furnishing cause and to making proper objections, the rulings and instructions of the trial court and the finding of the jury as evidencing the absence or presence of prejudice. These are the invariable quantities so to speak in the problem. What an attorney may say in an earnest and spirited argument is uncertain. Improper remarks having been made, what should be done by opposing counsel, judge and jury can be quite definitely ascertained. it must be requested,' and without a direction to the jury an objection is of no avail on appeal. If counsel are allowed to controvert the alleged improper remarks especially after admonition of the court concerning the same, there will be no reversal. If the objectionable remarks were called out by previous statements of opposing counsel, and were in legitimate reply thereto, no ground exists for exception; as for instance, where a corporation's attorney had commented on the unpopularity of corporations, his opponent's improper allusions did not cause a reversal, and where a railroad lawyer commented on the plaintiff's failure to call a specialist, the remarks of plaintiff's attorney on his client's inability to pay therefor were not reversible error, 10 but a statement by the plaintiff's counsel characterizing the defense as audacious does not justify the defendant's attorney in arraigning the plaintiff as a moneyed corporation, intent on crushing the defendant." If opposing counsel fails entirely to call the attention of the trial judge to the re as unworthy of notice, there will be no reversal. 12 Objections and Exceptions of Opposing Counsel. It is the duty of counsel for either party, if he desires at any time to object to the remarks of his opponent to do so specifically and at the time the remarks are made. Assignments of error in these regards will not otherwise be considered on appeal,2 especially if the trial court of its own motion instructs the jury to disregard the remarks.3 The objection must be both prompt and specific, as it does not avail if made at another time or in a general way. As will be seen later, even a direction on the part of the court that counsel should wait before object-marks, and the latter apparently regards them ing does not excuse delay by the latter. In case a part of the remarks are proper and a part improper, the objection to avail must point out the particular remarks complained of. Furthermore, objecting counsel loses his rights of exception if he remains satisfied with simply his objection even if it is sustained. He must present the rulings, with his exceptions and an assignment of errors, to the appellate court. If he desires a ruling of the court or an instruction to the jury he must request the same. He cannot afterwards criticise the failure of the court to take any particular action unless he invoked that action. If a written charge is desired 2 N. O., etc. R. Co. v. Clements, 100 Fed. Rep. 415; C. & E. R. R. Co. v. Cleminger, 178 Ill. 536, affirming 77 Ill. App. 186, and citing L. E., etc. R. Co. v. Middleton, 142 Ill. 550, and Seibert v. People, 143 Ill. 571; Ferguson v. Moore, 98 Tenn. 342; S. & E. T. Co. v. L., etc. R. Co., 51 S. W. Rep. 805; W. C. St. Ry. v. Levy, 82 Ill. App. 202; Monroe v. Lumber Co. (N. H.), 39 Atl. Rep. 1019; Ames v. Partridge (Colo.), 58 Pac. Rep. 341; In re Thomas' Estate (Colo.), 56 Pac. Rep. 907. 3 Monroe v. Godkin, 111 Mich. 183. 4 Gulf, etc. Ry. Co. v. Brown, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 93; Moore v. Rogers, 84 Tex. 2; Moore v. Moore, 73 Tex. 394; Railway v. Greenlee, 70 Tex. 562; Morrison v. State, 76 Ind. 335. 5 Gowen v. Bush, 22 C. C. A. 196, distinguishing Railway Co. v. Farr, 6 C. C. A. 211. 6 Wabash R. Co. v. Mahoney, 79 Ill. App. 53, citing E. J., ete. R. Co. v. Fletcher, 128 Ill. 619; Marder v. Rulings and Instructions of the Trial Judge.