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even if there was a defect in this respect. The question the absence of the preliminary petition required by of subscribing for the stock and issuing the bonds for a the statute. The court said that the act was intended road from the mouth of Kansas river to the south to sustain and not to defeat the will of the people. boundary of the State was submitted to the elector's This principle would have justified its application in of Johnson county. Notice was given for the time relief of the defect before it, if there was such defect, required by the statute, and a full and fair vote was and its consideration might well have altered the retaken, so far as we are informed. The approval of the sult. Both of these decisions were made after the electors by their vote, at a meeting called for that pur bonds in this suit had been issued and the interest pose, is the object of the statute. Defects, irregulari upon them regularly paid for a considerable time. The ties, or informalities, which do not affect the result of road had been built as promised, the county of Johnthe vote, do not affect its validity. The defect we are son and its people enjoyed the anticipated benefits, considering (if it is a defect) does not go to the ques and we are of the opinion that we are not bound to tion of jurisdiction, and does not impair the validity follow a decision which releases them from all the corof the bonds.

responding obligations. Gelpcke v, Dubuque, 1 Wall. The case of Lewis v. Commissioners of Bourbon Co., 175, 1865; Bulls v. Muscatine, 9 id, 571, 1871; Super12 Kan. 186, is cited on this point. In that case four | visors v. Olcott, 16 id. 678, 1872. questions were passed upon by the Supreme Court of Another question was also involved. It is a part of Kansas. First. Was the presentation of a petition, the case that on the 1st day of January, 1869, the railsigned by one-fourth of the qualified voters, a condi road company executed to Nathaniel Thayer, F. W. tion precedent to the valid action of the commission Palfrey and George W. Weld, the plaintiffs in this ers? Second. Did the failure to name the corpora suit, a deed of trust conveying a large quantity of tion in the propositions submitted to the electors avoid lands, and transferring, among other things, its subthe whole proceedings? Third. A majority of the scriptions from towns and counties, including that votes of the electors having been cast against the now in suit, to secure the payment of five millions of proposition to issue bonds, was the county board au dollars of its bonds to be issued by the said company, thorized to issue them? Fourth. Did the subsequent as therein particularly described; that before the submission, and the proceedings thereon, confer the coupons now sued upon had become payable, the railauthority to issue the bonds?

road company had issued five millions of its negotiaThe court held that the first objection was cured by ble bonds, which are now outstanding and unpaid to the act of 1868. The second and the third objections the full amount thereof. The court says: The queswere held to be fatal, and that the case was not re tion then arises whether notice to one of the trustees lieved by the proceedings referred to in the fourth ob in this deed of trust is notice to the holders of the jection.

mortgage bonds in such manner that in a suit by the The court did in its language hold that the objection trustees to enforce payment of the town bonds the raised in the present case, to wit, that the name of the character of a bona fide holder without notice is lost. corporation was not inserted in the proposition for the In Curtis and others v. Leavitt, 15 N. Y. 194, the court popular vote, was fatal. Had this been the only or an say: “If Graham, one of the trustees, was chargeable, indispensable part of the decision we should have as director of the company, with knowledge that there been called upon to inquire whether the decision was had been uo previous resolution, notice to him was one of that class of State decisions upon its own stat not notice to his cestui que trust. He did not stand to ute that was binding upon us. The other question, them in the relation of an agent. He was selected however, existing and decided in the Bourbon county and appointed as a trustee by the company, not by the case, was in its nature so exclusive, and so controlling, cestui que trust. His powers and duties were prethat any thing said, or professed to be decided be scribed by the company, not by the bondholders. yond it, does not require much consideration. The There were at the time of the execution of the trust court held that in the exercise of its general jurisdic deeds no bondholders, no cestui que trust. It is a nection it had the power to inquire into the number of essary attribute of an agency that it should be created votes actually cast for and against the proposed issue by the principal. * * * In this case, as the relation of bonds, and upon making such inquiry it found and of principal and agent did not exist between the bonddetermined that, in fact, a majority of the votes cast holders and Graham, notice to him, or knowledge by were against the proposition. Upon this point all the him, that there was no previous resolution was not decisions of this court, and, so far as we know of, all constructive notice to the bondholders." other courts, concur. If a majority of the electors And again, on the page following, it is said: “The cast their votes against the proposition to issue bonds, trustees are not to be regarded as the agents of the the entire foundation of the proceedings is gone. There purchasers of the bonds and mortgages assigned to is an absolute want of jurisdiction to proceed farther them. No consideration proceeds from them. They in the matter, and an attempt to do so is yoid, as are were mere assignees of those securities, coupled with all proceedings or issues based upon it. With this no interest, in trust to hold them as security for the elemental failure existing in the Bourbon county case, payment of all the mortgage bonds that should thereother and farther decisions tending to the same result after be sold or negotiated by the company. * * * are not to be regarded as authority.

