Imágenes de páginas

St. Jo. R. R. Co. v. Marion County, 36 Mo. 294, 304. The Ct., Minnesota, May 29, 1877. State v. Young (N. W. latter company was by its charter “entitled to all the L. Rep.) privileges, rights, and immunities which were granted Attorney and client : agreement between attorneys : to the Louisiana and Columbia Railroad Company, so how far binding upon clients.-While suit for divorce far as applicable," eto. The right to receive county was pending, an agreement was signed by counsel, but subscriptions was held to be one of these privileges, not by either of the parties, providing that the husrigbts, and immunities. The court said: “It was under band might “ retain all * * * real estate, * * * this section that the county) court proceeded when however received;" and then, no defense being interthe stock was first taken and the notes issued. The posed, a decree of divorce, not referring to the agreelegislature gives the company all the rights, privileges,

ment, passed by default for the wife. Held, that it and immunities contained therein, the same as if it

would not be presumed the attorneys had authority had been re-enacted. The language seems broad

to make this agreement, and that it did not bind the enough, by reasonable construction, to fully sustain wife; and further, that she was not estopped from asthe acts of the county court." (36 Mo. 304.) In Smith serting title to property previously conveyed by her v. County of Clark the same views were held with directly to her husband by a deed which, for that rearegard to the charter now in question. The court say: son, was void. Sup. Ct., Illinois, June 22, 1877. Brooks “The power thus conceded to the courts or other | v. Kearns (Chic. Leg. News). municipal bodies may well be termed a privilege to Conflict of law : action on judgment obtained in sisthe corporations, and we see no substantial objection ter State.-In an action on a judgment obtained in a to a transfer of such a privilege by simply, in general sister State, coverture at the time when the promises terms, embodying the section of the original act which were made and the judgment was obtained, cannot be granted it, into the new law. That such was the inten set up as a defense. Philadelphia Com. Pleas, June tion of the legislature, and of the railroad company, is 30, 1877. Gilfrey v. Saarbach. clear, and if the word 'privilege'admits of the narrow Excise law: New York statute : petition of freeholders construction claimed, the practical construction it has

| not necessary: license can be granted only to innkeepers. received in this State, as may be seen by reference to

-Section 6, chapter 628, of Laws of 1857, requiring the the decisions of our courts, would preclude any inquiry 1.petition of twenty freeholders as a prerequisite to into the subject pow. These provisions were the prin the granting of a license for the sale of spirituous cipal means by which this and other roads were built, liquors, is repealed. Under a provision of said act, and without them the charters would have been of no still in force, a license cannot be granted to any one value.” (54 Mo. 67.)

unless he have the ability and necessary accommodaThe power of the counties to subscribe being thus

tions to entertain travelers. Sup. Ct., New York, 2d held to be a right and privilege of the company, in our Dept., May, 1877. People v. Hartman (N. Y. Week. opinion, passed with its other rights and privileges Dig.). into the new conditions of existence which the com Malicious prosecution: advice of counsel.-Where pany assumed under the consolidation.

defendant in justification pleaded that he acted under The argument sought to be drawn from the distinc advice of an attorney at law, held, it was not incumtion, that the company with which the consolidation bent upon him to prove that such attorney was a perwas effected belonged to another State, we fail to

son learned in the law. That it will be presumed that appreciate. If the legislature of Missouri authorized an attorney licensed by the Supreme Court of this it, what difference can it make whether the connecting State to practice law, has been examined as the law company belongs to Missouri or to Iowa? There is no requires, and may reasonably be supposed to be comdifference in principle. The Philadelphia, Wilmington

petent to give legal counsel, and to justify resort and Baltimore Railroad Company, in its consolidated

therefor to such a source. Sup. Ct., Illinois, June form, combined the roads and charters of three differ

