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The fact is stated that a man richly endowed with effect. Judgment below reversed and new trial natural gifts, learued in the Mosaic law, meets the | granted. Brink v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co. Opinion by Saviour “over beyond Jordan," probably for the first Earl, J. time, and they are drawn publicly into conference over 2. Reasonable time when question of law: when of a matter of the highest importance. Christ is there fact. - What would be a reasonable time in which to anxious over his mission on earth. The lawyer is furnish the proofs, the facts being undisputed, would there anxious to know whether this is the true be a question of law to be determined by the court. Messiah. He had intelligently considered the words But if there is any evidence tending to show obstacles and ways of the Master. He is deeply interested in and hindrauces in the way, and reasonable diligence him and would prove him to be the real Messiah or in overcoming them, it is for the jury. Ib. expose a mere claimant. He, with this view, puts to 3. Waiver: what does not amount to: estoppel.- When him the question of all others that touches the real the proofs of loss were presented to the company, inmission of the real Christ.

sured was informed that payment of the policy would Jesus answers him by a question that discloses at be resisted on the ground of fraud, and no other reason once his respect for the law to which he appeals and was stated. Held, that the company was not thereby his respect for the sincerity and learning of his inter estopped from setting up as a defense that the proofs rogator. This is so considered by the lawyer, and he were not furnished in season, or any other defense makes without hesitation this surprising collocation of | than fraud. Ib. the law, which Christ immediately accepts as the au 14. Rule when proofs of loss are furnished in time as swer to the lawyer's question. The two are now in to defects: when proofs are not in time.-- If proofs of accord and directly establish the perfect interpreta loss are served in time and they are merely defective, tion of this perfect law.

and they are retained without objection, or are obHow then, may it be asked, can any clergyman go. jected to upon some other ground, the insurer cannot in the face of so plain and beautiful a narrative, out of afterward set up the defect as a defense to an action his way to demonstrate - a perversion — that Christ for the loss. But if no proofs are served in time, and the immortal came upon the earth and, among other the insurer bas done nothing to induce the omission, things, got glory to himself by worsting a mortal in the insured has lost all rights under the policy and wordy combat?

the insurer is not bound to specify its defenses nor Is his Christ the bramble that would rule over the does it waive those not specified. Ib. cedars of Lebanon and consume them with fire if (Decided June 5, 1877.) they put not their trust in its shadow ?

NEGOTIABLE PAPER. The Lombard poplar flourishes somewhat as an 1. Alteration of: what constitutes: authority to make ornamental tree about old settlements, but the

| alteration, when presumable from defect in instrument: * Green Olive" is planted by the living waters of

when not presumable. - It is the delivery of a paper, the new.

defective in the form in which it is delivered, that Geo. W. LAWTON.

gives the power to so add to it as to remedy the de

fects in it. But where a note, in its terms perfect, is COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT.

delivered, and the fact that it is not expressive of a APPEAL

contract biuding upon the party executing it arises Order reversing: order quashing a return and direct from a fact aliunde the paper itself (e. g., the note ing mandamus to issue with leave to relator to demur or being in ordinary form, and the maker a married take issue not appealable. The order from which the woman), in such a case a material addition to such an appeal in this case was taken, reversed the order of instrument can be justified only by express authority the special term quashing a return and directing a | to make it, and such authority will justify it. Judgperemptory mandamus to issue with liberty to the ment below affirmed. Taddiken v. Cantrell. Opinion relator to demur or take issue upon the allegations of by Folger, J. the return. Held, that as vo judgment could be 1 2. Alleration valid to bind party signing when authorentered upon the order, it stood in the same position

|ized by such party. - It appeared from the testimony as an order denying a motion for judgment upou a

that defendant gave authority to plaintiff, from whom demurrer as frivolous, or denying a motion to strike

she borrowed money, to draw up a note, which she out an answer and no appeal would lie. (Dabney v.

