mere formalities. The Act of March 30, 1865, | put up as required by the Act of 1865. This (Pub. Laws, 46,) made two important further was the state of the law when the Legislature changes: The firm title, where there were passed the Act of the 2d of June, 1874, (Pub. more than two general partners, may contain Laws, 271,) for the formation of partnership the words "and company," (previously forbid-associations with limited liabilities, under den,) the names in full of all the partners, which the present defendants were organized. special as well as general, being put upon a By this Act no general partners are required, sign; and the special partners were allowed to nor is any restriction put upon the firm name contribute their share of the capital in goods, or title, except that the word "limited" must the value, however, being first appraised under be the concluding word. The persons desiring oath by an appraiser appointed by the court of to form the association must sign and acknowlcommon pleas. By the Act of the 21st of Feb- edge a statement, setting forth, inter alia, ruary, 1868, (Pub. Laws, 42,) the firm name "the full names of such persons." The Act may consist of the name of any one general speaks only of "subscribing and contributing partner, with the addition "and company,' capital," total amount, "and when and how notwithstanding the name may be common to be paid," etc. But this being held to mean to such general partner, but the sign must be money capital only, a supplement was passed that such is not his Christian name, a demurrer on the ground that the petition does not state his name cannot be sustained. Perkins v. McDowell (Wyo.) Jan. 31, 1890. A suit brought and judgment rendered in the name of plaintiff by initials only for his given name is not open to objection on that ground in the absence of a showing that he had another name. It will not be presumed that he had any other name than the initials used in bringing suit. Fewlass v. Abbott, 28 Mich. 270. The objection that plaintiff in instituting an action has used simply the initials of his Christian names instead of the names in full must be taken by motion to require the full names to be set out or it will be regarded as waived. Wilganood v. Randolph, 22 Neb. 493. After judgment it is too late to object that plaintiff sued by the initials of his Christian names rather than by setting out the names in full, since he may have had no Christian name but simply distinguished himself by initials from other persons of the same surname. Breedlove v. Nicolet, 32 U. S. 7 Pet. 413, 8 L. ed. 731. Effect on criminal prosecutions. Where the indictment alleged that J. R. R. was robbed, and the proof showed that J. B. R. was robbed, there was no variance. Miller v. People, 39 Ill. 458. On the trial of an indictment for larceny, the name of the owner of the property may be amended from James Marshall to James Cicero Marshall. Haywood v. State, 47 Miss. 1. Tyrrel Babbs, where the evidence further shows that he is best known by the name appearing in the information. Atty-Gen. v. Hawkes, 1 Cromp & J. 120. It seems that if a person has but one Christian name it will not do to use the initial letter of it merely, but the whole name must be stated. Choen v. State, 52 Ind. 347, 21 Am. Rep. 179. Abbreviations, etc. The court may take judicial notice of the abbreviations of a man's given name, but as to his surname, query. Fenton v. Perkins, 3 Mo. 144. name was Sally, calling her Sarah or Sally is suffiA notice concerning a pauper whose Christian cient. Shelburne v. Rochester, 1 Pick. 470. Christy or Christ McElhenon, signed to a note, was Jack Murphy is sustained by proof of a sale to 105 Ind. 589. Signature of Christian names by their initials. The reason of the rule which required the Christian name to be written in full in England is held not to exist in Kansas, and in that State no written instrument can be regarded as a nullity because the Christian name is not written in full. Ferguson v. Smith, 10 Kan. 402. It has grown into such universal practice to sign So D. W. Humphries may be amended to D. G. one's given name by initial that it has had the Humphries. Unger v. State, 42 Miss. 649. effect to relax the common-law rule. Cummings v. Rice, 9 Tex. 529. But it has been held in Ohio that if the middle letter of one against whom burglary was committed is set out, it must be proved as laid. Price v. State, 19 Ohio, 423. Although the name given to one at his baptism is to be taken as original, and presumed to continue his name, yet if after his baptism he adopts and uses another, by which he is subsequently well known in the community where he resides, it is sufficient