22, 1877. Horn v. Sullivan (Chio. Leg. News). ent States; and yet it was held to be invested with the Lien : vendor's lien does not exist against intervening rights and privileges of each as applicable to the several

equities.-When a purchaser of land conveys another parts of the line. See, also, to the same purport, the

tract to his vendor in payment of the purchase-money, case of Hanna v. The Cincinnati, Fort Wayne and

and title to the last conveyed property fails, the Chicago R. R. Co., 20 Ind. 30.

vendor having accepted this conveyance from his Miller, J., dissented from the opinion in this case.

vendee in full payment, must look to the covenants of warranty in the last conveyance for his indemnity; and he cannot, when other equities have intervened,

set up lien upon the property conveyed on account of NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS.

failure of title to property transferred to him. The Alteration of instrument: filling blank in sealed in- principle is, that where a lien has been expressly restrument: execution of bond on Sunday.-In an action tained to a specified extent, it is equivalent to a waiver on a county treasurer's bond, held, that authority to of that lien to any greater extent. Sup. Ct., Teunesfill a blank in a sealed instrument may be given by see, March 3, 1877. Murrell v. Watson (Tenn. L. Rep.). parol. Such authority may be either express, or implied Mortgage : mortgagee not in possession cannot mainfrom circumstances. It will be implied from circum tain replevin for chattel taken from estate.-A mortstances whenever these fairly considered will justify the gagee of real estate, whose debt is due, but who inference. The facts in this case considered, and held has not entered into possession, cannot maintain resufficient to establish an implied authority from sure plevin for a specific chattel which the mortgagor or ties to the board of county commissioners to insert a his assigns has severed and removed from the realty, penal sum in the blank left in the bond. Also, that a and which before severance was a fixture on part of bond is not "executed" until delivery. Therefore, the realty and subject to the mortgage. Sup. Ct., although signed and sealed on Sunday, yet if not de- | New Jersey, June, 1877. Kercher v. Schalk. livered until a succeeding secular day, it is valid. Sup. 1 Negligence: contributory negligence: railroad company: crossings at grade : when questions of negligence liable, and that therefore the suit was properly should not be submitted to the jury.-F., a partially deaf brought. Sup. Ct., Pennsylvania, Nov. 24, 1876. man, drove a wagon up a steep slope, to a railroad Douglass v. Second National Bank of Titusville (W. crossing at grade on a road with which he was familiar. | N. (as.). At about five feet from the railroad the company had Trade-mark: numerical symbol may be used as.-The recently erected a watch-house which obstructed the numerical symbol 19. printed in large, bold, red charview to the north for about eight feet. Back of the acters, in a certain form and style, had been used since watch-house was an open space for about thirteen feet 1873 by the complainant as one of his trade-marks on through which there was an unobstructed view of the the packages and boxes of certain classes of cigarettes railroad. Beyond this the view was again closed by | manufactured by him, and was registered in the some buildings. F. drove past the buildings and the United States Patent Office in June, 1875. This symoperi space and stopped opposite the watch-house. He bol was originally employed to indicate the idea that then looked in both directions, though it was impossi the cigarettes were composed of two kinds of tobacco ble for him to see toward the north. Without leaving in the proportion of half and half; but except so far as his wagon, he then drove on to the track and was it indicates this idea, which it does not really express, killed by a train: Held, that under the circumstances it is a merely arbitrary device. On a bill brought to there was a clear case of contributory negligence, and enjoin against another's use of this symbol, held, the judge should bave directed a verdict for the that the complainant had not a right to the exclusive defendant. Semble, it is not negligence per se for a use of the numerical character 12, written in any ordirailroad company to place a watch-house near a cross nary manner; but that he had a right to the exclusive ing in such a position as to obstruct the view of trav use of it in the particular form, size, color and style in elers using the crossing. The question of the company's which he had used and registered it. U.S. Circ. Ct., negligence in such case is for the jury. Sup. Ct., Penn E. D. Virginia, May, 1877. Kinney v. Allen & Co. sylvania, May 7, 1877. Central Railroad of N. J. v. | (Am. L. T. Rep.). Feller (W. N. Cas.). Power of attorney: construction of : power to receive

COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT. check does not include power to indorse ; statute of limitation.- A power of attorney to prosecute a claim

AGENCY. against the United States, and to receive any check, order or certificate issued by the government for the | 1. Authority to make contract to sell real estate may payment thereof, confers no power upon the attorney be by parol.-An agent of defendant's testator made to assign or indorse the paper in the name of the an agreement in writing with plaintiff whereby be payee. When the drawee of such check had settled agreed for his principal to convey certain real estate with the drawer and charged up the amount against to plaintiff for a specified price, and it was orally him, there is sufficient privity between the parties, to agreed between the agent and plaintiff that work enable the payee to recover the amount upon a count which plaintiff agreed to do on houses belonging to for money had and received. This principal is applica the agent should be applied in payment for the real ble to a case where the bank had paid the check upon estate. Held, that the authority to execute the agreea forged indorsement. The statute of limitations | ment to convey might be conferred by parol. Judgrefers to the time of the institution of the suit, and ment below affirmed. Moody v. Smith. Opinion by not to the time of Giling an amendment to the declar Folger, J. ation. Sup. Ct., Dist. of Columbia. Millard v. Bank 2. Statute of frauds, when not applicable: contract of Republic (Wash. L. Rep.).

with agent for agent's benefit.-The plaintiff did the Statute of limitations : does not bar debt: for money work as agreed upon the houses of the agent, and the borrowed from trustee.-If a trustee loans the trust fulfillment of the contract for the sale of the real fund in breach of the trust, and the borrower has estate being refused, plaintiff brought action against notice of the trust and the breach, he becomes a quasi the principal for the value of his labor on the houses. trustee, and he cannot separate the loan from the trust, Held, that the action was maintainable, and the objecnor insist that the statute of limitations, which bars a tion that the contract was invalid by the statute of loan as a loan, also bars the remedy for the trust fund | frauds was not available. Held, also, that the rule in his hands, and if it be followed into the hands of that he who undertakes for another by authority from one who receives it by collusion or with express notice him shall not act for his own benefit and to the detriof the trust, he cannot plead the statute of limitations, ment of the principal would not prevent recovery, it for the reason that he himself becomes a trustee, and being shown that the agent had express authority to the fund can be recovered. Sup. Ct., Tennessee, April, | make the contract in question. Ib. 1877. Merriman v. Cannovan. (Tenn. L. Rep.).

3. Contract: work not in exact accordance: waiver.Suretyship : promissory note: indorsement of guaranty When work was done in some respects not in perfect signed by four persons: right of one who advances money accordance with the specifications of a contract, but on the note: each guarantor severally liable : affidavit of the party for whom such work was done constantly defense. -A promissory note was indorsed, “For the supervised it while being done and found no fault, amount of the within note received, I hereby guaran and there has been a substantial compliance with the tee its prompt payment,” etc., which guaranty was terms of the contract, held, that a judgment would signed by the payee and three others. In a suit by a not be disturbed on account of the work falling short holder for value against the last of the guarantors: | of the requirements of the contract. Neither would it Held, that the guaranty necessarily applied to the be because the contract was not performed within the holder for value, and that the omission in it to iudicate time agreed, no objection being made to work done to whom it was made was supplied by the advancement after that time by the party for whom it was done, and of money upon it. Held, further, that the contract of | he taking the benefit of such work. Ib. each subscriber was sufficient to make himn severally ! [Decided June 5, 1877.)

