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existed independent of it, and could not be taken away. The principle governing the case is stated by Judge Cooley (Const. Lim. 362) thus: "A vested right of action is property in the same sense in which tangible things are property, and is equally protected from arbitrary interference. Where it springs from contract or from the principles of the common law, it is not competent for the legislature to take it away." See, also, Bedford v. Schilling, 4 S. & R. 401; Butler v. Palmer, 1 Hill, 334; Bigelow v. Pritchard, 21 Pick. 174; New Cent. Coal Co. v. G. C. Coal Co., 37 Md. 557; Grenough v. Grenough, 11 Penn. St. 489; Steamship Co. v. Jolippe, 2 Wall. 459. In Girdner v. Stephens, 1 Heisk. 280; 2 Am. Rep. 700, it was held that, after a cause of action had been barred by a statute of limitation, the defendant had a vested right to rely upon such statute as a defense, and that neither a State constitutional convention nor a legislature had the power to revive the right to maintain the action. See, to the same effect, Yancy v. Yancy, 13 Am. Rep. 5.

Pennsylvania court, a similar question arose, and it was held that the death of the member did not revoke any of the rules applied to membership. In the case of Hyde v. Woods, 15 Alb. L. J. 435, decided by the United States Supreme Court, it was held that a provision similar to that contained in the principal case was valid, and the carrying out of it in the case of an insolvent member was not a preference under the bankrupt law. The same conclusion was reached in Nicholson v. Gouch, 5 E. & B. 999. These cases do not fall within the principle that the jurisdiction of the courts cannot be ousted by contract. See Scott v. Avery, 5 H. of L. 382; Nicholls v. Eaton, 91 U. S. 716.

The case of Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Mulligan, 45 Md. 486, was an action against a railroad company for negligently killing a cow belonging to Mulligan, the plaintiff below, and the defense was contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff in permitting the cow to stray on to defendant's track. The court, however, held the defense not available, Several actions with respect to seats in stock ex- saying that the best considered decisions, both in change boards, and involving a curious question of England and here, hold the law to be, in such a law, have recently been adjudicated in the courts. case, that mere negligence or want of ordinary care The latest one is Thompson v. Adams, decided on on the part of plaintiff will not preclude his right the 27th of October last, by the Philadelphia Court to recover, provided the defendant might, by the of Common Pleas, and reported in a late number of exercise of ordinary care on his part, have avoided the Legal Intelligencer. The plaintiff gave to his part- the consequences of the neglect or carelessness of the ner in the stock brokerage business $1,000 to pur- plaintiff. Upholding this rule, see Butterfield v. Forchase a seat in the Philadelphia Board of Brokers, rester, 11 East, 60, where it is said that " one person an unincorporated association for the purpose of being in fault will not dispense with another's using facilitating the buying and selling of stocks, gov- ordinary care for himself;" Davies v. Mann, 5 M. & erned by a constitution and by-laws. The partner W. 546, where Lord Abinger said: "As the defendpurchased the seat in his own name, and continued ant might, by proper care, have avoided injuring to hold it until his death without any knowledge on the animal, and did not, he is liable for the consethe part of the board of any other ownership or quences of his negligence, though the animal may title. At that time he was indebted to various have been improperly there;" Mayor of Colchester members of the board upward of $5,000. By a v. Brooke, 7 Ad. & El. (N. S.) 377, where it is stated clause in the constitution of the board it was pro- that a wrong-doer is not without the pale of the law vided that "where a member dies his seat may be requiring every one to use care and skill in the consold by the secretary, and after satisfying the claims duct of that which may be harmful to others if misof the members of the board, the balance shall be conducted; Tuff v. Warman, 94 Eng. C. L. Rep. paid to his legal representatives." The seat was 573. Here it was held that mere negligence on the sold by the secretary, and the question at issue was, part of plaintiff would not defeat his right of recovwhether plaintiff was entitled to the proceeds or ery if the defendant might, by care on his part, have any part thereof, either in full or in equal propor- avoided the results of plaintiff's carelessness. See, tion with the other creditors of the deceased, who also, State v. Railroad, 52 N. H. 528; Kerwhacher v. were members of the board. The court held that C., C. & C. R. R. Co., 3 Ohio St. 172; Evansville, the partner purchased the seat subject to the rules etc., R. R. Co. v. Hiatt, 17 Ind. 102; Beers v. Housaof the association, that the plaintiff invested his tonic R. R. Co., 19 Conn. 572. In Brown v. Hannimoney, trusting to the partner's integrity; and hav-bal & St. Jos. R. R. Co., 50 Mo. 461; 11 Am. Rep. ing permitted the partner to exercise the privileges of membership, he made him liable to the penalties, and that the proceeds of the sale of the seat should be applied as far as they would go in payment of the claims of members of the board. In the case of Singerly v. Johnson, 3 Week, N. Cas., also before a

