glance at him over his spectacles - a look which seemed to chill him to the very marrow. Ella, too, felt that her replies had sealed the doom of her once dearlybeloved. And well-grounded was the fear of the culprit, the triumph of the accusers. Sufficient cause had the lawyers for the glances which said unmistakably, "he's a goner;" and very bad on the bench for that look which read, "you rascal, fifteen years of penal service for you." For the law of the land at that time said that a marriage not lawfully celebrated, by reason of fraud having been practiced by one party on the other, was valid in favor of the innocent victim, and that a marriage was perfectly good even when one of the parties had been married under a false name, providing the other was not cognizant of the deceit. King v. Wroxton, 4 B. & A. 640. Hence, Ella having proved her husband ignorant of her real name, established the validity of the marriage, branded him as a bigamist, and severed the last hair that held the sword of Justice pendant over his head, consigning him to ignominy, disgrace and servitude. Having done all this, you remember she determines, woman-like, to rescue him ere the punishment, so richly deserved, overtakes him. She conspires with his counsel; produces a statement written by herself before her wedding, for Landon's perusal, explaining all about the change of name, and, on cross-examination, has an attack of non-mi-ricardo, and will not swear that the wretch at the bar had not read the paper on their marriage eve. On this peg is hung the argument that both Eva and Landon had conspired to deceive the public, and had knowingly and willfully intermarried without due publication of bans and proper license, and consequently the marriage was void. She was not Mrs. L., and Mr. L. had been free to wed when he met his second love.

Strange this may seem, but the law was good, provided the marriage took place after the fourth year of the reign of his majesty George the Fourth. If the wedding had been before that time it would have been different, in the event of Landon's ignorance, as Miss Mary Hodgkinson, who was married under the name of White, without any intention to mislead or without misleading any one interested, found to her cost, when her union was declared invalid. Rex v. Tibshelf, 1 B. & A. 195.

It may be a comfort to some in this world of trouble to know that the employment of a sham clergyman or forged license will not render the service inoperative when the innocent victim desires the noose to hold tight. Dormer v. Williams, 1 Curt. 870; Lane v. Goodwin, 4 Q. B. 361.

Notwithstanding the widely-spread belief that matrimonial alliances are made in heaven (which, if true, must cause heaven to be any thing but a place of rest, and almost require the presence in those realms of the blest of some individuals that one would think might as well be kept out), among all Anglo-Saxon communities marriage is but a civil contract-like an agreement to build a house or make a bonnet; and the essence of it consists in the consent freely given by a man and a woman able at the time to agree. Force or coercion used toward either party will invalidate the affair. Stevenson v. Stevenson, 7 Phil. (Pa.) 386. It would be very unwise, therefore, for any young lady to make a dead set upon an eligible parté, and intimidate him into matrimony by threatening imprisonment and such like dire inflictions, for, though the lips of the timid and frightened male murmur assent

to the all-important "wilt thou?" yet, neither mind nor heart consenting, Justice and Right will rescue the entrapped one, and put asunder those thus joined together. Collins v. Collins, 2 Brewst. (Penn.) 575. Mere unwillingness, some degree of reluctance, a show of masculine modesty, a refusal to take the hand of the bride, holding his peace (perhaps his last until he gains the quiet of the tomb), will not, however, enable the bashful swain to reconsider the matter after the justice or parson has performed the ceremony, even though the presence of the parents of the bride and a conservator of the peace in charge of the good-man may have somewhat overawed him. Jackson v. Winns, 7 Wend. 47. And voluntarily taking up housekeeping, or going into board together, after the cause of intimidation has been removed, will have the effect of making perfectly good (so far as the law is concerned) a marriage at first invalid, because brought about by fraud or force. Hamstead v. Plaiston, 49 N. H. 84.

