is morally justifiable; and that the nation which adopts such a policy is entitled to the moral support of the world, and the nation. which obstructs such a policy merits the condemnation of mankind.

5. That the exercise of force by the United States within the Isthmus of Panama is legally justifiable to the extent that such force is necessary to protect rights and fulfill duties created by treaty stipulations.

6. That the legal right conferred upon the United States by the treaty of 1846 to a free and unobstructed transit across the isthmus of Panama justifies the use of force sufficient to preserve the said line of transit free from all obstruction.

7. That the legal duty imposed upon the United States by the same treaty, to maintain the sovereignty of the territory, justifies and requires the exercise of force sufficient to prevent the encroachment of any foreign power upon this territory.

8. That the right of way conditioned by the correlative duty of protection constitutes an easement attached to the territory and unaffected by changes of proprietorship.

9. That by the transference of the soverignty of this territory to the new republic of Panama, the legal right of defending the transit across the isthmus is still held by the United States as against Panama; and the legal duty of maintaining the sovereignty of the territory against foreign encroachments is still imposed upon the United States in favor of Panama.

10. That by the recognition of the independence of the new republic, Columbia has acquired the status of a country foreign to Panama; and the United States is hence under the legal obligation to protect by all necessary force the territorial sovereignty of Panama against any encroachments on the part of Columbia.

The Legal Adviser gives the following summary of the "Venezuela Case:"

The Hague Tribunal has decided in favor of Germany, Great Britain and Italy, the blockading powers in the Venezuela case. The Tribunal decided that the blockading

powers are entitled to a preference of 30 per cent. of the custom duties at La Guayra and Puerto Cabello, the litigants to pay the cost of the Tribunal.

The Tribunal states that it has been guided by international law, the equity of the case, the protocols signed at Washington since Feb. 13, 1903, and the protocol of May 7. The court further says that it is not competent to question the character of the warlike operations of the blockading powers, nor to decide whether they had exhausted all pacific means to prevent the necessity for employing force.

The decision also states that the blockading powers could not have intended to renounce the acquired rights, that Venezuela throughout the diplomatic negotiations constantly distinguished between the allied powers and the neutrals, and that the latter did not protest against the claims for preference by the blockading powers, either at the time the war stopped or immediately after the signature in the protocol of Feb. 13.

To the United States is assigned the duty of carrying out the decision of the Tribunal so far as it relates to the payment of costs.

Having submitted the case to The Hague Tribunal, its decision has become international law so far as the signatory powers are concerned and will, no doubt, be recognized as law by all the powers. The decision must be disappointing to all the advocates of arbitration in settling international disputes. It offers a premium to the creditor nation which makes a show of force by giving it a preference to the nation which seeks the milder method of diplomacy or arbitration.

H. CLEVELAND CoxE. attaché of the Consul General of the United States at Paris, writing in the March number of the Yale Law Journal, expresses the belief that the thing which "strikes most forcibly the legal minded American who comes to France to study her institutions . . . is the condition of personal liberty. . . . Strange as it may seem, it is, nevertheless, perfectly true, that the personal liberty of the French citizen today is little better protected, in some respects,

than it was 100 years ago." He says:

Presumption of innocence in France is admitted in theory in the "Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme," and is inferred, at the present day, in the Code d'Instruction Criminelle, but strange to say, in practice innocence is not presumed until the contrary has been clearly proved. In other words, the law on this point is not carried out. . . .

The Code of Criminal Instruction (Procedure), Article 91, authorizes an examining magistrate (Juge d'Instruction) to issue an order for a suspected person to appear before him. In practice the suspected person is generally arrested at once and then examined by the magistrate. Now the Code does not intend that anyone should be arrested in this way unless it appears that there is danger of the suspected person evading justice and making good his escape before sufficient evidence has been collected to proceed to an immediate examination of the suspected per son. Now, on account of there being nothing equivalent to a Habeas Corpus Act, a man once arrested in this way cannot regain his liberty until the examining magistrate pleases. His reputation may be absolutely. ruined and his business utterly destroyed by this detention, but he has no redress. Not only are the Juges d'Instruction very powerful in the matter of arrest, but the Prefects of Departments (and, at Paris, the Prefect of Police) are clothed with magisterial powers by Art. 10 of the Code of Criminal Instruction-thus placing the power of arbitrary arrest in the hands of three classes of public authority-Juges d'Instruction, Prefects of Departments and Prefect of Police.

