in New York began to grow with rapid strides, and has continued to do so up to the present time, the ratio of increase being greater than that of any other large city in the world, except Chicago and Berlin. The density of the tenth ward, which is on the east side of the city, between the Brooklyn bridge and Grand street, is the greatest of any city in the world with the exception, perhaps, of a certain district in the city of Prague; and it may be said advisedly that sanitary district A, of the eleventh ward, has the greatest density of any corresponding area of the world, and twice that of Prague in 1893. It comprises about 320 acres, and the density ranges from 600 to 1,000 inhabitants per acre or an average of about 512,000 per square mile. The greatest density is 640,000 per square mile.

Chicago. This city, on account of its large area in comparison with the population, has an average only 8,430 inhabitants to the square mile, its area being 186 square miles. In arriving at the population for 1894, it is necessary to use considerable judgment in deciding which census should be employed. There has been estimates made of over 2,000,000, but, to be conservative the school census of 1894 is used, making the population, including the whole of Cook county, 1,692,727. In ascertaining the ratio of increase, different results are obtained by using different methods of estimating the population, whether by United States census or by that of the city. The increase from 1880 to 1890 by the United States census was 118 per cent. Comparing the United States census with the school census of 1890, the ratio of increase per decade is 106 per cent. If again we compare the school census of 1884 with the school census of 1894, we have an increase of 150 per cent. per decade. Mr. Corthell asks what the population of the cities under consideration is likely to be at the end of future decades, and hazards the following estimates:

This estimate is made with due allowance for the effect of certain disturbing conditions, such as the changes which new methods of transportation may bring about, either taking people more quickly and cheaply into cities or out of them into more distant districts which are now scarcely settled or entirely open. The congestion of city areas, making them too dense for health and comfort, must also tend to decrease population in many districts, but in spite of these counteracting forces, the ratio of growth will probably continue without diminution for some decades to come.

In view of these facts, it is not surprising that a new science should have arisen, the "science of the modern city," as Dr. Shaw calls it, the science of the ordering of common concerns in dense-population groups. The great modern problem, in general terms, is stated as follows: "How can the environment be most perfectly adapted to the welfare of the urban populations?”

The legal aspect of the question, as intimated at the outset, is, perhaps, the most important, and should be treated first. Has the municipality the power to cope with the evils of city life and adjust conditions to needs? What are the powers of municipalities and what is meant by local self-government? In England, a general investigation of the subject of municipal corporations led to the passage, in 1835, of the municipal corporation act, which gave to the borough council almost complete power to determine the municipal organization, by providing that the council might appoint such officers as it might think necessary and discontinue the appointment of any not deemed necessary. It also provided for the transfer to the borough council of powers of various special authorities. Power was given to levy a borough rate and to borrow money for specific purposes, subject to the approval of some central authority. Since 1835 many other powers have been conferred by general act upon municipal corporations. Thus they were permitted to provide for the housing of the working classes, to provide means of instruction and amusement for their population and to organize or acquire water works, gas works, tramways, etc. The new local government act of 1894 further increased the

powers of municipal corporations.

But while English legislation distinguishes very clearly between local affairs and affairs of a general character, it provides for the exercise of administrative control by the central authorities of London. The object is to prevent the assumption of excessive financial obligations. The borrowing and taxing power of municipalities is thus greatly restricted in theory, the consent of the local government board at London being required for the issue of loans. These are provisions in regard to the amount of money which may be borrowed, and the maintainance of a sinking fund to insure its payment. The important point to mark is that England has definitely given up the policy of regulating local matters by means of action of a central legislature.

How is it on the continent? The continental method is one of general grant of power subject to enumerated restrictions. The controlling principle is that municipal corporations are to have a sphere of action in which they are to be entirely free from central control. The municipal corporation may do anything where power has not been specifically conferred upon some other authority. This principle is believed to have been first adopted in the Prussian municipal corporations act of 1808, and has since been incorporated in most Prussian municipal corporation acts. It has also been adopted in France in

the Commons Act of 1884.

Again, municipal legislation in continental Europe is general and not special. The effect has been to develop local autonomy. Central administrative control is still very considerable and is exercised not only over financial administration and matters of general concern, but also over the municipal organization. In France and Prussia the central administration has the power to dissolve the municipal councils. But over purely local matters the central council does not extend.

In the United States the position of municipal corporations is very different. The sphere of local autonomy assigned to cities by the legislature is very small, and there is continual interference in local affairs on the part of the

central authority. There are several reasons for the failure of this country to profit by the experience and example of Europe. Early municipal organization in this country was based on the narrow conception of the sphere of municipal activity which prevailed in England prior to the passage of the municipal reform acts. The original American municipal corporation was an organization for the management of local property and finances. Almost its only function was the issue of local police ordinances. Certain officers of the corporation discharged judicial functions.

A striking result of the narrow character of the original American municipality was that the city council had no power to levy taxes in order to provide for the expenses of local services. Taxation being an attribute of sovereignty, municipalities were not clothed with the power to tax. Even at present, by the common law, the incorporation of a place is held by high authorities not to carry with it the power to levy taxes. It is purely as a result of statutes that municipal corporations have power to levy taxes.

Most of the large cities have become more than organizations for the satisfaction of local needs; they are in a sense agents of the state government, and are entrusted with the exercise of functions affecting the interests and welfare of the citizenship of the whole state. This double character of the municipal corporation might seem to invest it with greater importance than is possessed by a European city, but as a matter of fact it has retarded the pro · gressive development of the municipality as an independent self-governing body.

The fact that it exercises general functions appears to justify, if not to necessitate, interference and control on the part of the legislature. The two kinds of municipal activity have not been sufficiently distinguished, either in abstract or in practice, and the result has been that the legislature has interfered in everything, even in matters of purely local concern.