And now let us approach the great question, will a marriage, entered into with the entire concurrence of those most deeply interested, be valid and binding if all the rites and ceremonies, religious or otherwise, have been absent? This query touches the pockets of all marriageable and marrying "forked radishes with heads fantastically carved," whose business it is to fee-handsomely or otherwise, as the spirit or circumstances may move them-the officiating priest or magistrate. Nay, more, it affects the pockets of all interested, for clothes, which Carlyle says give us individuality, distinction, social polity - which have made men and women of us which are threatening to make clothes-screens or scare-crows of us-cost money, especially at such times. On this important point doctors (of the law) differ rather widely. Some writers have said "yea" and others "nay" to the question; while courts and judges have said “ditto" and "do" to either response.

Long since, Parsons-ample authority in such matters, we must recognize in the name -said: "Marriage being essential to the peace and harmony, and to the virtues and improvement of civilized society (comforting words, surely, to many a lonely heart), it has been, in all well-regulated governments, among the first attentions of civil magistrates to regulate marriage. Where the laws of any State have prescribed no regulations for the celebration of matrimony, a mutual engagement to intermarry by parties competent to make such a contract would, in a moral view, be a good marriage, and would impugn no law of the State. But when the civil government has established regulations for the due celebration of marriage, it is the duty as well as the interest of all citizens to conform to such rules." Milford v. Worcester, 7 Mass. 48. Another Parsons (think not, gentle reader, that the expression is ungrammatical) says: "That in all Christian communities of which we have any knowledge, and, as we suppose, in all civilized countries, certain ceremonies are prescribed for the celebration of marriage, either by express law or by a usage which has the force of law, and the question is, whether a mere consent of the parties, even with mutual promises, but without any use of or reference to any of these ceremonies, is sufficient to constitute a valid marriage." 2 Parsons on Contracts, 75.

Whenever there is a ceremony, no particular form of words and no particular actions or deeds are necessary. A simple nod of the head or bob of a curtesy in response to the fatal query will be as efficacious and

as binding upon the nodder or the bobber as the most sonorous “I do," or simpering "yes," accompanied by Sir Charles Grandison bows and ritualistic genuflexions. People v. Taylor, 1 Metc. (N. P.) 190.

A gentleman, hailing from Boston, whom we have before quoted, and who claims for himself great knowledge on this and kindred subjects, says he never knew of any case in which a mere agreement to marry, with no formality and no compliance with any law or usage regulating marriage, has actually been permitted to give both parties and their children all the rights and lay them under the obligations and liabilities, civil and criminal, of a legal union. 2 Parsons on Contracts, 79. His next sentence, however, is an admission that some recent decisions of the courts seem to tend strongly in the direction which he disapproves. To some of these cases we will refer.

A man and a woman, in New York State, were engaged to be married. The former entertained the notion that wedding ceremonies were vanities of vanities, empty show, vain delusions, unnecessary expenses, in fact he did not believe in them, and expressed the desire that his lady-love would forego the performance, especially as the marriage without them would, to his mind, be all sufficient. The fair one hesitated the pomps and vanities of this wicked world and the flesh pots of Egypt had strong hold on her. But at last she gave way to his wishes, and named the day which was to see these twain made one flesh. On that eventful hour they went out riding together in a carriage, and while rolling smoothly along the gent produced a ring, and, placing it upon the lady's finger, said: "This is your wedding ring; we are married." She received the circlet of gold as the sign of wedlock. He then further remarked: "We are married; I will live with you and take care of you all the days of my life, as my wife." She made no objection to the pleasant programme thus sketched out for her future course, and together they drove to a house where he had previously engaged board for "himself and wife." There they lived together for over a month, he treating her and speaking to her and of her as his wife. Soon-sad to relate-a change came o'er the spirit of their dreams. We seek not to lay blame at the door of either, but a divorce was sought for, and the Supreme Court of the State held and decided that this simple and uncommon marriage | was perfectly valid. Bissell v. Bissell, 55 Barb. 325.

On the other hand, once upon a time in Scotland, after a family supper, at which, we may assume, toddy was not absent, one of the party, a jolly bachelor, put a ring on the finger of a daughter of the house, a maiden bright and fair, saying to her, "Maggie, you are my wife before heaven; so help me, oh God!" The two kissed, the lady modestly exclaiming, "Oh, Major!" The banqueters then drank the very good health of the happy couple, and forthwith bedded them, according to an old Scotch custom. In course of time the question arose, was Maggie the wife of the Major? The Court of Sessions said she was, but the final court of appeal in the kingdom took the liberty of reversing that decision, and saying that she was not, upon the ground that it appeared clear to them that no real marriage was then intended, although the ultimate maturing of matrimony was hoped for and confidently anticipated by poor Maggie and her friends. Stewart v. Robertson, 2 H. L. (Sc.) 494.

