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* Broken teacups, wisely kept for show,'

LETTER FROM RUFUS CHOATE. or were they a standing notice to the incomer, in- | W e are indebted to Raphael J. Moses, Jr., Esq., of viting him to partake of their contents?”

W New York, for a copy of the following interestSome cases involving the domestic relations de- ing letter from Rufus Choate: serve remark. In Hawkins v. Providence, etc., R. R.

Boston, 26 Jany, 1855. Co., 119 Mass. 596, it was held that a married | 1. D. WADDELL, Cedar Turn: woman cannot maintain an action in her own name MY DEAR SIR– I hope you will do me the justice against a common carrier for loss of personal | to believe that I have intended long since to acknowl

edge your letter, but that a succession of cases, some apparel furnished her by her husband, or purchased

ill health and some absences, have hindered me until by her from moneys jointly earned by them. This is

any reply will seem, I am afraid, ungraceful and undifferently held in this State. In Merchirter v. welcome. If, even now, however, I could convey Hatten, 42 Iowa, 288, where by statute a married a single useful suggestion, I should the less regret woman was alone authorized to bring action for an

the delay. I take it for granted that, in regard to

strictly professional studies, you do not mean to injury to her person, it was held that the husband

solicit any hint. In our profession we are nothing, if also had a right of action for consequential injury

we are not first and thoroughly lawyers; and, to beto himself for loss of her labor and service. In

come such, there is but one way. Such a course as Noice v. Broron, 9 Vroom, 228, an agreement of a Hoffman's, with some changes of particular books, married man to marry, when he should obtain a di extended and distributed over ten years of labor, at vorce in a suit then pending, was held contrary to the rate of at least three hours a day, over and above public policy and void. Thus exemplifying the

all that you need for your current business, will set

you very high in this indispensable attainment - the doctrine of the song, “ 'Tis best to be off with the

knowledge of our science. old love, before we get on with the new.” It is

But I suppose you are thinking rather of subsidiary quite refreshing to our profession to know that an

pursuits and accomplishments? I would unite then infant is liable, as for necessaries, for an attorney's with the thorough mastery of the American law services in defending him in bastardy proceedings. proper, which you are to practice, as much of the civil So says Barker v. Ilibbard, 54 N. H. 539. It must

law as possible. This it was which gave Legare so

much fulness and so much elegance of matter. The be borne in mind, however, that the infant is only

civilians are subtle, copious and exact. liable for reasonable fees. “Any express promise

You, of course, know where all that learning is to he may make to pay exorbitant fees to his attorney be had; but I would look, too, into the Casuists for will be void.” In Freeman v. Robinson, 9 Vroom, I analysis; for ethical distinctions; for the direction of 383, the absence of legal obligation of the father,

the head and level: Samen de Legibus and de Legis

latione is a good book, and represents a class. He was at common law, to support bis infant child, is re

a Jesuit, you know. But the great problem is, after iterated, and it is held, that a subsequent promise

all, how to give to your legal attainments their utmost by the father to pay for goods sold his minor child,

power of impression on others; on the bench; on the without his knowledge or consent, is invalid for bar; the community; the time. And this conducts want of legal consideration. That the wife is not you at once into the circle of elegant, various, yet a “relation" of her husband, was held in Cleaver v.

kindred, acquisition and accomplishment.

In my judgment, the first book to read and thorCleaver, 39 Wis. 96.

oughly digest, is Quintillian. See there how the Broron v. Inhabitants of Vinalhaven, 65 Me. 402, is

most splendid of legal rhetoricians -- the lights of the a very queer case. The selectmen of a town, in Roman bar were trained to their marvellous perfecthe performance of a statutory duty, employed a tion in the practice of forensic debate. I would transnurse in a small-pox hospital established by the town,

late him - a page or two a day – understand him perand suffered him to depart without being properly

fectly, and apply all his weighty and mature counsels —

apply by adapting them to the altered circumstances disinfected, whereby plaintiff took the disease.

of our time. He who masters him, knows how to beIleld, that the town was not liable.

come the most finished of the profession of the law. Of interest in these “centennial” times is the Add Aristotle and Cicero day and night, and of the case of Old South Society in Boston v. Crocker, 119 moderns Bacon, Burke, and then all the best English Mass. 1, involving the right of the religious society

fine writers of prose and verse.

