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citizenship, if there can be such a thing. From the language here employed the court may properly infer that as persons the plaintiffs in error were not citizens of New York. For all that appears they may have been citizens of New Jersey, as was the defendant. Holding, as we do, that a State court is not bound to surrender its jurisdiction upon a petition for removal until at least a petition is filed which upon its face shows the right of the petitioner to the transfer, it was not error for the court to retain these causes. need not, therefore, consider whether the act of 1867 limits the right of removal to the citizenship of the parties at the time of the commencement of the suit, or whether the State court had the right to call upon the defendants in error to show cause against the application.

We

The judgment of the Court of Appeals in each of these cases is affirmed.

JURISDICTION OF STATE COURTS AS TO MORTGAGE MADE BY BANKRUPT.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES - OCTOBER TERM, 1877.

MCHENRY et al., plaintiffs in error, v. LA SOCIETE FRANCAISE.

The creditor of a bankrupt whose debt was secured by mortgage proved the same against the estate. Held, that the jurisdiction of the State courts for the purpose of foreclosing the mortgage was not, as to the bankrupt and his wife, divested by the bankruptcy proceedings, but the creditor might foreclose in such courts with the leave of the bankruptcy court and the consent of the assignee.

N error to the Supreme Court of the State of California. The action was brought by La Societe Francaise, D'Epargnes et de Prevoyance Mutuelle against John McHenry and wife, and others. The necessary facts appear in the opinion. The judgment below was in favor of plaintiff.

against the estate. This, under section 20 of the bankrupt law (14 Stat. 526; Rev. Stat., § 5075), admitted the complainant as a creditor of the general estate only for the balance of the debt after deducting the value of the mortgaged property, to be ascertained by agreement, sale, or in such other manner as the bankrupt court might direct. The assignee is not required to take measures for the sale of mortgaged property unless its value is greater than the incumbrance. His duties relate chiefly to unsecured creditors, and he need not trouble himself about incumbered property, unless something may be realized out of it on their account, or unless it becomes necessary to do so in order to ascertain the rights of the secured creditor in the general estate. If he does, and it becomes necessary to adjust the liens before his sale, he may, under the ruling in Claflin v. Houseman, institute the necessary proceedings for that purpose in the courts of the United States, or of the State, as he chooses. If he does not, and the secured creditor wishes to make his security available, the creditor must act, and, having obtained leave of the bankrupt court to bring his action for that purpose, he may proceed in the State court, if the assignee does not object, or in the courts oj the United States, at his election. Here the necessary leave to sue was obtained before the decree was rendered, and the assignee, instead of objecting to the jurisdiction of the State court, consented to that mode of proceeding. The bankrupt and his wife alone objected, but as to them, as we held in Eyster v. Gaff, the jurisdiction of the State court was not divested by the proceedings in bankruptcy. The judgment is affirmed.

RECENT BANKRUPTCY DECISIONS.

BANK DEPOSITS.

One bank acting as agent of another: preference. — Where an arrangement is entered into between two banks, by which one is to act as agent of the other for

Mr. Chief Justice WAITE delivered the opinion of clearing-house purposes, and the latter deposits funds the court.

In Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130, we decided that under the law as it stood previous to the adoption of the Revised Statutes, the courts of the United States did not have exclusive jurisdiction of suits for the settlement of conflicting claims to property belonging to the estate of a bankrupt, and that an assignee in bankruptcy might sue in a State court to collect the assets. In Mays v. Fritton, 20 Wall. 414, we also held that if an assignee in bankruptcy submitted himself to the jurisdiction of a State court in a suit affecting the estate which was pending when the proceedings in bankruptcy were commenced, he was bound by any judgment that might be rendered. And in Eyster v. Gaff, 91 U. S. 525, Mr. Justice Miller, speaking for the court, said: "The debtor of a bankrupt, or the man who contests the right to real or personal property with him, loses none of his rights by the bankruptcy of his adversary. The same courts remain open to him in such contests, and the statute has not divested those courts of jurisdiction in such actions If it has for certain classes of actions conferred jurisdiction for the benefit of the assignee in the Circuit and District Courts of the United States, it is concurrent and does not divest that of the State courts."

The principles upon which those cases rest are decisive of this. The complainant, having a debt against

with the former sufficient to meet checks drawn upon the latter, the relation of creditor and debtor is created, and such deposits, upon a failure of the former bank, will pass to its assignee. Where the latter bank has knowledge of the insolvency of the former, a repayment of such deposits by the former on the day of its failure is a preference, and may be recovered by the assignee. U. S. Cir. Ct., E. D. Missouri. Phelan v. The Iron Mountain Bank, 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 308.

