Imágenes de páginas

citizenship, if there can be such a thing. From the against the estate. This, under section 20 of the language here employed the court may properly infer | bankrupt law (14 Stat. 526; Rev. Stat., § 5075), that as persons the plaintiffs in error were not citizens admitted the complainant as a creditor of the general of New York. For all that appears they may have estate only for the balance of the debt after deducting been citizens of New Jersey, as was the defendant. the value of the mortgaged property, to be ascertained Holding, as we do, that a State court is not bound to by agreement, sale, or in such other manner as the surrender its jurisdiction upon a petition for removal bankrupt court might direct. The assignee is not until at least a petition is filed which upon its face required to take measures for the sale of mortgaged shows the right of the petitioner to the transfer, it was property unless its value is greater than the incumnot error for the court to retain these causes. We brance. His duties relate chiefly to unsecured creditneed not, therefore, consider whether the act of 1867 ors, and he need not trouble himself about incumbered limits the right of removal to the citizenship of the property, unless something may be realized out of it parties at the time of the commencement of the suit, on their account, or unless it becomes necessary to do or whether the State court had the right to call upon so in order to ascertain the rights of the secured the defendants in error to show cause against the ap creditor in the general estate. If he does, and it beplication.

comes necessary to adjust the liens before his sale, he The judgment of the Court of Appeals in each of may, under the ruling in Claflin v. Houseman, institute these cases is affirmed.

the necessary proceedings for that purpose in the

courts of the United States, or of the State, as he JURISDICTION OF STATE COURTS AS TO

chooses. If he does not, and the secured creditor

wishes to make his security available, the creditor MORTGAGE MADE BY BANKRUPT.

must act, and, having obtained leave of the bankrupt SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES - OCTO

court to bring his action for that purpose, he may proBER TERM, 1877.

ceed in the State court, if the assignee does not object,

or in the courts oj the United States, at his election. McHENRY et al., plaintiffs in error, v. LA SOCIETE

Here the necessary leave to sue was obtained before FRANCAISE.

tho decree was rendered, and the assignee, instead of

objecting to the jurisdiction of the State court, conThe creditor of a bankrupt whose debt was secured by

mortgage proved the same against the estate. Held, sented to that mode of proceeding. The bankrupt that the jurisdiction of the State courts for the purpose and his wife alone objected, but as to them, as we held of foreclosing the mortgage was not, as to the bankrupt and his wife, divested by the bankruptcy proceedings,

in Eyster v. Gaff, the jurisdiction of the State court but the creditor might foreclose in such courts with the was not divested by the proceedings in bankruptcy. leave of the bankruptcy court and the consent of the assignee.

The judgment is affirmed. IN error to the Supreme Court of the State of Cali1 fornia. The action was brought by La Societe

RECENT BANKRUPTCY DECISIONS. Francaise, D'Epargnes et de Prevoyance Mutuelle

BANK DEPOSITS. against John McHenry and wife, and others. The

One bank acting as agent of another: preference. — necessary facts appear in the opinion. The judgment

Where an arrangement is entered into between two below was in favor of plaintiff.

banks, by which one is to act as agent of the other for Mr. Chief Justice WAITE delivered the opinion of clearing-house purposes, and the latter deposits funds the court.

with the former sufficient to meet checks drawn upon In Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, we decided that

the latter, the relation of creditor and debtor is created, under the law as it stood previous to the adoption of and such deposits, upon a failure of the former bank, the Revised Statutes, the courts of the United States

will pass to its assignee. Where the latter bank has did not have exclusive jurisdiction of suits for the

knowledge of the insolvency of the former, a repaysettlement of conflicting claims to property belonging

ment of such deposits by the former on the day of its to the estate of a bankrupt, and that an assignee in

failure is a preference, and may be recovered by the asbankruptcy might sue in a State court to collect the

signee. V. S. Cir. Ct., E. D. Missouri. Phelan y. The assets. In Mays v. Fritton, 20 Wall. 414, we also held

Iron Mountain Bank, 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 308. that if an assignee in bankruptcy submitted himself