sigued, and to add to such note any thing which counGreeley, 12 Abb. Pr. N. S. 191; Williams v. Raplee, 52

sel to be consulted by him should suggest as needful N. Y. 248; Coit v. Seward, 50 id. 17.) Appeal dismissed. to make the note right, legal aud proper. Held to be People ex rel. Lorillard v. Clyde, President P. & N. Y. sufficient to justify an addition to the note of such St. Nav. Co. Opinion per ourium.

language as would be necessary to make it a contract [Decided May 22, 1877.] .

capable of being enforced against defendant; and the

fact that the defendant did not know the precise FIRE INSURANCE.

terms of the addition which had been made was not 1. Conditions in policy: delay in furnishing proofs of

| material. Ib. loss.— By a clause in a fire policy the insured were re

[Decided May 22, 1877. Reported below, 4 T. & C. 2:22. ] quired to furnish to the company proofs of loss, in case of fire, as soon after the fire " as possible." Held, to re

PARTITION. quire reasonable diligence, and where a fire occurred 1. Judgment and sale in, bars future contingent inthe 23d day of November, and the insured, though terest. - Au actual partition or sale under a judgment delayed in procuring the proofs, was able to complete in partition is effectual to bar the future contingent them by the 8th of January following, but did not interests of persons not in esse, though no notice is furuish them to the company until the 16th of Feb- | published to bring in unknown parties, and though ruary, held, not to be a compliance with the terms such future owners may take as purchasers under a of the policy and to avoid it under a conditiou to thau | deed or will, and uot as claimants under any parties to the action Mead v. Mitchell, 17 N. Y. 210). Order

SURROGATES' COURT. below affirmed. Brevoort v. Brevoort. Opinion by

Practice in: objections to account filed under 2 R. S. Allen, J.

92, 8 52: referee and "auditor."-Appellants were trus2. Who entitled to maintain action.- Plaintiff had a

tees under a last will and testament. Respondents, present estate per autre vie in an undivided portion of

under the provisions of 2 R. S. 92, $ 52, obtained from the premises, and a contingent remaiuder in fee in

the surrogate of New York an order for appellants to two several undivided parts of the same premises.

account. Appellauts appeared and filed their account Held entitled to maintain an action for partition. Ib.

and respondents filed objectious thereto and the mat[Decided June 12, 1877.]

ter was referred to an auditor. Appellants made cerRAILROAD AID BONDS.

tain corrections to the account and moved that the When limitation upon issue imposed by toron valid : objections be set aside and also the order appointing unauthorized agreements by tourn officers: constitutional an auditor, on the grounds that appellants could not law.–The town of Ellicott authorized, under the pro raise objections to the account but the surrogate alone, visions of the various town bonding acts, the issue of and that under Laws 1870, chap. 359, only a referee bouds in aid of the Buffalo and Jamestown Railroad. | can be appointed in such a case and not an auditor. The condition of the issue was that the railroad should Held, (1) that even though the surrogate alone has be constructed through the village of Jamestown be- | power to examine the accounts of a trustee in such a fore the bonds should be delivered to the railroad com case he has a right to receive suggestions from others, pany or sold. Commissioners were appointed to issue and it is not error for him to receive and use the objecsuch bonds, but they were forbidden to issue until the tions filed; and (2) that the appointment of an auditor acts mentioned were done. By Laws 1871, ch. 925, § 1, was a sufficient compliance with the statute. Though towns are allowed to affix conditions to the issue of called an auditor the person appointed was in fact only honds such as the one mentioned. By the constitu a referee and had only the powers of a referee. Order tional amendment of 1874 towns are forbidden to issue below affirmed. Buchan et al., appellants, v. Rintoul. bonds. After the act of 1871 was passed the commis Opinion by Earl, J. sioners of the town and the railroad company made an [Decided May 22, 1877.] agreement whereby the bonds were to be issued when the railroad should be merely located through James

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS. town. Held, that the completion of the road was es