Whoever purchased the mortgage bonds became purThe Gulf Railroad v. Comrs of Miami County, 12 chasers of the bonds and mortgages so assigned as seKan. 234, is based upon the Bourbon case above re- | curity for their payment, or of an equitable right to ferred to, and follows it without examination or dis hold them as such security." cussion. It does not refer to the curative act of Feb We think this is sound doctrine, and that it estabruary 25, 1868, which was held in the Bourbon county lishes the proposition that notice to Thayer did not case not to be applicable to an election where a major- operate to destroy the bona fide holding of the bondity of votes was cast against the proposition, but holders under the deed of trust in wbich he was named which act it was held did relieve against the defect of as one of the trustees.

from proving that he was not actually in posNOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS.

session at the service of the writ of ejectment, in Bailment: right of pledgee to use animal pledged.-A | order to relieve himself from liability for mesne person to whom a horse is pledged in security of a debt profits. Sup. Ct., Pennsylvania, May 7, 1877. Miller may use the horse but he must pay for the value of its v. Henry. services.(citing American authorities). Sheriff Court,

Negotiable instrument, what is not: note including Renfrewshire, Scotland. Kirkwood v. Brown (Scot. attorney's fee for suit.-Defendants, the maker and L. Mag.).

payee of an instrument in which the maker waived Cloud on title: deed from wife to husband.-Where "any and all exceptions under and by virtue of any the wife, in 1866, made a deed of her real estate execution, exemption, homestead or stay laws of the directly to her husband, held, that the same was State of Missouri, or that of any other State," and absolutely void at law, and, therefore, it will not be in which he promised also “to pay a reasonable enforced in equity. Where a deed is made by a wife attorney's fee for the bringing of suit in collection directly to her husband, but there is nothing upon its of this note, if suit thereon be brought or collection face to show the relation between them, such a deed, thereof be enforced after the same shall become though void, is a cloud upon title, as evidence aliunde | due," were sued as maker and indorser, respectiveis necessary to establish its invalidity. Sup. Ct., I ly. Held, (1) affirming Bank v. Gay, 63 Mo. 33, that Illinois, June 22, 1877. Brooks v. Kearns (Chic. L. it was not a negotiable promissory note; (2) that News).

