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other hand, those who before purchased a certain quantity of meat, determine to diminish their purchases, owing to the increase of prices. This is another part of the fact; and thus they say the whole facts bear out their position, that an increased quantity of money, by being brought to bear on any particular article, though it at first enhances the price, yet by that very circumstance repelling a portion of the former demand, the price reverts to its former level, or nearly

So.

But here two things are confounded which are really distinct, and the whole fact is not traced. A person, in consequence of the increased price of meat 25 per cent, may resolve to purchase 25 per cent less than usual. As far as he is concerned, therefore, there is a demand for less meat; but if he determines to spend as much money in the butcher market, and this, in fact, he will do, if, when the price is raised 25 per cent, he buys 25 per cent less meat, the diminution in his purchases, the money he lays out being to the same amount, cannot have any effect in counteracting the supposed increase in the quantity of money drawn into the butcher-market.

But our principal business at present is to prove, that the fact is not traced far enough. Let us then grant, that in consequence of the increased price of meat, a certain class of purchasers expend on this article 25 per cent less money than formerly; this, certainly, will tend to bring the price of meat down to its former level. But what becomes of the money thus withdrawn from the butcher-market? We cannot suppose it is suffered to lie idle and unemployed; it will be spent on some other article of food, probably on bread. In this case, the speculative demand for bread is increased, and its price will rise, and if, in consequence of this rise in its price, some persons expend less on it than they were wont to do, what is thus withdrawn from expenditure on bread will be spent on some other article, the price of which it will enhance. We thus see what a difference it makes in the nature and bearing of a fact, when we stop short in the middle of it, and when we trace it to its termination.

Let us illustrate this position by an examination of the facts of the opposite party, of those whe declaim against

any increase in the circulating medium, as having no effect but the bad one of raising prices. They stop short at the first and immediate consequence of an increase in the circulating medium; it necessarily must raise prices; on this ground they rail against it. They look no farther; they do not even look at the other side of the fact. Prices are raised; this is bad to those who have to purchase, but it is good to those who have to sell; it holds out a stronger stimulus to their industry; and the usual consequences follow: more is produced, the community is rendered more wealthy, and prices fall. Thus, the whole fact leads to an inference quite opposite to that drawn from the partial fact; the general and permanent result is very different from the immediate and temporary result.

Machinery is introduced into a certain department of manufactures, which previously were wrought by manual labour: the workmen are thrown out of employment. Here is what the enemies of machinery call a decisive and undoubted fact in support of their opinion. Can anything be plainer or stronger? they exclaim. Speculative notions must yield to experience. Let us, however, view the case a little more closely. Machinery is introduced: employment is less easily procured, and wages fall. We shall allow, that the introduction of machinery is the cause of this evil, though the only facts in this case are, that the machinery is in operation, and the men are destitute of employment; that one is the cause of the other, is an inference to account for the state of affairs." To this blending of facts and inferences, which is one of the grounds of the objections of mere matter-of-fact men to the conclusions of Political Economy, and of the assumption continually made with regard to that science, that theory and experience are at variance, we shall afterwards advert.

First, as we have said, we shall grant, that the introduction of machinery is the cause of the evil. Why is machinery employed? Because thus the goods can be made, and consequently sold, at a cheaper rate, than when manual labour is employed in their manufacture. But if they are sold cheaper, will they not be within the reach of a greater number of peo

ple, and will not this enlarge the demand for them, and, in course of time, give employment not only to those labourers who at first were thrown out of employment, but to many more? The whole fact, in all its consequences, has been so palpably and frequent ly brought before us within the last half century, that an appeal to the temporary result of the introduction of machinery now possesses little weight. Indeed, this is a most striking and instructive instance of a fact confidently appealed to, against what are called speculative opinions, gradually unfolding itself, till it proves decidedly hostile to those very persons who brought it forward, and as decidedly in favour of Political Economy.

But the consequences of the introduction of machinery may be traced in another direction, which will equally prove our position, that facts are little worth unless they are whole in themselves, and viewed in connexion with all their consequences; and that what are called the facts of practical men seldom being of this description, are more likely to be prejudicial than serviceable-to lead from the truth, and the well-being of society, than to them.

· Machinery saves labour and lowers prices; but the money thus saved from expenditure in articles made by machinery, will be expended on other articles; this will increase the demand for them, and, of course, for labourers to make them; and thus machinery, which directly threw workmen out of employment, will indirectly procure them employment.