-Courts of appeal justly attach great importance on the subject of counsels' improper remarks to the rulings and holdings of the trial judge relative thereto. He sees the parties, knows the circumstances, is not Leary, 137 Ill. 323; W. C. St. R. R. Co. v. Sullivan, 165 Ill. 304; W. C. St. R. R. Co. v. Wainatta, 169 Ill. 19, affirming 68 Ill. App. 481, citing Felix v. Scharnweber, 119 Ill. 445; Marder, Luse & Co. v. Leary, 137 Ill. 319; Henry v. C. C. R. Co., 121 Ill. 264; Chicago v. Lesetti, 142 Ill. 642; C. B. & Q. v. Kellogg, 54 Neb. 127; L., etc. Ry. Co. v. Norman, 17 Ind. App. 355, cit. ing Worley v. Moore, 97 Ind. 15; Carter v. Carter, 101 Ind. 450; Choen v. State, 85 Ind. 209; Combs v. State, 75 Ind. 215; L., etc. R. Co. v. McEwan (Ky.), 51 S. W. Rep. 619; Fruchey v. Eagleson, 15 Ind. App. 88, citing C., etc. R. Co. v. Champion, 9 Ind. App. 510; McFadden v. Morn. Jour. Assn., 51 N. Y. Supp. 275; Sutton v. C., etc. R. Co., 98 Wis. 167, citing Andrews v. C., M. & St. P. R. Co., 96 Wis. 348, 361; A., etc. Ry. Co. v. Bagwell, 107 Ga. 157; S. L., etc. Ry. Co. v. Dickens (Tex.), 56 S. W. Rep. 124. 7 Hogan v. Mo., etc. Ry. Co., 88 Tex. 679. 8 Andrews v. C., M. & St. P. R. Co., 96 Wis. 361. 9 Britt v. Burghart, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 78. 10 McMullin v. Erwin, 69 Vt. 342; Slensby v. Milwaukee St. Ry. Co., 95 Wis. 184; A., T. & St. F. Ry. Co. v. Bryan (Tex. Civ. App.), 28 S. W. Rep. 98; N. Y., etc. R. Co. v. Luebeck, 157 Ill. 595; Belknap v. Groover (Tex.), 56 S. W. Rep. 249. 11 Pabst Brewing Co. v. Lueders, 107 Mich. 41. supposed himself to have been influenced by the remarks, and has in many respects a better opportunity than the appellate justices to determine what harm, if any, the remarks caused.18 His decision in this regard should be obtained at the trial term.14 Upon the making of improper remarks, if they are heard by the trial judge, it is his duty of his own motion to interfere,15 and if he does not it has been held that the omission is tanta. mount to a ruling, that the remarks were warranted, to which an exception lies without a request for such ruling.16 The better doctrine is that objecting counsel must ask for the ruling desired. If, however, whether of its own motion or in response to the request or motion of objecting counsel, the trial court takes immediate and decided action, stopping the objectionable remarks, reprimanding the offending counsel and directing the jury to disregard the remarks, there will not ordinarily be cause for reversal, especially if the remarks are withdrawn, as it will be presumed that the jury bas followed the court's directions, and there is no presumption of injury in such case.17 Instruction or direction of the court that the jury disregard counsels' improper remarks, is like the case of the introduction on a trial of objectionable and damaging evidence which the court subsequently strikes out and directs the jury to disregard. "The vice is eliminated and theoretically at 13 Brown v. Perez, 89 Tex. 286; Erb v. Ins. Co., 98 Iowa. 606; Lawlor v. Kemper, 20 Mont. 13. 14 Bullard v. B. & M. R. Co., 64 N. H. 27, citing Burnham v. Butler, 58 N. H. 568; Cole v. Boardman, 63 N. H. 583. 15 Brown v. Swineford, 44 Wis. 282; Houston, etc. R. Co. v. White (Tex.), 56 S. W. Rep. 204. 16 Cutler v. Skeels, 69 Vt. 161; Magoon v. B. & M. R. Co., 67 Vt. 195, and cases cited. 17 Yankton v. Douglass, 8 S. Dak. 440; Western, etc. R. R. Co. v. Ledbetter, 99 Ga. 318; Shaler v. Broadway Imp. Co., 47 N. Y. Supp. 815; Riley v. Ry. Co., 68 Mo. App. 652, citing Gidionsen v. R. R., 129 Mo. 403; Ford v. Cheever, 113 Mich. 440; Wenzel v. Johnston. 