See CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT.
Ses CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 6; JUDICIAL POWER, 1, 8.
GUARANTOR.
See SURETIES, 1, 2.
Defendant gave a letter of credit, asking plaintiff to let T. have "the paints,
oils and varnishes, glass, etc., he wants. I will be security for the amount
for what he will owe you." Held, to be a continuing guaranty. Boehne v.
Murphy, 485.
In an action against a town to recover for injuries caused by a defect in a
highway, the question, whether notice to the town of the existence of the
defect can be inferred from the length of time it has continued, is a ques
tion for the jury. Colley v. Inhabitants of Westbrook, 30
1. A married woman, engaged in business on her own account, purchased
goods on credit, to be used in that business, the husband having no connec
tion with the business, nor in any way participating in the profits there-
from. In an action against the husband for the value of the goods, held,
that, in the absence of proof that the husband had assented to his wife's
conducting the business, he was not liable for the debt. Tuttle v. Hoag, 481.
2. A feme covert is absolutely a feme sole with respect to her separate estate,
when she is not specially restrained, by the instrument under which she
acts, to some particular mode of disposition; and, although a particular
mode of disposition is pointed out, it will not preclude her from adopting
any other mode of disposition, unless there are words restraining her power
of disposition to the very mode pointed out. Kimm v. Weippert, 541.
8. A married woman, having separate property, joined with her husband in a
note for the purchase price of real estate purchased by the husband. To
secure the payment thereof a deed of trust of the same real estate was exe
cuted by both husband and wife. Default being made in the payment, the
land was sold, and suit brought to make good the deficiency out of the
wife's separate estate. Held, that the note was not a charge on the wife's
estate. Held, further, that extrinsic evidence was not admissible to prove
the intention of the wife to charge her separate estate. Ib.
4 When land is conveyed to husband and wife each takes an entirety, not-
withstanding a statute providing that all conveyances of land made to two
or more persons shall be construed to create estates in common and not in
joint tenancy. Hemingway v. Scales, 586.
IMBECILITY.
See CONTRACT, 2.
INDEMNITY.
See BOND OF INDEMNITY.
INDORSEMENT.
See PROMISSORY NOTE.
1. Where it does not appear that a person will sustain any special or peculiar
damage in consequence of the obstruction of a public highway, an injunc
tion to restrain such obstruction will not be granted at his suit. Dawson v
The St. Paul Fire Insurance Co., 109.
2. The courts of one state may enjoin a citizen thereof from enforcing the col-
lection of a judgment which he obtained in the courts of another state,
and which he is endeavoring to collect in such other state. Engel v. Scheuer
man, 573.
INSANE PERSON.
See INSURANCE, 3.
1. Where insured goods are removed from a building apparently in imminent
danger of being destroyed by fire, the insurers are liable for the reasonable
damage and expense of removal, although the building is not in fact burned.
White v. Republic Fire Insurance Co., 22.
2. A policy, the premium for which had been paid by note, contained a provis
ion that in case the note should not be paid at maturity, the full amount
of the premium should be considered as earned, and the policy become void
while said past-due notes remained over-due and unpaid; a loss occurred
after the maturity of the note and before it was paid. Held, that the com-
pany was not liable for any loss which occurred during the continuance of
the default, but that, on the subsequent payment of the note, the policy
revived and was in force from the date of such payment. Williams v. The
Albany City Insurance Co., 95.
B. The plaintiff's buildings, which were insured, were intentionally set on fire
by his wife, who was insane, and who had been left alone by the plaintiff,
It appeared that she had frequently been left alone before this occasion.
In an action on the policy of insurance, held, that the plaintiff, in leaving his
wife alone, had not been guilty of such a degree of negligence as would
constitute a defense for the defendants. Gove v. The Farmers' Mutual Fire
Insurance Co., 168.
4. A policy of insurance requiring that consent to subsequent insurance upon
the same property should be in writing, will not be rendered void when the
agent of the company gives such consent verbally, and the insured, in good
faith, acts upon it. Carrugi v. The Atlantic Fire Insurance Co., 567.
5. The powers of an agent, whose duty it is to take and revoke risks, include
the power of consenting to a prior or subsequent insurance on the prop-
erty. Ib.
6. To warrant the abandonment of a stranded vessel as a total loss, it must
appear, to the satisfaction of the jury, that the delivery of the vessel from
the peril was, upon reasonable grounds, judged to be impracticable, or not
to be effected unless at an expense that would absorb all her value. Cop-
elin v. The Phoenix Insurance Company, 504.
