« AnteriorContinuar »
from the jury. All which, of course, abundantly | tion of loan for benefit of estate.-Defendant, a married shows her fitness to plead the causes of others in like woman, owning real estate, borrowed money upon her case offending. But the whole report is valuable for promissory notes for the avowed purpose of paying its discussions upon the subject of obscene publica interest due upon mortgages upon such real estate. tions, which is now occupying the time of several Held, a contract for the benefit of her separate estate, courts in our own State, and the profession may await and that the subsequent application by her of the with additional interest the more deliberate judgment, proceeds to another purpose, would not affect the and, perhaps, opinion which next winter will be pro lender's rigbt of action. Yale v. Dederer, 22 N. Y. nounced, and which we shall duly chronicle.
406. The case of Hough v. Jones, 32 Pa. St. 432, is not
authority here. Judgment below affirmed. McVey COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT.
v. Cantrell. Opinion by Rapallo, J.
[Decided Sept. 18, 1877. Reported below, 6 Hun, 528.] ACTION. Promise to pay debt of another: stranger to considera
NEW YORK CITY. tion: when agreement does not run with land.- De Assessment for local improvements : valid and void fendant, for a consideration moving from one Parr, assessments.-A plot containing thirty-six lots was asthe owner of lands, orally agreed to pay certain mort sessed in 1856 at $10,250. Of this plot petitioner owned gages upon the lands held by a savings bank. Subse seyenteen lots. Assessments upon the seventeen lots quently Parr conveyed the lands to plaintiff with a for improvements were confirmed in the years 1869, covenant of warranty. Held, that plaintiff was a 1870, 1872 and 1874. The assessments were in 1869, 1872 stranger to the consideration for the promise of de and 1874 less than one-half the proportionate value of fendant, and could not enforce it against him. Under the seventeen lots, estimated upon the basis of the the agreement the bank could enforce the defendant's assessment of 1856. In 1870 the assessment was greater promise (Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268; Burrows v. than one-half such value. The General Term upheld Bass, 24 id. 178), and Parr also could enforce it upon the assesments, except that for 1870, which it held erpayment to the bank, and perhaps before. This right roneous, and reduced it to $2,710.50. There was nothcould not pass to plaintiff by conveyance as annexed
| ing in the case to indicate accurately what the assessto the land. Judgment below affirmed. Miller v. ment for 1870 should be. Held, that the General Term Winchell. Opinion by Andrews, J.
was right in upholding the assessments for 1869, 1872 [Decided Sept. 18, 1877.]
and 1874 (In re Methodist Episcopal Church, 66 N. Y., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
distinguished), but wrong in fixing the amount of as
sessment for 1870. If that assessment was erroneous, 1. Street railways in cities : constitutional amend
and the case did not show the amount to which it ments, 1875: New York Elevated Railway: Laws 1875, chap. 606, S 36.-The constitutional provisions which
should be reduced, it should be set aside. (In re went into effect January 1, 1875, forbidding the legis
Crane, 16 Alb. L. J. 118.) Judgment below affirmed
in part, and reversed in part. Matter of Petition of lature to pass a private or local bill granting to a corporation, association or individual the right to lay
Hebrew Benevolent Orphan Asylum Society. Opinion
by Rapallo, J. down railroad tracks, or granting to any corporation, association or individual any exclusive privilege, im
[Decided September 18, 1877.] munity or franchise, and requiring the legislature to
RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR. pass general laws in these cases, and forbidding it When rule does not apply : independent agent: New from passing any law authorizing the construction or York city : act by servant of board of public instruction. operation of a street railroad without the consent of The rule of respondeat superior does not exist when property owners, etc. Held, not to be violated by the power does not exist in the employer to select his Laws 1875, chapter 606, section 36, making provision servants, to discharge them if careless, unskillful or for the construction of an elevated street railway in incompetent, or control them while in his employ. New York city. Order below affirmed. Matter of (Blake v. Ferris, 5 N. Y. 48; Peck v. Mayor, 8 id. 222; Gilbert Elevated R. R. Co. Opinion by Church, C. J. Kelly v. Mayor, 11 id. 432.) Accordingly, where, as in
2. Vested right not affected by constitutional amend- New York city, a board of public instruction, although ments. Where, at the time the constitutional provis- a branoh of a municipal government, has complete ions went into effect, a corporation had the right control of all its employees and servants, and the muunder its charter to lay a railroad track in the streetsnicipal government has no control over the appointof a city, such right was not affected by the provisions ment, management, and discharge of such employees, meutioned, nor were legislative enactments passed in the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply be1875, and accepted by the corporation, changing the | tween the inunicipal government and such employees, method of constructing such track, obnoxious to such and the city is not responsible for the acts of such provisions. Ib.