COMPOSITION. to the jurisdiction of a State court in a suit affecting Acts subsequent to, do not revive debts of bankthe estate which was pending when the proceedings in rupt. -- Where an insolvent has been legally released bankruptcy were commenced, he was bound by any from his obligations by a composition with his creditjudgment that might be rendered. And in Eyster v. ors, the debt of one of such creditors, who accepted Gaff, 91 U. S. 525, Mr. Justice Miller, speaking for the the composition on the written condition that none of court, said: “The debtor of a bankrupt, or the man the other creditors should receive better terms, is not who contests the right to real or personal property revived by the payment of the insolvent, after such with him, loses none of his rights by the bankruptcy release, of additional sums to other creditors. U.S. of his adversary. The same courts remain open to Dist. Ct., N. D. Illinois. In re Sturgis, 16 Nat. Bankr. him in such contests, and the statute has not divested Reg. 304. those courts of jurisdiction in such actions If it has

DISCHARGE. for certain classes of actions conferred jurisdiction for

When bankrupt must apply for.- The bankrupt must the benefit of the assignee in the Circuit and District

apply for his discharge before the final report and disCourts of the United States, it is concurrent and does

charge of the assignee. U. S. Dist. Ct., Indiana. In not divest that of the State courts."

re Cross, 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 294. The principles upon which those cases rest are decis

FRAUD. ive of this. The complainant, having a debt against what necessary to exempt debt from operation of the bankrupt secured by mortgage, proved the claim | Bankrupt Law.--To exempt a debt from the operation of a discharge on the ground of fraud, it must be

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS. tainted with fraud in its inception. If the contract was fair and honest when made, the benefit of a dis- SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN – OCTOBER AND NO. charge will not be cut off by any subsequent fraudu

VEMBER TERMS, 1877. * lent conduct on the part of the debtor in respect to it.

EMINENT DOMAIN. Accordingly, where the bankrupt bought the business of another, agreeing to pay his debts and hold

1. Rule as to appraisement of ralue. — The settled

rule in this State, that the value of lands taken for him harmless, a discharge will release him, although he has made false representations that he has paid one

railroad purposes is to be fixed as it is at the date of of such debts. Sup. Ct., Mississippi. Brown v. Broach,

the appraisement by the commissioners, and not as at 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 296.

the date of the location of the line of the road thereon,

extends to the appraisement of damages resulting from JUDGMENT.

such taking to the contiguous lands of the same owner. When it creates no cloud on title : assignment under

Lyon v. G. B. & Minn. Railway Co. State Laws, set aside under Bankrupt Law. – A judg

2. Entry by railway company before condemnation.ment recovered after the making of a general assign

Though it would seem that a railroad company must, ment for the benefit of creditors, without preferences,

of necessity, be permitted to go upon lands for the purand valid by the laws of the State where it is made,

pose of locating the line of its road, yet if it proceeds creates no cloud upon the title to property transferred

to construct its road on the land of another without by the assignment, although such assignment be sub

having acquired the legal right to do so, as by license sequently set aside upon the application of an assignee

or condemnation, it is liable in damages as a trespasser, in bankruptcy. Until a general assignment for the bene

and may be enjoined or ejected. Ib. fit of creditors has been set aside, the title to property

3. Present value of land to measure damages.- Where embraced in it remains in the assignee; it does not vest

the company has in fact built its road over land of anin the assignee in bankruptcy by the mere force of an other without authority, and proceedings are afteradjudication and his appointment as assignee. U. S. ward taken to condemn the land, the measure of apDist. Ct., N. D. New York. Belden v. Smith, 16 Nat. praisement is the value which the land taken would Bankr. Reg. 302.

now have if the road had not been constructed upon LIEN.

it, together with the difference between the present Of executions subsequent to attachment, not enlarged

value of the owner's contiguous land with the road, by bankruptcy proceedings. — Subsequent executions

properly constructed, where it is, and what would have create a lien upon all the debtor's property in the

been its present value if the road had not been built. sheriff's hands not covered by a prior attachment. Ib. Where an attachment is vacated by the commence