112 Mich. 243; Murphy v. Gillum, 79 Mo. App. 564; Tyler, etc. Works v. Ryco (Tex.), 55 S. W. Rep. 350; Baxter v. Detroit Ry., 116 Mich. 188; Ruth v. C., etc. Ry. Co., 70 Mo. App. 190; Felix v. Scharnweber, 119 Ill. 448; Phippen v. Bay Cities, etc. R. Co., 110 Mich. 353, citing Maclean v. Scripps, 52 Mich. 214; Warren v. Halley, 107 Mich. 120; People v.. Wirth, 108 Mich. 307; Taylor v. Mallory, 96 Va. 18; Wheeler v. Jenison (Mich.), 79 N. W. Rep. 643; Billings v. Ins. Co., 70 Vt. 477; Abbott v. Mobile, 119 Ala. 595; Distilling Co. v. Riggs (Ky.), 45 S. W. Rep. 99; Collins Park & B. R. Co. v. Ware, 110 Ga. 307, 37 S. E. Rep. 975. least the erroneous evidence found no lodgment in the minds of the jury.' "18 Neglect on the part of the trial court to interpose and correct counsel or to caution or instruct the jury in the case of a violation of the privileges of argument, is error and reversible error as a rule, and usually where opposing counsel have objected, but it is not always reversible error,19 the decisive consideration being whether or not there was resulting prejudicial error. To overrule a proper objection is error,20 and in response to an objection it is not sufficient for the court to say "these arguments are not evidence" or words to that effect in order to remove prejudice.21 Improper remarks for which there is no excuse should be rebuked with vigor.22 If the trial court is unable to restrain counsel in his abuse of his privileges evidently the proper course is to grant a new trial.23 While it is error for the trial judge to make remarks indicating his opinion on 18 Chesebrough v. Conover, 140 N. Y. 388; Cole v. Fall Brook Coal Co., 159 N. Y. 59, citing Marks v. King, 64 N. Y. 628; Platner v. Platner, 78 N. Y. 90; Gall v. Gall, 114 N. Y. 121; Blashfield v. E. S. Tel., etc. Co.. 147 N. Y. 527; Holmes v. Moffat, 120 N. Y. 159. In I. C. R. R. Co. v. Treat, 179 Ill. 576, a judgment for plaintiff was not reversed notwithstanding an improper offer by his attorney, the trial court properly instructing the jury, but Justices Boggs, Cartwright and Phillips filed a dissenting opinion and cited Scripp v. Reilly, 38 Mich. 10; State v. Moore, 104 N. Car. 744; Birmingham Nat. Bk. v. Bradley, 108 Ala. 205; Leach v. Detroit Elec. Ry. (Mich.), 84 N. W. Rep. 316. 19 Wiiliams v. R. Co., 126 N. Y. 96, citing Mitchum v. State, 11 Ga. 616; Tucker v. Henniker, 41 N. H. 317; Rolfe v. Rumford, 66 Me. 564; Alabama, etc. R. Co. v. Carroll, 28 C. C. A. 207; K. C., etc. R. Co. v. Sokal, 61 Ark. 130, citing L.,etc. R. Co. v. Cavenesse, 48 Ark. 131; Brown v. Swineford, 44 Wis. 282; Holder v. State, 58 Ark. 473; Shular v. State, 105 Ind. 304; Waldron v. Waldron, 156 U. S. 361; Coble v. Coble, 79 Vt. 589, citing State v. Smith, 75 N. Car. 306; Devries v. Haywood, 63 N. Car. 53; Jenkins v. North Carolina Ore Co., 65 N. Car. 563; State v. Williams, 65 N. Car. 505; State v. Underwood, 77 N. Car. 502; Fringle v. Miller, 111 Mich. 663; Missouri, etc. R. Co. v. Woods (Tex. Civ. App.), 25 S. W. Rep. 741; Stone and Gravel Co. v. Gates Iron Works, 124 Ill. 623; Rotan v. Maedgen (Tex. Civ. App.), 59 S. W. Rep. 585. 20 C., etc. Ry. Co. v. Newlin, 74 Ill. App. 648; Rail. road Co. v. Stewart, 54 Ohio St. 667. 21 Hundley v. Chadick, 109 Ala. 575, citing Florence C. & I. Co. v. Field, 104 Ala. 471; Bates v. Morris, 101 Ala. 282; Dollar v. State, 99 Ala. 236; Haynes v. McRea, 101 Ala. 319; Pollock v. Harmon, 94 Ala. 421; Scbaidler v. Ry. Co., 102 Wis. 564, 78 N. W. Rep. 732. 22 Masterson v. Ry. Co., 102 Wis. 571, 78 N. W. Rep. 757. 