employees. (Ferry v. Mayor, 8 Bosw. 504; Treadwell v. 3. Statute not declared unconstitutional in doubtful Mayor, 1 Daly, 123; Gildersleeve v. Board of Educucases.-An adverse doubtful construction is not suffi- tion, 17 Abb. 201; Coulter v. Same, 63 N. Y. 365; 2 cient to condemn an act. It is only in cases of clear Dillon on Mun. Corp., $ 772; Maximillian v. Mayor, 62 and substantial departure from the provisions of the | N. Y. 162.) Judgment below affirmed. Ham v. Mayor fundamental law, that the courts will declare acts of of New York. Opinion by Miller, J. the legislature invalid. People ex rel. Bolton v. Albert- [Decided Sept. 18, 1877.] son, 55 N. Y. 54; People ex rel., etc. v. Briggs, 50 id.
SURETYSHIP. 553; People v. Supervisors of Orange, 17 id. 235; Adams
Surety on official bond of tax collector: defalcation v. Howe, 14 Mass. 345. Ib.
made up by extra tax. Where there is a defalcation by a [Decided September 18, 1877.)
local tax collector, and for the purpose of meeting the MARRIED WOMAN.
deficiency caused by such defalcation the imposition Contract for benefit of separate estate: misappropria- | of a new tax is ordered, such action will not relieve
the sureties upon the collector's bond from making facts for himself, should give his opinion on a hypogood the amount of the defalcation. Judgment below thetical case similar to that before the jury, and not affirined. Oakley v. Mayor of New York. Opinion by on the actual case as if he were a juror instead of a Earl, J.
witness. Sup. Ct., Georgia, August 28, 1877. Griggs [Decided Sept. 18, 1877.]
v. State. SURROGATE.
Exempt property: musical instrument of musician.1. Costs in Surrogates' Courts : allowances may be made Plaintiff was a tinner by trade and also a musician, to all parties appearing.–Under the provisions of the playing for hire when he had opportunity. In an acstatutes regulating the award of costs and allowances tion for the value of a cornet, seized on attachment in Surrogates' Courts (2 R. S. 223, $ 10, Laws 1870, chap. against plaintiff by defendant, a deputy sheriff, held, 359, $ 9, Code of Procedure, ss 308, 309), the surrogate | that an instruction that if plaintiff, though a tinner is not limited to an allowance to the party technically
by trade and working principally at that trade, earned successful, but may give it to any and all parties or their money as a musician with his cornet, that was a sepcounsel deemed to be equitably entitled thereto. De arate business and trade, and such cornet was one of cision of General Term overruled, but order affirmed his tools in trade and would be exempt from attachon another ground. Noyes v. Children's Aid Society. ment, provided the cornet, together with his tinner's Opinion by Folger, J.
tools, did not exceed $100, was correct. Sup. Jud. Ct., 2. Review of decree of surrogate by General Term:
Massachusetts, Sept. 19, 1877. Baker v. Willis. discretionary order not appealable to the court.-A de
Federal criminal law: obstructing the mails.--The cree of a surrogate granting allowances is the subject |
act of Congress which makes it criminal to obstruct of appeal to the General Term on the merits (Lain v.
or retard the passage of the mail, applies where the Lain, 10 Paige, 191; Wilcox v. Smith, 26 Barb. 316), and
mail is carried by rail in a passenger train which is may be reviewed by that court and if without justifi
unlawfully stopped by persons who are willing to percation on the facts and circumstances of the case, re
mit the passage of the mail car detached from the versed entirely or modified and reduced, and an order
pasenger cars of the train. Words used by such perthereon resting in the discretion of that court cannot
sons may be acts of obstruction when they constitute be reversed in this court. Order affirmed. Ib.
part of the wrongful business in question. U. S. Dist. [Decided Sept. 25, 1877.]