It seems pretty clear, however, that in the State of New York no religious form or ceremony of any kind,

nor, in fact, any formality, except the agreement itself, is essential to the validity of a marriage. Any agreement made in the present tense between persons of opposite sexes, capable of contracting, whereby they assume toward each other the marital relation, is an actual marriage. It need not be in writing, nor need any witness be present. And it may be proved as any other contract; and when proved to the satisfaction of a court of justice, it constitutes a lawful marriage. Bissell v. Bissell, supra; Van Tuyl v. Van Tuyl, 8 Abb. N. Y. Pr. (N. S.) 5. The services of both priest and magistrate may be dispensed with. Wright v. Wright, 48 How. Pr. 1. Out in Mississippi, too, it has been decided that to constitute a legal union nothing more is needed than that, in language which both of the contracting parties understand - be it English, Irish or Dutch- -or in words declaratory of their intention, they accept one another as husband and wife, and if the words used do not, in their ordinary meaning or common use, "conclude matrimony," yet if the man and woman intend marriage, and their intent is sufficiently manifest, they become inseparably welded together until, as Samuel Smetes says, illcooked joints and ill-boiled potatoes, calling in the aid of a divorce court, put them asunder. Their consent to enter into the holy state may be expressed either in writing or orally. Dickenson v. Brown, 49 Miss. 357; Rundle v. Pegram, id. 751.

So, in Pennsylvania, words in the present tense (one sees now, what one perhaps never saw before, the advantage of the study of grammar) uttered for the purpose of effecting a matrimonial alliance, is all that is required. No particular form of solemnization before officials of either Church or State is needed. Commonwealth v. Stamp, 53 Penn. St. 132. The law among the dwellers in Alabama is similar, to all intents and purposes. Campbell v. Gullatt, 43 Ala. 57. In Michigan, too, if persons agree to take each other for husband and wife, for better, for worse, at once, without any pomp or ceremony, or show, or with any pomp, ceremony or show, that may be pleasing to human nature, and from thenceforth live together, the Gordian knot is fairly tied, only Death or some other heartless divorcer can cut it. Hutchins v. Kimmell, 31 Mich. 127. People who quote Latin, and know a little more of that classic tongue than "e pluribus unum," "excelsior," "sine qua non,' 77 66 compos mentis," "et cætera,' and agree in the correctness of the law, as stated in these last-mentioned cases, express the principle enunciated in them, with the aid of their little Latinity, as follows: Marriages made per verba de presenti, vel per verba de futuro cum copula, are lawful. And this being interpreted means, that a marriage contract entered into by words signifying the intention of having a wedding then and there, and the couple immediately separating, and one entered into by words expressive of a determination to have a marriage some day or other, followed by the parties dwelling together in amity, are as valid and as binding as if made in the presence of the church.

It has, however, been expressly held in Maryland, that some religious ceremony must be added to the civil contract. Denison v. Denison, 35 Md. 361. On the Pacific coast the contract must be declared before a person duly authorized to take such declarations, and in the presence of a couple of witnesses. Holmes v. Holmes, Abb. U. S. 555. And a Massachusetts judge said that a marriage which was merely the effect of a mutual engagement between the parties, or solemnized

by any one not legally empowered to do so, is not valid, nor is it entitled to the incidents of a marriage duly performed. Milford v. Worcester, 7 Mass. 48. In England no wedding is perfect unless made in the presence and with the intervention of a minister in holy orders, or other person authorized by statute; and so it is in Canada.

Whether there is a ceremony or not, intention being an all-important ingredient in this as in all contracts, it follows, notwithstanding novels and sensational stories to the contrary, that a marriage ceremony performed in jest does not make the pair husband and wife, even though a genuine J. P., who did not know whether he was tying the nuptial knot in joke or in earnest, officiated at the ceremony. McClary v. Terry, 21 N. J. Eq. 225.