7. The owner of a vessel, abandoned as a total loss, is not bound to receive her
from the underwriters if there is any material deficiency in her repairs,
nor unless she be repaired and returned within a reasonable time. Ib.
See PROMISSORY NOTE, 3; WAR.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS.
See NUISANCE.
JOINDER OF PARTIES.
See REWARD.
1. In organization of the federal and state governments, three separate bodies
of magistracy were established, the legislative, executive and judicial. It
was intended that the functions of each of these should be separate and
distinct within its own sphere, and, as far as practicable, independent of
those of the other branches. Neither branch is permitted to exercise the
powers appropriately belonging to another. State v. Warmoth, 712.
2. The doctrine that there is a distinction between a purely ministerial act and
one in the discretion of the executive, and that the performance of the
former by the executive may be enforced by judicial order, accords to the
judiciary the large discretion of determining the character of all acts
which would infringe the right of the executive to use discretion in deter.
mining the same question. Ib.
3. Therefore a writ of mandamus will not issue to compel the chief executive
to perform an act required by law to be done by him. Ib.
1. Where the United States court and a state court have a concurrent juris-
diction, the court first acquiring jurisdiction of any matter retains it to the
exclusion of the other. Hines v. Hobbs, 581.
2. Where parties commence proceedings in a state court, and in the course of
litigation are enjoined from further action until certain matters are disposed
of, it is a violation of the injunction order to institute proceedings in the
United States court involving the matters enjoined; and the state court has
power to punish the disobedience of its orders, although it cannot require
the parties to dismiss their suit in the United States court. Ib.
8. A proceeding in rem against a vessel for the recovery of damages for a
maritime tort can be enforced only by the courts of the United States.
Young v. Ship Princess Royal, 731.
See ADMIRALTY; NATURALIZATION; SURETIES, 3.
A covenant by a lessor to erect a building on the leased premises does not by
implication impose upon him an obligation to rebuild in case of the destruc-
tion of the building by fire during the term of the lease; nor does the
destruction of the building and the refusal of the lessor to build relieve
the lessee from his agreement to pay rent. Cowell v. Lumley, 430.
See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 1, 3; RIPARIAN RIGHTS, 2.
See CONFEDERATE MONEY, 1; CONTRACT, 6; MARRIAGE CONTRACT.
Where a debtor, with the assent of certain of his creditors, placed his per-
sonal property in the hands of one of them, with instructions to sell it, and
pay himself and such other creditors out of the proceeds, held, that the
creditors for whose benefit the property was to be applied obtained a lien
upon it and its proceeds superior to any which a general creditor could
acquire by the subsequent levy of an attachment thereon. Handley v.
Pfister, 449.
LIMITATION.
See STATUTE OF LIMITATION.
LITTORAL RIGHTS.
See RIPARIAN RIGHTS.
LOCAL IMPROVEMENT.
See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 1.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 6; ELECTION; JUDICIAL POWER.
MARINE INSURANCE.
See INSURANCE, 6, 7.
MARITIME JURISDICTION.
See ADMIRALTY.
MARITIME LAW.
See JURISDICTION.
1 An ante-nuptial contract was made in the state of Mississippi by a female
minor with her intended husband. The contract was to be carried out in
the state of Louisiana, where the husband and wife resided after marriage.
Held, that the capacity of the parties, as well as the form of the contract,
must be governed by the laws of Mississippi, while its effect must be gov
erned by those of Louisiana. Succession of Jesse W. Wilder, 721.
2. To ascertain whether such a contract is for the benefit of the minor, so as
to determine whether it is void or voidable, the lex loci contractus alone
must be considered. Ib.
8 Under the common law, as administered in the United States, the general
rule is, that the contracts of minors are voidable only, and not void. The
exception is, where the contract on its face appears necessarily prejudicial
to the minor. Ib.
4 Where nothing appears on the face of a marriage contract necessarily
prejudicial to the minor wife, it is voidable only, and, if not disaffirmed by
her when she has the capacity so to do, will be binding on her. Ib.
MARRIED WOMEN.
See HUSBAND AND WIFE.
1. The plaintiff, a passenger in defendants' railway car, gave up his ticket to
a brakeman, who was authorized to demand and receive it. Shortly after
the latter approached plaintiff, denied that he had received his ticket, and
assaulted and grossly insulted him. In an action against the railway com.
pany to recover damages, held, that the defendants were liable, and that
plaintiff could recover exemplary damages. (TAPLEY, J., dissented on the
question of damages.) Goddard v. Grand Trunk Railway Co., 39.
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