COMPOSITION.

Acts subsequent to, do not revive debts of bankrupt. Where an insolvent has been legally released from his obligations by a composition with his creditors, the debt of one of such creditors, who accepted the composition on the written condition that none of the other creditors should receive better terms, is not revived by the payment of the insolvent, after such release, of additional sums to other creditors. U. S. Dist. Ct., N. D. Illinois. In re Sturgis, 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 304.

DISCHARGE.

When bankrupt must apply for.-The bankrupt must apply for his discharge before the final report and discharge of the assignee. U. S. Dist. Ct., Indiana. In re Cross, 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 294.

FRAUD.

What necessary to exempt debt from operation of

the bankrupt secured by mortgage, proved the claim | Bankrupt Law.-To exempt a debt from the operation

of a discharge on the ground of fraud, it must be tainted with fraud in its inception. If the contract was fair and honest when made, the benefit of a discharge will not be cut off by any subsequent fraudulent conduct on the part of the debtor in respect to it. Accordingly, where the bankrupt bought the business of another, agreeing to pay his debts and hold him harmless, a discharge will release him, although he has made false representations that he has paid one of such debts. Sup. Ct., Mississippi. Brown v. Broach, 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 296.

JUDGMENT.

When it creates no cloud on title: assignment under State Laws, set aside under Bankrupt Law. - A judgment recovered after the making of a general assignment for the benefit of creditors, without preferences, and valid by the laws of the State where it is made, creates no cloud upon the title to property transferred by the assignment, although such assignment be subsequently set aside upon the application of an assignee in bankruptcy. Until a general assignment for the benefit of creditors has been set aside, the title to property embraced in it remains in the assignee; it does not vest in the assignee in bankruptcy by the mere force of an adjudication and his appointment as assignee. U. S. Dist. Ct., N. D. New York. Belden v. Smith, 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 302.

LIEN.

Of executions subsequent to attachment, not enlarged by bankruptcy proceedings. Subsequent executions create a lien upon all the debtor's property in the sheriff's hands not covered by a prior attachment. Where an attachment is vacated by the commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy, the lien of subsequent executions is not thereby enlarged; the property passes to the assignee free from incumbrance, to the extent of the attachment, and subject to the execution liens as to the excess. U. S. Dist. Ct., Vermont. In re Nelson, 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 312.

MORTGAGE.

Right of mortgagee to timber cut from mortgaged premises after default: expense of keeping property. One who holds a mortgage valid, as against the provisions of the Bankrupt Law, with condition broken before the commencement of the proceedings, has a right as against the assignee to all the bark, wood and timber cut from the premises, whether on them or not. Where such mortgagee has given notice of his claim to the marshal when he seized the property, and to the assignee when he took possession of it and they afterward keep possession, they are to be considered as taking it for him, and the expense of securing it should be borne by him. U. S. Dist. Ct., Vermont. In re Bruce, 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 318.

TRUST.

What bankrupt takes as trustee: apportionment of share.

Where the income of trust moneys is to be paid to the bankrupt during his life, to be applied to the support of himself and wife, and the education and support of thier children, the trust declaring that the principal and income should be inalienable, the bankrupt takes it as sub-trustee, and is bound to apply it to the purposes named, and, therefore, it will not, upon his bankruptcy, pass to the assignee. The court cannot apportion such income and give the assignee an aliquot share. U. S. Dist. Ct., Massachusetts. Durant v. The Hospital Life Ins. Co., 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 324.

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1. Rule as to appraisement of value. The settled rule in this State, that the value of lands taken for railroad purposes is to be fixed as it is at the date of the appraisement by the commissioners, and not as at the date of the location of the line of the road thereon, extends to the appraisement of damages resulting from such taking to the contiguous lands of the same owner. Lyon v. G. B. & Minn. Railway Co.

2. Entry by railway company before condemnation.— Though it would seem that a railroad company must, of necessity, be permitted to go upon lands for the purpose of locating the line of its road, yet if it proceeds to construct its road on the land of another without having acquired the legal right to do so, as by license or condemnation, it is liable in damages as a trespasser, and may be enjoined or ejected. Ib.