CONTRACT. 1. Agreement in relation to life insurance : parol contract: holding insurance policy as mortgagee : consideration : mutuality.-Plaintiff's testator and defendant entered into an arrangement whereby the testator was to procure a policy of insurance upon bis life and assign it to defendant, who was to pay the premiums and have the benefit of the policy, with the understanding that, if at any time the testator desired to redeem the policy, he could do so by paying the premiums advanced by the defendant and the interest thereon. In pursuance of this the testator procured a policy on his life which was immediately assigned to defendant by an assignment absolute in form, and defendant paid all the premiums up to the time of testator's death and received from the insurance company the amount for which the policy was issued. Previous to his death testator, for the purpose of redeeming the policy, offered to defendant the amount advanced by him for premiums, etc., and defendant refused to receive the same. Held, affirming judgment below, that the agreement was founded on a consideration and was valid, notwithstanding that it was in parol and the assignment was absolute in form; that defendant held the policy as mortgagee only, and this was not affected by the fact tbat there was no obligation on the part of the testator to repay the premiums, and that defendant was liable to the personal representative of the testator for the amount received from the insurance company on the policy, less the amount of premiums and interest advanced by him. Matthews v. Sheehan. Opinion by Earl, J.

2. Contract construed a mortgage rather than conditional sale.-In all doubtful cases a contract will be construed to be a mortgage rather than a conditional sale, because in the case of a mortgage the mortgagor, although he has not strictly complied with the terms of the mortgage, still has his right of redemption, while in the case of a conditional sale, without strict compliance, the rights of the conditional purchaser are forfeited. Ib. [Decided May 22, 1877.)

IMPRISONED DEBTOR. 1. Discharge of: practice on application for discharge. -An application under article 5, title 1, chap. 5, part 2, of the Revised Statutes, for the purpose of exonerating the person of an imprisoned debtor from imprisonment, is required to be made ($ 2, art. 7), to an officer residing in the county in which the insolvent debtor resides or is imprisoned, and section 5 provides that in case of disability, resignation, removal from otfice or absence from the county, of the officer before whom the proceedings were commenced, the same may be continued by his successor in office or by any other officer who might have originally instituted such proceedings, and in case of ($ 6) there being no such officer, then a judge of the County Court may attend and adjourn, eto. In this case the original order was made in New York county on the 20th of July, 1876, by Donohue, J., returnable on the 2d of September, 1876. On the return day the parties appeared, but there was no justice in attendance. On the 4th of September, which was Monday, the next court day, Westbrook, J., who resides at Kingston, continued the proceedings until the 8th of September. Held, reversing the order of General Term, and dismissing appeal to that court, that all subsequent proceedings were invalid, Westbrook, J., neither residing in the county or the district, and be

ing in no sense the successor of Donohue, J. In the matter of Roberts. Opinion per curiam.

2. Who may make order: appeal. – Application under article 5, mentioned, must be made to certain officers therein mentioned, and cannot be made to any court, and an order made by such a person is not appealable either to the General Term or to this court. Ib. [Decided May 22, 1877.]

MASTER AND SERVANT. 1. Liability of master for negligence causing death of servant. - In an action by the personal representative of a workman against his employer for death caused by the caving in upon the workman of an embankment which was being cut down, under the supervision of such employer, the court, at trial, charged the jury among other things, “that if the defendant could have done any thing to preserve the life of the deceased, he should have done it." The defendant excepted, and the court qualified the charge by saying that he meant to have said “any thing that could have prevented the accident,” to which defendant also excepted. Held, that the charge was error. The fact that the defendant could have done something which would have prevented the accident, was not the test of his liability; the question was, was he negligent; did he exercise ordinary care and prudence in conducting the excavation, in view of the position of the deceased; the probable consequences which would result from the falling of the overhanging earth while intestate was below? Judgment below reversed. Leonard, administratrix, v. Collins. Opinion per curiam.

2. Evidence bearing on question of negligence : charge to jury: contributory negligence.-It was claimed that defendant made a promise when deceased went below the bank, that it would not be cut away for half an hour, but that he caused work to be commenced immediately. The court charged that this promise was a very important feature in the case and that “it might go very far in the opinion of the jury to establish his (defendant's) want of care and prudence.” Defendant asked the court to charge in addition that, if the jury believed that “the defendaut said he was not going to begin work at once or any thing that could be so construed, and notwithstanding that statement the deceased saw the two meu working upon the bank and cutting it down, the plaiutiff cannot recover upon the theory that the deceased had no warning that the work was going on." This request was refused. Held, error. Ib. [Decided June 5, 1877.)