28 Morrill v. Palmer, 68 Vt. 1. facts necessary to be proved24 still this will not always cause reversal.25 An attorney who errs in his theory of the case and believes that certain questions and evidence are proper when in fact they are improper, bas a right to ask such questions, and where the court properly rules thereon the review court will not reverse.26 The ruling of the trial court on the question of the propriety or impropriety of remarks must be made at the time. If the court directs counsel to wait until the summing up to make their objections the error is reversible," and it is not proper to have it generally understood that all improper remarks are objected to. 28 Prejudicial Error will Reverse.-Where prejudicial error results from improper remarks notwithstanding the objections interposed and the action of the court in restraining or attempting to restrain counsel and in directing and instructing the jury, courts of review will reverse the judgment.29 The theory of this is that the error was so great that the prejudice it caused could not be removed by the court's admonitions. This of course usually occurs in cases of flagrant misconduct of counsel; and especially when the conduct is persistent and continuous, and when no rebuke or direction on the part of the court can destroy its influence,30 where witnesses are referred to as "ghouls" and vultures" "prowling among the cots as 24 I. C. R. R. Co. v. Souders, 178 Ill. 585, citing Andreas v. Ketchum, 77 Ill. 377; Skelly v. Boland, 78 Ill. 438; Feinberg v. People, 174 Ill. 609. 25 L. E., etc. Ry. Co. v. Close, 5 Ind. App. 444. 26 Young v. Fox, 49 N. Y. Supp. 634. 27 Halpern v. Nassau Elec. R. Co., 45 N. Y. Supp. 134, citing Koelges v. Ins. Co., 57 N. Y. 638; Williams v. Railroad Co., 126 N. Y. 96. 28 Penn. Co. v. Greso, 79 Ill. App. 127. 29 St. L., etc. R. Co. v. Waren, 65 Ark. 619, citing K. C., etc. R. Co. v. Sokal, 61 Ark. 130; Hood v. C. & N. W. Ry. Co., 95 Iowa. 331, citing Henry v. Ry. Co., 66 Iowa, 56; Rudd v. Rounds, 64 Vt. 432; McHenry Coal Co. v. Sueddon, 89 Ky. 684; Wheeler & W. Mfg. Co. v. Sterrett, 94 Iowa, 160, citing Henry v. R. Co., 70 Iowa, 233; Whitset v. R. Co., 67 Iowa, 159; Jones v. Assn., 92 Iowa, 652; In re Barney's Will (Vt.), 44 Atl. Rep. 75; Potter v. Ry. Co.(Mich.), 82 N. W. Rep. 245; Britton v. R. Co., 118 Mich. 491, 76 N. W. Rep. 1013; Daggett v. Mfg. Co., 45 Atl. Rep. 755; Greenfield v. Kennett (N. H.), 45 Atl. Rep. 233. 30 Lindsay v. Pettigrew, 10 S. Dak. 228, 3 S. Dak. 199; Bagully v. Morn. Journ. Assn., 56 N. Y. Supp. 605, citing Halpern v. R. Co., 45 N. Y. Supp. 134; C., B. & Q. v. Kellogg, 55 Neb. 748, 154 Neb. 127; Garrity v. Rankin (Tex.), 55 S. W. Rep. 367; Smith v. Jennings (Mich.), 80 N. W. Rep. 236. 33 in the hospital" and where the word "union" in a company's name was alleged to mean a monopoly.32 to mean a monopoly.32 When counsel neglects or refuses to withdraw the improper remarks, the verdict will be set aside. In cases where there is evidence of error the judgment will at times be affirmed conditionally on remittitur.34 If a case has been closely contested or there is a sharp conflict in evidence these and like considerations will favor a reversal,35 and where there is a close issue, a judgment may be reversed even if the verdict is not excessive.36 Courts of review have often and with emphasis announced that improper methods of trying causes will not be tolerated; that the only corrective is for counsel to know that by such methods they imperil whatever verdicts they may obtain, and if trial courts do not by way of rebuke, instruction or granting new trials do their duty as is their power, the appellate courts must apply the corrective.37 31 Rudiger v. C., etc. R. Co., 101 Wis. 292, citing Friemark v. Rosenkrans, 81 Wis. 359, and other cases. 32 Union Compress Co. v. Wolf, 63 Ark. 174, citing L. R., etc. R. Co. v. Cavenesse, 48 Ark. 106, and authorities therein cited. 83 Robertson v. Madison, 67 N. H. 205. 