3. Present value of land to measure damages.-Where the company has in fact built its road over land of another without authority, and proceedings are afterward taken to condemn the land, the measure of appraisement is the value which the land taken would now have if the road had not been constructed upon it, together with the difference between the present value of the owner's contiguous land with the road, properly constructed, where it is, and what would have been its present value if the road had not been built. Ib.

ESCROW.

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1. Conditions upon which escrow was to be delivered, provable by parol: what does not constitute escrow.— The conditions upon which an escrow was to be delivered to the grantee therein named may rest in and be proved by parol. Where the grantor in the deed retains the right of control over it, notwithstanding its deposit with a third person with instructions to deliver it to the grantee upon his compliance with specified conditions, it is not an escrow. Campbell v. Thomas. 2. When deposit of deed is not in escrow.—. In pursuance of an oral agreement for the sale of land to him by T., C. paid a small part of the purchase-money, and T. executed a deed of the land running to C. (in which the consideration was simply stated to be $3,100), and delivered it to H. with directions to deliver it to C. if the latter should, on the second day thereafter, deposit with H. his two notes for a certain sum, secured by mortgage, and pay to H., for T.'s use, the balance of the price. Within the time limited, C. offered to H. said notes, mortgages and money, but H., by T.'s direction, refused to deliver to C. the deed, and T., at the same time, tendered back to C. the money already paid, and left it with H. for C. upon the latter's refusal to receive it. In an action by C. against T. and H. to compel a delivery of the deed to him, held, that as there was no execution or deposit with H. of the mortgage from C., contemporaneously with the execution and deposit of T.'s deed, and as the latter deed does not contain the whole contract alleged and relied upon by the plaintiff, there was no valid contract, and the deed was not an escrow. Ib.

ESTOPPEL.

When holder of chattel mortgage estopped from setting

* From O. M. Conover, State Reporter, and to appear in 42 Wisconsin Reports.

up same against creditor.-If chattel mortgagees or their agent, knowing that the mortgagors are endeavoring to obtain a loan of money on the property, to pay a bill of freight for which it is held, conceal the existence of the mortgage for the express purpose of enabling the mortgagors to obtain such loan, they are estopped from setting up the mortgage against one who, being ignorant of its existence, and being thus intentionally kept ignorant thereof, advances the money to pay the freight, on the security of the property and on the faith that it is unincumbered. And it is immaterial, in such a case, that the mortgagees or their agent did not know that the mortgagors were applying for a loan to the particular person from whom such loan was obtained. McLean v. Dow.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

Wife cannot compel husband to account.-A wife who permits her husband, without objection, for a long series of years to receive and appropriate to his own use, or to their joint use, the income of her separate estate, cannot compel him to account to her therefor, until such permission is revoked by her, and then only from the time of such revocation. Lyon v. G. B. & Minn. Railway Co.

MARRIED WOMAN.

Conveyance by stranger to married woman: presumption as to consideration. In the statute which declares that a married woman "may receive by inheritance, or by gift, grant, devise or bequest, from any person other than her husband, and hold to her sole and separate use," real and personal property (R. S., ch. 95, § 3), the word grant includes deeds of bargain and sale of land. Where a conveyance is made by a stranger to a married woman, the presumption in the absence of proof is, that the consideration was paid by her, and not by her husband. McVey v. G. B. & Minn. Railway Co.

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1. Constitutional provisions must be complied with, or assessment invalid. That provision of our State Constitution which declares that the rule of taxation shall be uniform, requires a uniform assessment of value; and no tax upon property can be supported which does not proceed upon valid assessment, legally made, upon a uniform rule. Marsh v. Supervisors of Clark Co.

2. Any violation of law defeats tax. - Violations or evasions of duty imposed by law to secure a just and uniform rule of assessment, whether occurring by mistake in law or by fraud in fact, which go to impair the

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The vote for the Hon. John R. Brady, for Judge of the Supreme Court of the First District, cast at the late election, was 123,000, the largest vote ever cast for any man for any office in the city of New York.

The appointment of Mr. Baron Deasy as second Lord Justice of Appeal under the Irish Judicature Act, gives general satisfaction. Baron Deasy had a large practice in equity. It is considered a very liberal act of the government to go outside the range of their own supporters to select a Roman Catholic and a political opponent on the ground of merit solely.

