Opinion of the Court. place fixed for inspection and reception of the work by the city engineer or either of his assistants or deputies, and such owners, their agents and representatives, may appear and be heard before such engineer, his assistant or deputy, as to whether such improvements have been made in accordance with the ordinance authorizing the same and the contract therefor." 1 Kentucky Session Laws, 1881, 990. In accordance with the provisions of this act the local improvements in question were made, and warrants issued for the sums apportioned against each of the lots belonging to plaintiffs in error as their share of the cost, to Joseph Nevin, the contractor, one of the defendants in error, who assigned them to Samuel B. Richardson, the other, and they brought the actions. The plaintiffs in error set up in their pleadings, and insisted in the trial court, that the act of the General Assembly, so far as it authorized the cost of the improvements of streets and other ways to be assessed against the owners of lots and gave a lien thereon, in the manner therein provided, and all the proceedings thereunder, were in conflict with section one of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, as amounting to a deprivation of property without due process of law and a denial of the equal protection of the laws. The statute has been repeatedly before the Kentucky Court of Appeals, which has sustained it as constitutional and proper legislation, the powers vested thereby in the local government being subjected to the supervision of the courts, "where the particular facts in each case can be examined, and the controversy determined by those rules and principles which have always governed courts in dealing with questions of assessment and taxation." Preston v. Roberts, 12 Bush, 570, 587; Beck v. Obst, 12 Bush, 268; Broadway Baptist Church v. McAtee, 8 Bush, 508, 516. Unjust, unequal, or arbitrary burdens are not authorized to be imposed by the terms of the act, and opportunity is given to every party interested to be heard in opposition to the enforcement of the liability in the courts, which are specifically authorized to "make all corrections, rules, and orders to do justice to all parties concerned." Opinion of the Court. In Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 104, it was held by this court, Mr. Justice Miller delivering the opinion, "that whenever by the laws of a State, or by state authority, a tax, assessment, servitude, or other burden is imposed upon property for the public use, whether it be for the whole State or of some more limited portion of the community, and those laws provide for a mode of confirming or contesting the charge thus imposed, in the ordinary courts of justice, with such notice to the person, or such proceeding in regard to the property, as is appropriate to the nature of the case, the judgment in such proceedings cannot be said to deprive the owner of his property without due process of law, however obnoxious it may be to other objections. It is not possible to hold that a party has, without due process of law, been deprived of his property, when, as regards the issues affecting it, he has, by the laws of the State, a fair trial in a court of justice, according to the modes of proceeding applicable to such a case." And the conclusion was reached that neither the corporate agency by which the work is done, the excessive price which the statute allows therefor, nor the relative importance of the work to the value of the land assessed, nor the fact that the assessment is made before the work is done, nor that the assessment is unequal as regards the benefits conferred, nor that personal judgments are rendered for the amount assessed, are matters in which the state authorities are controlled by the Federal Constitution. So the determination of the taxing district and the manner of the apportionment are all within the legislative power. Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S. 345; Stanley v. Supervisors, 121 U. S. 535, 550; Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691; Hagar v. Reclamation District No. 108, 111 U. S. 701; United States V. Memphis, 97 U. S. 284; Laramie County v. Albany County, 92 U. S. 307. And whenever the law operates alike on all persons and property, similarly situated, equal protection cannot be said to be denied. Wurts v. Hoagland, 114 U. S. 606; Railroad Company v. Richmond, 96 U. S. 521, 529. The remedy for abuse is in the state courts, for, in the language of Mr. Justice Field in Mobile v. Kimball, "this court is not Opinion of the Court. the harbor in which the people of a city or county can find a refuge from ill-advised, unequal, and oppressive State legislation." As the question raised in these cases is a Federal question (Spencer v. Merchant, supra), we will not sustain the motions to dismiss; but as there was, in our judgment, color for those motions, and the contention now made has often been pressed upon our attention before, and as often determined adversely, so that the rule must be regarded as settled, we shall grant the motions to affirm. Affirmed. MEANS v. DOWD. APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 47. Submitted and decided December 17, 1888. FOR The court denies a motion for an order for a mandate, no notice of it having been given to the other party. IT has been the custom with the court to make a general order, immediately before the commencement of the February recess, for the issue of mandates in every case disposed of prior to the 1st of January, if application therefor should be made, except in cases in which a petition for rehearing might be pending, and cases docketed and dismissed under the 9th rule. In this case, which is reported ante, page 273, application was made to the court for the immediate issue of a mandate, without giving the other party notice of the intention to make such a motion. Mr. W. W. Fleming for the motion. No one opposing. PER CURIAM: No notice having been given to the other side, and there being no agreement of the parties that the mandate may issue, the motion is Denied. Opinion of the Court. CHAPPELL V. BRADSHAW. Error to the Court of Appeals of the State of Maryland. No. 1037. This case is reported ante, page 132. A like motion under a like circumstance being made for the issue of a mandate, it was denied, but the court informed the counsel that he was at liberty to file his motion and give notice, which he elected to do. HOYT'S ADMINISTRATOR v. HANBURY. APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS. No. 109. Submitted December 6, 1888. - Decided December 17, 1888. This court concurs with the Circuit Court in its opinion upon the effect of the proofs in this case, and affirms the decree below. When a letter is found in the record as part of the evidence taken before a master, and it is certified by the clerk as filed on the same day as other exhibits specifically referred to in a deposition, and the record shows no objection taken to its admission at the hearing before the court, it must, in this court, be deemed to have been admitted by consent. BILL IN EQUITY. The case is stated in the opinion of the court. Mr. H. C. Cady and Mr. Theodore E. Davis for appellant. No appearance for appellees. MR. JUSTICE GRAY delivered the opinion of the court. The bill in equity in this case was filed by Emily Hoyt against Anna Hanbury and Miner N. Knowlton, to compel Knowlton, the plaintiff's brother and attorney in fact, to account for money entrusted by her to him, and by him invested in land in Chicago, Illinois; as well as to set aside a contract and conveyances executed by him and by Mrs. Hanbury, by which that land was exchanged for land at Clarendon Hills, in the neighborhood of Boston, Massachusetts, upon the ground that he was induced to enter into the contract and Opinion of the Court. to make the exchange by her false and fraudulent representa tions as to the situation and value of the land in Massachusetts. The Circuit Court entered a money decree against Knowlton, and dismissed the bill as against Mrs. Hanbury, and an appeal taken by the plaintiff is now prosecuted by her administrator. On examination of the evidence, and especially the testimony of Knowlton and of Mrs. Hanbury, and the letters written by Knowlton before and after the exchange, this court concurs in the opinion, expressed by the Circuit Judge, that Knowlton had had some experience as a dealer in real estate, and was quite capable of taking care of his own interests; that in making the exchange he did not rely upon what was said by Mrs. Hanbury, but acted upon his own judgment and upon information obtained by him from third persons; and consequently that no ground is shown for maintaining the bill. As the case turns upon a pure question of fact, depending upon conflicting evidence, and can be of no value as a precedent, further discussion of the testimony would be useless. In the brief for the appellant, it is objected that one letter, written by Knowlton to Mrs. Hanbury after the exchange, which strongly supports the conclusion below, cannot be considered, because it was never offered in evidence. But this objection is not open to the appellant. The letter is found in the record as part of the evidence taken before the master, and is certified by the clerk to have been filed on the same day as other exhibits specifically referred to in Mrs. Hanbury's deposition, and the record does not show that any objection was taken to its admission at the hearing before the court. It must, therefore, under Rule 13 of this court, be deemed to have been admitted by consent. Decree affirmed. |