Opinion of the Court. corporations. The act declares that the property thus acquired shall be vested in the trustees of the society, and shall be held for the uses and purposes therein named, and no other, the uses and purposes named being those of religious worship. The property is held under a trust. It was said in Niccolls et al. v. Rugg et al. 47 Ill. 51, that the sole object of a court of chancery in cases of this character, is to enforce a trust, and hold the trust property to the purposes for which it was originally given. The object sought by this bill is to pervert the property from the purpose for which it was acquired, to withdraw it in part from use for the purpose of religious worship, and apply it to the individual use of members of the congregation. A court of equity will not lend its aid to any such diversion of the property from the uses to which it was devoted. The division which it will aid to effect must be for the purpose of religious worship. And it must be applied for, not by members of the congregation as individuals, but by an organized religious body, for the purpose of religious worship. The schism contemplated by the article of the constitution, adopted by the congregation in 1870, upon which a partition of the church property was to follow, was, as we regard it, a division or separation of the church into two religious bodies, and there must be a separate organization of part of the original church, in order to claim a division of the church property. We are of opinion the demurrer to the bill was properly sustained, and the decree of the court below will be affirmed. Decree affirmed. 1. PLEDGE a security for whole debt and every part of it. In all cases a pledge is understood to be a security for the whole and for every part of the debt or engagement, unless it is otherwise stipulated between the parties. If several things are pledged, each is deemed liable for the whole debt or other engagement, and the pledgee may proceed to sell them, from time to time, until the debt or other claim is completely discharged. If anything perishes by accident or casualty, without his fault, he has a right over the residue for his whole debt or other duty. 2. SAME-extending lien to a prior or subsequent debt. The mere existence of a former debt due the pledgee does not authorize him to detain the pledge for that debt when it has been put in his hands for another debt, unless there is some just presumption that such was the intention of the parties. The same rule applies to a subsequent debt or loan contracted by the pledger, for in such case the new debt or loan will not attach to the pledge, unless the circumstances create a presumption that the new debt or loan was made upon the credit of the pledge, and was so understood by the parties. 3. Where a party pledged a lot of whisky for the re-payment of a sum of money borrowed, with interest, storage, etc., and a few weeks after pledged another lot for a similar loan, and there was no proof that either pledge was dependent on the other, or that when the first pledge was made a future loan was anticipated, or that when the second one was made the first was alluded to: Held, that each pledge was a security for the loan made at the time, and not both for the first loan. 4. SAME measure of damages for a conversion of. Where property pledged is taken and converted by a mere wrongdoer, having no interest or claim in the same, the pledgee will be entitled to recover in trover to the extent of the full value of the property so converted. But where the conversion is by an officer acting under a legal writ of attachment or execution against the pledger, he will occupy the same position as if he were the pledger himself, and be subject only to the same measure of damages. 5. Where two different loans were made at different times, of $900 each, the first upon a pledge of 22 barrels of whisky, and the second upon a pledge of 20 barrels, neither being dependent upon the other, and the whisky was all seized upon attachment against the pledger, and on repievin by the pledgee the last lot of 20 barrels was recovered and restored to the pledgee, it was held, on the trial, under a count in trover Statement of the case. for the conversion of the other lot, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the full amount due him on the first loan, and that in the absence of proof showing that he had appropriated the 20 barrels to his own use, the value of the same, in excess of the sum due him on the second loan, could not be deducted from the sum due on the first loan, as the second pledge was still liable to be redeemed by paying the sum for which it was held. