wife was entitled to dower. Had there been no second marriage, there could have been no question of her right. Whether the result is the same in the case of a second wife not surviving her husband is a question that was not discussed. It was assumed to be the same, the whole contest of the case turning on the effect of a contract between husband and wife before the divorce. If, upon lawful marriage after divorce, the link between the wife and her divorced husband which supports her claim to dower is finally severed, no troublesome questions will arise, no matter how many times a man is divorced; otherwise, such questions as have been discussed in this case may arise whenever a man dies, leaving more than one divorced widow and no genuine widow. In this case, however, the much-married man has left a widow, and under the statute she, and no one else, is entitled to dower, so that the questions are not material. They are not likely to become practical. Such a case as this has never before been presented to this court, and it is to be hoped it may never arise again. Moreover, the legislation of 1877 has abolished dower as to all marriages entered into after that date. Upon the appeal of Phebe E. Brown the superior court is advised to render judgment affirming the order of the probate court. Upon the appeal of Esther Macdonald the superior court is advised to render judgment affirming the order of the probate court. The other judges concurred. HAMMOND v. HAMMOND BUCKLE CO. (Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. Aug. 1, 1899.) CORPORATIONS-ACTION FOR SERVICES-EVIDENCE OF EMPLOYMENT HEARSAY-INCREASE OF BUSINESS DURING EMPLOYMENT. 1. In an action to recover for services as general manager of a corporation engaged in the manufacture of buckles, testimony of plaintiff that he was the inventor of a buckle, and had been in the buckle business about 19 years, is admissible, as bearing on the value of his services under a quantum meruit, should it become necessary to make that claim. 2. In an action to recover for services as general manager of a corporation, and for money paid out for the company, where the point as to whether plaintiff was employed after a certain date is contested, his testimony as to what he did, and what he paid out, from such date onwards, is admissible, as one step in his proof; leaving the question of his being authorized to act to be proved later on. 3. In an action to recover for services as general manager of a corporation for a number of months prior to a certain date, testimony of plaintiff as to what he was doing for it during that time is admissible, as one step in his proof. 4. In an action to recover for services as general manager of a corporation, and for money paid out for it, where one of the items claimed is for money paid to defendant's bookkeeper, testimony of plaintiff that he paid the bookkeeper, and the amount so paid, is admissible, as one step in his proof, though it is disputed that he was authorized to pay the bookkeeper. 5. Where plaintiff in an action to recover for services as general manager of a corporation claims that he was employed by a person who was sole owner for a short time of the stock, and that such employment was afterwards ratified by the company, evidence of the purchase by such person of plaintiff's patent, and the employment of plaintiff, is admissible, on condition that it be afterwards shown that the company ratified such employment; but what was said at the time of the employment about other matters outside of the purchase and employment is inadmissible. 6. Where plaintiff in an action to recover for services as general manager of a corporation claims that he was employed by a person who was sole owner for a short time of its stock, and that such employment was afterwards ratified by the company, a letter from such person to plaintiff, written after he had ceased to be the owner of the stock, stating that he had sold the stock and had attended to fixing plaintiff's salary, is inadmissible, being mere hearsay evidence. 7. Where plaintiff in an action to recover for services as general manager of a corporation claims that he was employed by a person who was sole owner for a short time of its stock, and that such employment was afterwards ratified by the company, extracts from the records of the executive committee, and from the records of the directors' and stockholders' meetings of the corporation that purchased the stock from such person, showing that such corporation had become the owner of the stock, about which there was no dispute, are immaterial and irrele vant. 8. In such case an extract from the annual report of the president of the corporation which purchased the stock from the person alleged to have employed plaintiff, containing a statement that plaintiff was "now the manager" of defendant, is mere hearsay evidence. 9. In an action to recover for services as general manager of a corporation, evidence that the business had largely increased during the period of the alleged employment is inadmissible, where it is not shown that the increase was due in whole or in part to the services of plaintiff. Appeal from superior court, Tolland county; Ralph Wheeler, Judge. Action by Joseph C. Hammond, Jr., against the Hammond Buckle Company to recover for services and money paid out. From a judgment for plaintiff, and an order denying a motion for a new trial, defendant appeals. Reversed. The complaint contained the common counts only. The bill of particulars filed was as follows: To railroad car fare while in employ To salary advanced to C. H. Ham- $ 353 88 2,395 84 810 00 $3,559 72 The first defense was a general denial; the second was, in effect, payment, and this, in the reply, was denied. On the trial the plaintiff offered evidence tending to prove, and claimed to have proved, among others, the following facts: The defendant is a joint-stock corporation organized in 1889 under the laws of this state. The plaintiff was one of the original incorporators, | $50,000 price was paid by the rubber com The owning 95 of the 200 shares of its stock; and the others were his son, C. H. Hammond, who owned 5 shares, and Samuel A. Chapman, who owned 100 shares. The stock was owned by these three in this way down to November 14, 1893. The plaintiff was the treasurer of the