Ladies, to whom appertain the privilege of “naming the day," may choose any one of the seven for pub licly assuming a new patronymic. Some question, it is true, has arisen as to whether a celebration of marriage on Sunday is a violation of law; but it is generally believed by lawyers that matrimony may be lawfully entered into on that sacred day. The reasons why are various; it is either because the frequency of the thing has in some measure protected it by usage, and the consequence of an opposite view would be disastrous, or because the contract of marriage is in the nature of a continuing contract, and may be regarded as made every succeeding day as long as the parties live together (2 Parsons on Contracts); or, and this applies chiefly to New York State, as civil contracts and matrimony is such- made for a lawful purpose, and not tending to disturb the public peace and quiet, are valid and enforceable, although made on Sunday; so are marriages, unless it can be made out that they are contracts tending to disturb the public peace and quiet. Some marriages undoubtedly have that tendency, and so we would advise some ladies to be careful when they get married.

A

R. VASHON ROGERS.

THE LAW OF OBSCENE LITERATURE. SHORT-HAND report of the recent trial of Charles Bradlaugh and Anne Besant, in the Queen's Bench, before Lord Chief-Justice Cockburn and a jury, for an obscene libel, has now been published at London in a neat volume of 325 pages. It presents, to the American lawyer, many features of novel interest as well as precedent, and for the first time is given by its pages a comprehensive definition of obscene publication. The indictment was for a misdemeanor, as well at common law as under the 14 & 15 Vict., c. 100, one of the Lord Campbell's acts. One of the counts may be valuable as a precedent, and we subjoin it in a note,* premising that both during

The jurors for our lady the Queen, upon their oaths, present that C. B. and A. B. unlawfully and wickedly devising and contriving and intending as much as in them lay to vitiate and corrupt the morals as well of youth as of divers other liege subjects of our said lady the Queen, and to incite and encourage the said liege subjects to indecent, obscene, unnatural and immoral practices and bring them to a state of wickedness, lewdness and debauchery, therefore, to wit, on the 24th day of March, A. D. 1877, in the city of London and within the jurisdiction of the Central Criminal Court, unlawfully, wickedly, knowingly, willfully and designedly did print, publish, sell and utter a certain indecent, lewd, filthy and obscene libel, to wit, a certain indecent, lewd, filthy, bawdy and obscene

the trial and upon motion in arrest of judgment, the Chief-Justice and Mellor, J., agreed that it was not necessary to set out any parts of the objectionable publication, but it was sufficient to identify it by title and designate it as a whole; and also, that, under the indictment averring intention, the verdict was good, although the jury specially found that while the book was of the averred tendency the defendants were guiltless of corrupt motives in the publication" (p. 267).

Who promoted the prosecution was a question involved in doubt; and Chief-Justice Cockburn (p. 255) remarked in his charge: "I should very much like to know who are the authorities prosecuting, because that has not transpired. The solicitor-general tells us it may have been the magistracy. I do not believe it. I, however, concur with him that however ill-advised may be this prosecution, here it is. Every man has a right, even if he is only a detective policeman, to put the criminal law of the land into motion, if he thinks he has ground for so doing; so long as the government of this country thinks proper to have the administration of justice defective in that, which from this place I say, is an essential necessity with a view to its proper administration, and I mean the office of a public prosecutor. But we have the case here, and however much we may deplore the rashness which set this prosecution going, we must deal with it as though it had the sanction of the crown, which I do not think it has, although the solicitor-general appears to conduct it."

At the calling of the cause for trial (removed by certiorari from the Central Criminal Court) the defendants throughout acting as their own counsel, and without any attorney or solicitor being at their sides moved to quash, upon the ground of insufficiency; but the court ruled that it would not, even before plea, hear at Nisi Prius such a motion which ought to be made by preliminary motion at Chambers. Two of the special jury being excused their places were supplied by talesmen an usher being sent for a common juryman to make up the twelve" (p. 4).