You get your idea of the fine legal orator," then occupying the “Old South Church" to sell the

from Quintillian, Cicero and Aristotle; but, to realize edifice. The Hancock mansion has been pulled

it in yourself, the indispensable studies are ethics (in down; the old State House is on its last legs; the which I include the publicists, Grotius, Puffeudorf, “Old South " evidently is doomed; and we expect etc., as well as the various moral kinds), and history. nothing less than the desecration of the “ Cradle of | All knowledge will help, but these are nearest. HisLiberty" — ola Faneuil Hall, — and probably the

tory you must know to understand the sources and

| causes and spirit of laws; ethics to enrich and guide next generation of Boston yankees will sell Bunker

your reasonings on facts and your judgment of actions Hill Monument for building stone.

and of character. McIntosh, Smith, Jeremy Taylor We have not exhausted the interest of this I (in cases of conscience) Cicero, Whewell and Rush are volume, but have no more space to devote to it. T of this kind.

Nothing will set your fortunes earlier, and if your and his duty to the surety enjoins on him to do, and legal and general studies are faithful, nothing will the surety is injured by the omission, the latter ought mark you more conspicuously and brilliantly than a not to be held. That duty enjoins upon the creditor rich, select and copious English style.

to enforce payment from the party primarily liable, This, with his emotional nature and eloquent feel- and if being requested by the surety to collect the ing, placed Erskine at the head of the bar of England, | debt when it is collectible from such party, by measures in an hour and forever.

of active diligence, the creditor refuses or neglects to This, more than any thing else (always excepting | do it until it becomes uncollectible from the principal, his prodigious learning and power of logic), made the such conduct ought to be a defense in equity to any spell of Pinkney's orations. The tendencies of the suit brought against the surety to charge him with the bar are to a cheap, extemporaneous, impoverished payment of the debt. But failure on the part of the gobble. To counteract this, resolve to be master of our creditor to comply with the request of the surety to mother tongue; it will cost you a life-time, and it is enforce payment of the debt will not exonerate the worth it. Write every day. If too exhausted for surety unless it result in actual injury to him, and then original composition, translate, say from Demosthenes, only to the extent of such injury. The solvency of Cicero, Tacitus, Seneca, Pascal – selecting the choicest, the debtor or the sufficiency of the fund at the time most lively and most energetic expression. Burke, when the request to collect was made, and subsequent Dryden, Johnson, Shakespeare, Jeremy Taylor, Spen insolvency or insufficiency, are essential parts of the cer have all the words. Never, under any circum defense of the surety, and must be alleged and proven stances, sleep without having read for the language by him. Thomas on Mort. 70, 71; Remsen v. Beekman, one page in a great author. It will lift up your spirit, 25 N. Y. 552. dilate your conceptions, insensibly color and warm | Plaintiff claims, however, that defendant McCrum your vocabulary. Fluency is not the thing. Rich | has not brought himself within the rule releasing sureand weighty speech is power! But I have run through ties, he pot having shown that the defendant Weinmy letter. I wish you the loftiest success, and look to | berg is insolvent; and that, as it does not appear but handsome things from you.

that plaintiff may be able to collect any deficiency out Your friend and servant,

of her, defendant McCrum is not sbown to have susRUFUS CHOATE. tained any injury from the plaintiff's delay.

The answer to this is, that if it turns out that the

deficiency can be collected from Weinberg, it will be DEFICIENCY ON FORECLOSURE SALES

the duty of the plaintiff to so collect it, and in that WHEN MORTGAGOR NOT LIABLE FOR.

case there is no occasion for a decree holding the de

fendant McCrum; but if it cannot be collected from CITY COURT OF BROOKLYN, AUGUST, 1877.