corporation from its organization until April 23, 1896, when his son, above named, was appointed treasurer. plaintiff was the inventor of what is known as the "Hammond Buckle," which the defendant manufactured and sold in various grades, styles, and forms. On November 14, 1893, Joseph Banigan, president of the United States Rubber Company, made a proposition to the stockholders of the defendant to purchase their entire stock for $50,000. The stockholders then and there accepted this proposition. This proposed purchase included all the property and good will of the defendant, save the book accounts. At this interview it was arranged, in substance, between Banigan and the stockholders, that the business of the defendant should go on as before, and that the plaintiff should be continued in the employ of the company both as treasurer and as general manager. It was stated by Banigan at that interview that he might offer the stock and property of defendant to the United States Rubber Company at the same price he had offered the defendant, and, if that company did not care to take it, Banigan would hold it as his own, and continue the business in his own interest. On the 15th of November, 1893, Banigan reported his purchase to the United States Rubber Company, and explained the arrangement he had made with the plaintiff for a continuation of the business, and offered his purchase to that company at the price he had agreed to pay. The United States Rubber Company on the same day accepted this proposition. When he made the proposition of November 14, 1893, to the defendant's stockholders, Banigan acted for himself alone, and he was for a short time, by the acceptance of his proposition, the sole owner of the stock and property of the defendant; and it was during this time that it was arranged that the plaintiff should go on as treasurer and general manager of the defendant. In accepting Banigan's proposition made to the United States Rubber Company on November 15, 1893, that company accepted it subject to the terms and arrangement made with the plaintiff, and ratified all that Banigan had done in the premises. the request of Banigan, the holders of the defendant's stock transferred their shares directly to the United States Rubber Company, as follows: Samuel A. Chapman, 97 shares; the plaintiff, 91 shares; C. H. Hammond, 2 shares, so that after such transfer the rubber company owned 190 shares, while Chapman, the plaintiff, and C. H. Hammond appeared to own 3, 4, and 2 shares, respectively. These transfers appear on the books of the defendant as made November 15, 1893. The At pany to the defendant's stockholders. The entire arrangement and agreement of November 14, 1893, between Banigan and the plaintiff and the stockholders of the defendant, was a verbal one, of which no official record or memorandum exists. At the annual meeting of the stockholders of the defendant held in January, 1894, the plaintiff was elected one of its directors, and on the same day, at a meeting of the directors, was elected as treasurer of the defendant. At this meeting the oral arrangement made by Banigan in November, 1893, by which the plaintiff was to continue to act as general manager as well as treasurer, was reported orally to the stockholders and directors. The plaintiff was again elected as treasurer of the defendant in January, 1895. After November 14, 1893, the plaintiff continued to perform all the duties of treasurer, and all the duties incident to the position of general manager, of the defendant, until April 23, 1896, when his son, C. H. Hammond, was appointed treasurer in his stead. Thereafter, until April or May, 1897, the plaintiff continued to perform many of the duties incident to the position of general manager, as before, and wrote divers letters relating to the business of the defendant, which he signed as general manager. The plaintiff was paid nothing by the defendant after April 23, 1896, when his son took the position as treasurer, and has not been paid for any of the items named in the bill of particulars which he offered evidence to prove, and claimed he had proved, were due to him from the defendant. The defendant offered evidence tending to prove, and claimed it had proved, that the plaintiff was not in the employ of the defendant after April 23, 1896, as general manager or otherwise; that the defendant did not owe the plaintiff anything for mileage, as claimed by him; and that it owed him nothing under the third item of his bill of particulars. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, upon which judgment was subsequently rendered. The defendant made a motion below for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the evidence in the cause. The court denied the motion, and from that denial the defendant appealed. He also appeals on the ground that the court below erred in its rulings upon evidence, and in the charge to the jury. The rulings upon evidence, both oral and documentary, are set forth at great length upon the record. The following are the principal rulings with reference to the admission of documentary evidence: The plaintiff offered in evidence a letter dated November 17, 1893, from Banigan to himself, of which the following is a copy: "Providence, Nov. 17, 1893. Mr. J. C. Hammond, Jr.-Dear Sir: On arriving in New York, Tuesday night, the sad fate of our Mr. P. J. Conley upset me to some extent; but, as per arrangement, the United States Rubber Company's executive met at 10 o'clock Wednesday morning, and I presented to them the fact that I had bought the Chapman and Armstrong interests, and the land, buildings, machinery, and all appliances for the making of buckles. This would be turned over to the Hammond Buckle Company, and then all the stock of the Hammond Buckle Company turned over to me for the sum of $50,000; and all the stock (raw, wrought, and in process) was to be sold to me at net cost, and I offered it to the United States Rubber Company at that price. I offered to carry it myself, and give them all the buckles they wanted for the companies in which they were interested at a net cost price, plus 10 per cent. for the manufacturing profit. They, however, decided to buy the property for the $50,000; so to that end I telegraphed you on Wednesday. Please have the account of stock taken as early as