Attorney and client: suretyship. — Although an attorsential to the valid issue of the bonds, and the com

ney at law has no authority to compromise a client's missioners were unauthorized to make any agreement

case by virtue of his employment as attorney, yet, it changiug the condition; that the railroad company

he by way of compromise makes an agreement to give before the completion of its road through Jamestown

the debtor further time and obtains additional security could not require the bonds to be issued, and if that

by doing so, the principal, who knowingly accepts the event did not take place before the constitutional pro

benefit of the arrangement, ratifies it and is bound by vision mentioned went into force, the bonds could not

it. 10 Paige, 126. Where plaintiff got judgment and be issued, the town having no longer authority to in

execution against the debtor and his surety, and the cur obligations of such a nature. Judgment below

execution was levied on real estate and a threshing affirmed. (Town of Concord v. Savings Bank, 2 Otto,

machine of the debtor, the real estate being exempt 625, and County of Moultrie v. Savings Bank, id. 631,

from execution under the homestead law, and the distinguished.) Buffalo and Jamestown R. R. Co. v.

debtor gave a new vote for the whole amount of judgWeeks et al., Com'rs. Opinion by Folger, J.

ment and costs, payable six months after date, secured [Decided May 22, 1877. Reported below (sub nom.

by deed of trust on the real estate, and, thereupon, Buf. and J. R. R. Co. v. Judson et al.), 7 Hun, 499.)

the plaintiff's attorney surrendered the threshing SERVICE.

machine to the debtor, and ordered the execution to be 1. Defective service upon non-resident defendants in | returned, the plaintiff knowing the arrangement, it action affecting real estate: effect of.- In an order of | was held that the surety was discharged. Sup. Ct., publication in an action affecting real estate, it was di- | Missouri, April, 1877. Semple et al. v. Atkinson et al. rected that the summons be published and that a copy (Cent. L. J.). of the summons and complaint be deposited forthwith Chattel mortgage: to secure future debts and upon in the post-office directed to defendants named, who goods to be acquired, void.- A mortgage, made to sehad iuterest in the real estate, and amoug others to G. cure debts maturing at a future day, which conveys a B., "at Galleon, Ohio," and to H. B.," at Union City, stock of goods in a particular store, and any other Iud." The proofs showed that copies of the sum goods which may from time to time, during the existmous and complaint were deposited in the post-office, ence of the mortgage, be purchased by the grautors addressed to G. B. and H. B., at Sylvania, Ohio, and | and put into said store to replace any part of said there was no proof of personal service upon either of stock which may have been disposed of, or to increase these persons. Held, that the judgment would not and enlarge the stock pow on hand, is void per se. affect the interest of H. B. or G. B., and the purchaser Chaucery, Tennessee, April, 1877. Phelps v. Murray. at a sale thereunder was not obliged to complete his Contributory negligence: aged person on streets. - An purchase. Judgment of General and Special Terms aged person, whose eyesight is impaired, is not guilty reversed. Smith v. Wells. Opinion by Andrews, J. of contributory negligence in walking the streets of a

2. Small interest of defendants not served no answer city. Sup. Ct., New York, 4th Dep., April, 1877. to application to relieve purchaser.-The fact that the Peach v. City of Utica. interest of H. B. and G. B. was small, held, not to be Criminal evidence: testimony sustaining accomplice.material. A purchaser on a judicial sale is entitled An accomplice, besides proving the murder, testified to demand a good title. Ib.

to a number of subsequent occurrences, which, al[Decided May 22, 1877.]

I though not directly connecting the prisoners with the

commission of the crime, yet tended to explain the hence every reasonable presumption should be allowed relations, conduct and motives of the prisoners. The to support the former and to defeat the latter. Sup. commonwealth then called other witnesses to prove Ct., Minnesota, April 25, 1877. State v. Worthingham these occurrences. Held, that this evidence was not | (N. W. L. Rep.). simply corroboration of an accomplice upon imma | Negligence : duty of owner of wharf as to vessels moorterial poiuts, but was to a large extent independenting there: municipal corporation.- The owner of a and confirmatory, and in view of the other evidence wharf who receives, or is entitled to receive, wharfage in the cause was properly admitted. Sup. Ct., Penn for vessels moored thereto, is bound to use at least orsylvania, May 7, 1877. Carroll v. Commonwealth (W. dinary care and diligence in keeping the water adN. Cas.).