66

Sir Hardinge Gifford, the solicitor-general, opened the case for the crown in a speech which occupied seventeen octavo pages, although alternated with much interlocutory dialogue with bench and the defendants in the nature of comment, query, or dissent. His complaint of obscenity was against a volume originally written forty years ago by Dr. Knowlton, of Boston, and entitled Fruits of Philosophy," and now republished by the defendants, to be sold at six pence per copy, not as a medical book, but indiscriminately and as a popular one, until it had attained a circulation of over an hundred thousand

book, called "Fruits of Philosophy," thereby contaminating, vitiating and corrupting the morals as well of youth as of other liege subjects of our said lady the Queen, and bringing the said liege subjects to a state of wickedness, lewdness, debauchery and immorality in contempt of our said lady the Queen and her laws, to the evil and pernicious example of all others in the like case offending and against the peace of our said lady the Queen, her crown and dignity.

+ These observations were evidently made because the effect of the authorities taking up the challenge to prose_ cute was to run up the circulation from a few to over an hundred thousand copies. If the profits of the defendants were, say 3d. per copy, they netted some twelve hundred pounds by the operation.

copies. His preliminary view of the scope of the book was better digested by the Chief-Justice in the charge (p. 260), "that the evils of over population shall be remedied by persons after they have married by recourse to artificial means to prevent the procreation of a numerous offspring; also, those consequent evils, especially to the poorer classes, which the production of a too numerous offspring is certain to bring about." The propositions of the solicitor-general are included in the after-rulings, but they were elaborated with considerable skill in an endeavor to show the jury that the circumstances of the publication made indubitably obscene what, if issued as a restricted scientific book, would not have been objectionable. He traced the publication to the defendants by evidence in a briefly technical manner and rested. Indeed, they had by a note to the city authorities - the publication being within old London limits-admitted issue and circulation of the book; and challenged arrest, in order to have an early test case. However, by motions to quash and in arrest of judgment, as well as by many dilatory observations during trial, the accused seem to have repented of their bravado and to court a technical instead of absolute acquittal.

There was a brief cross-examination of the detective (who was the testis pro forma legis) in order to elicit that the authorities (city or in Home office) were not interested prosecutors. This was a point addressed to the jury, as if to say, "we ask you to doubt obscenity when the parent vindicators of law are loth to openly assume the responsibility of saying they believe in our guilt and in the impolicy of our act."

It was agreed that each jury man should have a copy of the impounded pamphlet; and that it should be considered in evidence as if read, the point as to insufficiency of declaration by mere title in the indictment being of course not prejudiced.

Then the co-defendant, Mrs. Besant, opened the case on her own behalf. Her photograph is prefixed to the report, and it shows a remarkably handsome, intellectual and modest woman of about thirty, slight built and graceful. She is authoress of various pamphlets and tracts upon woman's rights and civil and religious liberty, with decided atheistical views, also of a biography of (Miss Martineau's idol) Auguste Comte, with an inclusive resumé of his positivism, adapted for the general reader. Certainly no one can read Mrs. Besant's opening speech (several hours in two days being occupied, and its report consuming pages 27-151 of the report) or her summing up, without agreeing that in even logic, as well as in lucid statement, in ornate style, in tact, and clear arrangement, she not only surpassed her co-defendant (who has been heard in this country as a lecturer) but excelled the solicitor-general. She spoke eloquently and fluently, with only occasional reference to her notes. If any one were ungallant enough to hint that these may have emanated from others, it will be a full answer to point to those critical tests of original ability-interruptions and catechism from the bench, which were full and occurred repeatedly. She was instant as well as apt with her replies. Early in her opening she asserts, "I now come to the Philosophical Proem. I do not agree with it; but I say there is not a single syllable which even the solicitor-general can twist into indecency, and I hold that in order to convict on this indictment you must take the whole book to be obscene."

The Lord Chief-Justice. "I don't wish to interrupt you, but that is going too far."

Mrs. B. "Is it putting it a little too strong?" Lord Chief-Justice. "You are wrong. The question is whether the book is obscene. Not whether there may be intermediary passages that are not. The jury must look at the scope and effect of the whole book which the indictment charges as a whole."