Ct., E. D. Pemusylvania, August 27, 1877. United
States v. Clark.
Indorsement : extension of time to principal debtor : Action against executor: old Code, section 399.- The
release of indorser.-When a sum of money has been provision of section 399 of the old Code which prohibits
received under a contract, as a consideration in exall parties to actions from testifying to personal trans
tension of time of payment, without the consent of actions with a deceased person against his executor,
the indorser, he can make the defense, notwithstandetc., makes no distinction between cases where parties
ing the contract could not have been enforced under the are called as witnesses in their own behalf and in be
statute. Sup. Ct., California, July, 1877. Smith v. half of a co-defendant, in cases where they are jointly
Pearson (San Franc. L. Jour.). and severally liable. Judgment below affirmed. Al
Insurance : waiver of condition of policy: condition exander v. Dutcher. Opinion by Rapallo, J.
that waiver must be indorsed on the policy: effect of [Decided Sept. 18, 1877. Reported below, 7 Hun, 439.)
parol waiver: principal and agent: agent's knowledge :
how fur principal affected.-A condition contained in NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS.
an insurance policy, that no officer could waive the Agency: liability of principal: fraud : public policy. performance of a condition except by indorsement on -A principal is not bound by a contract made in his the policy, will not prevent a general officer of the name by a sub-agent appointed without authority, company from waiving a condition by parol, and even where it is precisely the contract which his agent | the question is one of fact for the jury. By the is employed to make; but public policy requires that | terms of an insurance policy “no agent or other perthe principal be held responsible for the torts of a sub- son, excepting one of the general officers of the comagent appointed without authority. If a fraud ispany (and then only by indorsement hereon made and committed through the neglect of an agent to employ signed by said officer) is authorized to waive, change, reasonable precautionary measures to prevent it, or alter, or amend any condition or provision of this through any improper or wrongful act whilst in the policy.” The secretary having requested the plaintiff's master's business, the principal will be responsible. adjuster to delay making out proofs of loss, pending Where a trust is put in one person, and another whose estimates for rebuilding, thereby leading the insured interest is intrusted to him is damnified by reason of to believe that proofs of loss would not be required the neglect of such as that person employs in the dis within the time specified in the conditions, held, charge of that trust, he shall answer for it to the party that it was a question of fact for the jury whether damnified. Sup. Ct., California, July, 1877. Bank of there was a waiver or not. The terms of a policy California v. W. U. Tel. Co. (San Franc. L. Jour.). stipulated that “if any incumbrance exists on the
Criminal evidence : meaning of motions of a wounded insured property at the date of this policy * * * man: expert testimony.-What a witness understood, and the insured shall fail to notify the secretary of to be meant by certain motions of a wounded man, this company thereof in writing * * * this oommade while the latter was speechless and on the verge pany shall not be liable for loss or damage under this of unconsciousness, is not competent evidence, where policy." An undisclosed mortgage existed at the the question assumes that something was meant, and time of issuing the policy; subsequently, through the where the understanding of the witness is sought same agents, the mortgagee's interest was insured without either calling for his reasous or showing him under another policy, and eight months after a respecially qualified to interpret the motions referred newal certificate of the first policy was issued. Both to. A scientific expert, who has observed none of the l policies were signed by the president and secretary of the company, and countersigned by the agents. Held, precedent.--An action was brought on the following that the above facts, if not conclusive, were yet suffi- note: “Scholarship note. $25.00. No. 118. Columcient to warrant the jury in finding that the defend- | bus City, Iowa, Feb. 10, 1858. For value received I ant had knowledge of the incumbrance. Sup. Ct., promise to pay in five equal installments, the first of Pennsylvania, Jan. 12, 1877. State Ins. Co. v. Todd which shall be due the first day of January, 1869, to (Week. Not. Cas.).