ESCROW. ment of proceedings in bankruptcy, the lien of subse

1. Conditions upon which escrow was to be delivered, quent executions is not thereby enlarged; the property

provable by parol: what does not constitule escrow. passes to the assignee free from incumbrance, to the

The conditions upon which an esrrow was to be delivextent of the attachment, and subject to the execu

ered to the grantee therein named may rest in and be tion liens as to the excess. U. S. Dist. Ct., Vermont.

proved by parol. Where the grantor in the deed reIn re Nelson, 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 312.

tains the right of control over it, notwithstanding its MORTGAGE.

deposit with a third person with instructions to deliver Right of mortgagee to timber cut from mortgaged it to the grantee upon his compliance with specified premises after default: expense of keeping properly. - conditions, it is not an escrow. Campbell v. Thomas. One who holds a mortgage valid, as against the provi 2. When deposit of deed is not in escrow.- In pursusions of the Bankrupt Law, with condition broken ance of an oral agreement for the sale of land to him before the commencement of the proceedings, has a by T., C. paid a small part of the purchase-money, and right as against the assignee to all the bark, wood and T. executed a deed of the land running to C. (in which timber cut from the premises, whether on them or not. the consideration was simply stated to be $3,100), and Where such mortgagee has given notice of his claim delivered it to H. with directions to deliver it to C. if to the marshal when he seized the property, and to the latter should, ou the second day thereafter, deposit the assignee when he took possession of it and they with H. his two notes for a certain sum, secured by afterward keep possession, they are to be considered mortgage, and pay to H., for T.'s use, the balance of as taking it for him, and the expense of securing it the price. Within the time limited, C. offered to H. should be borne by him. U. 9. Dist. Ct., Vermont. said notes, mortgages and money, but H., by T.'s diIn re Bruce, 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 318.

rection, refused to deliver to C. the deed, and T., at TRUST.

the same time, tendered back to C. the money already What bankrupt takes as trustee: apportionment of

paid, and left it with H. for C. upon the latter's reshare.- Where the income of trust moneys is to be

fusal to receive it. In an action by C. against T. and paid to the bankrupt during his life, to be applied to H. to compel a delivery of the deed to him, held, that the support of himself and wife, and the education

as there was no execution or deposit with H. of the and support of thier children, the trust declaring that mortgage from C., contemporaneously with the executhe principal and income should be inalienable, the tion and deposit of T.'s deed, and as the latter deed bankrupt takes it as sub-trustee, and is bound to apply

does not contain the whole contract alleged and relied it to the purposes named, and, therefore, it will not, upon by the plaintiff, there was no valid contract, and upon his bankruptoy, pass to the assignee. The court the deed was not an escrow. Ib. cannot apportion such income and give the assignee

ESTOPPEL. an aliquot share. U. 8. Dist. Ct., Massachusetts. When holder of chattel mortgage estopped from setting Durant v. The Hospital Life Ins. Co., 16 Nat. Bankr.

* From 0. M. Conover, State Reporter, and to appear in Reg. 324.

42 Wisconsin Reports.

up same against creditor.- If chattel mortgagees or general equality and uniformity of the assessment, their agent, knowing that the mortgagors are endeav- and thereby to defeat the uniform rule of taxation, oring to obtain a loan of money on the property, to pay | vitiate the whole assessment as the foundation of a a bill of freight for which it is held, conceal the exist- valid tax. (Kelley v. Corson, 11 Wis. 1, and Miltimore ence of the mortgage for the express purpose of en- | v. Supervisors, 15 id. 9, as to this point, overruled.) Ib. abling the mortgagors to obtain such loan, they are estopped from setting up the mortgage against one who,

BENCH AND BAR. being ignorant of its existence, and being thus intentionally kept ignorant thereof, advances the money

This was Charles Sumner's opinion, in 1836,

of Chancellor Walworth and Judge Cowen, whom hé to pay the freight, on the security of the property and

met at Saratoga : “ Neither interested me. They were on the faith that it is unincumbered. And it is im mere book mer. Judge Oakley, of New York, whom I material, in such a case, that the mortgagees or their

met, is abler than both.” agent did not know that the mortgagors were applying The vote for the Hon. John R. Brady, for for a loan to the particular person from whom such Judge of the Supreme Court of the First District, cast loan was obtained. McLean v. Dow.

| at the late election, was 123,000, the largest vote ever

cast for any man for any office in the city of New HUSBAND AND WIFE.