Mrs. B. I am much obliged to you, my lord. Then gentlemen, read the whole preface, and judge of any part which will tend to produce obscenity, taken as a whole."

A suggestion being made about adjournment, the court said: "We must go on I think for another half hour, unless Mrs. B. feels exhausted;" but she pluckily replied: "Oh, no, I can go on." Then the ChiefJustice observes: "We well sit another half hour."

The bench afterward interrupts with a question about statistics, and Mrs. Besant returning to them readily, resumes the thread of her argument. At a later stage becoming ironical upon the solicitor-general, she observed: "He put it to you that he read the extract with a large amount of pain. I do not quite know why he should, then, have read it at all, as each of you have a copy. The extreme delicacy of the learned counsel might have excused him from a task he said was so painful."

The court interposes with: "The learned solicitorgeneral is not here, and I think you must be just to him. He was rather challenged to read them."

Mrs. B. Do you think I ought to be gentle with him, my lord, as he is absent?" [Laughter.] Lord Chief-Justice. "What I said was that you must be just to him."

Mrs. B. I will not press the point, as he is not here. I do feel the position is especially painful for him, because if he does not get a verdict against a woman, it makes the position of a learned counsel very painful." [Another laugh.]

Lord Chief-Justice. "You have gone through this long, and I must say very able address, up to the present, without saying any thing that could be regarded as painful or offensive to any one."

Mrs. B. "And I will try to do so to the end. My feelings toward the solicitor shall be more charitable than his were to me, for he accused me of some of the vilest things a woman can do. Perhaps by not too roughly defending myself against him, I shall make my case the stronger."

Mrs. B. then resumed her address precisely at the disconnected point of illustration. A question soon arose that is often raised at Nisi Prius, particularly in cases where insanity is discussed. Mrs. Besant offers Tristam Shandy to the jury to read a passage; when the solicitor-general intervenes with: "I am reluctant to interpose, my lord, but I must take your judgment whether or not such passages ought to be read." The Lord Chief-Justice, after lunch, ruled: "I have been consulting with my learned brothers, and they agree with me I am bound to reject every publication as evidence, but that I cannot prevent the defendant from committing a passage to memory and reciting it as part of her speech, nor from reading the book as if reciting from memory. But the book is not evidence, and need not to be proved, nor must it be handed to the jury."

Accordingly, throughout her speech, extracts were read out of all manner of popular books, from the

Bible, and Jeremy Taylor to Fielding, and newspapers; and in order to illustrate what may be called the text of Mrs. Besant's speeches: "When the whole scope, effect and aim of a book is to produce laudable results, the fact that passages of it are couched in coarse language, or with indelicate reference, cannot make it obscene, nor is that obscene which meets with general popular toleration."

It is impossible to read the report of the trial without arriving at the opinion that the prosecution allowed too much range to a theory of defense which was really fallacious. Neither the solicitor-general nor the court seem to have emphasized the plain and narrow proposition, viz.: That inasmuch as the prosecution of species has the sole object of copulation, and the latter without the wish of species, was mere passion, a book that was published for indiscriminate circulation, and to show how nature, as well as the laws of physiology and morals could be defied, and how to promote passion; and in illustrative language, that was indelicate and coarse, is an obscene publication as published.

That both Mrs. Besant and Mr. Bradlaugh were allowed to open and sum up, would seem to establish a precedent that such a course is a wise discretion to extend to two joint defendants who have precisely the same line of defense.

The lady unquestionably exhausted the capabilities of the latter, and her speech was so much better than was that of her associate, both in logic and oratorical mould, that it may be said the discretion of silence on his part would have been the wisest.

The court stopped Mr. Bradlaugh when he commenced to comment to the jury upon what the daily press had that morning said, and would not (p. 169) permit him to correct its erroneous statements.