the defendants were not jointly liable; (3) that the Eminent domain : condemnation of land for railroad | assignor could only be held liable in an action uses: payment a condition precedent: injunction: against him upon his implied undertaking to pay waiver.- Where land has been condemned for railroad after due diligence used by the assignee in the purposes, commissioners appointed, damages assessed, institution and prosecution of suit against the etc., the right of the land-owner to payment for his | maker for the recovery of the money due, or property as a constitutional condition precedent to the in the event of insolvency or non-residence of the transfer of the title to the land taken, exists in all its maker, so that suit would be unavailing or could original vigor. Where the corporation is insolvent and not be instituted. Sup. Ct., Missouri, April, 1877. the damages are not paid, it is the right and duty of Samstag v. Conley (Cent. L. J.). the trial court to issue an injunction restraining the Prescription : line fence.- The plaintiff is the owner corporation from operating its cars over the land until in fee of certain lands, and he has held open, actual, the owner shall have been paid the assessed dama continued and uninterrupted possession of the lands ges, and there is no vested right in the corpora to a certain fence beoween himself and the defendant tion, and no doctrine of public policy or conveni | (which fenoe was not on the section line between ence which can absolve a court of equity from this them) for more than twenty years next preceding duty. Courts of equity, in such cases, will indulge in the commencement of this suit, and during this time no presumption that the land owner has waived or a fixed and permanent division fence has been kept postponed his right to insist on payment of the dama-l up and continued unchanged there. Held, that the ges, and will insist on, at least, as conclusive evidence plaintiff was entitled to the ownership and possession of alleged waiver as is required in cases of vendor's of the said land up to the fence, in virtue of his lien, the condemnation and seizure of the land being adverse possession, wherever the original line may a statutory proceeding in invitum. Sup. Ct., Mis- have been between them. Sup. Ct., Iowa, April, 1877. souri, April, 1877. Evans v. Missouri, I. & N. R. R. Co. Meyer v. Weigman. (Cent. L. J.).

Promissory note : accommodation indorser: where Fraud: when sale fraudulent: knowledge of vendee.- fraud alleged, holder of accommodation paper taken as Where goods were sold and the vendor at the time was | collateral security not a purchaser for value.- The indebted, and his creditors attached the property on | holder of accommodation paper, pledged to him as the ground of a fraudulent sale to defeat the vendor's collateral security for an antecedent debt, is not a creditors, held, it is sufficient if the purchaser of the purchaser for value, and a note in his hands may be goods knew of the fraudulent intent of the seller or impeached for fraud in its making and procurehad notice of such facts as would have put a man of ment. Sup. Ct., Pennsylvania, Feb. 6, 1877. Cumordinary prudence upon inquiry, which, being made mings v. Boyd (W. N. Cas.). with ordinary diligence, would have discovered the Removal of cause: jurisdiction.– The defendant fraudulent purpose or intent of the seller. Sup. filed its application and bond for the removal of the Ct., Iowa, April, 1877. Jones v. Hetherington. cause from the State to the Federal court. After

Judgment: holder of subsequent lien on land affected approving the bond, the State court permitted the by, may show amount due on.- A judgment was plaintiff to enter a nonsuit. Held, that after the entered on a bond in the penal sum of $8,000, con filing of the proper application and bond the State ditioned for the payment of “all moneys borrowed court could proceed no further in the cause, and from the said, The Ashland Banking Company, or that any attempt in that direction was coram non which may from time to time be borrowed from judice; and that consequently, the nonsuit was the same, lawful money as aforesaid, at or upon the improperly granted. Sup. Ct., Missouri, April, days and times when the same shall fall duo". Held, 1877. Berry v. Chic., R. I. & P. R. R. Co. (Cent. that the holder of a subsequent mortgage should be | L. J.). allowed to show the real amount due, for which the Rent: crops reserved in a lease: when rent due: tenbond entered up was security. Sup. Ct., Pennsyl- ant's ownership in crop undivided.— The share of the vania, May 7, 1877. Price's Appeal.

crops reserved by the lease to the land-owner is Mesne profits : evidence : estoppel.- A defendant in an to be regarded as rent. The owner of the land action of mesne profits, against whom judgment in acquired no property in the part of the crop reserved the ejectment has been entered, is not preoluded' for rent until it was set apart to him by the ten

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ants; the ownership of the tenants continued till week, commonly called Sunday.” The subject of that time. The rent in such case is not paid till which it treats is a single one, and that is the preventhe part of the crop is set apart by the tenant for tion of public dramatic entertainments in the city of the landlord, and is not payable until this can be New York on Sunday. Held, that the act is not obdone. Sup. Ct., Iowa, April, 1877. Tounsend v. noxious to the requirement of the constitution, artiIsenberger.