34 Wetzel v. Meranger, 85 Ill. App. 457; C., B. & Q. v. Kellogg (Neb.), 76 N. W. Rep. 462, citing on the general subject Iron Co. v. Field (Ala.), 16 South. Rep. 538; Bullard v. R. Co., 64 N. H. 27; Paper Co. v. Banks, 15 Neb. 20; Live Stock Co. v. May, 51 Neb. 474; Martin v. State, 63 Miss. 505; Rudolph v. Landwerlen, 92 Ind. 34. 35 The Oriental v. Barclay, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 193, citing Willis v. McNeil, 75 Tex. 465; Ry. v. Jarrell, 60 Tex. 268 and other cases; Killoven v. Meehan & Dunn, 68 Mo. App. 212. See also in this connection Giddionsen v. Ry., 129 Mo. 392; Hoffman v. Hoffman, 126 Mo. 416; Olfermann v. Union Depot Ry. Co., 125 Mo. 417; St. L., etc. R. Co. v. Holmes (Tex. Civ. App), 49 S. W. Rep. 658, citing Tel. Co. v. Teague (Tex.), 27 S. W. Rep. 958; Dillingham v. Wood (Tex.), 27 S. W. Rep. 1074. 36 St. L, etc. Ry. Co. v. McLendon (Tex. Civ. App.), 26 S. W. Rep. 307, citing among other cases, Sinclair v. Stanley, 69 Tex. 718; Ry. Co. v. Jones, 73 Tex. 235; Moss v. Sanger, 75 Tex. 323. 37 P., etc. R. Co. v. Warren, 64 Ill. App. 584; W. C. St. R. R. v. Groshon, 51 Ill. App. 463; Same v. Annis, 62 Ill. App. 180, affirmed 165 Ill. 475; Same v. Krueger, 67 Ill. App. 574; Same v. McKeating, 68 Ill. App. 439; Waldron v. Waldron, 156 U. S. 361. was held to be fatal error." 88 Remarks about an unequal contest between a poor woman and a rich corporation, and charges of drunkenness on the part of defendant's employees, of which there is no evidence, will render it impossible for the supreme court of Texas to reverse a finding of the court of appeals that there was prejudicial error. 39 An argument of plaintiff's attorney that defendant had been guilty of dangerous practices for a long time will cause a reversal, it not being based on evidence ;40 and so will a comment that a deposition had been taken but the court would not allow it to be read, and that counsel's client should not be made to suffer for the court's ignorance;41 but remarks to the effect that a defending railroad is "an artı ficial being without life, without soul, as cold as iron, as heartless as marble," etc., will not cause a reversal where there is no showing that opposing counsel asked an instruction and the court refused the same.12 Improper Remarks not Causing Prejudice will not Reverse.-In contradistinction to the foregoing rule that where prejudicial error results, which is not removed, there will be a reversal, is the rule that appellate courts will not reverse a judgment on account of improper remarks of counsel unless it is plain that justice was subverted or defeated thereby; when no harm has been done there is no need of a new trial; a just verdict will stand.43 While a verdict against the clear 38 Ranchan v. Rutland R. Co., 71 Vt. 142, 43 Atl. Rep. 11. 89 C., etc. R. Co. v. Langston, 92 Tex. 709. 40 Heald v. C. & M. R Co. (N. H.), 44 Atl. Rep. 77. 41 Cunningham v. Speagle (Ky.), 50 S. W. Rep. 244. 42 Landers v. Ohio R. Co. (W. Va.), 33 S. E. Rep. 296. 43 C. & A. R. R. Co. v. Dillon, 123 Ill. 578; Roose v. Roose, 145 Ind. 165; Buscher v. Scully, 107 Ind. 246 and cases cited; Horms v. Steir, 67 Ill. App. 634, citing W. C. St. R. R. Co. v. Annis, 62 Ill. App. 180; N.C. St. R. Co. v. Leonard, 67 Ill. App. 603, affirmed 167 Ill. 618; M., K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Withers, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 506; Tunnicliff v. Bav Citles Con. Ry. Co., 107 Mich. 261; Sabine v. Merrill, 67 N. H. 226; Texas Brewing Co. v. Walters (Tex. Civ. App.), 43 S. W. Rep. 548; Texas, etc. Ry. Co. v. Hughes (Tex. Civ. App.), 41 S. W. Rep. 821, citing Ry. Co. v. Duelin, 86 Tex. 450; Radford v. Lyon, 65 Tex. 471; Schular v. State, 105 Ind. 289; McDonald v. Ft. Dear. Nat. Bank, 72 Ill. App. 17 (reversed on other grounds); Barber v. Hutchins, 66 Tex. 323; Kohman v. Baldwin (Tex. Civ. App.), 46 S. W. Rep. 396; Chamberlain v. Ry. Co. (Mich.), 81 N. W. Rep. 339; Shelby v. Detroit Ry. (Mich.), 81 N. W. Rep. 106; Taylor v. Ins. Co. (Iowa), 82 N. W. Rep. 326, weight of the evidence will be reversed," a finding of the jury according to the preponderance of the testimony will seldom be disturbed. 