An English newspaper, in speaking of the elevation of Mr. Thesiger to the bench, says: "As far as money is concerned, elevation to the bench is seldom a profitable exchange for an English barrister. And not only has a newly-made judge to content himself with a considerable reduction of income, but the expensive dignity of knighthood exhausts a serious proportion of his first year's emoluments of office. Until recently the heavy fees for passing through the preliminary degree of serjeant-at-law had also to be counted among the costs for accepting judicial honors. In becoming a justice of appeal the Hon. Mr. Thesiger is known to be resigning one of the most lucrative practices ever made at the bar. In his case, however, there exists a precedent for declining to incur the expenses of knighthood, should he feel so inclined. Another peer's son, Mr. Justice Denman, is the single occupant of the English bench whose name is without the generally coveted prefix of "Sir." After his appointment to a judgeship, when he was called upon to receive knighthood, he adroitly pointed out that as the younger son of a peer he already took precedence of all knights bachelors, and argued that it could not be necessary for him to accept a lesser dignity than that which he already possessed. It will be curious to observe whether the son of Lord Chelmsford will adopt a similar view."

The difficulties and privations oftentimes experienced by the frontier judiciary are illustrated by what happened to Mr. Justice Crease of British Columbia, while upon his circuit. He was riding on horseback over a trail in the forest leading to the town where he was to hold court, when his horse stumbled and fell. He was thrown forward on the pummel of the saddle (Mexican) from which he received very serious injury, which it was feared at one time might be fatal. Notwithstanding the intense suffering resulting from the accident the Judge, with a courage that excited the admiration and amazement of all, proceeded to hold court while lying on a stretcher, and although physically so helpless that he could not move a muscle, he went through the business of the court in a manner that showed him in no respect wanting in his wonted mental vigor. Subsequently he was carried to another point; he was carried over a trail a distance of nearly 100 miles, on a stretcher borne by eight Indians. The journey was through a wild and precipitous region. On more than one occasion the stretcher was necessarily in a perpendicular position with the judge's head down hill, and had it not been that he was firmly strapped to the stretcher with strong leathern bands, the judge and his couch would oftentimes on the journey have parted company in a rather unceremonious manner. It is worthy of note that notwithstanding his constant suffering the judge seemed to think more lightly of the dangers of the situation than any other person in the party that accompanied him."

RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS.

COMMON CARRIER.

Special contract excluding liability except for willful misconduct delivery of goods to wrong person.-A railway company having carried goods from one of its stations to another, the station-master at the place to which they were carried, without making inquiries of the consignor, after a delay of a week, delivered the goods to a person of a name very similar to that of the person named as consignee. The contract of carriage was at a reduced tariff conditioned to exclude all liability except for willful misconduct. Held, that the delivery of the goods amounted to willful misconduct. Com. Pleas, May 4, 1877. Hoare v. Great Western Railway Co., 37 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 186.

COVENANT.

Covenant to use building “as and for a private residence only:" charitable institution: injunction: costs of unnecessary affidavits.-In an action to restrain the breach of a covenant not to use any buildings to be erected on a plot of land "otherwise than as and for a private residence only, and not for any purpose of trade," held, that the erection of a large building, capable of accommodating 100 children, for a charitable institution supported by voluntary contributions, was not an infringement of the covenant. Although the action was dismissed with costs, the defendants were ordered to pay the costs of numerous affidavits filed by them, and which had no real application to the question before the court. Ch. Div., July 5, 1877. German v. Chapman, 37 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 265.

DIVORCE.

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on the 31st of December, 1874, wrote to say that, considering the condition of the premises, "the price is out of all reason. We must, therefore, request you to

reconsider the question of price, having regard to the previous observations, and to the fact that the company have already been served with notice to put the premises in repair, and we shall be glad to receive in due course a modified proposal from you." No farther communication on this subject took place till the 19th of April, 1875, when the agent for the company wrote to say that as the negotiations had not resulted in a sale" the company would take in hand the repairs. On the 20th of April, the solicitors for the appellant wrote, declaring that "the negotiations" had been broken off in December last, and that there had been ample time since then to complete the repairs. On the 22d of April,the notice expired, and on the 28th, the ejectment was served. After verdict for the plaintiff and judgment in the court below, held, that the com pany was entitled in equity to be relieved against the forfeiture, for that the letters at the end of November and at the beginning of December had the effect of suspending the notice, and that the suspension did not come to an end till the 31st of December, till which time the operation of the notice was waived, so that no part of that time could be counted against the tenant in a six months' notice to repair. Hughes v. Metropolitan Railway Co., L. R., 2 App. Cas. H. L. (E.) 439.