cle 3, section 16, that “no * * * local bill which Railroad aid bonds: Illinois statute : bonds void in may be passed by the legislature shall embrace more hands of innocent holders for value.- The act of March than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the 7, 1867, authorizing certain towns and cities to appro title." Judgment below affirmed. Neuendorf v. priate money in aid of railroads, confers no authority | Duryea. Opinion by Folger, J. Church, C. J., dison such towns and cities to issue bonds or borrow sented. money with which to pay such donations. Nor 2. Act mentioned does not infringe on right of wor. does the subsequent act of February 26, 1869, confer ship.-Nor does the act infringe upon the right presuch authority. The act of March 24, 1869, has a served by the constitution in article 1, section 3: prospective operation, and cannot be insisted upon as “The free exercise and enjoyment of religious prolegalizing bonds already issued under the previous acts fession and worship without discrimination or prefermentioned. Such donations or appropriations were ence * * * in this State to all mankind," etc. Ib. to be paid by a tax which it was the duty of the 3. Lindenmuller v. People, 33 Barb. 548, approved corporate authorities to levy and collect. Where our | and followed. Ib. mode of payment of municipal indebtedness is fixed [Decided May 22, 1877.] by statute, by implication, it excludes all others.

EVIDENCE. Held, also, that the bonds in question, having been of pecuniary condition, when inadmissible.-In an issued without authority of law, are void in whoso action involving a loan, evidence was offered showing ever hands they may be. Sup. Ct., Illinois, June that at various times, some three years previous to the 22. 1877. Town of Middleport v. Treasurer of Iroquois time of making the alleged loan, plaintiff had made County (Chic. L. News).

declarations that he was without means of his own Slander: words imputing crime: how understood : evi

| amounting to as much as the loan. It was shown, dence: malice: rumor: damages: mental anxiety. - however, that he did at the time the loan was claimed Where slanderous words, imputing a crime, are to have been made have money enough in his possesspoken, they are to be considered in an actionable sion to make it. Held, reversing the decision of sense, unless the evidence tends to show that, from the court below, that a rejection of the evidence was the circumstances of the speaking, or from facts proper. Nicholson v. Waful. Opinion by Folger, J. known to the hearer, they were not calculated to [Decided June 19, 1877. Reported below, 6 Hun, 655.] impress him with the fact that a crime was charged.

MORTGAGE. Proof of the speaking of slanderous words at times

1. Right of holder to contract with reference to.- The not charged in the petition is admissible for the

holder of a bond and a mortgage on real estate may

hola purpose of showing malice. In such action it is not

make an executory agreement with the maker thereof competent for plaintiff to prove that because of the

and a third person for an extension of the time of speaking of the slanderous words there was a rumor

payment, for a decrease of the sum to be paid, and in the neighborhood in reference to the charge. It

for a different mode of payment, but it must be a lawis not competent in an action of slander to prove

ful agreement, founded upon a new and good considthat the plaintiff has been troubled, and suffered

eration. When such agreement is made it takes the mental anxiety, because of the speaking of the

place of the bond and mortgage, or is incorporated words. Sup. Ct., Iowa, April, 1877. Prime v. East

with them pro tanto. Judgment below affirmed. Clapp wood.

v. Hawley. Opinion by Folger, J.

2. When mortgage not enforceable.- Where time was COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT.

not of the essence of a contract under which the bond

and mortgage was given, and the contract has been in BOUNDARIES.

part performed by the defendant and plaintiff has reFixed monuments control courses: when boundary is

ceived his portion of the avails of such part performmonument.-The rule is well settled that a convey

ance, and plaintiff has not insisted upon performance, ance is to be construed in reference to its visible loca

and there has not been a specified time agreed upon or tion calls as marked or appearing upon the land in

named by either party at or before which there should preference to quantity, course or distance, and any

be a full performance or an omission to make it a departicular may be rejected if inconsistent with other

fault; held, that neither the bond nor mortgage parts of the description and sufficient remains to lo

could be enforced. Ib. cate the land intended to be conveyed. A boundary | Decided May 22. 1877) line referred to in a deed as the " Johnson” boundary,