Under the law of 1897, although at the first preliminary investigation of the charge against a suspected person the examining magistrate is not empowered by law to do anything more than establish identity, state the charge and hear what the accused has to say, something very much more than this happens in practice. The magistrate questions the accused, confronts him with witnesses and examines the witnesses. It is not until after all this unlawful proceeding that the lawful (law of 1897) examination begins

(assuming that the magistrate decides that a prima facie case is made out). Then for the first time is the accused allowed to have counsel present, but the latter is not allowed to speak "until after having been authorized to do so." There is no cross examination of witnesses allowed at this or any future stage of the prosecution, and to put the accused at a further disadvantage, he is often interrupted at the examination referred to by, "You did not say that at your preliminary examination." So that the magistrate has a case made out against the accused and the latter is, to a certain extent, already judged, before he comes to trial.

OUR Federal immigration officials have never been charged with overscrupulousness in administering the immigration laws in the case of certain classes of immigrants-particularly the Chinese; but it is doubtful if they have ever shown greater ingenuity than that displayed by the Australian customs officials in the following case under a law which proscribes the immigration of "Any person who, when asked by an officer, fails to write out at dictation and sign in the presence of the officer a passage of fifty words in length in an European language directed by the officer," to which case attention is called by the Australian correspondent of The Law Times.

An example of the extreme care with which the educational standard of voluntary or involuntary immigrants into Australia is watched was shown recently in the case of Hans Max Stelling in Newcastle, New South Wales. Hans was the second mate of a German barque, and he had been convicted in Newcastle, during the month of June last, and sentenced to six months' imprisonment for stealing some cigars and paint, the property of the captain of his ship. In due course the term of his imprisonment expired, and Hans was discharged from durance vile. But, ere he had gone many yards from the gaol gates, he was again arrested and haled forthwith before a customs officer, in order that he might be tested in modern European

languages. The officer dictated to Hans a passage in modern Greek, but, as this language was unknown to the examiné, he was condemned to the pains and penalties enforceable against a prohibited immigrant. Hans claimed to be a German subject, and he offered to submit himself to any test in the German, French, or English languages. Notwithstanding his offer, the magistrate, being unable to order a second test, was compelled to administer the law as written, and committed him to prison. This seems a rather severe punishment for not knowing modern Greek! However, the severity of the application of the above statutory provision roused public opinion against it, and, after the public press and German Consul, not to mention the inevitable solicitor for the person punished, had joined in protest, the Federal Government ordered the release of Hans in view of having him deported from Australia under Sects. 7 and 8 of the above-mentioned act. Meanwhile, an application for a rule nisi for a writ of habeas corpus had been granted, but, when the motion to make it absolute came for hearing, the application was dismissed, as Hans was at liberty. Now that he is at liberty legally, within the bounds of the Commonwealth, it appears that he cannot be dealt with as a prohibited immigrant. He refuses to leave Australia, and so he places the onus of the next move on the Federal Government. Owing to the manner in which public opinion has been expressed, the Federal Attorney-General has explained that the reason Greek had been used as an educational test was to keep Hans Max out of our white Australia, as he was the son of a German father and an Egyptian mother, and so a colored person, and likely to cause a permanent blot on the whiteness of Australia. Why were not our politicians honest in the beginning and in a straightforward manner place the ban on color, not spelling? The form of the legislation under which Hans Max has been persecuted is only a subterfuge, easily understood by the manner of its enforcement, and now put beyond doubt by

the positive statement of the Attorney-General.