to describe him by that name in a prosecution for illegally selling liquor to him. Com. v. Trainor, 123 Mass. 414. An information charging the illegal sale of liquors need not set out the middle name or initial of the one to whom they were sold, and proof of the middle name at the trial will not constitute a variance. State v. Feeny, 13 R. I. 627. A complaint by Charles J. Rock alleging that defendant unlawfully did sell intoxicating liquors to Charles Rock aforesaid is sufficient. Com. v. O'Hearn, 132 Mass. 553. Upon an information for offering a bribe to an officer named Thomas Babbs there is no variance, though the proof shows his name to be Thomas A person may execute an instrument and bind himself as effectually by his initials as by writing his name in full. Palmer v. Stephens, 1 Denio, 478. Corporators may sign the articles of association by their usual signatures, and the use of initials to designate the Christian names is not objectionable. State v. Beck, 81 Ind. 501. Where a statute required the voting papers at an election of borough councilors to be signed with the names of the burgesses voting, the parties' usual signatures are sufficient, and it is no valid objection that the Christian names are denoted only by the initials. Reg. v. Avery, 18 Q. B. 576. Where a form for notice of claims showed the Christian names in full it was held that a notice was sufficient if the Christian names were represented by initials only. Reg. v. Hartlepool, 2 Lowndes, M. & P. 666. Whether the name R. P. O'Neil signed to a power of attorney to convey land was meant for Rev. Patrick O'Neil, the owner of the land, cannot without other proof be submitted to the jury. Burford v. McCue, 53 Pa. 431. H. P. F. the 1st of May, 1876, (Pub. Laws, 89,) author- | such identification. The full name, therefore, izing contribution "in real or personal estate, is no more than the whole of such title, as it mines, or other property, at a valuation to be is used by himself and his neighbors for such approved by all the members." The Act of purpose. To construe the statute to require 1874, it will be seen, was not a mere amend- the literal and absolute following of the entire ment or supplement to anything that went be list of names which the person may have had fore, but like the Act of 1836, a new scheme, bestowed upon him would be giving it not carefully and elaborately drawn, creating a only a very narrow and technical construction, new kind of artificial person, standing between which serves no purpose of the Act, but even a limited partnership as previously known and one which might tend to defeat its real intent. a corporation, and partaking of the attributes A statement signed "Stephen Grover Cleveof each. It was, however, a step forward in land" would not create certainty, but doubt, the same line of legislative recognition of as to its author. business demands uniformly pursued since the start, in 1836. With this review, we may now turn to the two points especially involved in the present case. And, first, we are to inquire what is meant by the full names of the members. This phrase first made its appearance in the Act of 1865, in connection with the requirement that there should be "put up in some conspicuous place on the outside, and in front of the building," a sign on which should be painted, in legible English characters, "all the names in full, of all the members of said partnership, stating who are general and who are special partners." Previously to this Act only the names of the general partners could appear in the firm title, and "without the addition of the word 'company' or any other general word." This Act required the use of the names of all the general partners, except when there might be more than two, in which case the names of any two could be used with the addition of the words "and company," and the sign, as already noted, "stating who are general and who are special partners." This last requirement is the key note of the intent; it was to give information to the public as to the persons who com posed the firm, and the capacity in which they stood connected with it, as generally or only specially responsible. The object aimed at was the identification of the person, and the requirement of his full name had nothing further in view. A man's name is the designation by which he is distinctively known in the community. Custom gives him the family name of his father, and such prænomina as his parents choose to put before it, and appropriate circumstances may require "Sr." or "Jr." as a further constituent part. But all this is only a general rule, from which the individual may depart if he chooses. The Legislature in 1852 