NEW TRIAL. When refusal to submit to jury, not ground for.Where evidence is not conflicting and is unimpeached and not controverted by circumstances and probabilities and is such that no verdict could properly be given against it, it is not the duty of the judge at circuit to submit the question at issue to the jury, and a refusal to do so in such a case is not a ground for a new trial. Affirming judgment below. (See case on former appeal, 57 N. Y. 229.) Cutts v. Guild. Opinion by Allen, J. [Decided June 22, 1877.)

RAILROAD AID BONDS. Statutory construction: Laws 1867, chap. 953; 1868, chap. 317. — By Laws 1867, chap. 953, authority is given to the village of Fort Edward to borrow money and issue bonds of the village in aid of a railroad mentioned in the act. The exercise of the authority is made to depend upon a vote of the taxable electors of

the village at an election to be held at a time and place eral in the earth. Indeed, this latter idea is not adto be designated by the board of trustees, notice of vanced by any one, and it would be preposterous. As which “shall be published in a public newspaper of we construe the statutes of the United States and the the village for at least two weeks previous to the time recognized rule of the government on this subject, the appointed for such election." This act was amended moment this ore becomes detached from the soil in by Laws of 1868, chap. 317, but not as to the time of which it is embedded it becomes personal property, publication. Held, that it was necessary that two the ownership of which is in the man whose labor, weeks should intervene between the publication of the | capital and skill has discovered and developed the notice and the election, and the statute was not satis mine and extracted the ore or other mineral product. fied by a publication in two successive weeks before | It is then free from any lien, claim or title of the the election, the first publication being made April United States, and is rightfully subject to taxation by 24th and the meeting being held May 5th. Order below the State as any other personal property is. The refusing mandamus affirmed. In re petition of Hetfield truth of this proposition is too obvious to need or adv. Trustees of Fort Edward. Opinion by Andrews, J. mit of illustration or elaboration, and, as we have [Decided May 29, 1877.)

already said, the pressure of business does not admit

of it. SALE.

In regard to the taxing of this personal property, Of personal property at fixed price to be paid in other

and the mode of collecting it by sale as provided in property at fixed price: condition precedent.- Defend

the section last cited, it does not seem to us that there ant agreed to take from plaintiff a quantity of old

can be any reasonable ground for asserting that the rails at a specified price per ton, to be paid for in fish

United States has any interest in the tax or in the sale joints at a specified price each, and a quantity of old

of the property taxed. It is, however, urged with rails and of fish joints were delivered by the parties

more show of reason that section six, which makes respectively. Plaintiff then sent a large amount of old

this tax “a lien on the mines or mining claims from rails to defendant, who notified plaintiff that he did

which the ores or minerals bearing gold or silver are not wish them, but would accept them and credit the

extracted for reduction," is an interference with the amount agreed to be paid therefor to the fish-joint ac

right of property of the government in the lands in count. Held, reversing judgment below, that plaintiff

which the mineral remains are extracted. was not entitled to recover from defendant without

An examination of the language we have quoted will showing a demand and refusal to deliver the fish joints.

show that it was carefully prepared to avoid this obLong Island R. R. Co. v. Verree et al. Opinion by

jection, and we think it does. Rapallo, J.

