Opinion of the Court. undertaking in writing, to pay the same, whether said note is given by her alone, or jointly with others; she being the sole and exclusive owner of the property, she holds it with all the incidents of property- the right of selling, giving, or charging it with the payment of debts." In Clark v. Valentino, 41 Georgia, 143, 147, the court approving of the language just quoted, says by Brown C. J.: "But it is insisted that this court has laid down a different rule as to the ability of the wife to bind her separate estate for the payment of the debts of her husband, in Kempton v. Hallowell and Company, 24 Georgia, 52; Hicks, Trustee v. Johnson, 24 Georgia, 194; and in Keaton v. Scott, 25 Georgia, 652. I think not. In all these cases the property was given and secured to the wife by deed or will, and it was expressly provided in the instrument, that it should in no case be subject to the debts of the husband; and the court held that her power of alienation was restricted by the donor in the instru ment by which she acquired it; and that she could not on that account bind it for the payment of her husband's debt, that being the very thing to which the restriction related. This amounts, however, only to an exception to the general rule, and is not the rule itself. The rule is, that the feme covert is a feme sole as to her separate estate, with full power of alienation or disposition at her pleasure. The exception is that if the donor has restricted the power of alienation or disposition, she is bound by such restriction, and cannot, directly or indirectly, alienate or bind it, in violation of the restriction placed upon it by the donor." The designation of a particular mode in the gift or settlement might preclude the adoption of any other. Wylly v. Collins, 9 Georgia, 223; Weeks v. Sego, 9 Georgia, 199; but unless restrained or fettered by the instrument in which her estate originated, she had the absolute power of disposition. Fears v. Brooks, 12 Georgia, 195. Of course she could make such disposition for such object and in such way as was expressly authorized. The code was adopted in 1863, and § 1773 of the edition of 1867, § 1783 of the edition of 1882, provides as follows: "The VOL. CXXVIII-16 Opinion of the Court. wife is a feme sole as to her separate estate, unless controlled by the settlement. Every restriction upon her power in it must be complied with; but while the wife may contract, she cannot bind her separate estate by any contract of suretyship, nor by any assumption of the debts of her husband, and any sale of her separate estate, made to a creditor of her husband in extinguishment of his debts, shall be absolutely void." While before this enactment a married woman could bind her separate estate for her husband's debts if she held the same free from restriction, the statute rendered that no longer possible, by imposing a restriction where none existed. But if an instrument settling property upon a married woman provides that she may pledge it for her husband's debts, there is nothing in the statute to prevent her from so doing. It is not wrong in itself for a wife, of her own free will, to devote her separate property to the relief of her husband. Obedience to the dictates of duty, or even yielding to the impulses of affection, has in itself no tendency to impair the happiness of the family but the contrary. As remarked in Sutton v. Aiken, Trustee, 62 Georgia, 733, 741, "it is evident that it is not wicked or immoral for a wife to pay her husband's debts, nor has the general public an interest in her abstaining from so doing. The restraint imposed upon her by the law is solely for her benefit and well being. The rule is economical, not moral; and its policy is in favor of a class, and not of the public at large. True, the class is a numerous and important one, but married women cannot be said to constitute the public. The public justice, police, order, safety, revenue, health, religion, or morality is not involved in preventing wives from devoting their property to the payment of their husbands' debts.” Hence, while the State has seen fit to impose a restriction where the instrument of gift is silent, or the wife otherwise holds by an unqualified ownership, it does not follow that the statute can be extended, upon grounds of general public policy, to destroy a power expressly bestowed, and render property inalienable which the donor granted upon condition that it might be conveyed as specified. It is not to be assumed that Opinion of the Court. the State intended to discourage gifts to, or settlements upon married women by making it impossible for those who wish to give to effectuate their intentions in respect to the terms on which the property should be held and disposed of. The wife is "controlled by the settlement," not only as to compliance with "every restriction upon her power," but also as to every provision therein which enables her to act as prescribed, notwithstanding, except for such provision, she could not, under the statute, do that which as a feme sole she might do. The wife cannot bind her separate estate "by any assumption of the debts of her husband," but the separate estate which she cannot thus bind is estate so settled to her sole and separate use as to be controlled without the