the treasurer of Oskaloosa College or order, at OskaMortgage to secure coupon bond: sheril's sale: dis loosa, Iowa, tbe sum of twenty-five dollars, with intribution of proceeds: holder of bond informally trans terest at the rate of ten per cent per aunum till paid, ferred to him.-Holders of bonds, the whole series of payable annually on the first day of January, it being which are secured by a mortgage, share pro rata in the for the purpose of endowing the Bible Department in distribution of the proceeds from the sale of the mort said college. A. D. HICKOCK." The following ingaged property, and this, notwithstanding an infor dorsement appears on the note: “The giver of this mality in the manner in which the holders acquired the note, if he desires, may use the principal after due, by bonds, if they were really entitled to them. A issued paying the interest annually. N. E. CAREY, Agent." two hundred coupon bonds, each of $500, the payment Held, (1) The indorsement is a part of the original of each and all of which was secured by a mortgage contract, and may be so regarded in construing the upon certain property. By the terms of the bonds instrument. (2) The indorsement permits defendant any holder by indorsement to that effect, could render to use the principal after due — to retain it upon the them not transferable without subsequent indorse- | | terms expressed. The plaintiff did not wholly surrenment by them. A indorsed all the bonds to himselfder its right to the principal, but that defendant could or assigns, and subsequently by further indorsement withhold it, which could be done only by the payment made two of the bonds payable to B. The remainder of the interest annually. Where the interest is not of the bonds he delivered to C without any further paid according to the terms of the note, the principal indorsement, as collateral security for a pre-existing becomes due. It is no excuse for the non-performance indebtedness and for future advances. The mort- of an obligation that the obligee claimed more of the gaged property having been sold at sheriff's sale, under defendant than he had a right to do. Although the a prior incumbrance, and the fund being insufficient defendant paid the note before suit was commenced, to pay all the bonds, B claimed the payment of his yet by his failure to pay the interest annually the note bonds in full out of the proceeds belonging to the matured according to its terms, and its indorsement mortgage. Held (affirming the judgment of the court became inoperative. The acceptance of interest was below), that B was not entitled to payment in full, but the acceptance of partial payment only. The note should share pro rata with C in the distribution of the having matured, the defendant was entitled to no furfund. Sup. Ct., Pennsylvania, May 21, 1877. Hodge's ther extension of time. Sup. Ct., Iowa, June, 1877. Appeal (Week. Not. Cas.).
Oskaloosa College v. Hickock. Negligence : crossing railway track : contributory neg Pledge: rights of pledgee of commercial paper.-The ligence.- In an action to recover for the negligent pledge of commercial paper as collateral security for killing of plaintiff's husband, the evidence tended to the payment of a debt does not, in the absence of show the following facts: The deceased was struck special power for that purpose, authorize the party to and killed while attempting to cross defendant's rail whom such paper is so pledged to sell the same upon road in a frequented path leading across the tracks; I default of payment thereof at public or private sale. the day was clear, and the engine might have been Sup. Ct., Illinois, June 22, 1877. Joliet I. & S. Co. v. seen for at least fifty yards from the point where the Sciolo F. & B. Co. casualty occurred. The bell on the engine was not Statute of limitations : revival of debt.-A promise to rung, but the bell of another engine standing in the pay “all I owe you" is not sufficient to revive a debt yard near by was being rung at the time, which might | barred by the statute of limitations, in that it does have misled the deceased if he had trusted to hearing not fix the amount of the balance due, either directly alone; he could not have been seen after he passed or by reference to something by which the amount can upon the tracks in order to stop the train. Held, that be definitely ascertained. Sup. Ct., Pennsylvania, although the defendant's employees were guilty of | Jan. 26, 1877. Miller v. Bashore. negligence in not sounding the bell on the engine United States Marshal: suit against deputy marshal which caused the injury, yet a verdict for the plaintiff for breach of official duty.-There is no statute of the was erroneous, on the ground of the negligence of the United States, that we have been able to find, which deceased in attempting to cross the tracks when he authorizes a deputy United States Marshal to be sued saw or might have seen the approaching engine. One for breach of official duty. The liability of the marwho is about to cross a railroad track must look as shal to be sued for a breach of official duty occasioned well as listen; he must be vigilant and watchful, and by himself or deputy, is the same as that of a sheriff the failure to exercise such vigilance is negligence per by the common law. Sup. Ct., Georgia, Sept. 4, 1877. se. Sup. Ct., Missouri, April, 1877. Harlan v. St. Elyea v. Williamson. Louis, K. C. & N. Ry. Co. (Cent. Law Jour.).