45 Even where there is error on the part of the court or the counsel, or both, such errors will be regarded as harmless unless it clearly appears that the objecting party was prejudiced thereby.46 It will not be assumed that every misstatement of law or fact made by counsel in the course of a heated trial will have the effect of exciting improper prejudices, as the instructions of the court and the good sense of a competent jury will be regarded as sufficient protection against ordinary errors.47 Illogical and absurd arguments will not justify reversals where it does not appear that the jury was misled or prejudiced.48 It will be taken into consideration that opposing counsel have the right to reply when such is the fact.49 Weight also will be given to the fact that the trial judge, the one whose opportunity was the best to determine all pertinent questions, has overruled a motion for a new trial before the appeal and any misconduct of counsel must appear to have been injurious to the objecting party before this action of the trial court will be reversed.50 Conclusion.-Fine distinctions and discriminations are connected with various phases of the general subject under discussion to such an extent that, as indicated above, few exact rules in relation thereto of sufficiently general application to be of value, can be framed. The course of the trial lawyer is however moderately clear from the import of the above judicial determinations. While he may differ with the court as to what remarks are proper, he need not necessarily on that account allow the record to contain reversible error if the point of difference is 44 Cleveland Paper Co. v. Banks, 15 Neb. 20. 45 Howard v. Howard, 99 Ga. 298; Swift & Co. v. Rutkowski, 82 Ill. App. 108; Willis & Bro. v. Lowry, 66 Tex. 542. 46 Boltz v. Sullivan, 101 Wis. 608; I. C. R. R. Co. v. Weiland, 179 Ill. 609, affirming 67 Ill. App. 332; Smiley v. Scott, 179 Ill. 142, affirming 77 Ill. App. 555; Demars v. Mfg. Co., 67 N. H. 404; Furnald v. Burbank, 67 N. H. 595. 47 Knopke v. Ins. Co., 99 Wis. 293, distinguishing Sutton v. R. Co., 98 Wis. 157; Henry v. R. Co., 121 III. 268; Perkins v. Roberge (N. H.), 39 Atl. Rep. 583. 48 Hayes v. Smith, 15 Ohio C. C. 300. 49 Galveston, etc. Ry. Co. v. Duelin, 86 Tex. 450; Furnish v. Burge (Tenn.), 54 S. W. Rep. 90. 50 City of Lafayette v. Weaver, 92 Ind. 477. not a vital one. If he contemplates knowingly to abuse his privileges of argument he had best not do it. It is difficult to see wherein he could thereby profit. A persistent course in this direction insures a new trial or a reversal, and a large verdict does not even aid a settlement when one or the other of these is certain. If counsel has inadvertently or in any way made improper remarks he should promptly withdraw them with or without objection by the other side and ask the court for a decided and certain instruction to the jury that will have the effect of removing any prejudice caused, and except in a case of flagrant and persistent impropriety, this will be sufficient. As to the course of counsel who have the right of objection, the decisions are not so clearly of one import. The earlier decisions made it the duty of the court to correct offending counsel and to admonish the jury, a failure to act in this respect being regarded as a ruling that the remarks were proper to which implied ruling counsel could except. According to this line of decisions counsel who is defending, if no others, should ordinarily keep quiet and rejoice in his silence