We trust we have said enough to prove, that what are called facts are not always such; that they are often mixed up with theory and prejudices; and that even when political arithmeticians or practical men state what is really the case, they do not state the whole case; that when they assert that a certain measure is beneficial or injurious, they most frequently have viewed it only as regards their own interest, or particular line of inquiry or business, or in its immediate and temporary results, and not as it affects the interest of the community at large, and displays itself in its remote and permanent consequences.

We shall now attend to the circumstances of facts, on which, as much as

in their consequences, depend their value and authority, either as the ground-work of general principles, or as opposed to them.

A general principle in Political Economy, or any other science, is laid down, after having been carefully deduced from a vast number of facts and observations, under a great variety of circumstances. A practical man denounces this general principle as erroneous and prejudicial; he says, it recommends a certain measure, which he has adopted, and found not to be attended with the alleged result. The advocate of this general principle first examines whether it really recommends the measure proposed; he finds it does; he next investigates the consequences said to have flowed from the adoption of this measure, and he finds them, through their whole extent and train, to be such as described, and quite at variance with what his general principle predicts. He is staggered: there is one other inquiry, however, to be made; under what circumstances was the measure adopted and pursued? This inquiry conducts him to the real fact, which he no longer finds to be at variance with his general principle. The measure was good in itself; it was exactly such as the general principle recommended, and it would have produced the beneficial results pointed out in the general principle, but it was adopted and pursued under circumstances which altered essentially its character and effects. Stript of these circumstances, the measure would have proved beneficial: altered by them, it has proved injurious ;-but both results are, in fact, confirmations of the general principle. "Little, if any regard," observes Mr Stewart," is due to a particular phenomenon, when stated as an objection to a conclusion resting on the general laws which regulate the course of human affairs. Even admitting the phenomenon in question to have been accurately observed, and faithfully described, it is yet possible that we may be imperfectly acquainted with that combination of circumstances whereby the effect is modified; and that if these circumstances were fully before us, the apparent exception would turn out an additional illustration of the very truth which it was brought to invalidate." (P. 448.)

That war is prejudicial to a nation, in drawing off its labour and resources from profitable industry, and directing them to schemes of ambition and conquest,-in introducing, confirming, and widely spreading habits of national profusion, and in introducing that laxity of morals among a large class of citizens, which must always result from a state of warfare directly, as well as from those fluctuations in the wages of labour and in the manufactures and trade of a country, to which they are more frequently and deeply liable in war than in peace, is a maxim long and firmly fixed in the minds of most reflecting and observant people, a maxim drawn from the experience of the world as far back as history carries us, and not less convincing to the political philosopher, than it is consoling to the friend of humanity, who is accustomed to regard these evils as some check on the ambition both of princes and their subjects.

But we all must recollect how expressly and decidedly the late wars with revolutionary France were held up as having conduced to our national prosperity, by many people; how their termination was regretted, and how the slightest chance of a renewal of hostilities was hailed as a certain prelude to increased national wealth and prosperity. If the philosopher was incredulous, and the friend of humanity was shocked at this doctrine, and repelled it as not less unfounded than dangerous, the supporters of it were ready with what they called facts. These, they contended, were obvious, decisive, and numerous. They appealed to the state of our commerce previous to the commencement of the war, during its progress, at its termination, and after it had ceased for some time. The tables of our exports and imports-the state of our principal manufactures-the rapid and large fortunes made by our merchants-the enormous loans they were able to accommodate government with-the improvements in agriculture, and the signs of improvement and wealth displayed in the increase of building and population, as well as in the improved style of living among many classesall were facts appealed to, as proving that war, so far from being an evil, was a blessing.

This is plausible reasoning: to all appearance it is supported by a train

of obvious, undoubted, and applicable facts. But it will not bear close and careful scrutiny and examination, and it affords another instance and proof of the worthlessness of what are called facts, in many topics of Political Economy, and the doubt and suspicion with which they ought to be regarded; especially when, as in the present case, so directly and utterly at variance with general principles, that is, with the confirmed and long experience of mankind.