PARTIES. held to be in the nature of a monument, and parol

In action in nature of creditor's bill: judgment debtor evidence competent to show where this boundary was. Judgment below affirmed. Robinson v. Kime. Opiu

necessary.-In the case of a creditor's bill to reach a

chose in action the judgment debtor is a necessary ion by Andrews, J.

party; and this is especially true when the property [Decided June 12, 1877.]

sought to be reached is claimed to be held in trust, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

and when the judgment debtor is the representative of 1. Laws 1860, chap. 501, forbidding dramatic repre an estate interested in such property. Judgment besentations in New York city on Sunday, valid.The low affirmed. Miller, receiver, v. Hall. Opinion by title to Laws of 1860, chapter 501, is “ An act to pre- | Miller, J. serve the public peace and order on the first day of the 1 [Decided June 22, 1877.]


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in which the purchase price is to be paid in installWhen case sustained by uncontradicted evidence must ments which are called payments of rent. The court be submitted to jury.-The general rule is that where a say: It was decided by this court, in Green v. Van disinterested witness, who is in no way discredited, tes Buskirk, 5 Wall. 307 ; 7 id. 139, that the liability of tifies to a fact within his own knowledge, which is not property to be sold under legal process, issuing from of itself improbable or in conflict with other evidence, the courts of the State where it is situated, must be the witness, is to be believed and the fact is to be taken determined by the law there, rather than that of the as legally established, so that it cannot be disregarded | jurisdiction where the owner lives. These decisions by court or jury. But in this case, which was an ac rest on the ground that every State has the right to tion by a real estate broker for money alleged to be regulate the transfer of property within its limits, and due upon a contract made by him with defendant's that whoever sends property to it impliedly submits testator to pay him for services in procuring the sale to the regulations concerning its transfer in force of real estate, the only witness was plaintiff's son, there, although a different rule of transfer prevails in who was a clerk in his office, and whose compensation the jurisdiction where he resides. He has no absolute was in part dependent upon the receipt by his father right to have the transfer of property, lawful in that of commissions for the sale of property, and this wit- jurisdiction, respected in the courts of the State where ness testified to a single conversation in which the it is located, and it is only on a principle of comity testator agreed to pay plaintiff more than twice the that it is ever allowed. But this principle yields when usual fee for procuring the sale of the property. Held,

the laws and policy of the latter conflict with the that the case should be submitted to the jury. Judg

former. ment below reversed. Kavanagh v. Wilson, executor.

The policy of the law in Illinois will not permit the Opinion by Earl, J.

owner of personal property to sell it, either absolutely [Decided June 12, 1877.]

or conditionally, and still continue in possession of it.

As possession is one of the strongest evidences of title USURY.

to this class of property, it is not allowable to sep1. Contract fair on face does not raise presumption

arate the possession from the title except in the manner of : burden of proof.-Where a commission merchant

pointed out by statute. To suffer real ownership to be contracted with a dealer in produce for the loan or

in one person and the ostensible ownership in another, advance to such dealer of money at the legal rate of

without notice to the world, the courts of Illinois gay, interest to enable the dealer to purchase or carry his

give a false credit to the latter, and in this way works merchandise, and also for an agreed commission to

an injury to third persons. Accordingly, the real undertake the care, management and sale of the com

owner of personal property creating an interest in anmodity, such contract being in a proper and usual

other, to whom it is delivered, if desirous of preseryform, held affirming judgment below, that such

ing a lien on it, must comply with the requirements contract did not of itself establish usury, and it was

of the chattel-mortgage act. R. 8. Illinois, 1874, chap. upon the party seeking to impeach it upon that ground

95, p. 711-12. This act requires that the instrument to prove that it was usurious. Matthew8 v. Coe. Opinion by Allen, J.

of conveyance, {if it have the effect to preserve a

mortgage, or a lien on the property, it must be re2. Practice: general objection to report of referee.Where there is no evidence to support the finding of a

corded, whether the party to it be a resident or non

resident of the State. If this be not done there is no referee, an exception to the report presents a question

validity to the instrument, so far as third persons are of law reviewable on appeal. Ib.

concerned. [Decided June 22, 1877.]