In an interesting address on "Suicide and the Law," delivered recently by Wilbur Larremore before the New York Bar Association, printed in the March number of the Harvard Law Review, the author says:

Cato the Younger, who is probably the most illustrious of suicides, upon the eve of his act, discoursed with much vehemence in justification of the right "to set himself at liberty." Cato's view has been assumed as self-evidently true by all nations and tribes. that have not received a strong influence from Christianity.... Undoubtedly the logic of the situation is with Cato and the pagans to whom suicide itself never suggested any idea of turpitude, it being held immoral only if, and in so far as, some collateral feature, such as cowardice, characterized it. The sentiment against suicide which generally prevails among Christians and Mohammedans constitutes one of the most signal moral accomplishments of Christianity, or rather of the Christian church. It is nowhere condemned in the Bible, though it is expressly inhibited in the Koran, Mohammedanism having "on this as on many other points borrowed its teaching from the Christian church, and even intensified it." . . . The anti-suicide sentiment generated by the Christian church very naturally was embod ied in the English common law.

In the present state of intelligence, however, no good can result from adherence to the dogma of the absolute sinfulness of suicide. . . . There is just one condition which safely may be tolerated by public opinion as a justification of suicide. That condition is the most simple and primitive one-the one that has been recognized by all systems save the Christian church. If a person be facing certain death, which must be preceded by excruciating physical pain, his suicide may be viewed without reproach. . . . But the line must be drawn with the avoiding of physical torture which is a prelude to certain death from causes outside the victim's will. If exceptions were allowed in favor of some

forms of acute mental suffering, private judgment would speedily come to be asserted as against the general dissuadent sentiment and the paganistic attitude would be revived. . .

The contention of Cato and Mr. Lecky is certainly valid to the extent that one who attempts suicide should not be treated as a criminal. . . . He should be classed not as a criminal, but as an unfortunate person amenable to temporary deprivation of liberty. He should be made subject to restraint in the discretion of a magistrate not exceeding a brief, definite period.

The Law Register has this to say of "The Reed Smoot Case":

Smoot's case seems to be different from Roberts', in that the Utah Senator is said. not to be a polygamist. But it is claimed, and not denied, that he associates with open and avowed polygamists, and is an apostle of a church which does not condemn polygamy, and whose decrees are held paramount in authority to the laws of the State or nation. When Smoot's credentials were first presented, they were referred with many protests against the admission of the man, to the Senate Committee on Privileges an Elections. This committee has been taking testimony in the course of its investigation, and before it has appeared the president of the Mormons, evidently a fellow of excellent pith, "Fate tried to conceal him by naming him Smith." But his barn-yard rooster pride, and, it must be admitted, a downright tendency to truth telling are destined to make him historical.

The Senate Committee is said to be "shocked" by his self-revelations. Such unreserved and unnecessary truth-telling must certainly affect peculiarly a body of public. men to whom as a class truth is so precious as not to be used on all occasions and with everybody.

But this man Smith has owned up to cohabiting, since 1890, when Utah became a State, with five polygamous wives and during that time to have become the father of eleven children. What these things have to

do with Smoot has not been made to appear as yet, except that Smoot is Smith's friend and colleague in the Mormon Church. This fact alone is deemed by some as sufficient to disqualify Smoot from holding the office of Senator. It may be, but to condemn a Senator for the company he keeps or for the religious or irreligious or immoral views he entertains would open a Pandora's box of evils. The word "qualifications" is capable of an almost infinite variety of constructions, under pressure of political, religious and social considerations. Arbitrary action lies that way. A colored man might be found disqualified per se.

The case is not the same as if a man had been proved guilty of a crime known to the law. Then evidently the Senate or House could expel. Yet the Senate allowed an embezzler to sit in it for six years. Smoot has not yet been proved guilty of anything more than keeping bad company. But may not other Senators be guilty of the same of fense, and "shall the pot call the kettle black?" That public opinion would uphold the Senate in unseating Smoot is undoubted, but public opinion is not the law and unless the Utah Senator is expelled legally the precedent will come back to plague us.