The defense examined as witnesses Miss Alice Vickery, M. D., who produced certificates as a chemist from the Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain, and as mid-wife from the London Lying-in Hospital, as well as Obstetrical Society, and Dr. Drysdale, a distinguished London savan, and Henry G. Bohn, the great publisher. The direct examination of the one lady by the other was well handled, and the rapport as perfect as if they had rehearsed it for the stage, although it is evident that much of it was pièce de inconstance. Dr. Drysdale created some merriment by asking if advice against copulation in any manner was prosecutable, inasmuch as that went to the root of over-population. During his examination (p. 222) a ruling was had that he might read from previously prepared memoranda (per Lord Chief-Justice Cockburn), "if put down freshly and from memory."

Mr. Bohn's examination went to the point that he had for many years published for popular circulation, physiological works containing statements parallel to those in the indicted pamphlet; such as De la Motte Ligniac's Physical Essay on Man and Woman in a state of Marriage, and published with plates, and forty editions of Venette's Tableau de l'amour conjugale.

In addition to the charge we have mentioned respecting the scope of the book, the Chief Justice also said (p. 261): "Although the intention here is not unduly to convey illicit knowledge, and gratify prurient and libidinous thoughts, still if the effect of this book is to excite and create thoughts of a demoralizing character to the mind of the reader, the work is open to the condemnation asked for at your hands." The charge substantially followed the rulings of our courts

(in People v. Gardner, 6 N. Y., and in the case of exMayor Hall's Impeachment, N. P.), viz.: "That infraction of law, even with good intention, or without any intention at all, was an indictable and punishable offense," and thus, to a large extent, qualifying the remarks of Mr. Bishop (in his treatises) about the necessary concurrence of mens rea et corpus rea in every criminal offense.

On the argument for arrest of judgment, the rhetorical fencing between Mrs. Besant and the Lord Chief-Justice, as well as Mr. Justice Weller, was as adroit on her part as upon their own. Eventually — and we do not cite the case of the widow and the unjust judge they had to admit that it was a nice question for the Appellate Court whether the indictment was good.

There was important ruling on the frequently mooted question of surplusage, and the court (p. 284) thus excellently expresses the doctrine: "The indictment is not badly drawn if something is put in that might have been left out altogether. If it is useful enough for the purpose, the useful part is not corrupted by the useless part."

During the argument of the motion in arrest of judgment, Mr. Solicitor-General cited a case on the law of obscenity from 2 Sargent & Rawle (Comm. v. Sharples), and the court interposed parenthetically: "Decisions of the American courts are always to be highly respected by us" (p. 298). From all which occurred during the arguments that followed the verdict, and before judgments entered, it is clear that the court were disposed to postpone sentence until after the appeal, and in any event to impose only technical terms. But that "gift-o'-gab werry gallopin," which Cockney Sam Weller ascribed to provincial Job Trotter, mastered Mr. Bradlaugh, and on the Sunday evening following the verdict, he had a meeting of over fifteen hundre persons at a shilling (or 25 cts.) per head, to celebrate the finding of the jury in acquitting of express intention. In the course of her speech at this gathering, Mrs. Besant made a point of the Lord Chief-Justice being at heart in their favor, and referred to a letter written to her by one of the jury, to the effect that he did not concur in the verdict as announced (N. B. there was no poll demanded). Mr. Bradlaugh proclaimed in another speech, that the sale of the books would continue, and a large number were actually sold about the hall during the meeting. These facts having been promoted to the court by affidavit, it is evident from the report (p. 317) that Sir John Cockburn was nettled, and he declared that the law had been set at defiance by the defendants, and the case must now be dealt with as a grave and aggravated one. The sentence imposed was (as in the case of Col. Valentine Baker) six months imprisonment without labor, and a fine of $200, with additional recognizances of peace, etc. Mr. Bradlaugh asked: "Would your lordship entertain an application to stay execution of sentence?" The Chief-Justice promptly said: "Certainly not." But being, it is to be presumed, asided by his associates, he as quietly added: 'On consideration, if you will pledge yourselves not to circulate until the decision of the Court of Appeal, we will." This course was adopted, and it is understood that the appeal will be argued in November by Mrs. Besant. Certainly the advocates of women's rights have in this trial a formidable precedent. The lady not only successfully contended against the maxim respecting the fool-client, but appears to have made no mistake beyond omitting the demand of a poll