Secret liens, which treat the vendor of personal propWASTE.

erty who has sold it and delivered possession of it to Felling of timber by tenant: where right of action ac

the purchaser, as the owner until the payment of the crues.—The felling of timber trees by a tenant for the

purchase-money, cannot be maintained in Illinois. purpose of sale to the injury of the reversioner is

They are held to be constructively fraudulent as to waste, and an action lies by the reversioner imme

creditors, and the property, so far as their rights are diately to recover the damages to the freehold, and it

concerned, is considered as belonging to the purchaser is no defense to the action that the tenant acted in

holding the possession. McCormick v. Hadden, 37 III. good faith or under a claim of right, or that he was in

370; Ketchum v. Watson, 24 id. 591. Nor is the transpossession, claiming title in fee to the land upon which

action changed by the agreement assuming the form the waste was committed. The reversioner is not

of a lease. Courts will always look to the purpose to debarred from his remedy for waste because the pro

be attained by the contract rather than the name ceeding may involve the determination of a disputed

given to it by the parties, in order to determine its title. Judgment below affirmed. Robinson y. Kime.

real character. If that purpose be to give the vendor Opinion by Andrews, J.

a lien on the property until payment in full of the [Decided June 12, 1877.)

purchase-money, it is liable to be defeated by cred

itors of the purchaser who is in possession of it. This SECRET LIENS ON PERSONAL PROPERTY.-

was held in Murch v. Wright, 46 11. 488. In that case SALE OR RETURN UNDER FORM

the purchaser took from the seller a piano at the price OF LEASE.

of $700. He paid $50 down, which was called rent for THE case of Hervey et al., plaintiffs in error, v, Rhode the first month, and was to pay $50 each month as rent T Island Locomotive Works, decided by the Supreme until the whole amount was paid, when he was to own Court of the United States at the term just concluded, the piano. The court say, “tbat it was a mere subpasses upon a question arising under a form of con terfuge to call this transaction a lease," and held that tract of sale or return, which is at the present time | it was a conditional sale, with the right of rescission very common. The article is in fact sold, but a writ on the part of the vendor, in case the purchaser should ten contract is executed which is in the form of a lease I fail in payment of his installments — a contract legal and valid as between the parties, but made with the tinued inaction as amounts to gross negligence in the risk on the part of the vendor of losing his lien, in party prosecuting, when such inaction is to the precase the property should be levied upon by the cred- judice of innocent persons. A mortgage was executed itors of the purchaser while in possession of the lat in 1837, upon which bill of foreclosure was filed in ter. The case at bar is like this case in all essential 1840, decree taken and order for sale issued in 1842. particulars.

Save continuances, no further action was had in the The engine Smyser is the only subject of contro case until 1868. In the meantime, the mortgagor, versy in this suit, and that was sold on condition that who had remained in open and notorious possession, each and all of the installments should be regularly had sold portions of the premises (to innocent purpaid, with a rigbt of rescission on the part of the chasers, without actual notice of the pending suit. vendor in case of default in any of the specified pay Such purchasers, and those under whom they claimed, ments.

had remained in actual possession more than twentyIt is true the instrument of conveyance purports to one years, when the plaintiff in the foreclosure suit, in be a lease and the sums stipulated to be paid are for 1869, caused to be issued another order of sale. Held, rent, but this form was used to cover the real trans- that the failure to take any action in the cause from action, as much so as was the rent of the piano in 1842 to 1868, unexplained, was such negligence as preMurch v. Wright, supra. There the price of the piano | vented an enforcement of the decree against actual was to be paid for in thirteen months, and here the purchasers, without actual notice. Fox v. Reeder. value of the engine, $12,093.96, was to be paid in one