Weinberg and the defendant McCrum should be made

liable, he would be thereby damnified through the RUSSELL V. WEINBERG ET AL.

plaintiff's neglect to the precise extent of the payment A mortgagor sold the mortgaged property to W., who which he would thus be compelled to make. The assumed the payment of the mortgage. When the

mortgage having been collectible out of the property mortgage became due the property could be sold for suflicient to satisfy it, and he requested the mortgagee when the surety requested its collection, he ought not to immediately foreclose it. The mortgagee neglected

now to be called upon to make up for the subsequent to do so, and the property depreciated in value so that there was a deficiency on foreclosure sale when made. depreciation of the property, and therefore there Held, that the mortgagor was not liable for the defi

should not be any such direction against him in the ciency.

judgment. Such direction, if effectual, would compel A CTION to foreclose a mortgage. The facts appear hiin to meet a deficiency which would not have existed A in the opinion.

if the creditor, the plaintiff, had complied with his Rufus L. Scott, for plaintiff.

reasonable request. Roger H. Lyon, for defendant McCrum.

There must be judgment for a sale of the premises,

and making the defendant Weinberg liable for any deREYNOLDS, J. The defendant McCrum, after mak.

ficiency. ing the mortgage in suit, conveyed the mortgaged premises to defendant Weinberg, she assuming the

MUNICIPAL NEGLIGENCE, payment of the mortgage. Upon the maturing of the bond and mortgage, McCrum having then come into the position of surety, requested the plaintiff (the SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN, JUNE, 1877. mortgagee) to proceed immediately to foreclose and collect the debt, on the ground that the premises,

CITY OF LANSING V. TOOLAN. which were then sufficient to satisfy the mortgage,

Damages for negligence cannot be recovered against a mumight depreciate so as to become an inadequate secu

nicipal corporation for an injury resulting from the rity. The plaintiff neglected for a year to commence plan of a public work, as distinguished from its mode of

execution. So held, where the injured party had fallen his suit, and the proof now shows that although the

into a ditch which was dug across a highway, but was premises were of sufficient value to pay the mortgaged not covered to the full width of the road.

The determination of the plan of a public road is in the debt and costs of foreclosure at the time the request

nature of legislative action, the lawful exercise of which was made, they have since so far depreciated as to can neither be a wrong nor be transferred to courts and

juries from the body to which it belonus. make it altogether probable that there will be a defi

Negligence may be predicated of the construction and sub. ciency after applying the proceeds of the sale. The sequent management of a public work, but not of its question is whether defendant McCrum should be

plan. made liable for such deficiency.

ACTION for injuries received by plaintiff from fallThe rule seems to be, that if the creditor omits to do A ing into a ditch across the highway in the city an act, on the requirement of the surety, which equity | of Lansing. The facts appear in the opinion.

Opinion of the Court by COOLEY, Ch. J.

This disposes of the present case. If we assume the Toolan brought suit against the city of Lansing to original responsibility of the city for Van Keuren's recover damages for an injury received by him from act, then the only fault in the case was in not providfalling into a ditch which, he alleges, was cut by au- | ing further covering for the ditch or sewer. But that thority of the city across one of its streets, and negli | goes to the plan only; it has nothing to do with the gently left uncovered and unguarded. The facts ap- execution of the plan, which, indeed, is not compear to have been that one Van Keuren was employed plained of. by the city to build a wing to one of the bridges over The judgment must be reversed with costs, and a Grand river, and that in the prosecution of that work | new trial ordered. he found it necessary to cut the ditch in question across a street near it to keep the water, after a heavy rain