420, it was held that the fact that plaintiff was wrongfully on defendant's track at the time he was injured by defendant's negligence would not defeat an action for such injury. See, also, note to the case last cited, 11 Am. Rep. 425, where the authorities are collected.

SOME RECENT DECISIONS-21ST AMERICAN. II.

THE Pennsylvania cases

This

are very interesting. In Lancaster County Bank v. Moore (78 Penn. St. 407), the plaintiff lent money to the defendant upon his note. Afterward the defendant was judicially determined to have been insane at the time. The plaintiff, having no knowledge of the defendant's insanity, was held entitled to recover. case is accompanied by an elaborate note. In First National Bank of Carlisle v. Graham (79 Penn. St. 106) the defendant's cashier, to the knowledge of the directors, received the plaintiff's bonds for safekeeping, without compensation, and they were stolen. Held, that the bank would be liable if gross negligence should be shown. The doctrine that the deposit was outside the corporate powers of the bank, as laid down in First National Bank of Lyons v. The Ocean National Bank, 19 Am. Rep. 181, and Wiley v. The First National Bank of Brattleboro, id. 122, was not approved.

One of the most ingenious frauds ever concocted is the subject of examination in Brown v. Reed (79 Penn. St. 370). The defendant signed the following instrument: "North East, April 3, 1872. Six months after date I promise to pay J. B. Smith, or (bearer fifty dollars, when I sell by) order, two hundred and fifty dollars (worth of Hay and Harvest Grinders) for value received with legal interest without (appeal, and also without) defalcation or stay of execution. T. H. Brown, (Agent for Hay and Harvest Grinders)." This instrument was so printed, that by cutting it through vertically, the portions in parentheses were separated from the rest, and the remainder formed a good promissory note. It was so cut without defendant's knowledge, and the resulting note was transferred to an innocent purchaser. Held, that defendant was not liable in the absence of negligence, and negligence was a question for the jury.

In Mentz v. Armenia Fire Insurance Co. (79 Penn. St. 478) a fire policy was conditioned that in case of difference between the assured and the company touching the amount of any loss, such difference should be submitted to arbitrators, whose decision should be final and conclusive, and no action was to be maintained on the policy unless the amount of loss or damage in case of difference or dispute should be first ascertained. Held, that the condition did not oust the court of jurisdiction of an action on the policy, and that if the condition was of any effect, the company must show that they admitted the validity of the policy and their liability under it, and that the only question was as to the extent of the loss.

In Philadelphia & Reading Railroad Co. v. Hendrickson (80 Penn. St. 182), the plaintiff's barn having been burned by sparks negligently permitted to

escape from defendant's locomotive, it was held no defense that the roof of the barn was in such condition as to be easily kindled. In other words the owner of the barn was not bound to slate his roof for the convenience of the railroad people.

The unquiet question of proximate and remote cause came up again in Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Hope (80 Penn. St. 373). Fire having been communicated by a locomotive to a cross-tie of the track, spread thence through rubbish and dry grass to plaintiff's lands, about six hundred feet distant, held, that it was for the jury to determine whether the injury was the natural and probable consequence of the first ignition. Considerable attention was devoted to the defense of the Kerr Case, 1 Am. Rep. 431.

Massachusetts always furnishes a "Lord's Day" case, and here we have Smith v. Boston and Maine Railroad (120 Mass. 490), holding that one who travels on the Lord's Day to ascertain whether a house which he has hired, and into which he intends to move the next day, has been cleaned, cannot maintain an action for injuries sustained at a railroad crossing through the negligence of the servants of the corporation. It seems to have made no difference that the plaintiff had attended church in the morning.