Usury: new parties: novation : rescission.-Where Negotiable instrument: accommodation indorser: the original contract was usurious, and there was a fraud.-As against the holder of a note as collateral novation by a new party being introduced into it one security for a pre-existing debt, it is competent for an year, and such new party then is released by consent accommodation indorser to set up that he indorsed it of all the others, and the old contract is renewed by upon the fraudulent representation of the maker as the two original parties without any purgation of the to his solvency; and further, that he indorsed it in usury, held, that the novation itself having been blank at the instance of said maker, who subsequently | rescinded by the parties in interest, the renewal of the filled it up for a larger sum than represented. Sup. | old usurious contract without purging it of the usury, Ct., Pennsylvania, Feb. 12, 1877. Cummings v. Boyd. left it affected still with the taint, and the law still apNegotiuble instrumenti conditional note: condition | plied the payment, both prior to, and after the rescission, to the principal and legal interest alone. Sup. | rier, while in his possession and before delivery to the Ct., Georgia, Aug. 28, 1877. Archer v. Underwood. | next carrier. Held, that such intermediate carrier
Usury: sale of gold.-Where a loan of a certain undertakes not only to carry but to forward, and, as a amount in gold was made, but the borrower executed common carrier, he is liable for loss at the end of his his note therefor for a considerable larger sum than route before the goods are delivered to the next carthe equivalent value of the gold in currency, held, that rier, unless he is exempted from such loss by the terms the contract was an usurious one, notwithstanding the of his contract. Erie Railway Co. v. Lockwood. claim by the lender, that the amount in excess of the 5. Stipulations relieving carrier from liability.- Alvalue of the gold was not intended for interest, but was though the contract of affreightment contains a clause simply the rate at which he held the gold. The inten- | relieving the carrier from loss by fire, he is not thereby tion of the parties must be considered in determining exempted from the use of proper care for the safety whether or not a contract is usurious, and this can be of the goods while in his possession to be forwarded. established more safely from the circumstances attend- It is his duty to keep them while in his hands awaiting the transacting, than from its form or the direct ing reshipment, in a safe and proper place, and the testimony of the parties. Sup. Ct., Iowa, March, burden of proof is on him to show that he has done 1877. Austin v. Walker, Cent. L. J.
so, although the fire originated without his fault, in Will: construction of: qualification of fee.—Testator adjacent property over which he had no control, and first devises to A, his heirs and assigns. Then by a although he made all reasonable efforts after it origproviso in case of the devisee's death without children inated to prevent it from extending to the goods deor will, then to his next of kin who are lineally de stroyed. Ib. scended from testator's father. Held, to be no quali 1 6. Damages : rule as to.-Where the carrier is liable fication of his fee; being merely an attempt to regu for such loss, the owner is entitled to full compensalate the descent when cast, and there being no limita tion for the breach of the contract to carry and fortion over in default of children, no design was ward, and it is not error in the court to refuse to lay evinced to create an executory devise or a conditional dowu a rule of damages, which may not give him such fee. Sup. Ct., Pennsylvania, March 30, 1877. Edwards compensation, uor unless it appears from the record v. Barnard.
that the failure to so charge was prejudicial to him.