The use of the words “mines or mining claims" is [Decided May 22, 1877.]

evidently intended to distinguish between the cases in which the miner is the owner of the soil, and there

fore has perfect title to the mine, and those in which TAXATION OF THE PRODUCT OF MINES.

the miner does not have title to the soil, but works the THE case of Forbes, appellant, v. Gracey et al., de mine under what is well known in the mining districts I cided at the last term of the United States Su and what is, as we have said, recognized by the act of preme Court, was a suit brought by appellaut to enjoin Congress as a mining claim. In the first case, the the collector of taxes for Story county, Nevada, from

statute makes the tax a lien on the mine, because the collecting a tax imposed by the law of that State title to the mine is in the person who owes and should upon the property of the Consolidated Virginia Min pay the tax. In the other, the tax is a lien only on the ing Company, the appellant being a stockholder in claim of the miner; that is, on his possessory right to the company and an alien subject of the Queen of explore and work the mine under the existing laws Great Britain. The tax is by the State statute im and regulations on the subject. posed upon the proceeds of the mine worked by the In the former case, of course, the United States has corporation, and is resisted on the ground that title no interest to be protected, and the State is at liberty to the land from which the mineral is taken is in the to declare and enforce such a lien for her taxes. In United States, and is not for that reason liable to State the latter, also, such right as the mining Jaws allow taxation. The tax was imposed upon "ores, tailings and as Congress concedes to develop and work the and mineral-bearing material ” taken from mines, and mines, is property in the miner, and property of great was adjusted according to net product of such mate value. That it is so, is shown most clearly by the conrial, and the collection of the tax was enforceable by duct of the mining corporation in whose interest this sale of personal property, and was made "a lien upon suit is brought, which, for the purpose of evading this the mines or mining claims from which the ores or tax, permits its investment in this mine, said to be minerals are taken." The right to mine and remove worth from fifty to a hundred millions of dollars, to mineral from lands of the United States independent rest on this claim, this mere possessory right, when it of the title which was not parted with, has been re- | could at a ridiculously small sum compared to the cognized by the United States government. In re- value of the mine, obtain the government's title to gard to the questions involved, the court says: From the entire land, soil, mineral and all. Those claims the first section of the statute we ascertain what it is are the subject of bargain and sale, and constitute that is taxed, namely, all the ores, tailings or mineral very largely the wealth of the Pacific coast States. bearing material of whatever character, after deduct They are property in the fullest sense of the word, ing the actual cost of extracting said ores as mineral and their ownership, transfer and use are governed by from the miues and other expenses, such as transport a well-defined code or codes of law, and are recoguized ing them to the place of reduction, eto. From this it by the States and the Federal government. This is clear that it is the ore after it has been separated claim may be sold, transferred, mortgaged, inherited, from the bed in which it is found, and its proceeds without infringing the title of the United States. and products which are taxed, and not the ore or mine | Why may it not also be made subject to a lien for

. Ct.,

taxes, and the claim, such as it is, recognized by stat-petition is afterward filed, it will not be dismissed on ute, be sold to enforce the lien? We see nothing in the ground that a sufficient number and amount of principle or in any interest which the United States creditors are not included therein, unless it is made to has in the land to prevent it.

appear that, taking both petitions together, a sufficient number and amount have not joined. U. S. Circ. Ct.,

S. D. New York. In re Frisbie and McHugh, 15 Nat. RECENT BANKRUPTCY DECISIONS.

Bankr. Reg. 522.

Rate of interest and damages upon dishonored bill:

Termination of proceedings: what does not constitute. by what law governed.-The rate of interest and dam- |-Where assets have come into the hands of the asages which the drawer of a bill is to pay ex mora is

signee, and he has not rendered his final account governed by the law of the place where the bill is within three years from the adjudication, and the drawn. If a bill is made and dated at the business

bankrupt has not been discharged, or refused a disdomicile of the drawer, his undertaking is to pay it

charge, the proceedings are not terminated without there, in case of dishonor, though it may have been

a discharge, within the meaning of section 5105 of the negotiated elsewhere. Damages in a case of this sort

Revised Statutes, so as to revive the right of action by are a part of the law of the performance, and not of a creditor who has proved his claim. N. Y the execution and validity of the contract, nor of the Gen. Term, 4th Dept. Wood v. Hazen, 15

Gen. Term, 4th Dept. Wood v. Hazen, 15 Nat. Bankr. remedy. Such a question, arising in the courts of the United States, is one of general jurisprudence, and not