York. Wife cannot compel husband to account. -A wife who The appointment of Mr. Baron Deasy as permits her husband, without objection, for a long second Lord Justice of Appeal under the Irish Judicaseries of years to receive and appropriate to his own

ture Act, gives general satisfaction. Baron Deasy had

a large practice in equity. It is considered a very use, or to their joint use, the income of her separate

liberal act of the government to go outside the range estate, cannot compel him to account to her therefor, of their own supporters to select a Roman ('atholic until such permission is revoked by her, and then only and a political opponent on the ground of merit solely. from the time of such revocation. Lyon v. G. B. & An English newspaper, in speaking of the Minn. Railway Co.

elevation of Mr. Thesiger to the bench, says: “As far

as money is concerned, elevation to the bench is seldom MARRIED WOMAN.

a profitable exchange for an English barrister. And Conveyance by stranger to married woman : presump not only has a newly-made judge to content himself

with a considerable reduction of income, but the extion as to consideration.- In the statute which declares

pensive dignity of knighthood exhausts a serious prothat a married woman “may receive by inheritance, portion of his first year's emoluments of office. Until or by gift, grant, devise or bequest, from any person recently the beavy fees for passing through the preother than her husband, and hold to her sole and sep

liminary degree of serjeant-at-law had also to be

counted among the costs for accepting judicial honors. arate use," real and personal property (R. S., ch. 95, § | In becoming a justice of appeal the Hon. Mr. Thesiger 3), the word grant includes deeds of bargain and sale is known to be resigning one of the most lucrative of land. Where a conveyance is made by a stranger

practices ever made at the bar. In his case, however,

there exists a precedent for declining to incur the exto a married woman, the presumption in the absence

penses of knighthood, should he feel so inclined. of proof is, that the consideration was paid by her, Another peer's son, Mr. Justice Denman, is the single and not by her husband. McVey v. G. B. & Minn.

occupant of the English bench whose name is without

the generally coveted pretix of " Sir.” After his apRailway Co.

pointment to a judgeship, when he was called upon to RIPARIAN RIGHTS.

receive knighthood, he adroitly pointed out that as Riparian proprietor does not acquire title to break the younger son of a peer he already took precedence

of all knights bachelors, and argued that it could not water.- A riparian proprietor who has lawfully in

be necessary for him to accept a lesser dignity than truded into the water for the construction of a break

that which he already possessed. It will be curious to water cannot thereby acquire title in fee to land observe whether the son of Lord Chelmsford will occupied by such breakwater beyond his original boun

adopt a similar view." dary; nor can he, in a proceeding for compensation The difficulties and privations oftentimes for the alleged taking of such land, recover for any experienced by the frontier judiciary are illustrated by injury done to the breakwater. Diedrich v. N. W. what happened to Mr. Justice Crease of British CoUnion Ry. Co.

lumbia, while upon his circuit. He was riding on STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

horseback over a trail in the forest leading to the

town where he was to hold court, when his horse Agency of one signing contract may be shown by stumbled and fell. He was thrown forward on parol.- Where one, in signing a simple contract in his

the pummel of the saddle (Mexican) from which he

received very serious injury, which it was feared at own name, acts in fact as agent for a third person,

one time might be fatal. Notwithstanding the intense that fact may be shown by parol, by or against the un suffering resulting from the accident the Judge, wit named principal, even where the agreement is one a courage that excited the admiration and amazement

of all, proceeded to hold court while lying on a which the statute of frauds requires to be in writing.

stretcher, and although physically so helpless that he Weston v. McMillan.

could not move a muscle, he went through the busiTAXATION.