They are not quite so religious down in Louisiana, for in Mahood v. Tealza (26 La. Ann. 108) an action to recover the price of furniture sold, to the plaintiff's knowledge, to furnish a house of ill fame, was held maintainable. This seems consistent with Heineman v. Newman (55 Ga. 262), reported in this volume, which holds that, in an action for the price of goods sold and delivered, the defense that the sale was made for the purpose of defrauding the plaintiff's creditors is unavailing. In City of Shreveport v. Levy (26 La. Ann. 671) a municipal ordinance, forbidding the sale of goods on Sunday, but excepting from its operation those who closed their business places on Saturday, was held unconstitutional, because it gives the Jews an unfair advantage. A few pages further on we find City of New Orleans v. Stafford (27 La. Ann. 417), holding that an act of the legislature, prohibiting private markets within twelve squares of a public market in New Orleans, is not unconstitutional, as interfering with pre-existing private rights. The enactment is defended on the ground of public health. In Burke v. Bishop (27 La. Ann. 465) the gift, causa mortis, of a check drawn by a third person to the order of the testator, and by him indorsed in blank, was held valid, although the check was not presented for payment until after the testator's death.

Among the New York cases, the case of Malone v. Hathaway (64 N. Y. 5), on which we have before commented, involving the question of the liability of the master for an injury caused by one of his servants to another servant, is reported and accom

panied by an excellent note. In Rounds v. The Delaware, etc., Railroad Co. (64 N. Y. 129) the plaintiff, a boy twelve years old, jumped on the baggage car to catch a ride, and the brakeman kicked him off, and he was injured. A verdict for the plaintiff was sustained. In Lancey v. Clark (64 N. Y. 209), the defendant having lent his note to a firm, who procured its discount at a bank, one of the partners borrowed money from the plaintiff to take up the note, and, after it was due, took it up and sent it to the plaintiff. Held, that the plaintiff took title from the partner, and not from the bank, and could not recover. In Patterson v. Birdsall (64 N. Y. 294) a valid first mortgage was satisfied and discharged, the holder receiving in its place an usurious second mortgage. Held, that, the new mortgage being void, the original mortgage could still be enforced.

In Connecticut, Osborn v. Bryne (43 Conn. 155) decides that, upon the insolvency of a savings bank, a depositor cannot set off his deposit against a debt due from him to the bank. In Evergreen Cemetery Association v. City of New Haven (43 Conn. 234) it is held that a municipal corporation, without statutory authority or necessary and reasonable implication, cannot take for a highway any part of the lands of a cemetery.

In California the case of National Gold Bank and Trust Co. v. McDonald (51 Cal. 64) decides that checks deposited with a bank and credited in the depositor's pass-book are received, in the absence of a special agreement, for collection, and not as cash, and, whether drawn on the same or on another bank, may be afterward returned, and the credit may be annulled, if there are no funds to meet them. This seems rather in conflict with Oddie v. The National City Bank, 45 N. Y. 735. In Brenner v. Liverpool, etc., Insurance Co. (51 Cal. 101) a building was insured by a policy conditioned to be void if the building should fall, except by fire. The fall, not by fire, of about one-quarter of the building was held not to avoid the policy. Two judges dissented. If we had argued this case for the plaintiffs, we should have cited Childe Harold, canto 4, v. 145: "While stands the Coliseum, Rome shall stand;

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When falls the Coliseum, Rome shall fall;

And when Rome falls, the world.' From our own land
Thus spake the pilgrims o'er this mighty wall

In Saxon times, which we are wont to call
Ancient; and these three mortal things are still
On their foundations."

Although the Coliseum is partly in ruins, is it a "fallen building?" The poet says no. In Arques v. Wasson (51 Cal. 620) a mortgage, by a lessee of land in possession, of crops to be raised, but not yet planted, was held effectual. This is consonant with Apperson v. Moore, 30 Ark. 56, also reported in this volume.

In Minnesota, in State v. Lee (22 Minn. 407), it is held that negative evidence of character is competent, as where the witness knows the accused, and

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would have been apt to hear any thing alleged against him, and has never heard his character talked about, "the fact that a person's character is not talked about at all being excellent evidence that he gives no occasion for censure, or, in other words, that his character is good."

SOME POINTS ON EXTRADITION.
OCHRE POINT, NEWPORT, R. I.,
November 28, 1877.