PREFERENCE. of local law. V. S. Dist. Ct., Massachusetts. In re Distress pursuant to lease.-A distress, pursuant to Glyn; Ex parte Heidelbach; Ex parte Paton, 15 Nat. the terms of a lease, made within four months of the Bankr. Reg. 495.

commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy, is not DISCHARGE.

fraudulent under the baukrupt law, although the 1. When validity of, not impeachable in collateral ac- baukrupt consented to it, unless collusion is shown. tion.-The validity of a discbarge under the bank

Sup. Ct., Pennsylvania. Goodwin et al. v. Sharkey et rupt law of 1867 cannot be impeached in a collateral | al., 15 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 526. action on the ground that the bankrupt fraudulently

SURETYSHIP. represented in his schedule that plaintiff's place of Payment made on surety debt by bankrupt and recovresidence was unknown to him, and thereby prevented ered back does not release surety.-Where a payment his receiving notice of the proceedings. Sup. Ct. Com made by a bankrupt debtor has been recovered by his mission, Ohio. Rayl, administratrix, etc., v. Lapham, assignee in bankruptcy, the acoeptance of such pay15 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 508.

ment with knowledge of the debtor's insolvency is no 2. When want of notice will not invalidate.-Actual defense to an action by the creditor against the surety notice to the creditors is not essential to the jurisdic. | for the amount thereof, where the creditor has acted tion of the bankrupt court, and the want of it will not in good faith toward the surety and has been reason. invalidate the discharge where the bankrupt is found ably diligent to save him from loss. The surety is liato have honestly complied with the requirements of | ble for the amount of such payment, although he has the act. Ib.

in the meantime paid the balance of the indebtedness EXEMPT PROPERTY.

and taken up the evidence thereof. Sup. Ct., Iowa. Bankrupt law does not interfere with debtor's power | Watson v. Poague et al., 15 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 473. over.-The bankrupt law does not interfere with the debtor's power to sell or inoumber his exempt property. The bankrupt act of 1867, while adopting the

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS. exemption laws of the States as to the measure and

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.* amount thereof, does not embrace local restrictions upon the debtor's estate in aud dominion over ex

CARRIER OF PASSENGERS. empted property. Sup. Ct., Georgia. Farmer v. Tay 1. Right to enforce payment of fare.-A railway lor et al., 15 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 515.

company has the right to require passengers to pay

fare, and a rule directing its conductors to remove FIDUCIARY DEBT.

from the cars those who refuse to comply with the What is not debt in fiduciary capacity: factor.-A | requirement is reasonable. Shelton v. Lake Shore and debt due by a factor for the value of goods consigned Mich. So. Railway Co. to him to be sold on commission, and remittance made 2. Ticket wrongfully taken up.-The fact that a ticket in thirty days, is not such a debt contracted in a fidu- has been purchased by a passenger, which was afterciary capacity as will be excepted from the operation ward wrongfully taken up by a conductor of one of of a discharge. U. S. Circ. Ct., South Carolina. Ows the defendant's trains, will not relieve the passenger ley & Co. v. Cobin & Co., 15 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 489. from the duty of providing himself with a ticket, or PETITION.

paying fare on another train of the defendant in Practice, when facts requisite to authorize, denied : sup

which he may be a passenger. In such case, the right

of action of the passenger would be for the wrongful plementary petition.- Where upon a written denial by

taking up of the ticket, and for not having been rethe debtor that the requisite number and amount of

moved from a train by another conductor for refusing creditors have united in the petition, no reference to ascertain that fact is actually made, although an entry

to pay fare. Ib. of an order therefor appears upon the miuutes, the


1. Mortgage void as against creditors: right of adjudge is not called upou, under section 5021, to fix a

ministrator of mortgagor as to.-Where a chattel morttime within which additional creditors may join. Where, uuder such circumstances, a supplementary * From advance sheets of 29 Ohio State Reports.

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