The Federalist PapersCosimo, Inc., 2006 M12 1 - 656 páginas The Federalist papers -- 85 essays written by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison in support of the adoption of the U.S. Constitution -- began appearing in New York newspapers beginning in the autumn of 1787. And though controversy still swirls around authorship of certain individual essays, and the impact the papers had on the public opinion of the time remains open to debate, it's clear that the dramatic impact on global civilization of these spirited defenses of the nation's founding document cannot be exaggerated. As masterful examinations of the fundamental principals of the U.S. system of government, they are unrivaled -- as works of political philosophy, they have moved and influenced peoples and nations around the world in their battles toward freedom and democracy. This edition also includes The Articles of Confederation of the United States, and The Declaration of Independence. ALEXANDER HAMILTON (1757-1804), JOHN JAY (1745-1829), and JAMES MADISON (1751-1836) are among the most revered of America's Founding Fathers, men whose animated advocacy of the new nation continues to reverberate in political thought today. |
Dentro del libro
Resultados 1-5 de 76
Página 5
... former cases of great national dis- cussion . A torrent of angry and malignant passions will be let loose . To judge from the conduct of the opposite parties , we shall be led to conclude that they will mutually hope to evince the ...
... former cases of great national dis- cussion . A torrent of angry and malignant passions will be let loose . To judge from the conduct of the opposite parties , we shall be led to conclude that they will mutually hope to evince the ...
Página 10
... former and more remotely the latter ; and being persuaded that ample security for both could only be found in a national government more wisely framed , they , as with one voice , convened the late con- vention at Philadelphia , to take ...
... former and more remotely the latter ; and being persuaded that ample security for both could only be found in a national government more wisely framed , they , as with one voice , convened the late con- vention at Philadelphia , to take ...
Página 11
... former occasion teaches us not to be too sanguine in such hopes . It is not yet forgotten that well - grounded apprehensions of immi- nent danger induced the people of America to form the memorable Congress of 1774. That body ...
... former occasion teaches us not to be too sanguine in such hopes . It is not yet forgotten that well - grounded apprehensions of immi- nent danger induced the people of America to form the memorable Congress of 1774. That body ...
Página 13
... former of these comes first in order , it is proper it should be the first discussed . Let us therefore proceed to examine whether the people are not right in their opinion that a cordial Union , under an efficient DANGERS FROM FOREIGN ...
... former of these comes first in order , it is proper it should be the first discussed . Let us therefore proceed to examine whether the people are not right in their opinion that a cordial Union , under an efficient DANGERS FROM FOREIGN ...
Página 16
... former most favors the safety of the people . As to those just causes of war which proceed from direct and unlawful violence , it appears equally clear to me that one good national government affords vastly more security against dangers ...
... former most favors the safety of the people . As to those just causes of war which proceed from direct and unlawful violence , it appears equally clear to me that one good national government affords vastly more security against dangers ...