provided a mode of changing the name, but that act was in affirmance and aid of the common law, to make a definite point of time at which a change shall take effect. But without the aid of that act a man may change his name or names, first or last, and, when his neighbors and the community have acquiesced and recognized him by his new designation, that becomes his name. Two noted examples are at hand for illustration. The blunder of the friendly congressman who nominated him to West Point transposed and altered the names by which General Grant has gone into history, and considerations of taste or convenience have induced President Cleveland to omit one of the names his parents bestowed upon him. A name, therefore, is the title used for the identification of an individual, and the intent of its requirement in full is certainty of The Act of 1874, as already said, made no restrictions upon the firm title, except the compulsory termination "limited," and omitted the requirement of the sign, but in lieu thereof substituted the statement containing the "full names" of the persons composing the association. This phrase was borrowed from the Act of 1865, and its intent was the same in both,to secure the identification of the individual by having his name plainly set forth in the full form by which the community would recognize him. The appellants gave evidence that the names as signed to the statement were in the form habitually used by them in business, and by which they were generally known in the community. This, if proved, was a sufficient compliance with the statute. The Act of 1836 required the special partners to contribute actual cash, and for nearly thirty years this requirement was absolute and unyielding. The Act of 1865 for the first time permitted goods to be put in as capital, but required their value to be fixed by a sworn appraiser appointed by the court. The Act of 1874, as amended in 1876, did away with all these restrictions, and allowed the capital to be contributed in "real or personal estate, mines, or other property," without any other check as to the valuation than the agreement of all the subscribers. The statement is to certify the kind of capital contributed, whether money or property, and, in the latter case, a schedule with a description and valuation. By the plain terms of the Act the valuation is in the discretion of the parties, and (assuming, of course, good faith) may be sanguine or cautious. Rehfuss v. Moore, 134 Pa. 462, 7 L. R. A. 663. The description, therefore, is plainly for the information of parties interested, so that they may, if they desire, have the data for their own judgment of value. Accordingly it has been uniformly held by this court that a vague or general or lumping description is not sufficient. Maloney v. Bruce, 94 Pa. 249; Vanhorn v. Corcoran, 127 Pa. 255, 4 L. R. A. 386. It is not intended, however, nor would it be practicable in many cases where an existing business is the basis of the new firm, to require minute specification of details that may change from day to day. Certainty to a fair business intent is the safe, practical criterion, as was indicated in Relifuss v. Moore, 134 Pa. 462, 7 L. R. A. 663, where a lumping valuation of six distinct patent rights, at a very high figure, was sustained on the ground that they were all expected to be used in the operation of a single device, embodying the principle of all, and were considered valuable only in combination. The schedule in the present case described several tracts of land which it appears were re Independently of Statute 3 and 4 Wm. IV., chap. 42, 31, the court has the power to punish an administrator or executor for misbehavior in the conduct of the suit brought by him, by imposing costs. Comber v. Hardcastle, 3 Bos. & P. 115. An unsuccessful plaintiff executor cannot be exempted from costs, under 3 and 4 Wm. IV., chap. 42, § 31, by his good faith in suing, if by caution he might have discovered that the claim was groundless. Engler v. Twisden, 2 Bing. N. C. 263. An administrator suing upon a contract made with the intestate, but broken after his death, necessarily sues in a representative capacity, and is not liable for costs, if defeated. Tattersall V. Groote, 2 Bos. & P. 253; Cooke v. Lucas, 2 East, 395. Where an executor has blended his testator's estate with his own, so that his own executor cannot distinguish whether there are any assets of the first estate, the latter should not be made to pay the costs to a successful plaintiff suing for a debt of the first testator. Sandys v. Watson, 2 Atk. 80. Under Statute 3 and 4 Wm. IV., chap. 42, 8 31, an executor cannot be relieved from the payment of costs, when nonsuited, in an action upon a promise to him, of which the consideration was partly an account stated with him as executor and partly a demand due his testator. Spence v. A)bert, 2 Ad. & El. 785. Nor can an executor be relieved from the payment of costs, although suing in good faith, unless there be improper conduct on the part of the defendant. Birkhead v. North, 4 Dowl. & L. 732; Farley v. Briant, 3 Ad. & El. 839; Southgate v. Crowley, 1 Bing. N. C. 518. Pleas for Providence County to issue an execution against an administrator de bonis propriis for costs recovered by the petitioners in an action against them by the administrator, in which they prevailed. Granted. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. Henry J. Dubois for petitioners. Mr. George E. Webster defendant in propria persona. Matteson, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of the court: This is a petition for a writ of mandamus to require the clerk of the court of common pleas to issue an execution for costs against an ad American rules. The question is largely controlled by statute in America, the principal statutory provisions being indicated below. Alabama. In a contest between an administrator and dis tributees as to whether certain property belongs to the estate or to the administrator personally, upon a decision adverse to the administrator he is personally chargeable with costs. Jones v. Deyer, 16 Ala. 221. In an action by an administrator de bonis non upon a note given to the administrator in chief, the plaintiff, if defeated, is not chargeable personally with costs. Stewart v. Hood, 10 Ala. 600. Where the avails of an action prosecuted by an administrator would, if successful, be assets of the estate he represents, he is not chargeable personally with costs of the action if he is defeated therein. Hutchinson v. Gamble, 12 Ala. 36; Chandler v. Shehan, 7 Ala. 251. Costs may be awarded against an executor when a judgment is revived against him by scire facias. Hanson v. Jacks, 22 Ala. 549. Georgia. A verdict having been rendered against an administrator who had been brought in as a party defendant after the death of his intestate that "defendant pay the costs of said suit," a judgment for costs against the administrator individually is erroneous. Clements v. Maloney, 17 Ga. 289. An administrator is not personally liable for costs of a suit brought by him to recover for a wrong done to his intestate in his lifetime, although the estate is insolvent. Clark County Justices v. Haygood, 20 Ga. 847. Missouri. Under the English statute executors and administrators, when defendants, have no privileges as to costs. If the plaintiff obtains a verdict, he is en- An administrator plaintiff suing upon a cause of titled to judgment for the whole in the first in-action which accrued to his intestate in his lifestance de bonis testatoris; and if there are not assets, then to the costs de bonis propriis. Marshall v. Willder, 9 Barn. & C. 655. time, is not personally liable for costs. Ross v. Alleman, 60 Mo. 269; Wooldridge v. Draper, 15Mo. 470. ministrator, running against his own goods, should issue against his own goods, chattels, chattels, and estate, instead of the goods and and estate. The subject of costs in proceed chattels of the intestate in the hands of the ad- ings by and against executors and administraministrator. The petitioners recovered a judg- tors is one concerning which there has been a ment in the court of common pleas for their diversity of opinion and practice, and which is costs of suit in an action in which an adminis largely regulated by statute. In England, in trator and another were plaintiffs and they the early practice, an executor or administra were defendants. The respondent, upon ap- tor might recover costs if successful in a suit plication of the petitioners for execution, de- brought by him, but if the decision was clined to issue it, except against the goods and against him he was not liable for costs, the chattels of the intestate in the hands of the ad- reason being that the Statute (23 Hen. VIII. ministrator, and he now contends that it can chap. 15, § 1) by which costs were first given properly issue only in that form. The peti- to defendants was confined to cases of wrongs tioners applied to the court of common pleas done to and contracts made with the plaintiff. for an order to the clerk to issue execution Now, however, under the Statute of 3 and 4 against the goods, chattels, and estate of the Wm. IV., chap. 42, § 31, an executor or adadministrator, but the court declined to make ministrator, with respect to costs, is put on the the order. Of course the execution should same footing as other