jacent to such wharf, in which vessels lie moored Criminal Law: evidence: testimony of detective: what thereto, free from obstructions, and is liable for any degree of credit to be given to: character of evidence damage done to any such vessel by reason of the vegadmissible to prove motive for crime: connection of lect of such duty. And the same principles apply, prisoner with criminal organization.- A detective who whether the wharf-owner be an individual or a corpojoins a criminal organization for the purpose of expos ration, and whether such corporation be private or ing it, and who, without any felonious intent and solely municipal. Sup. Ct. Appeals, Virginia. City of Pefor the purpose of discovering, arresting, and punish tersburg v. Applegarth's Admr. (1 Va. L. J. 347). ing the criminals, counsels and encourages members Receiver: when court of equity will not appoint rewho are about to commit crime, is not an accessory ceiver of railroad.- A court of equity will not appoint before the fact, and his testimony is not to be treated a receiver of a railroad merely upon a showing that as that of an infamous witness. Upon a trial for there has been a default in the payment of interest murder, it appeared that the crime was committed by secured by a mortgage of the properties and income of strangers to the deceased, and without any apparent the company; that upon such default the trustees unmotive. Held, that it was competent for the common | der the mortgage were entitled to immediate posseswealth to explain the motive by showing the existence, sion; that they have demanded possession, and that object, and practice of a criminal organization to the same has been refused. It is necessary, in addiwhich the prisoner belonged and through whose tion to this, to show that ultimate loss will happen to agency the murder was committed. Sup. Ct., Penn the beneficiaries under the mortgage by permitting sylvania, May 7, 1877. Campbell v. Commonwealth (W. the property to remain in the hands of its owners unN. Cas.).

til final decree and sale, if such decree and sale bo Criminal law: cessante ratione lex cessat: unlawful made. The facts in this case examined and held not marriage.--- The Texas statute of 1868 (Paschal's Dig. to exhibit such danger to the bondholders as will war2016), making it a felony for a white person to marry a rant the appointment of a receiver. The case of Wilnegro, held to be repealed by implication. "The law liamson v. New Albany R. R. Co., 1 Biss. 498, followed. in question was simply one of a system, brought into | U.S. Ciro. Ct., E. D. Missouri, June, 1877. Union existence by the institution of slavery and designed | Tr. Co. v. St. Louis, I. M. and S. R. R. Co. (4 Cent. for its support, and which, like all other laws on the L. J. 585). subject, disappeared along with that institution." Statute of frauds: guaranty.- Defendant, assuming Dist Ct., Texas, 1st Jud. Dist., March, 1877. Stute v. to act as plaintiff's agent, on August 22, 1872, took from Webb (4 Cent. L. J. 588).

one Robbins (the maker) a note payable to defendant's Husband and wife: decree against husband granting | order. The note was thus taken as the property of the alimony in divorce suit cannot cut off creditors of hus- | plaintiff, and without any purpose on defendant's part band: homestead.-- Alimony cannot be assigned to the of acquiring any ownership in it for himself. On wife, upon granting her a divorce, so as to defeat the | August 27, 1872, defendant made and signed the folclaims of the existing creditors of the husband at lowing indorsement on the note, viz. : “ Notice and the time the wife's suit for divorce was commenced. protest waived. I guarantee the collection of the When real estate, subject to the debts of the husband, within note," and on the same day transmitted the has been assigned to the divorced wife for alimony, | note to plaintiff. Plaintiff having received the note and she put in possession thereof, a creditor who has and retained it without objection, brings this action recovered judgment against the husband and had exe- | upon the supposed guaranty. Held, that the supposed cution returned nulla bona may come into equity and guarauty is clearly within our statute of frauds, and have a decree for the sale of the land. The creditor in void for want of an expressed consideration, since it such case cannot reach the homestead or other prop appears, first, that there was a debt owing by Robbins erty exempt from execution. His rights are only to plaintiff, evidenced by the note; second, that the those he might have had against the property in the guaranty was a special promise to answer for a debt of hands of the husband before the decree for divorce. Robbins which continued to subsist; and third, that Chanc., Tennessee. Powell v. Warren (1 Tenu. L. the guaranty was not founded on any new and original Rep. 47).