Contenido
3 | |
13 | |
22 | |
34 | |
NO 9THE UNION AS A SAFEGUARD AGAINST DOMESTIC | 47 |
NO 10THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 53 |
THE UTILITY OF THE UNION IN RESPECT | 62 |
NO 12THE UTILITY OF THE UNION IN RESPECT | 70 |
NO 47THE PARTICULAR STRUCTURE OF THE NEW GOV | 312 |
TWEEN THE DIFFERENT DEPARTMENTS 335 | 317 |
No 48THESE DEPARTMENTS SHOULD NOT be so | 321 |
NO 49METHOD OF GUARDING AGAINST THE | 327 |
NO 52THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES | 341 |
NO 53THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 347 |
NO 54THE APPORTIONMENT OF MEMBERS AMONG | 353 |
NO 55THE TOTAL NUMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRE | 359 |
NO 13ADVANTAGE OF THE UNION IN RESPECT | 76 |
NO 20THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED 119 | 85 |
NO 15THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PRESENT CONFED | 86 |
NO 16THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 95 |
NO 17THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 101 |
NO 19THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 113 |
NO 21 OTHER DEFECTS OF THE PRESENT CONFEDERA | 125 |
NO 22THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 131 |
OF THE UNION | 141 |
NO 24THE POWERS NECESSARY TO THE COMMON | 147 |
NO 25THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 153 |
NO 26THE IDEA OF RESTRAINING THE LEGISLATIVE | 159 |
NO 27THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 166 |
NO 29CONCERNING THE MILITIA | 175 |
NO 30CONCERNING THE GENERAL POWER OF TAXA | 182 |
NO 31THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 188 |
NO 33THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 198 |
NO 34THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 203 |
NO 36THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 216 |
MENT | 224 |
NO 38THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED AND THE | 242 |
NO 49THE POWERS OF THE CONVENTION TO FORM | 250 |
NO 41GENERAL VIEW OF THE POWERS CONFERRED | 259 |
NO 42THE POWERS CONFERRED BY THE CONSTITU | 270 |
NO 43THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 278 |
NO 44RESTRICTIONS ON THE AUTHORITY OF | 289 |
NO 45THE ALLEGED DANGER FROM THE POWERS | 298 |
NO 46THE INFLUENCE OF THE STATE AND FEDERAL | 304 |
NO 56THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 365 |
MANY CONSIDERED IN CONNECTION WITH REPRESEN | 370 |
NO 58OBJECTION THAT THE NUMBER OF MEMBERS | 377 |
NO 59CONCERNING THE POWER OF CONGRESS | 383 |
NO 60THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 389 |
no 61the SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 395 |
NO 63THE SENATE CONTINUED | 407 |
NO 64THE POWERS OF THE SENATE | 416 |
to 65THE POWERS OF THE SENATE CONTINUED | 423 |
No 66OBJECTIONS TO THE POWER OF THE SENATE | 429 |
NO 67THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT | 436 |
No 69THE REAL CHARACTER OF THE EXECUTIVE | 445 |
NO 70THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT FURTHER CON | 454 |
NO 71THE DURATION IN OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE | 463 |
NO 73THE PROVISION FOR THE SUPPORT OF | 474 |
NO 74THE COMMAND OF THE MILITARY AND NAVAL | 481 |
NO 76THE APPOINTING POWER OF THE EXECUTIVE | 491 |
NO 77THE APPOINTING POWER CONTINUED AND OTHER | 501 |
NO 79 THE JUDICIARY CONTINUED | 512 |
No 81THE JUDICIARY CONTINUED AND THE DISTRI | 528 |
NO 82THE JUDICIARY CONTINUED | 534 |
ANSWERED | 555 |
NO 85CONCLUDING REMARKS | 567 |
IIIRESOLUTION TRANSMITTING THE CONSTITUTION | 584 |
605 | |
611 | |
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE | 619 |
Otras ediciones - Ver todas
The Federalist Papers Alexander Hamilton,James Madison,John Jay,Lawrence Goldman Vista previa limitada - 2008 |
Términos y frases comunes
1788 THE FEDERALIST admit advantage America Amphictyonic appear appointment articles of Confederation assembly authority bill of attainder bill of rights branch Britain causes circumstances citizens common confederacy Confederation consideration considered convention council court of equity danger declare duties effect elected electors equal eral ernment established executive exercise experience extend favor federal government foreign former HAMILTON House of Representatives impeachment important independent influence instance interests judges judicial judiciary department jurisdiction lative latter lature laws legislative body legislature less letters of marque liberty Macedon magistrate ment militia mode national government nature necessary necessity objects particular party peace persons political possess President principle proper proportion proposed Constitution propriety provision PUBLIUS reason regulation render republic republican requisite respect SECT Senate South Carolina Sparta stitution Supreme Court tion tive treaties trial by jury Union United votes York Packet