Law Notes for March quotes the following tale, rightly adding that, if true, it "furnishes food for thought."

The Louisville Courier-Journal prints a piece of news which is an interesting supplement to the trial of Lieutenant-Governor Tillman for the murder of Editor Gonzales in South Carolina. It is likewise an instructive commentary upon our jury system and the practice of criminal law. A Southern traveling man for a Cincinnati house is reported to have given the following account of the rather unique method adopted to secure a jury that would be sure to acquit: "As soon as it was known in what county of South Carolina the case would be tried, men representing themselves as agents for a picture enlarging establishment made their appearance in that county. There were a dozen of them, and each man carried with him

as a sample of the work done by his house. an enlarged chromo of Tillman, which was so natural that no one could fail to recognize it as Lieutenant-Governor Tillman, who was as well known by his pictures as is Governor Beckham in this State. The agent carrying his picture of Tillman would go to a house, ask for the head always, and with the man would begin to talk about securing a contract to enlarge a picture of any member of the family. After a few minutes' conversation he would display his sample, the pture of the slayer of Gonzales. This would invariably bring the talk around to the Tillman case, and the pretended agent would draw out of the man an expression of opinion on the case. He would obtain the name of the man, and after leaving the house-always without accepting any money, but with a promise to call later for the order-would put down in a book the name of the man, and whether he was for or against Tillman. This was done in every house of the county. Not one was missed, and at the end of the time, when the trial was to begin, the attorneys of Tillman were furnished with an alphabetical list of the entire male population of the county eligible for jury service, and opposite the name of each man was a memorandum showing how he stood on the case. When a man was called who was on the list as being opposed to Tillman and in favor of convicting him, this man would be forced to state that he had expressed an opinion in the case, and was therefore ineligible for service on the jury. This was the way Tillman's attorneys secured a jury which was composed of men who had all expressed themselves beforehand as favoring an quittal."

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IN the American Lawyer for February, R. Cleveland Coxe thus comments on divorce in France:

In regard to divorce, there is much to be learned from France. In the first place, the causes for divorce are very liberally accorded by the Code. One does not have to

commit adultery to obtain divorce. Very slight causes which show an apparent unsuitability of the spouses for life in common practically open the door to divorce.

Even persistent application on the part of both parties for divorce, on the ground that life as man and wife is not possible, was sufficient to dissolve the union. An effort is now being made to grant divorce on the application of only one of the parties for this cause mentioned. While this step is not to be recommended, on the ground that history, in connection with Rome, shows that a limit must be placed somewhere in order that marriage may be respected, still, where a judge in divorce may use a proper discre tion, it is very doubtful whether the power would be abused in America. But where both husband and wife wish to be divorced, and persist in this step for a considerable time, it would be moral to facilitate the gratification of this mutual desire. . .

French procedure in divorce is admirable. According to the Code the petitioner presents personally his requête, whereupon the judge, if he deems a prima facie case has been made out, issues an order for the two parties to appear before him privately. The parties are heard on the points set out in the requête and the judge attempts a conciliation. If this conciliation is not possible, permission is given to the petitioner to get out a summons. This permission or order is subject to appeal. As in all civil matters, the case is tried by a judge without a jury. There are other delays. The procedure, however, except as to the jury, is not unlike ours after the point referred to above. . . .

The feature of privacy cannot be too much enlarged upon in divorce proceedings. Not only does article 239 of the Civil Code provide that evidence can be heard with closed doors, but press reports are forbidden under a fine as high as 2000 francs as a maxiThe French system of concilation joined with privacy in divorce evidence is putting the legal horse before the legal cart. Not so a decree nisi. . . .

mum.

It may be asked-does this admirable French system as to divorce mark a diminu