suitors, except that, if conform to the judgment. The allegation of the action be in the right of the testator or inthe petition is simply that the petitioners re- testate, the court in which the action is pendcovered judgment for their costs, without stat-ing, or the judge of a superior court, may othing whether the judgment was against the ad-erwise order. But, independently of the latter ministrator personally or only against the statute, and by virtue of the former, if an exgoods and chattels of the intestate in the hands ecutor or administrator brought an action on a of the administrator. We assume, however, wrong done in his own time, or upon a conthat the judgment was against the adminis- tract, express or implied, made with himself, trator personally, and that the question which and failed in the action, he was liable to the dethe parties desire to raise for our determina- fendant for costs, even though he sued as extion is whether a judgment against an admin-ecutor or administrator. Nicolas v. Killigrew, istrator personally is a proper judgment. If 1 Ld. Raym. 436; Jenkins v. Plume, 1 Salk. so, it necessarily follows that the execution |207; Goldthwayte v. Petrie, 5 T. R. 234; Bol Otherwise where he sues upon a cause of action for costs on a verdict and general judgment for accruing to himself. Ibid. New Hampshire. In Folsom v. Blaisdell, 38 N. H. 100, it is said: "The only statutory provision of this State which recognizes any personal liability of an executor or administrator for costs, in a suit founded upon a cause of action in favor of or against the testator or intestate, is contained in Rev. Stat., chap. 161, § 13, which provides that, upon return of 'no goods or 'waste' made by the sheriff on an execution in a suit where the cause of action was against the person deceased, an execution may be awarded on scire facias against the goods or estate of the administrator as for his own debt, to the amount of such waste,' if it can be ascertained; otherwise for the whole debt." The same case holds that such execution can only be issued where the administrator fails to appear, or fails to show cause why execution should not be issued. It is not to be awarded as a matter of course upon scire facias. An executor or administrator suing, as such, upon a cause of action alleged to have arisen since the death of the testator or intestate, is personally liable for the costs awarded to the defendant. Keniston v. Little, 30 N. H. 318, 64 Am. Dec. 297; Moulton v. Wendell, 37 N. H. 406. Pennsylvania. the defendant. Callender v. Keystone Mut. L. Ins. Co. 23 Pa. 471, overruling Ewing v. Furness, 13 Pa. 531,and Muntorf v. Muntorf, 2 Rawle, 180. (This case must have escaped the attention of the learned chief judge, who wrote the opinion in the principal case, in his examination of the law in Penn sylvania.) An administrator plaintiff defeated in a wanton and vexatious suit is personally liable to the defendant for costs. Show v. Conway, 7 Pa. 136. An executor plaintiff is liable for costs in an action for a conversion of goods of the estate after his appointment. Gebhart v. Shindle, 15 Serg. & Every executor or administrator shall have full power to maintain any suit in any court of competent jurisdiction, in his name as such executor or administrator, for any demand, of whatever nature. due the decedent, in his lifetime, for the recovery of the possession of any property of the estate, and for trespass or waste committed on the estate of the decedent in his lifetime; but he shall not be liable, in his individual capacity, for any costs in such suit. Ind. Rev. Stat. 1881, § 2291. Where a plaintiff executor necessarily brings an An administrator plaintiff is not personally liable action in his representative capacity, and no de lard v. Spencer, 7 T. R. 358; Tattersall v.359; Pillsbury v. Hubbard, 10 N. H. 224; KenGroote, 2 Bos. & P. 253; Cooke v. Lucas, 2 iston v. Little, 30 N. H. 318, 64 Am. Dec. 297; East, 395; Dowbiggin v. Harrison, 9 Barn. & Folsom v. Blaisdell, 38 N. H. 100; Hutcheraft C. 666; Jobson v. Forster, 1 Barn. & Ad. 6; v. Gentry, 2 J. J. Marsh. 