NEGLIGENCE. year. It was evidently not the intention of the par

1. Who entitled to recover for death from, under statute : ties that this sum should be paid as rent for the use

next of kin: husband and wife.-In an action by the of the engine for one year. If so, why agree to sell

personal representative under the statute of 1851 (S. & and convey the full title on the payment of the last

C. 1139, 1140), to recover damages for causing by wronginstallment? In both cases the price of the property

ful act and neglect the death of a woman, who died inwas agreed upon, to be paid for in short installments,

testate, leaving a husband, but no children, or their and no words employed by the parties can have the

legal representatives, held, (1) the surviving huseffect of changing the true nature of the contracts.

band is, within the meaning of said act, the next of In the case at bar the agreement contemplated that

kin, and as such entitled to the fruits of any judgthe engine should be removed to the State of Illinois

ment obtained in the action. (2) While the proceeds and used by Conant & Co. in the prosecution of their

of a judgment recovered in an action under this statbusiness as contractors of a railroad. It was accord

ute are directed to be distributed to the beneficiaries ingly taken there and put to the use for which it was

of the judgment in the proportions provided by law purchased, but while in the possession of Conant &

in relation to the distribution of personal estates left Co., who exercised complete ownership over it, it was

by persons dying intestate, the money realized is not seized and sold, in the local courts of Illinois, as their

to be treated as part of the general estate of the inproperty. These proceedings were valid in the jurisdic

testate. The personal representative in whose name tion where they took place, and must be respected by

the action is brought is a trustee of the fund, and the Federal tribunals.

must distribute the proceeds of the judgment to those The Rhode Island Locomotive Works took the risk

to whom the general personal estate would descend of losing their lien in case the property should be

according to the course of the statute of descents and levied on by the creditors of Conant & Co. while in the

distribution. Steel, adm'r, v. Kurtz. possession of the latter, and they cannot complain, as

2. Amount of damages limited to compensation for the laws of Illinois pointed out a way to them to pre

actual loss. — (3) The amount of damages (within the serve and perfect it.

limit of the statute) are to be ascertained by the jury

from the proofs in the case, and are to be a fair and RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

just compensation to the widow or next of kin, with

reference to the pecuniary injury resulting to the SUPREME COURT COMMISSION OF OHIO. beneficiary from such death. (4) In such action, the CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.

jury, in assessing the damages, are limited to giving

pecuniary compensation for injuries resulting to the When question of fact for jury: erroneous charge.

beneficiaries in the action on account of the death of In an action for an injury occasioned by negligence,

the deceased. No damages can be given on account when the case is such as necessarily devolves careful

of the bereavement, mental suffering, or as a solace on ness on the plaintiff, and the proof given by him dis

account of such death. Ib. closes a case which fairly puts in question the due ex

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT. eroise of care on his part, the jury, in the determina

Alteration of note: what is: effect of.- Changing the tion of the question of contributory negligence, should

rate of interest in a note from six to seven per cent is be left free to consider all the evidence in the case. A

a material alteration. Such alteration, when made by charge of the court in such case, so given to the jury

the principal with the consent of the holder and that they may reasonably regard it as confining them,

owner, but without the consent of the surety, disupon the question of contributory negligence, to the

charges the surety, though such alteration was made evidence given only on the part of the defendant,

without fraudulent intent. Harsh v. Klepper. is misleading, and, therefore, erroneous. Weaver v. Gary.


TERM, 1876. Benefit of, lost by laches.-The benefit of the rule relating to lis pendens may be lost by suoh long-con


1. Upon after-acquired property: title of mortgagee. • From advance sheets of 28 Ohio State Reports. 1-At law in Rhode Island a mortgage of personal

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