamin Walden and he pleaded that he was baptized John and was never known as Benjamin. The court held that a traverse of the allegation that he was never called Benjamin was good, and stated that it was not sufficient to show a baptism by a name without also showing that he had always been called and known by it. Holman v. Walden, 1 Salk, 6, 6 Mod. 115.

That case is, however, also reported in 2 Ld. Raym. 1015, where it seems to turn on the principle that the plea was bad in that it would have been sufficient to have pleaded the matter of baptism. and that it was made bad by showing that he was never called or known by any other name, such allegation making it merely dilatory and not being to the merits.

And it seems that now a man may change either bis Christian or surname as radically and as often as he desires, if for an honest purpose, and it does not result in injury to third persons.

usage, or habit. England v. New York Pub. Co. 8 Daly, 375.

Even at common law a man might lawfully change his surname and was bound by any contract into which he might enter under an adopted or reputed name. Linton v. First Nat. Bank of Kittanning, 10 Fed. Rep. 897.

There is nothing to prevent a man from changing his name if he so desires. Re Snook, 2 Hilt. 568. The name which a man "always went by," which he declared to be his name in his dying declaration, and by which his mother had always known him, will be deemed to be his right name although one witness testified that he was baptized by another name. Binfield v. State, 15 Neb. 485.

Where a person is rightly described by the name of Edward in the body of a deed his mistake in executing it by the name of Edmund is immaterial. Middleton v. Findla, 25 Cal. 81.

A person must be sued upon a bond by the Christion name which he has attached to it. If objection is made that such is not his name it may be replied that he is known as well by one name as the other and the bond will be evidence of it. Gould v. Barnes, 3 Taunt. 504.

To a plea of misnomer it is sufficient to reply that the party is known as well by one name as by the other. Selman v. Shackelford, 17 Ga. 615.

Where a person had signed a contract with the initials of his Christian names and his surname, and had been arrested in an action growing out of such contract by a wrong middle name, the court said that if he had led the other party to know him by a name which was not his Christian name he could not complain if he was sued by such wrong name. Newton v. Maxwell, 2 Cromp. & J. 216.

One may lawfully take upon himself a surname for the purpose of bringing himself within the terms of a will which provides that no person can take the estate unless he takes such name. The court said a name assumed by the voluntary act of a young man at the outset of his life, and adopted by all who know him, and by which he is constant

cial age and community, and it should be construed in the spirit of its enactment. A review of the course of legislation may help us towards the true intent of the statute. The Act of the 21st of March, 1836, (Pub. Laws, 143,) was an elaborate scheme for the introduction of a new kind of partnership, not previously known to the law. One or more general partners were required, and they alone were authorized to transact the business or sign the firm name, and their names alone, without the word "company" or other general term, could appear in the firm title. The special partners must contribute actual cash as part of the capital, could not withdraw any part of it during the term, nor receive profits, or even interest, which lessened its amount, and any violation of these provisions, or any participation in the transaction of the business with the public, or the appearance of their names in the firm title, subjected them to be treated as general partners. A certificate of the facts had to be sworn to, acknowledged in the manner of acknowledgment of deeds, and recorded, before the partnership was legally constituted; and any change as to any fact set forth in the certificate must be again certified in like manner on penalty of liability of all parties as general partners. The influence of common-law ideas of partnership is apparent throughout the Act. It was manifestly re

name, as though he had obtained an Act of Parliament to confer it on him. Doe v. Yates, 5 Barn. & Ald. 544.

In King v. Billingshurst, 3 Maule & S. 250, Abraham Langley was held to have properly changed his name to George Smith.