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS. fall, from rushing against and destroying his unfinished Banks and banking: taxation : tax on bank notes.-The wall. This he did on his own responsibility, covering act of March 3, 1865, as amended by the act of July 13, it with plank to the width of sixteen feet. While it 1866, section 3412, R. S., imposes a tax of ten per remained in this condition, Toolan, in turning off cent upon all the notes of individuals and of State the street in passing along one evening, fell in the banks or banking associations, whether they are the ditch and was injured. There were questions of his issue of the bank “using them as circulation" or not. negligence on the trial below which are immaterial United States Ciro. Ct., S. D. Alabama, Jan. 19, 1877. here. The city afterward paid Van Keuren for his District Sav. A 8800. V. Marks (Int. Rev. Record). work, and allowed the ditch to remain for a sewer. Contempt: interference with receiver operating railThe case was put to the jury as one of negligence, and road.--A receiver is an officer of the court, whose duty plaintiff recovered.

it is to protect the property and operate the roads unIt is claimed, in support of the judgment, that the der the direction and order of the court. The propcity has accepted and ratified the act of Van Keu erty thus placed in his possession, is considered as ren in cutting the ditch and partially covering it, and properly belonging to the court, and of course entitled is therefore liable on the principles laid down in Detroit to its protection by all the means which are at the disv. Corey, 9 Mich. 165. It was on this ground that the | posal of the court, and the court, being a national court, plaintiff recovered below.

has a right to call upon the nation, as such, to enforce When the case was tried in the Circuit Court, the case its orders. In proceedings as for a contempt of court, of Detroit v. Beckman, 34 Mich. 129, was not reported, for interfering with railroads in the hands of a reIf it had been, the circuit judge would probably have ceiver, the court proceeds in a summary manner, and instructed the jury differently. It was there decided the accused is not, of right, entitled to a trial by jury. that the city could not be held liable to one who had The court will not proceed summarily to punish an fallen into an open sewer and received an injury offender, except where the offense is clearly proved. thereby, where the only ground of complaint was, United States Ciro. Ct., Indiana, Aug. 3, 1877. King that the city had not covered the sewer where it v. Railway Company. crossed a street to the extent which due and proper Damages: measure of: diversion of water of stream. care required. If the city, in this case, had instructed -Where the water of a stream had beer diverted from Van Keuren to make and cover the ditch or sewer as flowing in its accustomed channel, by reason of the he did, the facts would have resembled very closely erection by H. of a dam at its source, whereby A., those in the Beckman case, and the two could not through whose land it had flowed, sustained damage, have been distinguished in principle. The point of the held, that the measure of damages was the difference decision was, that a lawful exercise of legislative ac in the market value of the property of A, as a farm tion cannot be a wrong; and as the determination of and ore bank immediately before H. appropriated the the plan of a public work is in the nature of legisla stream, and immediately afterward as affected thereby, tive action, there must be something besides the without regard to the fact that A. had formerly used proper execution of the plan - some negligence in its the water, or might hereafter require it for use in execution, or some other distinct wrong - before the washing the ore obtained from his ore bank. Sup. Ct., muuicipality constructing the work could be held re Pennsylvania, May 21, 1877. Hanover Water Co. v. sponsible for a tort.

Ashland Iron Co. (Week. N. Cases). Now, had Van Keuren been employed by the city to Highway: fee of land in street: {dedication and cut the ditch for a sewer, and cover it for the passage abandonment: rights of original owner on abandonof teams as he did, putting it precisely in the condition ment.-Where the owner of land dedicates in which it was when Toolan was injured, the city, for a street, the fee remains in him, and reverts to him under the decision in Beckman's case, could not have when the street is vacated or abandoned. His rights been held liable as for negligence in not providing for therein cannot be divested by any direct legislative covering it further. In planning a public work a mu act. Sup. Ct., Illinois, June 22, 1877. Helm v. Webster. nicipal corporation must determine for itself to what Insurance : contracts interrupted by the war: effect of extent it will guard agaiust possible accidents. Courts suspension of payments : duty of insured; domicile : stay and juries are not to say it shall be punished in dam law.-Contracts of insurance entered into before the ages for not giving to the public more complete pro late war, between parties afterward separated in domtection; for, as was shown in Beckman's case, that icile by the belligerent lines, were not abrogated, but would be to take the administration of municipal only suspended by the war. Acc. Insurance Co. v. Henaffairs out of the hands to which it has been intrusted dren, 24 Gratt. 540, and cases there cited. This suspenby law. What the public have the right to require of sion extends to he stipulation requiring payment of them is, that in the construction of their works after premiums at dates falling within the period of such the plans are fixed upon, and in their management separation. Nor, in such case, is it material whether afterward, due care shall be observed; but negligence | tender of such payment was made at the day, or not, is not to be predicated of the plan itself.