ness of the court in a manner that showed him in no

respect wanting in his wonted mental vigor. Subse1. Constitutional provisions must be complied with, or quently he was carried to another point; he was carassessment invalid.- That provision of our State Cou

ried over a trail a distance of nearly 100 miles, on a

stretcher borne by eight Indians. The journey was stitution which declares that the rule of taxation shall

through a wild and precipitous region. On more than be uniform, requires a uniform assessment of value; one occasion the stretcher was necessarily in a perpenand no tax upon property cau be supported which dves dicular position with the judge's head down hill, and

had it not been that he was firmly strapped to the not proceed upon valid assessment, legally made, upon

stretcher with strong leathern bands, the judge and a uniform rule. Marsh v. Supervisors of Clark Co. his couch would oftentimes on the journey have

2. Any violution of law defeats tax. – Violations or parted company in a rather wuceremonious manner. evasions of duty imposed by law to secure a just and

It is worthy of note that notwithstanding his constant

suffering the judge seemed to think more lightly of uniform rule of assessment, whether occurring by mis- | the dangers of the situation than any other person in take iu law or by fraud in fact, which gu to impair the I the party that accompanied him.'


on the 31st of December, 1874, wrote to say that, con

sidering the fcondition of the premises, “the price is COMMON CARRIER.

out of all reason. We must, therefore, request you to Special contract excluding liability except for willful

reconsider the question of price, having regard to the misconduct: delivery of goods to wrong person.-A

previous observations, and to the fact that the company railway company having carried goods from one of its

have already been served with notice to put the premistations to another, the station-master at the place to

ses in repair, and we shall be glad to receive in due which they were carried, without making inquiries of

course a modified proposal from you." No farther the consignor, after a delay of a week, delivered the

communication ou this subject took place till the 19th goods to a person of a name very similar to that of

of April, 1875, when the agent for the company wrote the person named as consignee. The contract of car

to say that as “the negotiations had not resulted in a riage was at a reduced tariff conditioned to exclude

sale” the company would take in hand the repairs, all liability except for willful misconduct. Held, that

On the 20th of April, the solicitors for the appellant the delivery of the goods amounted to willful miscon

wrote, declaring that “the negotiations" had been duct. Com. Pleas, May 4, 1877. Hoare v. Great West

broken off in December last, and that there had been ern Railway Co., 37 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 186.

ample time since then to complete the repairs. On the COVENANT.

22d of April,the notice expired, and on the 28th, the Covenant to use building as and for a private resi

ejectment was served. After verdict for the plaiutiff dence only:" charitable institution: injunction: costs

and judgment in the court below, held, that the com of unnecessary affidavits.-In an action to restrain the

pany was entitled in equity to be relieved against the breach of a covenant not to use any buildings to be

forfeiture, for that the letters at the end of November erected on a plot of land otherwise than as and for

and at the beginning of December had the effect of a private residence only, and not for any purpose of

suspending the notice, and that the suspension did uot trade," held, that the erection of a large building, come to an end till the 31st of December, till which capable of accommodating 100 children, for a charitable

time the operation of the notice was waived, so that institution supported by voluntary contributions, was

no part of that time could be counted against the tennot an infringement of the covenant. Although the

ant in a six months' notice to repair. Hughes v. Metroaction was dismissed with costs, the defendants were

politan Railway Co., L. R., 2 App. Cas. H. L. (E.) ordered to pay the costs of numerous affidavits filed

139. by them, and which had no real application to the

MASTER AND SERVANT. question before the court. Ch. Div., July 5, 1877.

Negligence: sub-contractor under railiray company: German v. Chapman, 37 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 265.

common employment.- The plaintiff, a workman in the DIVORCE.