ISAAC GRANT THOMPSON, ESQ. :
MY DEAR SIR-I regret that my telegram did not
arrive in time to enable you to correct an oversight in
my letter, with respect to the incorporation, into the
Revised Statutes, of the McLeod act. From a further
search, after my manuscript was sent off, I ascertained
that the provisions of that law were substantially re-
produced in sections 753, 762 and 763, pages 142 and 143,
and I pray you to insert this correction in the next
publication of THE JOURNAL. As the absence of due
care on my part has rendered necessary this note, I
avail myself of the occasion to suggest some points
deduced from my extradition articles, to which, if Con-
gress should deem a legislative investigation expedient,
its attention might be directed:

1. Whether on general principles, common to all civilized and especially to all christian nations, a State is ever authorized to deliver up (Lord Coke said that it was not) its citizens or those whom it has received under its protection to a foreign State, to be tried by its laws, administered by its judges ?

2. Whether extradition, either with or without

treaty, is consistent with Magna Charta or the bills of right, as incorporated into the organic laws of all the States of the Union, and which declare, in terms more or less precise, that "no member of the State can be disfranchised or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land or by the judgment of his peers?"

3. Whether extradition, in whatever mode granted, either by treaty or by the executive or other department of the federal government, is not a violation of the Constitution of the United States, which was intended to protect, certainly in all cases of federal cognizance, all persons within our jurisdiction from being held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, without the presentment or indictment of a grand jury, or deprived of life, liberty and property without due process of law; and which professes to secure in all criminal prosecutions speedy and public trial by an impartial jury?"

4. Inter-State extradition is regulated by the Constitution of the United States, accepted by all the States of the Union as "the supreme law of the land," but it being established that the individual States have no power to surrender their citizens or others to foreign countries, and that there can be no extradition by the executive or other departments of the general government, by virtue of any authority vested in them, is it competent for the President and Senate to make a valid treaty of extradition, in disregard alike of the Constitution of the United States, and of the bills of rights of the States - more especially is it competent to make such a treaty regulating and controlling the exercise of the criminal jurisdiction of the individual States, and which has always been regarded as a matter of State cognizance ?

5. But if it be competent for the treaty-making power to make such treaties, is it not necessary, to avoid any embarrassment in our international relations as well as collision with the State authorities, that the execution of them should be under the exclusive control of the United States, both as regards the surrender by us of the alleged fugitives from justice and the proceedings as to the trial of those who are surrendered to us by foreign powers?

6. If it be competent for the United States to make a valid treaty of extradition, every act of surrender being in derogation of the right of asylum, should not the offenses to which it applies be only those of a heinous character, excluding those that are of such a nature, that the injury done to the extradited party by the act of surrender, would exceed the punishment prescribed for the offense, and should they not only be accurately defined but ample provision be made for carrying out the condition, such as exists in the extradition clause of our English treaty, that the accused persons should only be delivered up "upon such evidence of criminality as, according to the laws of the place where the fugitive or person so charged shall be found, would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial if the crime or offense had there been committed ?" And it may be here suggested whether some of the new treaties made by the United States, like that with Belgium, and which include convicted persons, making, it would seem, the judgment of conviction conclusive, on the party from whom the surrender is asked, do not abandon the principle of the clause in the English treaty, and which these treaties do not reproduce.

7. Does it not follow from the principle of asylum heretofore alluded to, that as, for every fact foreign to the extradition, the accused is, in contemplation of law, in the territory of the country of refuge, the power of the State to which he is surrendered is limited to the trial of the offense for which he is extradited, and that consequently, if acquitted, he not only cannot be tried for another offense, whether before known or brought to notice in the course of the proceedings, but is entitled to be restored to the place from which he was surrendered, if not indemnified for any injuries accruing to him from the unjust arrest.

8. If a treaty of extradition can be validly made, should it be entered into indifferently with all countries without regard to similarity of laws and institutions and character of civilization, or should it be made only with a country which has the same system of jurisprudence with ourselves, thus confining such arrangements on the part of the United States to treaties with England, with whom even in such cases our common language and laws have not secured always harmonious action.