even though the insurer's agent resident in the State


of the domicile of the insured prior to the war, con asylum, and for that purpose the testator gave "all tinued to reside there, on the same side with the in the rest and residue of his estate, both real and persured, whilst the insurer and insured were so sepa sopal." Held, that from the blending of the real and rated. If such tender would in any case be material, personal estate, and from the terms of the disposition it will at any rate not be when, before the premium in of the residue, the annuities were chargeable upon the question became due, such agent had publicly pro residue of the estate. The testator having died claimed his purpose not to receive any more premiums, within a month from the date of the will, query which declaration was probably made known to the whether the devise to the charitable use could insured, and the cause of the failure to tender; and be declared void in a proceeding to which the beneespecially when the insurer, after the war, refused to ficiaries of that devise had not been summoned, and ratify the act of said agent, in receiving payment of a in which they had no part, but held that, even if the premium from another person as much as a month be devise were void, the residue descended upon the heirs fore the premium in question was due. In such case,

and next of kin subject to the testator's intention that however, it is the duty of the insured to tender pay

the real and personal estate should be blended into a ment within a reasonable time after the war, if living, residuary fund and subject to the original charges. and his failure so to do will occasion a forfeiture of Sup. Ct., Pennsylvania, January 26, 1877. Davis' Apthe policy. But in case of the death of the insured peal, Hanbest's Estate (Week. N. Cases). pending the war, his personal representative would be Payment: secured notes given to fall due at different under no obligation to make such tender; for then dates: distribution of collateral security.-When a trust there would be in the hands of the insurer a fund of the deed is given to secure a debt for which seven promisinsured, out of which he could deduct the unpaid pre sory notes are passed, payable at various periods, aud mium. Nothing more would then be necessary on the in case of default, sale is to be made and the notes part of the insured than that the insurer should, paid whether due or not, and the fund realized from within a reasonable time from the end of the war, be the sale is insufficient to pay all the notes in full, the informed of such death, and of its date. Such infor holders thereof are entitled to a pro rata distribution, mation will be sufficient, though unaccompanied by

without regard to the order in which the notes mature any formal demand of payment, or assertion of right upon their face. Sup. Ct., District of Columbia. to it. An insurance company chartered by another Ocean Nat. Bank v. Brown (Wash. L. Rep.). State, but doing business in this State in compliance Powers: trust: power of distribution: does not include with the statutes of 1855-6, is to be considered for the power of limitation as to character of estate given : trust purpose of being sued as domiciled in this State, and created under such power void.-A devise of a power to is entitled to rely on the statute of limitations just as make distribution of testator's estate among his chilif it were a company which had been chartered by the