employ of a contractor engaged by the defendants, had Status of wise after decree nisi for dissolution of mar to work in a dark tunnel rendered dangerous by the riage, and before decree absolute. — The status of a passing of trains. After he had been working a fortmarried woman is not affected by the pronouncing of night he was injured by a passing train. The jury a decree nisi for the dissolution of the marriage. She found that the defendants, in not adopting any precontinues to be subject to all the disabilities of cover cautions for the protection of the plaintiff, had been ture until the decree is made absolute. Action for guilty of negligence. Held, by the majority of the taking goods of the plaintiff. Plea, coverture of plain Court of Appeal (Cockburn, C. J., Mellor and Grove, tiff at the time of the alleged taking and of plea pleaded. JJ.), reversing the decision of the Court of Exchequer, Prior to the alleged taking a decree nisi had been pro that the plaintiff, having continued in' his employment nounced for the dissolution of the plaintiff's marriage, with full knowledge, could not make the defendants which was made absolute after plea and before the liable for an injury arising from danger to which he trial. Held (reversing the judgment of the Exchequer voluntarily exposed himself. Held, by Mellish and Division), that the plaintiff was still a married woman Baggallay, L. JJ., disseuting, that the plaintiff, as sernotwithstanding the decree nisi, and that the plea was vant to the contractor and not to the defendants, had proved. (Prole v. Soady, L. R., 3 Ch. 220, distin entered into no contract with the latter which would guished.) Norman v. Villars, L. R., 2 Ex. Div. (C. A.) modify the ordinary duty of those who carry on a 359

dangerous business to take reasouable precautions that LEASE.

no one should suffer personal injury from the manner Notice to repair: negotiations for sale: suspen- |

in which it is carried on; and that no such contract sion of notice: waiver.- Where a notice to repair bas

should be inferred from the plaintiff remaining in his been given, and the lessee makes an offer to sell his

employment. Woodley v. The Metropolitan District interest in the premises, and a negotiation takes place

Railway Co., L. R., 2 Ex. D. (C. A.) 384. on that offer, the effect of that offer and the negotiation is to suspend the notice till the negotiation has

NEGLIGENCE. been terminated, from which event alone the date of Act of God: overflow of river by reason of neglect to the notice can properly be calculated. Equity will comply with statute: measure of damages.- A river relieve against an ejectment founded on the original overflowed a wall belonging to the defendants, who notice. A notice to repair, within six months, houses were a dock company working under a private act of held on lease by the Metropolitan Railway Company, Parliament, and caused damage to the plaintiffs' propwas given on the 22d of October, 1874, to expire on the erty. The plaintiffs contended, that the defendants 220 of April, 1875. It was answered by a letter of the were bound at common law to keep their wall at a 28th of November, suggesting that the lessor might reasonable height, and alleged that they had not done like to purchase the premises. The lessor's solicitors, 80. The height of the wall was also less than the by letter of the 1st of December, asked the price height specified by the defendants' act of Parliament. demanded, and were told, by letter on the 30th of | The defendants alleged that the wall was high enough December, that it was £3,000. The lessor's solicitors I to keep out any ordinary tide, and that the damage was caused by the act of God. They also contended, those of the Court of Appeals of this State. This that, if they were liable for any damage at all, they was sufficient for the purposes of the work in England, could not be held responsible for the damage which but in order to suit it for the use of the bar in this was caused by the water, which would have come over country the American editor has added from other the wall if it bad been at the height at which the sources such cases as are of importance. In doing plaintiffs alleged they were bound to keep it. Held, this, he has not confined himself to American reports that, as the defendants had not kept the wall at the only, but has collected the Euglish decisions since 1873. height required by their act of Parliament, they were The work is, therefore, not merely a new American guilty of negligence, and were therefore liable for the edition, but a substitute for a new English edition. whole of the damages. Ch. Div., July 23, 1877. The citations of authority come down to the day of Nitro-Phosphate and Odam's Chemical Manure Co. v. publication, and the book can be safely said to give a London and St. Catharine's Docks Co., 37 L. T. Rep. full view of the law of sales as it stood on the 1st of (N. S.) 330.

November, 1877.