9. Should treaties be further extended to countries which, although differing in language and laws from us, recognize with us a common private as well as public international law, such as France, and the countries adopting her codes, and Germany, whose new institutions are supposed to be in advance in criminal legislation?

10. Is regard to be had to the due administration of justice, thus excluding Spain? Are treaties to be confined to our own family of nations or concluded with the Turks and Chinese, when the principle of exterritoriality, to refer to no other objections, render them wholly inapplicable?

11. Except in the case of co-terminous countries

having the same laws and language as France and Belgium, extradition treaties have been generally of very little effect. May it not be worthy of consideration, whether the evils resulting from them, including such cases as that of Robbins or Nash under our first treaty with England, may not overbalance the advantages that can accrue from them, and whether in most cases falling within these terms, the apprehension of extradition under the treaty would effect, especially with the higher class of culprits, what the dread of exile, deemed by the Romans the greatest of all punishments, could not accomplish?

It would seem that extradition treaties are destined to receive a fatal blow from a source which I have not anticipated in my letters,-their incompatibility with the abolition of the death penalty in some countries, while it is maintained in others. My eminent colleague of the Institute, Mancini, in proposing, as Minister of Justice of Italy, its abrogation, is understood to have intimated that it would be impossible thereafter to comply with demands for extradition, the result of which would be to subject the accused or convicted party to a punishment abhorrent to the recognized principles of humanity.

I am, my dear sir,

Yours very truly,

W. B. LAWRENCE.

THE TRIAL OF THE LONDON DETECTIVES. LONDON, November 22, 1877.

Tuesday four out of the five prisoners on trial for conspiracy, at the Old Bailey, were convicted; one of the accused - Chief-Inspector Clark was acquitted. The preliminary examination at Bow street extended over three months; the trial before the jury occupied a little more than three weeks. The public interest in the proceedings, from first to last, was intense, and there is no reasonable doubt of the justice of the conviction.

Three chief inspectors of the detective branch of the Metropolitan Police-Clark, Palmer and Druscovichan inspector named Meiklejohn, and a solicitor named Froggatt, were indicted for a conspiracy, of which the alleged object was to defeat the ends of justice by preventing the apprehension and conviction of certain persons charged with crimes. The prosecution relied directly upon the testimony of Kurr, Benson, and others, who were not only accomplices in the alleged conspiracy-the persons for whose benefit the plot was said to be concocted - but convicted criminals undergoing punishment for felony. Baron Pollock, before whom the case was tried, gave the jury the correct estimate of the value of these men's statements, but they were supported by a mass of corroborative details, showing the general accuracy of their testimony, and conclusively fixing upon the accused their guilty connection with the frauds for which the witnesses had been convicted. The jury, after a clear and dispassionate summing-up, arrived without hesitation at the conclusion that the charge had been proved against Meiklejohn, Palmer, Druscovich and Froggatt, while they acquitted Chief-Inspector Clark. The history of the case, of which you published a brief notice in the spring, is the history of a long and intimate connection between the most trusted and experienced officers of Scotland Yard, and a confederation of rogues, who, by the aid of these officers, prosecuted their extensive frauds in the boldest man

ner, taking offices, sending out printed circulars and advertisements, and carrying on all the details of their business without even an attempt at concealment. Kurr, the principal of the gang, and the most important of the witnesses against the detectives, was in relations with Inspector Meiklejohn as long ago as 1873, when he needed protection for the fraudulent betting agencies which he established in the principal cities of the United Kingdom, and from which he derived a large income. As his business and connections extended themselves, he sought the aid of other rogues, notably Benson, a French Jew, of liberal education and considerable ability, who had recently completed a term of penal servitude for a fraud upon the Lord Mayor, whereby he had mulcted that functionary of a thousand pounds. At the same time Meiklejohn brought under Kurr's influence his brother officers, Druscovich and Palmer: and it was in consequence of this accession, both of evasive and commissive strength, that Kurr designed and executed his crowning villainy, the De Goncourt fraud.

Briefly, the De Goncourt fraud was this: Kurr, using Benson's brains and knowledge, flooded certain departments of France with circulars and advertisements, showing how money intrusted to the advertiser, to be laid out in betting upon the English turf, could be made to return enormous profits. Many thousands of dollars were spent in circulating these schemes, and Kurr himself testified that his returns in three weeks were $75,000! Among his victims was a wealthy old lady, Madame De Goncourt, who became so enamored of the scheme that she went to Paris for the purpose of raising money on securities, and remitted Kurr $50,000. Of course she heard nothing from Kurr after the receipt of the money, and it was in consequence of the efforts of her solicitor that the knaves were finally brought to justice.