499; Frink v. LuySlater v. Lawson, Id. 893. ten, 2 Bay, 166. Some of the courts in this country, in the On the other hand, it has been held in Pennabsence of statutes regulating the subject, have sylvania that an executor or administrator who held that where the cause of action accrued is plaintiff is bound to pay costs to the defendwholly after the death of the testator or intes-ant in cases of nonsuit or a verdict for the detate, the executor or administrator, if he fails fendant, not only when the cause of action acin an action brought by him, must pay the crued after the death of the testator or intescosts, but that he is not to be held liable when tate, but also upon a cause of action which the cause of action accrued wholly or partly accrued within the lifetime of the testator or within the lifetime of his testator or intestate. intestate, for the reason, as it was said, that it The reason assigned for the distinction is that is obvious justice that one against whom a vexin the former case, being a party to the trans- atious suit has been brought should recover his action, he is presumed to know all about it, costs, and that it is nothing to him on whom and to act upon his own responsibility, and the costs fall, whether on the estate or the extherefore ought not to be permitted to saddle ecutor or administrator personally. Muntorf the estate with the costs in case of failure; v. Muntorf, 2 Rawle, 180; Penrose v. Pawling, whereas, in the latter case, not being privy to 8 Watts & S. 379; Show v. Conway, 7 Pa. 126. the original transaction, he cannot be presumed to know exactly what the case may turn out to be upon investigation, and therefore ought not to be required to pay the costs himself. Ketchum v. Ketchum, 4 Cow. 87; Chamberlin v. Spencer, Id. 550; Barker v. Baker, 5 Cow. 267; Buckland v. Gallup, 40 Hun, 61; Potts v. Smith, 3 Rawle, 361, 24 Am. Dec. Executions for costs shall run against the goods and estate, and, for want thereof, against the commenced by or against them, and in actions commenced by or against the deceased, in which they have appeared, for costs accrued after they assumed the prosecution or defense, to be allowed to them in their administration account, unless the judge of probate decides that the suit was prosecuted or defended without reasonable cause. Me. Rev. Stat. 1871, p. 689, chap. 87, § 2. bodies of executors and administrators in actions Mississippi. Executors and administrators shall be entitled to, or be answerable for, costs, in the same manner as the testator or intestate would have been, and shall be allowed for the same in their accounts, if the court awarding costs against them shall certify that there were probable grounds for instituting, prosecuting, or defending the action on which the judgment or decree shall have been given against them. Miss. Rev. Code 1880, chap. 64, § 2377. The petition before us does not show whether the cause of action in the suit in which costs were recovered by the petitioners accrued during the lifetime of the intestate or subsequent to his death. We do not, however, deem this a material consideration. Pub. Stat. R. I., chap. 217, § 1, provides that "in all civil I causes at law the party prevailing shall recov When costs are adjudged against an executor or administrator, in any suit at law or in equity, and he shall obtain the certificate of the court before which the suit was tried that there was probable cause for bringing or defending the same, he shall not be individually liable for costs, although the estate may be insufficient to pay them. Miss. Rev. Code 1880, chap. 64, § 2378. Ohio. sented to an executor or administrator, the refIn any suit or proceeding upon any claim preerees or court before whom the same shall be tried may direct such costs to be awarded against the creditor or against the executor or administrator personally, or to be paid out of the assets of the estate, as a part of the costs of administration, as shall be just, having reference to the facts that appeared upon the trial. Ohio Rev. Stat. (Giauque) $8 6106, 6242. Under a general judgment in a cause, defendant having died, and action having been revived against his administrator, no costs can be recovered against the latter. Farrier v. Cairns, 5 Ohio, 45. West Virginia. sonal representative) had prudently discharged his duty, the suit or motion would not have been brought or made, the judgment or decree, so far as it is for costs, shall be ordered to be paid out of his own estate. W. Va. Code 1891, chap. 131, p. 836, $ 21. When a court enters of record that if he (the per Virginia Code 1891, § 2677, is same as the West Virginia Statute. California. In an action, presecuted or defended by an executor, administrator, trustee of an express trust, or a person expressly authorized by statute, costs may be recovered, as in an action by and against a person prosecuting in his own right; but such costs must by the judgment be made chargeable only upon the estate, fund or party represented, unless the court directs the same to be paid by the plaintiff, or defendant, personally, for mismanagement or bad faith in the action or defense. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1031. Statutory provisions substantially the same as |