In Gulliver v. Ashby, 4 Burr. 19 40, Lord Mansfield seems to have thought that the king's license or an Act of Parliament was essential to entitle a man to assume a new name.

garded as an experiment, to be entered upon cautiously and hedged about with restrictions. But the Act met the needs of the community, and, in the language of the present hour, it had come to stay. After more than half a century, it is still on our statute book as the basis of the system, and every change since has been a step forward in the same direction, and not backward. By joint resolution of the 16th of April, 1838, (Pub. Laws, 691,) a partner, general or special, or his executor, in case of his death, could, with the assent in writing of the others, sell and assign his interest without causing a dissolution, such alterations being certified, etc., as before. By the Act of the 21st of April, 1858, (Pub. Laws, 383,) the sale of a partner's interest, or an increase of the capital, either by increased contributions from the original partners, or by taking in new special partners, could be provided for in advance in the articles of partnership or in a separate instrument, such changes being required to be certified and recorded as before; but, most notable of all, the omission to record was not to work a dissolution as before, or subject the special partners to general liability. The spirit of progressive legislation had discovered that changes which left the business intact, or even increased in capital, did not demand the punishment of special partners by imposing general liability for neglect of

| the holder on due-bills is sufficient to transfer title to them. Weston v. Myers, 33 Ill. 432.

A bill may be lawfully signed by initials. Palmer v. Stevens, 1 Davies, 471.

An indorsement may be made simply by figures. Brown v. Butchers & D. Bank, 6 Hill, 443.

A person may bind himself by signing an assumed name to commercial paper. Grafton Bank v. Flanders, 4 N. H. 239.

A note assigned to C. R. Rogers may be sued by

Business name.

In business matters a contract or obligation may be entered into by a person by any name he may choose to assume. Bell v. Sun Print. Pub. Co. 10 Jones & S. 570; Re Snook, 2 Hilt. 568. One may carry on business in the name of his agent. Chandler v. Coe, 54 N. H. 561.

Julia Graham may lawfully carry on business under the name of Freeman Graham, Agent. Graham v. Eiszner, 28 Ill. App. 269.

An individual may do business under a corporate name. Bryant v. Eastman, 7 Cush. 111; Fuller v. Hooper, 3 Gray, 334.

A business name can consist of a combination of initials with the surname. Oakley v. Pegler, 30 Neb. 628.

Whether or not a re-arrangement of a person's Christian names or the substitution of one for another will make a fictitious or assumed name, within the meaning of a clause of a fire insurance policy vacating it if obtained under a fictitious or assumed name, is a question for the jury. Pollard v. Fidelity F. Ins. Co. (S. Dak.) Feb. 11, 1891.

In New York there is a statute making it a penal offense for a person to obtain credit by carrying on his business under an assumed name. Barron v. Yost, 35 N. Y. S. R. 380.

Signatures and indorsements on commercial paper. Initials are enough to charge one as indorser of a check. Merchants Bank v. Spicer, 6 Wend. 443. The indorsement of the initials of three names of

One who has placed a fictitious name on commercial paper, which is taken by a third person in ignorance of the fact that he signed it and without relying upon him as security, is not liable on the bill if the name is not one under which he transacted or held himself out as transacting business. Bartlett v. Tucker, 104 Mass. 342, 6 Am. Rep. 240.

Name for carrying on suit.

Simply stating the initials of the Christian name of plaintiff is not sufficient and will not withstand a plea in abatement, Norris v. Graves, 4 Strob. L. 32.

A suit cannot be carried on by the initial merely of the Christian or first name of the plaintiff against the objection of defendant although the one commencing the action does not know the correct name. Fisher v. Northrup, 7 L. R. A. 629, 79

Mich. 287.

It is immaterial if plaintiff leave the middle letter out of the name by which he brings suit. Dilts v. Kinney, 15 N. J. L. 130.

The entire omission of the Christian name of plaintiff in the statement of a claim against a decedent's estate is only a matter of abatement and the objection may be obviated by amendment. Peden v. King, 30 Ind. 181.

Where plaintiff sued by his surname preceded by Monsieur, and defendant pleaded in abatement a replication that he was known as well by that name as by his Christian name, this was held bad. Labat v. Ellis, 1 N. C. 92.

Where the Christian name of plaintiff is given as J. M., and there is nothing in the petition to show