dren does not enable the donee of the power to settle legislature of this State. The several acts of the Gov the estate in trust for those children for life, remainernment of Virginia during the war, suspending the der to their appointees or heirs. If such a settlement statutes of limitations, were valid to prevent the run is made the trust is void, and the legal estate vests in ning of said statutes to 3d of March, 1866. Acc. John the children in fee. A testator gave an estate to his son v. Gill, 27 Gratt. 587. And the time from 2d of wife for life, with power “to make any division or March, 1866, to 1st of January, 1869, is to be left out of distribution of my whole estate, real and personal, the computation under said statutes, by virtue of the among my children,” (naming them) “ in such shares seventh section of the act of March 2, 1866, commonly aud proportions as she, in her own discretion, may known as the Stay Law. Acc. Danville Bank v. Wad think best, hereby confirming all bequests and devises dill, 27 Gratt. 448. Though such company had, after the and all directions and orders made by her in regard to war, expressly revoked the powers of the resident agent the same." She devised the whole estate in trust to it had had before the war, and had never afterward ap- pay the income in equal proportions to the children, pointed another in his place, service of process on such remainder in fee as to each share of the principal to agent will, nevertheless, be effectual under the statutes the appointees of the children, or the persons who in that behalf, to give jurisdiction of an action against would take under the intestate law. Held, that the such company. The provisions of said statutes of trust was void, and that the legal estate vested abso1855-6 were amendatory of the previous law, and ex lutely in the children in equal shares. Sup. Ct., Penn. tended as well to policies previously issued, as to poli sylvania, January 22, 1877. Smith's Estate, Appeal of cies thereafter issued; and a foreign company doing | Fidelity, etc., Co. (Week. N. Cases). business in the State under the same, at the time said Recording act: rendor's lien: rights of creditor of amendments were enacted, and continuing to do busi grantee: homestead. — Where the vendor's lien is reness afterward in compliance with all said statutos, tained in a contract of sale of land, though the conmust be taken to have accepted said provisions, and tract is not recorded, the vendor's lien is superior to be bound by them. Sup. Ct. of Appeals, July 12, 1877. that of a judgment creditor of the vendee. Where a Life Insurance Company v. Duerson's Executor (Va. grantor, in a conveyance of land, had claimed homeL. Jour.).

stead in the notes given for the purchase-money by Legacies and annuities: when chargeable upon land: his grantee, and the conveyance is afterward set aside devise to charitable uses: when void: when subject of as fraudulent and void as to creditors, the grantor may such devise descends upon heirs subject to charges.-H., | claim homestead as against the creditors in the land or by his will, declared that P. was to have the collection the proceeds thereof. Sup. Ct. of Appeals, Va., July, of all the rents of his real estate and interest of mort 1877. Shipe v. Repass (Va. L. Jour.). gages and pay the same over to his executors. After Sale of personal property: sale of cattle in open market: giving certain legacies and annuities, he then directed caveat emptor. - In an action for fraud and deceit in his executors, “after the payment of the above lega- | the sale of “fat cattle,” in open market, which, it was cies and the expiration of all the life estates where I | alleged, were affected with the “Texas fever," held, Inve given annuities," to erect a certain charitable l that the mere concealment of facts in a sale in open market does not vitiate the sale. Where there is no as and for a private residence only, and not for any warranty, the doctrine of caveat emptor prevails. Sup. | purpose of trade." The vice-chancellor held, in the Ct., Illinois, June 22, 1877. Morris v. Thompson. case of one of the plots, that this covenant would not

Ships and shipping: tug towing vessel: duty and lia- be broken by the erection thereon, by the Institution bility of tug. - Where there is a general employment for the Education of the Daughters of Missionaries, of by a vessel, of a tug to tow her in and land her at the | a building to be used as a school or bome for a hunparticular place designated, the tug necessarily under dred female orphans, the objects of the institution. takes to bring with it the necessary skill and ability His lordship said that he could not conceive that there to perform that service, and it has the right, and it is was any doubt as to the meaning of the words, adding its duty to direct the vessel being towed, in the man that the term “purpose of trade" explained more agement of her helm, so that she may aid in making fully what was meant by the term “private residence.” the landing sought to be accomplished. U. S. Dist. He did not, however, rest solely on this ground, which Ct., N. D., Ohio. Smith v. Schooner Southwest. would, perhaps, have been intelligible, although it

Statute of frauds : verbal lease for a year to commence would have rendered the words “otherwise than as in futuro: holding over.- If a tenant, under a lease for and for a private residence only" practically supera year, holds over, he holds the premises, in the ab fluous. But he contended, apparently with much sence of a new agreement, subject to the same terms | animation, that the proposed building would, in the and conditions as in the original lease; that the hold fullest and most ample sense, be used as a private ing over rests upon a new implied contract, and not residence only. The committee, he said, had placed upon the former lease. Held, that a verbal lease for themselves in loco parentis to these children; and, the period of one year, to commence in futuro, is valid, since, if they had had a hundred children of their own, and not within the statute of frauds of Colorado. they could not bave been restrained from building a Sup. Ct., Colorado. Sears v. Smith (Ch. Leg. News). home for them, no more could they be restrained