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. LAMBERT TREE, Judge, presiding. This was an action of replevin, brought by Miller C. Baldwin. H. Pomeroy Baldwin, and Albert A. Alexander, partners, etc., against Timothy M. Bradley, sheriff of Cook county, for the recovery of 42 barrels of whisky. The coroner returned that he had taken and delivered to the plaintiff 20 barrels of the whisky, giving their brands, and had not found the balance. A count in trover was inserted in the declaration as to the 22 barrels not found. The defendant, to the count in replevin, pleaded that, as sheriff of Cook county, he had attached the goods by virtue of certain writs of attachment against the firm of Kiernan & Son, whose property he averred they were, and also that the goods were the property of Patrick and William Kiernan. To the count in trover he pleaded not guilty. It appeared that the plaintiffs made two loans of money to Kiernan, each of $900, the first on March 29, 1872, and the second on April 18, 1872, and that the re-payment of each loan was secured by a pledge of whisky: the first by a pledge of 22 barrels, the same described in the count in trover, and the last by a pledge of 20 barrels, which were replevied by the plaintiffs. A trial was had, resulting in a verdict upon the count in trover for $308, in favor of the plaintiffs. They, claiming $962.85, the sum due them on the pledge, prayed for a new trial, which the court overruled and rendered judgment on the verdict. The plaintiffs appealed from this judg ment. Messrs. UPTON, BOUTELL & WATERMAN, for the appellants. Messrs. SANSUM & LEDDY, for the appellee. 3 69TH ILL. Opinion of the Court. Mr. JUSTICE SCHOLFIELD delivered the opinion of the Court: It is not seriously contested that the property in controversy was pledged to appellants, and it is conceded that it was converted by appellee. The only question discussed in the briefs before us, and to which we have thought it necessary to direct our attention, is, what, under the evidence, is the measure of appellants' damages? As against a mere wrongdoer, the appellants would be entitled to recover to the extent of the full value of the property converted; but we do not consider appellee as standing in that light. His conversion was made in executing certain writs of attachment against Kiernan, the party by whom the pledge was made, and we have no reason to assume that they were not regularly and properly issued. In that view of the case, the appellee occupies the same position that Kiernan would. had he made the conversion and the suit been brought against him. It is contended by appellants that they are entitled to recover the amount which the 22 barrels of whisky were pledged to secure, with the interest agreed to be paid thereon, and proper charges made in respect to the pledge, including inspection and storage, while appellee insists, without denying that appellants are entitled to be paid these items, that the 20 barrels of whisky taken on the writ of replevin should be charged against appellants, and that their recovery should be limited to what may then remain due from Kiernan, on account of both pledges; and it is argued, that it would not only be equitable, but that it is legal to treat the loans and pledges made on the 29th day of March and the 18th day of April as one transaction. Were we inclined to take this view of the case, we are unable to perceive how, upon correct legal principles, it could materially better the condition of appellee. In all cases the pledge is understood to be a security for the whole and for every part of the debt or engagement, unless it Opinion of the Court. is otherwise stipulated between the parties. Story on Bailments, sec. 301. If several things are pledged, each is deemed liable for the whole debt or other engagement; and the pledgee may proceed to sell them, from time to time, until the debt or other claim is completely discharged. If one thing perishes by accident or casualty, without his default, he has a right over the residue for his whole debt or other duty. Ibid. sec. 314. But the character and extent of appellants' lien must alone be determined by the contract between them and Kiernan, and from it we must learn whether the 20 barrels of whisky should be appropriated to the payment of the amounts which the 22 barrels were pledged to secure. It is said in Story on Bailments, sec. 304: "The mere existence of a former debt due to the pledgee does not authorize him to detain the pledge for that debt, when it has been put into his hands for another debt or contract, unless there is some just presumption that such was the intention of the parties. The like rule applies to a subsequent debt or loan contracted by the pledger, for in such case the new debt or loan will not be deemed to attach to the pledge, so that the pledgee may retain the same therefor, unless, from all the circumstances, there is just ground of presumption that the new debt or loan was made upon the credit of the pledge, and was so understood by the parties. The rule in all these cases strictly applies, that the particular contract is to govern the rights of the parties. Modus et conventio vincunt legem." Here, two loans were made, for $900 each, for the period of 30 days. The amount to be paid on the first loan for money advanced, use of money, and charges of inspection and storage, was $962.95; and on the second loan, for the same items, the amount to be paid was $962.36. The first loan was made on the 29th day of March, and the 22 barrels of whisky now in controversy were pledged to secure its payment. The second loan was made on the 19th day of April, and the 20 barrels of whisky replevied were pledged to secure its payment. The |