Thus the legislature has claimed the right to decide what salaries a municipality shall pay, to appoint municipal officers and legislate officers out of office. It has decided that certain specific streets shall be paved, it has regulated the method of transportation within the limits of the cities, and it imposed burdens for the purpose of constructing sewers and similar works. Matters which from the present European point are strictly local, have thus been regulated by the central authority of the state without even exciting the resentment of the inhabitants of the cities.

The evils of legislative interference in local matters are dwelt on in the report on the government of cities in the state of New York submitted by the Fassett Senate committee in 1891. The report says: "The situation then is as follows: That it is frequently impossible for the legislature, the municipal officers, or even the courts, to tell what the laws mean; that it is usually impossible for the legislature to tell what the probable effect of any alleged reform in the laws is likely to be; that it is impossible for any one either in private life or public office to tell what the exact business conditions of any city is, and that municipal government is a mystery even to the experienced; that municipal officers can escape responsibility for their acts or failures by

securing amendments to the law; that municipal officers can escape responsibility to the public on account of the unintelligibility of the laws and the insufficient publicity of the facts related to municipal government; that local authorities receive permission to increase the municipal debt for the performance of public works which should be paid for out of taxes; that the conflict of authority is sometimes so great as to result in a complete or partial paralysis of the service; that our cities have no real autonomy; that local self-government is a misnomer, and that consequently so little interest is felt in matters of local business that in almost every city in the state it has fallen into the hands of professional politicians.

"These are conditions which, if applied to the business of any other corportion, would make the maintainance of a continued policy and a successful administration as impossible as they are to-day in the government of our municipalities, and produce waste and mismagement such as is now the distinguishing feature of municipal business as compared with that of private corporations."

The testimony of ex-Mayor Seth Low, of Brooklyn, on this point is extremely valuable. In his chapter on municipal government in Mr. James Bryce's "American Commonwealth," Mr. Low writes: "The charter of a city, coming as it does from the legislature, is entirely within the control of the legislature. Just as there is no legal bar to prevent the legislature from recalling the charter altogether, so there is no feature of the charter so minute that the legislature may not assume to change it. In the state of New York there is no general law touching the government of cities, and the habit of interference in the details of city action has become to the legislature almost a second nature. In every year of his term the writer was compelled to oppose at Albany, the seat of the state legislature, legislation seeking to make an increase in the pay of policemen and firemen, without any reference to the financial ability of the city or the other demands upon the city for the expenditure of money. Efforts were made also at one time to legislate out of office some of the officials who had been appointed in conformity to the charter. New and useless offices were sought to be created, and the mayor found that not the least important of his duties as mayor was to protect the city from unwise and adverse legislation on the part of the state. It is a curious circumstance that most of these propositions had their origin with members of the legislature elected to represent different districts of the city itself. The city itself was compelled at times to seek legislation for the enlargement of its powers, that is to say, the powers committed to a city are strictly limited to those defined by the charter or granted by special acts of the legislature. Consequently when an unforseen situation is to be dealt with calling for unusual methods or powers, it is necessary to secure authority to this end from the legislature of the state."

Judicial decisions have consistently upheld the power of the legislature to regulate municipal affairs. As is well known, the Supreme Court of the United States has declared that a municipal charter, unlike a charter of a private corporation, is not a contract, but merely a public legal privilege which

may be amended by the legislature as it sees fit, and even taken away altogether. At an early date in American political history the Supreme Court assumed the position that municipal corporations, except so far as their property rights were concerned, were to be regarded as governmental agencies rather than as legal persons, and therefore subject to legal regulation.

The American view of the position and power of municipal corporations is clearly stated by Judge Dillon in his "Law of Municipal Corporations." He says that "It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers, and no others: First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporations-not simply convenient, but indispensable. Any fair, reasonable doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved by the courts against the corporation, and the power is denied. Of every municipal corporation the charter or statute by which it is created is its organic act. Neitheir the corporation nor its officers can do any act or make any contract or incur any liability not authorized thereby, or by some legislative act applicable thereto. All acts beyond the scope of the powers granted are void."

The rule of strict construction of corporate powers in general is familiar, and Judge Dillon observes that while this rule is not so directly applicable to the ordinary clauses in the charters or incorporating acts of municipalities as it is to the charters of private corporations, "it is equally applicable to grants of power to municipal and public bodies which are out of the usual range, or which may result in public burdens, or which in their exercise touch the right to liberty or property, or, as it may be compendiously expressed, any common law right of the citizen or inhabitant."

It is true that of late the courts have shown, a disposition to depart from the rule stated by Judge Dillon. There is now a pronounced tendency to recognize as existing in municipal corporations, from the mere fact of their incorporation, a very large range of powers over purely local matters. A recent case exemplifies this tendency in a striking and significant manner. The question was whether the city of Crawfordsville, Indiana, had the right to establish an electric lighting plant, not only for the lighting of the streets of the city, but also for the distribution of the electric light among the inhabitants. The only statute bearing upon the question was a general one providing that the common council of any city might light the streets and other public places of the city with electric light and might contract with any individuals or corporations for performing such services or for granting to any person or corporation the right to erect and maintain in the streets the necessary poles and appliances for the purpose of supplying electric light to the inhabitants of the city. Thus the only reference in the statute to the power of distributing electric light among the inhabitants was the one granting the power to the municipality to make a contract for such a purpose with some private corporation. There can hardly be any doubt that, had the view emphasized by Judge Dillon been taken in this case, the right of the city to supply electric light to its inhabitants, as a commercial enterprise, would have been denied. But the