In the first place, the supporters of this opinion bring into notice only the fair side of the question; they carefully keep out of view all the evils which the war they so loudly commend inflicted on commerce and national happiness, directly and indirectly. They appeal to the list of exports and imports, but they forget, or wilfully overlook, the list of bankrupts. They appeal to the wages of the manufacturers, but they forget the increase of the poor-rates; and they do not advert to the circumstance, that, if wages were sometimes very high, they were often also very low; that these fluctuations were rapid and excessive; and that no circumstance can be more prejudicial, not only to the real and permanent wealth and prosperity of a nation, but also to its moral improvement, than these rapid and excessive fluctuations of wages. Secondly, they not only overlook the evils, but they do not carefully examine, whether, what they called the good of war, was really so, or only in appearance; and whether it was not the good of one portion of the community, procured at the expense of another portion. If so, it could not be national good, nor could the fact appealed to be indicative of national wealth and prosperity. But that this was the case; that in many respects the good was rather specious than solid, and that in other respects it was only individual good, acquired at the expense of other individuals, will, we believe, appear evident on a close and impartial investigation.

Thirdly, what is the obvious and necessary consequence of this doctrine? Is it not that we should always be at war, because war advances national prosperity more than a state of peace? But ought not those facts, as they are called, which seem to lean to this conclusion, be rejected as unfound

ed or inapplicable? They recommend not only a state of war, but a state of continual war; that is, not only what all considerations of justice and hu manity condemn, to which the experience of all ages and nations is oppo sed, but what is absolutely impossible. Fourthly, all the consequences of that war, which is so strikingly recommended as productive of national prosperity, are not brought forth and exposed to view by those who maintain this opinion. As it is impossible a nation can always be at war, the consequences of war, when peace returns, ought to be regarded, as well as its alleged good effects, while it continued. This conducts us to the exposure of another weakness in the cause of those who appeal to facts in defence of the advantages of war, and its preferableness to peace. War is beneficial to the commerce of a nation, and peace the reverse, because while at war, we flourished, and at the return of peace, our prosperity languished. But was the peace the cause of this decline in our commerce? Was it not the effects of the long war, in which we had been stimulated to make such unprecedented and extraordinary exertions? And is it not as absurd and unfair to ascribe our decayed prosperity, on the return of peace, to peace, as it would be to ascribe the feeble and worn-out condition of a person who had been long stimulated to great exertions by powerful exciting causes, whether applied to the mind or body-not to these causes, but to the cessation of their application ?

If peace had really brought national evil, would not that evil have continued, and increased as the peace continued? Is this the case?Is not the reverse the case? If, therefore, war, allowing for a moment that it really benefits a nation, must close at some time or other, and at its cessation must cause a revulsion, probably proportionate in degree, extent, and continuance, to those circumstances attending it, which rendered it really, or in appearance, conducive to national good, ought not this fact to be taken into consideration and account by those who appeal to facts in behalf of the advantages of war? And in contrasting the effects of war with those of peace, ought not the latter to be in full operation, and not struggling with the VOL. XVI.

evils entailed on it by war, before its real and permanent effects are traced? But, lastly, a most important circum stance, which distinguished our wars with revolutionary France from all former wars, is omitted by the advo cates for war. We allude to the immense expenditure by government, chiefly supported by loans. Large portions of these were given to foreign powers, not, indeed, in the shape of money, but in the produce of our manufactures; or rather, foreign nations were enabled to purchase an increased quantity of our manufactures by means of the money our government supplied them, and which money was raised in this country by loans. This is a circumstance which distinguishes the revolutionary war from all former wars, and which therefore ought to be specially and particularly noticed and estimated, in considering any results of that war, differing from the results of wars in general. We have dwelt thus long in our own consideration of this case, because it affords an instructive instance of the different aspect a fact assumes when partially viewed, and when viewed in all its circumstances and consequences.

But it is not only matter-of-fact political economists, who are led astray themselves, and lead others astray, from not attending to all the circumstances of a case. Even those writers who insist most strongly on the neces sity and advantage of general principles in political economy, are apt, when they state facts in confirmation and illustration of their principles, to take a narrow and imperfect view of them. In the last Number of the Edinburgh Review, LXXIX., there is a glaring instance of this. We allude to the elaborate article on the Standard of National Prosperity, and the Rise and Fall of Profits. On the doctrines contained in that article, and the reasoning by which they are support ed, it is not our purpose to animadvert; but only to notice one part of the article, as illustrating our position, that facts, unattended with all the cir cumstances attending them, are worse than worthless, are actually deceptive, and injurious to the cause of truth.