consideration moving to the guarantor. Sup. Ct., Marriage: civil contract merely, and no formal sol Minnesota, May 15, 1877. Shephard v. Allen (N. W. emnization required: presumption as to.- Under chap L. Rep.). ter 61, General Statutes of Minnesota, marriage is a civil contract, of which consent is the essence. A mu

WHEN EQUITABLE ACTION MAINTAINAtual agreement between competent parties, “per verba

BLE-STALE CLAIMS. de presenti,to take each other for husband avd wife, deliberately made and acted upon by living together

THE case of Sullivan, trustee, v. Portland and Kenprofessedly in that relation, is sufficient, without any I nebec Railroad Company, just decided by the formal solemnization or ceremony, to give it validity United States Supreme Court, was an equitable in law. The policy of the law favors matrimony and action to recover moneys due under a certain conlegitimacy rather than concubinage and bastardy, and I tract upon the ground that a mortgage the foreclosure of which had cut off the carrying out of the contract

WHAT CONSTITUTES A BANKER UNDER THE was void. Objection was raised that the action should

REVENUE LAW. have been at law. The court said that the objection that there is a remedy at law is available only where such

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES - OCTOremedy is as plain, adequate, and effectual as the rem

BER TERM, 1876. edy in equity. Boyce's executors v. Grundy, 3 Pet. 215. Here, if the complainants could recover the moneys SELDEN, COLLECTOR, plaintiff in error, v. THE EQUITclaimed, they would be entitled also to discovery and

ABLE TRUST COMPANY. an account. Where this objection lies, it is the duty

A trust company which merely invests its capital in mortof the court, sua sponte, to take notice of it and give gage securities and sells those securities with its own

guaranty, hell, not to be a banker either in the ordinit effect. There is in such cases a constitutional right

ary acceptation of the word or under the United States to a trial by jury Parker v. The Woolen Co., 2 Black, revenue laws. 551. Another defense was that the claim was stale, IN error to the Circuit Court of the United States more than seventeen years having elapsed after such I for the District of Connecticut. The facts appear action should have been taken before the bill was filed. in the opinion. As to this point the court said: To let iu the defense Mr. Justice STRONG delivered the opinion of the that the claim is stale, and that the bill cannot, there court. fore, be supported, it is not necessary that a foundation | The Equitable Trust Company is a corporation shall be laid by any averment in the answer of the created by the laws of the State of Connecticut, and defeudants. If the case, as it appears at the hearing, | its principal office or place of business is at New is liable to the objection by reason of the laches of the Haven in that State. Its "only business has been complainants, the court will, upon that ground, be and is the investing of its own capital in mortgage passive and refuse relief. Every case is governed securities on real estate, and selling such mortgage chiefly by its own circumstances; sometimes the securities with the company's guaranty. It does not, analogy of the statute of limitations is applied; some nor has it ever, collected or received any deposit of times a longer period than that prescribed by the stat mouey subject to be paid, or revuitted on draft, check, ute is required; in some cases a shorter time is suffi or order, nor does it receive deposits, issue notes, or cient, and sometimes the rule is applied where there is | make discounts of any description whatsoever, nor do no statutable bar. It is competent for the court to any other business than above stated." In “investapply the inherent priuciples of its own system of ing said capital in mortgage securities on real estate jurisprudence and to decide accordingly. Wilson y. | as aforesaid, the manner adopted by the corporation Anthony, 19 Barber (Ark.), 16; Taylor v. Adams, 14 id. has been and is as follows: To make loans thereof to 6:2; Johnson V. Johnson, 5 Alabama, 90; Ferson v. San individuals, taking from the borrower a bond * * * ger, 2 Ware, 256; Fisher v. Boody, 1 Curtis, 219; Chol and securing the payment of said bond by a mortgage mondly v. Clinton, 2 Jac. & Walker, 141; 2 Story's Eq. deed of real estate, executed by the borrower iu con$ 15:20 (a).