MASTER AND SERVANT.

Negligence: sub-contractor under railway company: common employment.-The plaintiff, a workman in the employ of a contractor engaged by the defendants, had Status of wife after decree nisi for dissolution of mar- to work in a dark tunnel rendered dangerous by the riage, and before decree absolute. The status of a passing of trains. After he had been working a fortmarried woman is not affected by the pronouncing of night he was injured by a passing train. The jury a decree nisi for the dissolution of the marriage. She found that the defendants, in not adopting any precontinues to be subject to all the disabilities of cover- cautions for the protection of the plaintiff, had been ture until the decree is made absolute. Action for guilty of negligence. Held, by the majority of the taking goods of the plaintiff. Plea, coverture of plain- Court of Appeal (Cockburn, C. J., Mellor and Grove, tiff at the time of the alleged taking and of plea pleaded. JJ.), reversing the decision of the Court of Exchequer, Prior to the alleged taking a decree nisi had been pro- that the plaintiff, having continued in' his employment nounced for the dissolution of the plaintiff's marriage, with full knowledge, could not make the defendants which was made absolute after plea and before the liable for an injury arising from danger to which he trial. Held (reversing the judgment of the Exchequer voluntarily exposed himself. Held, by Mellish and Division), that the plaintiff was still a married woman Baggallay, L. JJ., dissenting, that the plaintiff, as sernotwithstanding the decree nisi, and that the plea was vant to the contractor and not to the defendants, had proved. (Prole v. Soady, L. R., 3 Ch. 220, distin-entered into no contract with the latter which would guished.) Norman v. Villars, L. R., 2 Ex. Div. (C. A.) | modify the ordinary duty of those who carry on a 359

LEASE.

Notice to repair: negotiations for sale: suspension of notice: waiver.- Where a notice to repair has been given, and the lessee makes an offer to sell his interest in the premises, and a negotiation takes place on that offer, the effect of that offer and the negotiation is to suspend the notice till the negotiation has been terminated, from which event alone the date of the notice can properly be calculated. Equity will relieve against an ejectment founded on the original notice. A notice to repair, within six months, houses held on lease by the Metropolitan Railway Company, was given on the 22d of October, 1874, to expire on the 22d of April, 1875. It was answered by a letter of the 28th of November, suggesting that the lessor might like to purchase the premises. The lessor's solicitors, by letter of the 1st of December, asked the price demanded, and were told, by letter on the 30th of December, that it was £3,000. The lessor's solicitors

dangerous business to take reasonable precautions that no one should suffer personal injury from the manner in which it is carried on; and that no such contract should be inferred from the plaintiff remaining in his employment. Woodley v. The Metropolitan District Railway Co., L. R., 2 Ex. D. (C. A.) 384.

NEGLIGENCE.

Act of God: overflow of river by reason of neglect to comply with statute: measure of damages. A river overflowed a wall belonging to the defendants, who were a dock company working under a private act of Parliament, and caused damage to the plaintiffs' property. The plaintiffs contended, that the defendants were bound at common law to keep their wall at a reasonable height, and alleged that they had not done so. The height of the wall was also less than the height specified by the defendants' act of Parliament. The defendants alleged that the wall was high enough to keep out any ordinary tide, and that the damage

was caused by the act of God. They also contended, that, if they were liable for any damage at all, they could not be held responsible for the damage which was caused by the water, which would have come over the wall if it had been at the height at which the plaintiffs alleged they were bound to keep it. Held, that, as the defendants had not kept the wall at the height required by their act of Parliament, they were guilty of negligence, and were therefore liable for the whole of the damages. Ch. Div., July 23, 1877. Nitro-Phosphate and Odam's Chemical Manure Co. v. London and St. Catharine's Docks Co., 37 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 330.

TRADE-MARK.

Partnership making article designated by special name: right of each partner to manufacture article of the dissolution. - M. and H. B. C., trading in copartnership under the name of B. C. & Co., manufactured and sold an article known in the market as Condy's Fluid. They dissolved partnership. H. B. C. then set up the same business on his own account and in his own name. M. also commenced the same business on his own account, but under the name of the Condy's Fluid Company. On bill filed by H. B. C. to restrain M. from trading under the name of the Condy's Fluid Company, and from manufacturing and selling as Condy's Fluid an alleged spurious compound, held, that, as M. had under the partnership articles the right to manufacture and sell Condy's Fluid, he could not be restrained from selling a spurious article as Condy's Fluid, so long as he did not induce the public to believe that the article sold by him was the article manufactured and sold by H. B. C. Ch. Div., June 15, 1877. Mitchell v. Condy, 37 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 268.