It would be a work of supererogation to recite the Partnership making article designated by special contents or give the general features of a work so well name: right of each partner to manufacture article of known to the profession in its first edition. Suffice it the dissolution. — M. and H. B. C., trading in copart to say, that in this edition the reputation of the first nership under the name of B. C. & Co., manufactured one is fully sustained, not only in the additions made and sold an article known in the market as Condy's by the author, but in those made by the American Fluid. They dissolved partnership. H. B. C. then editor. The book is printed at the Riverside Press, set up the same business on his own account and in his which indicates not merely excellence but elegance in own name. M. also commenced the same business on mechanical execution. his own account, but under the name of the Condy's Fluid Company. On bill filed by H. B. C. to restrain M. from trading under the name of the Condy's Fluid

REDFIELD'S REPORTS, VOL. II. Company, and from manufacturing and selling as

Reports of Cases armed and determined in the Surrogate's

Courts of the State of New York. By Amasa A. Redfeld. Condy's Fluid an alleged spurious compound, held, Vol. II. New York: Banks & Brothers, 1877. that, as M. had under the partnership articles the right These reports, although confined to cases decided to manufacture and sell Condy's Fluid, he could not in inferior courts, are probably of as great practical be restrained from selling a spurious article as Condy's

value as any series issued. To lawyers, interested in Fluid, so long as he did not induce the public to believe

probate matters, they are indispensable, as in them that the article sold by him was the article manufac

will be found the solution of many points of difficulty, tured and sold by H. B. C. Ch. Div., June 15, 1877. which never reach the appellate tribunals. Among Mitchell v. Condy, 37 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 268.

the cases involving questions of interest, reported in

the present volume, we notice these: Norton v. NorBOOK NOTICES.

ton, p. 6. Testator, who had himself written his will,

and signed the same, asked witnesses to witness it as BENJAMIN ON SALES - SECOND AMERICAN EDITION. his will, but did not sign it in the presence of the witA Treatise on the Law of Sale of Personal Property: with

nesses, or acknowledge his signature. Held, a suffiReferences to the American Decisions and to the cient execution and publication of the will. Edsall v. French Code and Civil Law. Second English Edition.

Waterbury, p. 48. A gift to testator's wife, and by By J. P. Benjamin, Esq., Q. C. of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-law. Second American Edition. By J. C. Per her accepted, in lieu of dower, does not preclude her kins, LL. D. New York: Hurd & Houghton, 1877.

claim to a share in a surplus of personalty undisposed THE distinguished success of Mr. Benjamin at the Eng of by will. Swartwout v. Swartwout, p. 53. Re

lish Bar has done much to remove the erroneous marriage held to terminate the guardianship of a impression which has heretofore prevailed among the widow judicially appointed guardian of her own chilprofessiou in England in respect to the ability and dren. Matter of Ward, p. 251. A savings bank deposit learning of their American brethren, but the high by an intestate, in the name of himself and wife enposition he has attained as an advocate and counsel, tered thus, “ Richard or Kate Ward," she never having while shedding lustre upon his reputation and confer had possession of the pass-book during his life, is prering honor upon his country, gives him no greater sumptively his property exclusively, and a gift held claim to be considered as a sound and able lawyer than not established. Booth v. Cornell, p. 261. A legacy does this treatise, the second American edition of to a corporation, the “New York Young Men's Chriswhich now lies before us. As soon as the first edition tian Association," had vested in interest, but before came from the press, which was in 1868, long before the time for vesting in possession arrived, the corporaMr. Benjamin had made bis name famous as an Eng tion accepted a new charter, under the name of “The lish barrister, the profession of both England and Young Men's Christian Association," etc., which proAmerica accepted it as the leading authority upon the vided that upon its acceptance the former corporasubject about which it treats. The book was prepared tion should be dissolved, and all its property vested in upon a plan new to the English Bar in this, that in the new corporation. Held, that the legacy lapsed by support of the principles enumerated it did not con the dissolution of the legatee, and the new corporation fine itself to English authority, but adopted as of equal value the determinations of American courts. This between slaves, contracted in a slave State before the course was followed in the second English edition, emancipation, with the consent of their masters, and which was issued in 1873, by the incorporation of a | according to the custom of marriage among slaves, still larger number of American decisions; though, as held a valid marriage when drawn in question in the the citation of all valuable American cases would make | courts here, Gillespie v. Brooks, p. 349. A bit of paper too bulky a volume, the author, as a rule, selected only affixed with mucilage and stamped upon, held a suffifrom the decisions of the Federal Supreme Court and I cient common-law seal. Ordish v. McDermott, p. 461

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