while his opponent piles error upon error in an argumentative structure. The later and better line of decisions is to the general effect that counsel who desires to object to his opponent's remarks must do so at the time they are made and with specification, as otherwise he is presumed to waive any objection, placing the burden upon him to watch his and his client's interests, not upon the trial judge. And this is eminently proper. It being the duty of counsel so desiring to object, it is his further duty to insist upon a decisive ruling to which there can be an exception, all of which becomes a part of the record, and in this way by a proper assignment of error is brought to the attention of the reviewing court. would get the district attorney to dismiss the case against him, and the sheriff said, though he would not promise that much, that he would use his influence to "make it go lighter with him," and the deputy sheriff said "it might make it go lighter with him," and that he "had known men to be turned loose by turning state's evidence," there were such inducements leading defendant to believe that his condition would be bettered by confessing that a confession made under such circumstances was not admissible in evidence. HENDERSON, J. Appellant was convicted of burglary, and his punishment assessed at two years' confinement in the penitentiary. The state introduced appellant's confessions against him. Appellant excepted on the ground that he was under arrest at the time the confessions were made, and was not properly warned, that the confessions were made to officers under promises of reward and persuasion. The state's witnesses (the sheriff and his deputy) testify that a proper warning was given, to-wit, that they told appellant before he confessed to the theft that same would be used against him as evidence. However, appellant introduced two witnesses who stated that the warning given was that his statement could be used for or against him. If this was the warning given, this confession was not admissible. Guinn v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. Rep. 257, 45 S. W. Rep. 694; Unsell v. State. 39 Tex. Cr. Rep. 330, 45 S. W. Rep. 1022. If this were the only question made as to the warning given, it being a matter of controversy as to the character of warning, one being legal and the other illegal, we would hold that a proper charge of the court, submitting this issue to the jury, was the correct practice. The charge, however, was defective in other respects, which we will point out hereafter. As stated before, it was also objected to the confession that, although the warning given may have been a legal one, yet it was made under such promises by the officers as to render it inadmissible. If there was any controversy between the witnesses as to what was said by the officers to the defendant. the court might, by a proper charge, have submitted this issue to the jury. But the officers themselves admit that they used some language of a persuasive character. Loessin shows that he knew Dr. Clark was a friend of defendant, and was using him to get a confession from him. Clark, it seems, told defendant, if he would make a confession and tell who was assisting him in taking the seed, they would get the district attorney to dismiss the case against him. The sheriff thereupon stated he would not go that far. but, if he would tell about it. it might go lighter with him. Deputy Sheriff Eilers says he told him he ought to tell it, and, if he did, it might go lighter with him, and he had known men to be turned loose by turning state's evidence. Clark says he told defendant, if he would would confess, he go on his bond. and they would get the district attorney to dismiss the case against him. The sheriff then said he |