formity with the laws of the State where sucb real "A court of equity, which is never active in giving estate is situated. To the negotiation, sale and guarrelief against conscience or public convenience, has anty of such bonds this company is exclusively dealways refused its aid to stale demands where a party voted, and it incurs no obligations except those arising has slept upon his rights and acquiesced for a great from such guaranty." That such is the character of length of time. Nothing can call forth this court into the company, and that such is the nature of its busiactivity but conscience, good faith, aud reasonable ness, is stipulated of record, and the only question diligence. Where these are wanting, the court is presented by the case is whether a corporatiou doing passive and does nothing. Laches aud veglect are such a business is a "bauker" within the meaning of always discountevauced, and, therefore, from the section 3407 of the Revised Statutes of the United beginning of this jurisdiction there was always a States relative to internal revenue. limitation to suits in this court." Smith v. Clay, Clearly the company is not a banker in the ordinAmbler, 645.

ary acceptation of the word. But Congress has deIf the complainants had severally sought to enforce fined who shall be regarded as bankers for the purtheir claim in an action at law, ex delicto or ex con- poses of taxation under the revenue laws. The 3407th tractu, the bar of the statute of limitatious would section of the Revised Statutes, page 673, has enacted have been complete after the lapse of six years. Rev. that "every incorporated or other bank, and every Stat. of 1857, p. 510.

person, firm or company having a place of business This bill was filed on the 21st of February, 1871. where credits are opened by the deposit or collection

The complainants were supine and silent for more of money or currency, subject to be paid or remitted than seventeen years. In the meantime the Kennebec upon draft, check or order, or where money is adaud Portland company became hopelessly and finally | vauced or loaned on stocks, bonds, bullion, bills of exinsolveut and its affairs a wreck. Proceedings were change, or promissory notes, or where stocks, bonds, iustituted to foreclose the second mortgage and bullion, bills of exchange, or promissory notes are rebrought to a close. The company lost all its property ceived for discount or for sale, shall be regarded as a and has since existed only in name. A new corpora bank or bauker." tion has come into existeuce and acquired and owns The statute describes three classes of artificial and all the property and effects lost by the old one. This natural persons, distinguished by the nature of the transfer occurred more than seven years before the business transacted by them, and declares that indifirst step was taken in the present case. This long viduals embraced in either of the classes shall be condelay thus characterized is unaccounted for. The sidered baukers. The first class is composed of those facts are amply sufficient to warrant the applica wbo have a place of business where credits are opened tion of the rule of laches and to give it the fullest by the deposit or collection of money or currency subeffect.

ject to be paid or remitted upou draft, check or order It is not claimed the company engaged in that branch notes should be regarded as bankers. If they did, a of business or that they are included in this first vast proportion of the corporations and of the merclass. The agreed state of facts expressly repels any chants and manufacturers of the country would be such claim.

included. But the language of the statute is " where' The second class are those who have a place of busi | such property is “receired" "for discount or for sale." ness where money is advanced or loaned on stocks, The use of the word "received” is significant. In bonds, bullion, bills of excbange, or promissory notes. no proper sense can it be understood that one reIt is contended on bebalf of the plaintiff in error that ceives his own stocks and bonds, or bills, or notes for the company is included in this class, because it ad. discount or for sale. He receives the bonds, bills, or vances or loans money on bonds. The case, however, notes belonging to him as evidences of debt, though states that all the loans the company makes are in he may sell them afterward. Nobody would undervestments of its own capital in mortgage securities on stand that to be banking business. But when a correal estate. It is true the bonds of the borrowers are poration or natural person receives from another pertaken with the mortgages, but the bouds are mere son, for discount, bills of exchange or promissory notes evidence of the debt. The money is advanced or belonging to that other, he is acting as a banker, and loaned on the security of the real estate mortgaged, when a customer brings bonds, bullion, or stocks for and not on the security of the bond. We think Con sale, and they are received for the purpose for which gress, in the clause of the act we are now cousidering, they are brought, that is, to be sold, the case is preintended reference to transactions entirely different sented which we think was contemplated by the statfrom loans or advances made on the personal promise ute. In common understanding be who receives goods or undertaking of the borrower. The words used are for sale is one who receives them as an agent for a not technical. They are, therefore, to be understood principal who is the owner. He is not one who buys in their common and popular sense. Dwarris on and sells on his own account. Statutes, 573. And that in common understanding an The Equitable Trust Company lent its own money, advance or loan of money on stocks, bonds, bullion, taking bonds and mortgages therefor. Those bonds it bills of exchange, or promissory notes is an advance sold with a guaranty. It sold only its own property, or loan where those species of property are pledged as not that it had received from other owners for sale. collaterals, or are hypothecated to secure the return of Such a business, in our opinion, did not constitute the advance or the payment of the sum lent, is unques the corporation a banker, as defined by the revenue tionably true. It can be nothing else where the money