The reviewer, after extracting from Mr Malthus's pamphlet on Value, an authentic account of the price of daylabour at Kirkcudbright, in the stew

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artry of that name, and annexing the fiar prices of wheat in the stewartry, thus remarks:

"Now it appears from this table, that the mean price of labour at Kirk cudbright in 1793 was 104d. a-day, and its mean price in 1812, when at the highest, 22d. a-day, being an advance of 109 per cent; but in the same period the price of the boll of wheat had risen from 55s. to 128s., being an advance of 133 per cent; shewing that husbandry labourers got 224 per cent less of the produce, or of the value of the produce, raised by them in 1812, than in 1793; a fall of proportional wages sufficient to account for a very great rise of profits!

"This table affords an equally satis factory solution of the fall of profits that has taken place since the peace.

The average price of wheat at Kirkcudbright in 1811-1812, was £5, 18s. 5d. per boll; and its price in 1822 was £2, 7s. 5d.; being a fall of nearly 60 per cent. But the money prices of labour had, in the same period, only fallen 39 per cent; so that its relative value, as compared with the main article of agricultural produce, had really risen 21 per cent., accounting completely for the fall of profits in the interval." (P. 20—29.)*

The doctrine the reviewer wishes to establish is this, that profits must always vary inversely as wages; that is, when wages rise, profits must fall, and when wages fall, profits must rise. (P. 11.) We shall not object to this doctrine, that, if it means anything, it must mean, that the fall and rise must be proportional, or at least ac

This article, as well as one in the Second Number of the Westminster Review, on Tithes, affords additional confirmation, if it were wanting, of what we endeavoured to establish in our last Essay, that Political Economists of the present day are blind guides in the mazes of this science; and that, in most cases, Milton's description of Chaos is applicable to them :---

-Chaos umpire sits,

And his decision more embroils the fray.

A very few observations on the Tithe article, will, we think, justify the censure, so far as the Westminster Review is concerned. One of the objects of the Reviewer is, to controvert the opinion that tithes are no tax, but a portion of the rent of land. “They who support this proposition," he observes," are driven to deny the doctrine of rent, as propagated by Mr Ricardo," &c. This doctrine, therefore, he explains: "Rent is that portion of the return on capital, employed upon the land, which exceeds the ordinary profit of stock, and is paid to the landlord for the use of the land." Again-" The least fertile soil of all, or that which returns no more than the ordinary profits of stock, will return no rent whatever." It is not our intention to examine this doctrine, but only to shew from it and what the Reviewer says of tithes, that rent and tithes are proved by him to be the same, though his object is to prove them quite distinct and different. We now come to the important conclusion. This may be stated in a few words. "The lowest soil in cultivation pays no rent. Every soil, from which produce is extracted, pays tithes. Rent, therefore, and tithe, are not identical, but altogether different."

This is very logical in form and in word, but the reverse in reality. Tithes are part of the produce; they are evidently not the property of the cultivator, and therefore do not constitute any of the profits of stock; they are therefore that portion of the return on capital employed upon the land, which exceeds the ordinary profits of stock; but this is the Reviewer's definition of rent. Tithes and rent, therefore, are not different, but identical. The Reviewer, indeed, adds to his definition of rent, that it is paid to the landlord for the use of his land; but it matters not under what name, or to whom that portion of the return on capital employed upon the land which exceeds the ordinary profits of stock, is paid; that cannot alter its real nature. Tithes and rent, therefore, according to the Reviewer's own shewing, are essentially the same, though paid under different names, and to different people. The real difference, however, he has not pointed out; it is this-Rent is arranged between tenant and landlord; if in money, its proportionate value to the produce depends upon and varies inversely, as the quantity of the produce multiplied by its price; if in kind, its proportionate value to the produce varies inversely as the produce; whereas tithe is fixed independently of the former, and always bears the same proportion to the produce. Rent is paid for the landlord's right of property in the land, and for the capital laid out in improving it; but not for capital expended during the currency of a lease. Tithe is paid for the tithe-owner's right of property in the land; for the capital laid out in improving it, and rendering it more fertile; and also for the capital expended during the lease, in so far as that increases its produce,

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