Antenuptial contract designed to bar dower right.-
Where an antenuptial contract, intended to operate as CARRIER OF GOODS.
an equitable jointure, and to bar all rights of dower, 1. Carrier may limit liability.-A common carrier
is entered into by parties of mature age, capable of may limit his common-law liability for losses happen
judging in regard to their interests, without any fraud ing to the goods without fault or vegligence on his
or imposition, and is reasonable in its terms, and has part by a special agreement fairly made by the parties.
been in good faith carried into effect by the husband Gaines v. Union Transp. and Ins. Co.
during his life, full effect should be given to it, ac2. Assent of shipper to contract limiting liability nec
cording to the intention of the parties. In giving essary.-When a carrier claims exemption from such
construction to a contract, the intention of the parliability, under a bill of lading not signed by the owner
ties will govern; and words which, in their strict or consignor of the goods, he must aver and prove
legal import, are at variance with that intention, will that such bill was assented to by the shipper. Whether
be rejected, or construed so as to comport therewith. such assent has been given, so as to make the bill of
Mintier v. Mintier. lading binding on the shipper is a fact to be proved,
NEGLIGENCE. and cannot be implied or presumed contrary to the
1. Negligence of third person not chargeable on defacts when the acts of the shipper do not operate as
fendant.-- In an action against a railroad company to
recover damages caused to third persons by a train in an estoppel. Ib. 3. Carrier cannot contract against his own negligence.
motion, no recovery can be had unless the agents and - Where the action against the carrier is to recover on
servants of the company were guilty of negligence, his common-law liability for losses occurring at the
which occasioned the injury. C., C., C. and Ind. Rail
way Co. v. Elliott. point of delivery after the transit is ended, but before notice of delivery to the consiguee, and the defendant
2. Railway train : omission to give usual signals.claims exemption from such loss by virtue of a condi
The omission to ring the bell or sound the whistle at tion of the bill of lading to that effect, he must aver
public crossings is not of itself sufficient ground to and prove, not only that this condition was assented
authorize a recovery, if the party, notwithstanding to, but that the loss happened without any fault or
such omission, might, by the exercise of ordinary care, neglect on his part, and the failure to establish such
have avoided the accident. Ib.
3. Contributory negligence.-What is such contribuassent or show due and proper care to prevent the loss
tory negligence as will defeat a recovery is usually a entitles the plaintiff to recover. Ib. 4. Goods shipped over connecting lines: what receiv
question of mixed law and fact, to be determined by
the jury from all the circumstances of the case and ing carrier undertakes.--Where goods are shipped under a contract with a common carrier, to be carried
under proper instructions from the court; but where over several indepeudent but connecting lines to their
the undisputed facts show that by the exercise of ordidestination, at an agreed through rate, each carrier to
nary care a party might have avoided injury, he canreceive and carry to the end of his route, and there
not recover. Ib. forward by the next connecting line, and they are lost
4. Duty of traveler approaching railroad.— It is the at the terminus of the route of an intermediate car
duty of a traveler upon the highway, when approach
ing a railroad crossing, to make use of his senses to * From advance sheets of 28 Ohio State Reports. | ascertain if there is a train in the vicinity; and if, when in full possession of his faculties, he fails to see according to the author, it ought to be. It is a very or hear any thing, when a prudent man, exercising his entertaining and instructive volume and ought to be eyes and ears, with ordinary care, would have discov read by every one who takes an interest in the matters ered a train in close proximity, and he is thereby in upon which it touches. We do not suppose that all of jured, he is guilty of such negligence as will prevent those who read will agree with the conclusions arrived a recovery. Ib.
at: in fact, as in political economy and all sciences in
progress of development, there is here a wide opporBOOK NOTICES.
tunity for reasoners who start from the same point
and have the same facts to deal with, to differ. The STEPHEN'S DIGEST OF THE CRIMINAL LAW.
abstract rules governing right and wrong are perhaps A Digest of the Criminal Laco (Crimes and Punishments).
| plain and certain, but the practical application of these By Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, K. C. S. I. Q. C. St. Louis: Soule, Thomas & Wentworth, 1877.
rules give rise to doubts and disputes and even their VFR. STEPHEN has done a vast service not only to the
theoretical application occasions discussion. There is, MI profession and to the law makers, but to the world
however, a tendency in modern times to harmony of at large, in preparing his digest of the law of England
thought in respect to these subjects, and though upon the subjects of evidence and of criminal law.