BOOK NOTICES.

BENJAMIN ON SALES-SECOND AMERICAN EDITION. A Treatise on the Law of Sale of Personal Property; with References to the American Decisions and to the French Code and Civil Law. Second English Edition. By J. P. Benjamin, Esq., Q. C. of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-law. Second American Edition. By J. C. Perkins, LL. D. New York: Hurd & Houghton, 1877.

THE distinguished success of Mr. Benjamin at the Eng

lish Bar has done much to remove the erroneous impression which has heretofore prevailed among the profession in England in respect to the ability and learning of their American brethren, but the high position he has attained as an advocate and counsel, while shedding lustre upon his reputation and conferring honor upon his country, gives him no greater claim to be considered as a sound and able lawyer than does this treatise, the second American edition of which now lies before us. As soon as the first edition came from the press, which was in 1868, long before Mr. Benjamin had made his name famous as an English barrister, the profession of both England and America accepted it as the leading authority upon the subject about which it treats. The book was prepared upon a plan new to the English Bar in this, that in support of the principles enumerated it did not confine itself to English authority, but adopted as of equal value the determinations of American courts. This course was followed in the second English edition, which was issued in 1873, by the incorporation of a still larger number of American decisions; though, as the citation of all valuable American cases would make too bulky a volume, the author, as a rule, selected only from the decisions of the Federal Supreme Court and

This

those of the Court of Appeals of this State. was sufficient for the purposes of the work in England, but in order to suit it for the use of the bar in this country the American editor has added from other sources such cases as are of importance. In doing this, he has not confined himself to American reports only, but has collected the English decisions since 1873. The work is, therefore, not merely a new American edition, but a substitute for a new English edition. The citations of authority come down to the day of publication, and the book can be safely said to give a full view of the law of sales as it stood on the 1st of November, 1877.

It would be a work of supererogation to recite the contents or give the general features of a work so well known to the profession in its first edition. Suffice it to say, that in this edition the reputation of the first one is fully sustained, not only in the additions made by the author, but in those made by the American editor. The book is printed at the Riverside Press, which indicates not merely excellence but elegance in mechanical execution.

REDFIELD'S REPORTS, VOL. II. Reports of Cases argued and determined in the Surrogate's Courts of the State of New York. By Amasa A. Redfield. Vol. II. New York: Banks & Brothers, 1877. These reports, although confined to cases decided in inferior courts, are probably of as great practical value as any series issued. To lawyers, interested in probate matters, they are indispensable, as in them will be found the solution of many points of difficulty, which never reach the appellate tribunals. Among the cases involving questions of interest, reported in the present volume, we notice these: Norton v. Norton, p. 6. Testator, who had himself written his will, and signed the same, asked witnesses to witness it as his will, but did not sign it in the presence of the witnesses, or acknowledge his signature. Held, a sufficient execution and publication of the will. Edsall v. Waterbury, p. 48. A gift to testator's wife, and by her accepted, in lieu of dower, does not preclude her claim to a share in a surplus of personalty undisposed of by will. Swartwout v. Swartwout, p. 53. Remarriage held to terminate the guardianship of a widow judicially appointed guardian of her own children. Matter of Ward, p. 251. A savings bank deposit by an intestate, in the name of himself and wife entered thus, "Richard or Kate Ward," she never having had possession of the pass-book during his life, is presumptively his property exclusively, and a gift held not established. Booth v. Cornell, p. 261. A legacy to a corporation, the "New York Young Men's Christian Association," had vested in interest, but before the time for vesting in possession arrived, the corporation accepted a new charter, under the name of "The Young Men's Christian Association," etc., which provided that upon its acceptance the former corporation should be dissolved, and all its property vested in the new corporation. Held, that the legacy lapsed by the dissolution of the legatee, and the new corporation could not take. Minor v. Jones, p. 289. A marriage between slaves, contracted in a slave State before the emancipation, with the consent of their masters, and according to the custom of marriage among slaves, held a valid marriage when drawn in question in the courts here. Gillespie v. Brooks, p. 349. A bit of paper affixed with mucilage and stamped upon, held a sufficient common-law seal. Ordish v. McDermott, p. 461

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