Statute of frauds: parol promise to pay the debt of from building a home for these objects of their care. another : liabilities of indorsers. — The holder of a prom “Suppose," continued his lordship, “that a Turkish issory note sued the second indorser, who paid the pasha were to come over to this country with several note before judgment. In a subsequent action by the of his wives and a hundred children, might be not second against the first indorser, defendant offered to build a house on this land ? Perhaps this is an absurd prove by parol that plaintiff was, in fact, surety for illustration, but it shows that a hundred people may the maker of the note, and that he placed his name on live in a private residence.” This latter proposition the back of the note by mistake. Held, that the evi no one can doubt; but then, in the case proposed, the dence was not admissible.

building would really be somebody's private residence, Per Paxson, J. It makes no difference as regards namely, the pasha's. But, in the case before the court, the effect of the statute of frauds, whether the party the building could not accurately be described as anyinvoking it be plaintiff or defendant. Sup. Ct., Penn body's private residence; certainly not the commitsylvania, May 28, 1877. Haur v. McNair (Week. N. tee's, for they would not reside there, and as to the Cases).

children it would be a very public residence indeed. Transfer of cause to Federal court: sufficiency of affi As to the actual intention of the owners it cannot, we davit for. – An affidavit for transfer of cause to a think, be doubted what it was, namely, that the houses Federal court, which merely states that certain parties should be used in the ordinary way in which private to the suit are non-residents of the State where suit residences in England are used, and not, for example, is brought, but fails to state that they are residents of for such a purpose as an asylum for a thousand idiots, some other State, is insufficient. Such afidavit should even though the keepers of the idiots derived no show affirmatively the citizenship of the parties, and emolument from keeping them. Whether the actual that they are residents of some other State of the intention was sufficiently expressed by the words of United States. Sup. Ct., Iowa. Delaware R. R. Const. the covenant must, it seems, be considered doubtful, Co. v. Davenport & St. P. R. R. Co. (Ch. Leg. News). since the vice-chancellor is unable to conceive an in

terpretation which to us appears to be the only interNOTES OF ENGLISH CASES.

pretation conceivable.

A case of Cohen v. Mitchell, which was tried by Mr. COVENANTS IN DEEDS AS TO CHARACTER OF BUILD

Justice Lush, without a jury, at the Leeds Assizes, INGS ON LAND CONVEYED. - ALTERATION OF NE

| raised a question of considerable importance. It was GOTIABLE INSTRUMENT.

an action on a bill of exchange for £100. In February MHE question as to what is a private residence lately of the present year, Mitchell offered the bill in ques.

1 came before Vice-Chancellor Bacon, in a case of tion to the plaintiff for discount. The plaintiff disGerman v. Chapman, 25 W. R. 802, and it received an | counted it, retaining the sum of £8, and paying to answer that cannot fail to be a startling one to many Mitchell £92 in cash. It was a three months' bill. householders. The plaintiff had, together with others, The plaintiff did not discover till he came to enter the purchased an estate in the rural neighborhood of | bill in his bill-book, after Mitchell had left, that the Sevenoaks, and had divided it into plots on which to date of the bill was the 29th of December, 1877, a erect villa residences of a superior character. The period of ten months in advance of the time when the conveyance of each plot contained a covenant on the transaction took place. All parties treated the bill part of the purchaser, and so as to bind the land and | as one which was then running to maturity. The the future owners thereof, not to build more than a plaintiff, discovering what he took to be a clerical certain number of houses on it, at a cost of not less error, altered the 7 into a 6, thus making the date of than £1,000 each, or £1,800 for a pair of semi-detached the bill the 23th of Docember, 1876. Evidence was houses, and “that no house or building to be erected tendered for the defendants to show that their intenon the land should be used or occupied otherwise than I tion was to date the bill on the 29th of January, 1877,

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