concurrence of her husband; and where, by the terms of the instrument, his concurrence is essential to whatever is done, it is not so situated as to come within the intent and meaning of the statute. The property in question belonged to Brodnax. He conveyed it to a trustee by an instrument which required his assent to any sale or mortgage, and provided that the property should be held free from his debts contracts and liabilities, except such incumbrances or liens as might be made thereon at the written direction of himself and his wife. Under such circumstances the statute cannot be availed of to invalidate these mortgages; and this disposes of the case, for the mortgages were, in our judgment, such incumbrances as Mrs. Brodnax had the power to direct jointly with her husband to be created. The meaning of the clause of the deed bearing on this subject is, that while the property was to be free from the contracts, debts and liabilities, of the husband it might be specially subjected to encumbrance to secure some of his debts, upon the written agreement of both husband and wife to that effect. This exception cannot be rejected as inconsistent with the previous provision, for it does not go to destroy it. In the particular instances in which she might choose to join with Brodnax in doing what he had not reserved the legal right to demand, debts might be made a charge upon the property Citations for Appellants. which was otherwise to be held free from all his debts. And in this view it does not matter whether the debt secured was past due or not. The decree of the Circuit Court will therefore be affirmed. BANKS v. MANCHESTER. APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO. No. 45. Submitted October 29, 1888. - Decided November 19, 1888. In a hearing on bill and answer, allegations of new matter in the answer are to be taken as true. Where the judge of the Supreme Court of a State prepares the opinion or decision of the court, the statement of the case and the syllabus or head-note, and the reporter of the court takes out a copyright for such matter in his name" for the State," the copyright is invalid. A copyright, as it exists in the United States, depends wholly on the legislation of Congress. The judge who, in his judicial capacity, prepares the matter above mentioned, is not its author or proprietor, in the sense of § 4952 of the Revised Statutes, so that the State can become his assignee and take out a copyright for such matter. BILL IN EQUITY, to restrain the defendant from infringing the plaintiffs' copyright. The defendant answered, and the complainants demurred to the answer. Decree dismissing the bill, from which plaintiffs appealed. The case is stated in the opinion of the court. Mr. Edward L. Taylor, for appellants, cited: United States v. Hillegas's Executors, 3 Wash. C. C. 70; Hines v. North Carolina, 10 Sm. & Marsh. 529; Mexico v. De Arangois, 5 Luer (N. Y.) 634; Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591; Banks v. De Witt, 42 Ohio St. 263; Little v. Gould, 2 Blatchford, 362; Stationers v. Patentees about the Printing of Rolls' Abridgment, Carter, 89; Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burrow, 2383; Basket v. University of Cambridge, 1 Wm. Bl. 105; Myers v. Callaghan, 5 Opinion of the Court. Fed. Rep. 726; Gould v. Banks, 53 Conn. 415; Banks v. West Publishing Co., 27 Fed. Rep. 50. Mr. Richard A. Harrison, for appellee, cited: United States v. Rhodes, 1 Abbott (U. S.) 28; People v. Imlay, 20 Barb. 68; Gendell v. Orr, 13 Phila. 191; Miller v. Taylor, 4 Burrow, 2383; Lindsley v. Coats, 10 Ohio, 243; King v. Beck, 15 Ohio, 559; Banks v. West Publishing Co., 27 Fed. Rep. 50; Myers v. Callaghan, 5 Fed. Rep. 726; Nash v. Lathrop, 142 Mass. 29; Atwill v. Ferrett, 2 Blatchford, 39; Connecticut v. Gould, 34 Fed. Rep. 319; Gould v. Banks, 53 Conn. 415; Davidson v. Wheelock, 27 Fed. Rep. 61; Chase v. Sanborn, 4 Cliff. 306; Myers v. Callaghan, 20 Fed. Rep. 441; Banks v. Manchester, 23 Fed. Rep. 143. MR. JUSTICE BLATCHFORD delivered the opinion of the court. The Revised Statutes of Ohio, in §§ 426 to 435, (title 4, chapter 1, pp. 273, 274, edition of 1879,) provide for the appointment of a reporter by the Supreme Court of that State, to report and prepare for publication its decisions, and for the printing of copies of the reports by the public printer, and for their distribution to public officers, as soon as a form of sixteen pages of printed matter is printed, and also for the binding and distribution of a full volume. Section 436 provides as follows: "The reporter shall secure a copyright, for the use of the State, for each volume of the reports so published; and he shall receive such compensation for his services, not exceeding eighteen hundred dollars per year, during the time the Supreme Court Commission is in session; and at all other times not exceeding one thousand dollars yearly, payable out of the state treasury, in such instalments as the Supreme Court by order entered on its journal, directs." Section 437, as amended by the act of January 17th, 1881, 78 Laws of Ohio, 14, provides for the mode of doing such printing and binding, under a contract to be made by the Secretary of State with a responsible person or firm, when and as often as he shall be authorized to do so by a resolution of |