writers do not yet agree they are not so acrimonious in We took occasion, when reviewing the book on evi
their controversies as they used to be. This volume, dence, to give some specimens of his style, which has
after a chapter devoted to the social sciences, as a the merit of bei:g clear, concise and certain. He uses
whole, treats of the relations first of ethics and then the English language of the best writers and speakers
of political economy to jurisprudence. Next comes a to express his meaning, and thus clothes the law in a
chapter wherein jurisprudence generally is discussed, garment that makes it attractive. The statutes, both
the distinction between it and ethics pointed out and in England and America, are written in a senseless
its limits defined; the various definitions given and jargon, that renders them unreadable, and sometimes
historically considered; the province of government incomprehensible, and even the most important and
reviewed and its duties explained and a consideration carefully drawn ones are of doubtful meaning until
had of the topics of taxation, education and codificaexplained by the courts. To show how excellent is the
tion. The closing chapter contains an historical remethod of expression adopted by Mr. Stephen, and
view of the subject which is a valuable resume of what how well his work is done, we will take his definition
has taken place in the direction of law reform up to of murder:
the present time. Altogether the work constitutes a “Murder is unlawful homicide with malice afore
very valuable contribution to the department of social thought” (art. 223).
science upon which it treats. This is certainly a brief description of one of the
DAHLGREN ON MARITIME LAW. most terrible crimes. But every term in the sentence, Maritime or International Law. By John A. Dahlgren, late and, indeed, every word needs a definition, and the
Rear Admiral United States Navy. Edited by Charles definitions are given, all of them, as briefly as possible.
Cowley of the Massachusetts Bar, formerly Judge Ad
vocate on the staff of the author. Boston: B. B. RusIn the same section malice aforethought is defined, sell, 1877. and in the preceding section unlawful homicide. But This work was the last effort of the pen of its author, unlawful homicide is but one kind of homicide, and a and is composed of notes upon the subject of which it definition of homicide is also given as follows:
treats, hastily thrown together while he was in com* Homicide is the killing of a human being by a mand of the South Pacitio Squadron, and during a humau being" (art. 218). Aud in article 219 the word prolonged stay off Callao, Peru. These notes were “killing" is defined.
left in an incomplete state, but they have furnished In fact no word or expression upon whose meaning the basis for a very excellent practical treatise upon the nature of the crime depends, is left unexplained. those parts of iuternational law that naval officers Each of the articles stating a principle, or giving a have to do with. The work of the editor, who has defiuition requiring such explanation, are illustrated given the treatise its finishing touches, is thoroughly by examples. Thus:
well done, and we know of no volume in which the "Article 36. Innocent agent. Whoever commits a topics mentioned are more carefully considered. These crime by an innocent agent, is a principal in the first topics are: Law of Blockade; Contraband of War; degree." Illustrations: (1) “A tells B, a child under Visitation and Search; Duties of Naval Commanders seven, to bring him money belonging to C. B does so. on Foreign Stations. The book, which is in pamphlet A is a principal in the first degree. (2) A, knowing a form and contains 147 pages, has also a biographical note to be forged, asks B, who does not know it to be sketch of the author, by his widow, and addenda by forged, to get it changed for him. B does so, and gives the editor. It ought to be read by all who are interA the money. A is a principal in the first degree.” ested in the subject treated upon.
These brief extracts show the character of the work, which ought to be in the hands of every criminal law
COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS. yer in the land. The edition before us is a reprint, and is elegantly printed and bound.
THE following decisions were handed down in the
1 New York Court of Appeals on Tuesday, Sept. HERON ON JURISPRUDENCE.
25, 1877: Jurisprudence and its Relation to the Social Sciences. By Judgment affirmed, with costs — Wines v. The
Denis Caulfeld Heron, Q.C., Member of Parliament for | Mayor; The People ex rel. Kingsland v. Clark; Morthe County of Tipperary. San Francisco: Sumner, Whitney & Company New York: Hurd & Houghton, gan v. Smith; Pomeroy v. Tanner; Blanchard v. 1877.
Blanchard; Weed v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co.; This work treats upon jurisprudence as one of the Hull v. Donington; Donington v. Hull.— Order afdepartments of social science, and consequently dis firmed, with costs — Noyes v. Children's Aid Society ousses what we call the law uot alone as it is but as, I of New York City; Standard Sugar Refinery v. Day