laws. is advauced or lent on stocks or bullion, and by the The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed. statute bonds, bills of exchange, and promissory notes are placed in the same catalogue with stocks and bul.

VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCE BY WEAKlion. All of them are alike the subjects on which the

MINDED PERSON - LACHES. advance or loan is made. It is a fair presumption, therefore, that Congress regarded an advance or loan IN the case of Allore v. Jewell, recently decided by ou bonds as similar in its character to an advance or I the Supreme Court of the United States, the court loan on stocks, involving in each case a hypotheca- | hold that whenever there is great weakness of mind tion of th subject on which the advance is made. If | arising from age, sickness, or any other cause in a not so, if it was intended to embrace loans generally, person executing a conveyance of land, though not there was no vecessity for introducing the qualifying amounting to absolute disqualification, and the conwords “on bonds, bills of exchange, or promissory sideration given for the property is grossly inadequate, notes." It was, however, not the lending, but the a court of equity will, upon proper and seasonable method or mode of operation which was in view. If application of the injured party, or his representatives it was mere lending Congress had in contemplation, it or heirs, interfere and set the conveyance aside. The is difficult to conceive of a reason why mortgages of action here was brought by the heir-at-law of Marie real estate were not included with stocks, bonds, bul Genevieve Thibault, late of Detroit, Michigan, to canlion, eto. But it is a well knowu common usage for cel a conveyance of land alleged to have been obtained banks to make advances or loans on the hypothecation from her a few weeks before her death, when from or pledge of such property, though not upon the by | her condition she was incapable of understanding the pothecation or mortgage of real estate. There was a nature and effect of the transaction. The conveyance reason, therefore, for omitting real estate from the was of a quantity of land in Detroit worth from six to catalogue of things upon which the advances or loans eight thousand dollars for the consideration of two contemplated might be made. Advances on that are hundred and fifty dollars cash and an annuity of five not within the ordinary business of a banker. To hundred dollars during the life of the grantor and payus, therefore, it appears plain that it is the business of ment of her physician's bills and the use of the house advancing or lending in the mode usual with bankers, thereon, or the rent of such other house as she might that is, on collaterals or on the pledge of personal | occupy. At the time the conveyance was made the property, that, by the statute, is defined to be bank grantor lived alone in great degradation, and was in a jug, within the intention of Congress, and that lend. condition of mind bordering on the line between saning upon mortgages of real estate is not intended. ity and insanity. A number of suspicious circumstances

The third class described by the statute comprises accompanied the transaction and only the grantee and those who have a place of business where stocks, bonds, his agent and attorney were shown to be present at the bullion, bills of exchange, or promissory notes are re- time it took place. The court below refused a decree ceived for discount or for sale. The language is not setting aside the deed complained of. In reversing “where stocks, bonds, etc., are sold," or "are held for | this decision the Supreme Court said: “It is not sale." Surely Congress did not intend that corpora- | necessary, in order to secure the aid of equity, to tions or persons who have a place of business where prove that the deceased was at the time insane, or in they sell their own stocks, bonds, bullion, bills, or such a state of mental imbecility as to puder her

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