The confederates were now in possession of ample means for satisfying the demands of the corrupted officers, and now, too, they stood in need of their assist

ance.

The proceeds of Madame De Goncourt's checks had been converted into Scotch notes, because of the risk of maintaining a bank account in London in the face of the investigations Madame De G.'s solicitor was pushing. Druscovich, in whose hands the inquiry had been placed, bound by his acceptance of previous bribes, warned the swindlers, and they decamped to Scotland with their spoil, where they attempted to baffle pursuit by getting the notes changed. During these operations Druscovich aided the fugitives by his concerted delays, but he told them he would ultimately be compelled to arrest some of them if they did not make their escape. In order to arrange matters, Meiklejohn was brought up from Derby, where he had accepted a position under the Midland Railway Company, and he succeeded apparently in getting Druscovich to render more active help. For this assistance the conspirators paid him handsomely, giving him £500 in Scotch bank notes. This payment proved his ruin. He rashly attempted to put the notes in circulation, even after the Police Gazette had cautioned bankers against them. Some intimation of this suspicious circumstance found its way to Scotland Yard, but Druscovich was in charge of the office, and inquiry was evaded for a time. Repeated attempts were made by the conspirators to get rid of the Scotch notes, and interviews between Benson and Kurr with others on the one side, and Meiklejohn and Druscovich on the other, were held at the Bridge of Allan to devise plans

for safely realizing the money. But while they were planning the chase became hot on a sudden; Benson and Kurr had repeated warnings from their purchased allies in London, among whom Palmer for the first time appears. Druscovich was sent to the Bridge of Allan, and deliberately wasted time while Kurr and Benson disappeared. Subsequently the conspirators had many interviews with both Druscovich and Meiklejohn, and on the eve of their flight for Rotterdam they stopped at Palmer's house. At Rotterdam, where they were finally arrested, Druscovich had visited them.

ers.

Here the connection of Froggatt, the solicitor, with the case, begins. After the arrest at Rotterdam, he was employed by one of the confederates, who remained in London, and became a party, with him, to the dispatch of a telegram, in the name of the Superintendent of Police of London, to the Dutch authorities, concocted for the purpose of securing the release of the prisonHe negotiated for the disposal of the Scotch notes of which the prisoners had not been able to make use in the ordinary way, and it was proved that some of these notes were paid into Froggatt's bank account. He attempted to prevent several witnesses from appearing against or identifying Kurr, and he tried to obtain possession of important documentary evidence against Benson, presumably in order to destroy it.

The conspirators all received the same sentence, the severest the law permits, two years' penal servitude. Druscovich and Palmer were strongly recommended to mercy, but the universal sentiment is that these received no more than they deserved, while for Meiklejohn's offense the punishment is wholly inadequate. A conviction for "conspiracy" at common law does not involve a sentence with hard labor; but a recent statute has added that penalty to conspiracies against public justice.

But the two years' penal servitude must be accounted as trifling in comparison with loss of position, reputation, and, in the case of the three detectives, pension, earned by years of service in the calling from which all of them are henceforth excluded.

PRE-EMPTION OF LAND CLAIMED UNDER MEXICAN TITLES.

IN

N the case of Van Reynegan, plaintiff in error, v. Bolton, just decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, the action was on ejectment by one claiming lands situate in California, under a title derived from the Mexican Government against one claiming to be rightfully in possession under the preemption laws of the United States. The court held thus: (1.) Under the Mexican law, when a grant of land is made by the government, a formal delivery of possession to the grantee by a magistrate of the vicinage is essential to the complete investiture of title. This proceeding, called in the language of the country the delivery of judicial possession, involves the establishment of the boundaries of the land granted when there is any uncertainty with respect to them. A record of the proceeding is preserved by the magistrate and a copy delivered to the grantee. (2.) Unless there is something in the decree of the tribunals of the United States confirming a claim to land under a Mexican grant otherwise limiting the extent or form of the tract, the boundaries thus established should control the officers of the United States in surveying

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