possible, as you, of course, know that at the end of business Tuesday night the property was mine, so that any buckles shipped after Tuesday night, or sold, were shipped or sold for my account; and the property should be turned over to me as of that date, and I, in turn, will transfer it to the United States Rubber Company. If they elect to do otherwise, they may take the stock of the Hammond Buckle Company di rect. Let no stoppage take place, but with as little delay as possible have the whole business of Chapman and Armstrong turned over to the Hammond Buckle Company, and call on me for the money as soon as you require it. Let Chapman and your good self figure out what will be necessary for the production of sufficient buckles to fill the wants of those companies, and order sufficient machinery to produce the same. I have handled the salary situation, and it is agreeable that you be paid $2,500, Chapman $1,500, and your superintendent $2,000 a year. I send a copy of this letter to Mr. Chapman, that he may be thoroughly acquainted with the matter, so as to avoid any misunderstanding that I came into possession of the property on Tuesday night, the 14th inst. Yours, respectfully, Joseph Banigan." The defendant objected to this on the ground that it was hearsay and was immaterial and irrelevant, but the court admitted it. The plaintiff offered in evidence, as Exhibit F, an abstract from the minutes of the meeting of the executive committee of the United States Rubber Company held November 15, 1893, showing the proposition made by Banigan to said committee for the purchase on behalf of the rubber company from him of the property and stock of the defendant, and the acceptance of the proposition by the committee; also, extracts from the minutes of a meeting of the board of directors of the United States Rubber Company held December 6, 1893, as Exhibits G and H, approving and ratifying the above action of the executive committee; also, as Ex hibit I, an extract from the minutes of the annual meeting of the stockholders of the United States Rubber Company held April 17, 1894, showing an approval and ratification of the action of the executive committee and directors of the corporation in making said purchase. The defendant objected to the admission of each of these exhibits, as immaterial and irrelevant, but the court admitted them. The plaintiff also offered in evidence, as Exhibit R, an extract from the annual report of the president of the rubber company to its stockholders at the annual meeting in April, 1894, of which the following is a copy: "As the product of all of our factories on arctics, lumberman's, etc., on which buckles are used, is so great, it was considered a decided advantage for the United States Rubber Company to own its own buckle business. We have therefore become large stockholders in the Hammond Buckle Company, of Rockville, Conn., of which Joseph C. Hammond, Jr., was and is now the manager, so that we now get our buckles at the cost thereof." The defendant objected to the admission of this exhibit on the ground that it was hearsay and was immaterial and irrelevant, but the court admitted it. The defendant duly excepted to each and all of these rulings. The other rulings upon evidence complained of are sufficiently stated in the opinion. Henry Stoddard and Joel H. Reed, for appellant. Charles Phelps, for appellee. TORRANCE, J. (after stating the facts). The claimed errors in the rulings upon evidence will be first considered. They are 18 in number, but it will not be necessary to consider them all separately. They will be considered substantially in the order of statement in the reasons of appeal. Upon his direct examination, the plaintiff was permitted to state, in substance, that he was the inventor of a buckle, and that he had then been in the buckle business about 19 years. The defendant complains of this, and we think without reason. At most, it was a preliminary matter, and certainly did the defendant no harm; but it was clearly admissible, as bearing upon the value of plaintiff's services under a quantum meruit, if it became necessary to make that claim. One of the strongly-contested points in the case was whether the plaintiff had ever been appointed or employed by the defendant after November, 1893, as its general manager. With a view to prove that he had been so appointed or employed, the plaintiff was asked the following question: "At whose instigation or solicitation did you enter upon the duties as treasurer and general manager of the Hammond Buckle Company on November 14, 1893 ?" This and several other questions of similar form were, upon objection, withdrawn before answer, because, as defendant claimed, they assumed, without proof, that the plaintiff had been treasurer and general manager of the defendant. The court then suggested that plaintiff should be asked what he did for the defendant in 1893 and onwards, and afterwards show how he came to perform those duties. The plaintiff was then asked, in substance, to state in detail what he did for the defendant from November 14, 1893, onwards, and he did so at some length. This was claimed and admitted against the defendant's objection for the purpose of showing the duties incident to the position of general manager, and what plaintiff actually did. Later on the plaintiff was asked this question: "Passing to the second item of the bill of particulars, which speaks of services as general manager for 112 months, to April 16, 1897,-were those months immediately prior to April 16, 1897?" This was finally changed, and asked in this form: "What were you doing during the 112 months preceding April 16, 1897?" The defendant objected to this on the ground, substantially, that it as sumed, without proof, that the plaintiff had been employed during this period by the defendant. The court overruled the objection, and admitted the evidence. The witness answered, in substance, that he managed the business, sold goods, made contracts in behalf of the defendant, looked after its interests the best he knew how, and directed and advised in the management of the business. The plaintiff was then asked, concerning the third item of his bill of particulars, this question: "Did you pay any money to H. C. Hammond, the bookkeeper?" The defendant objected to this because there was no authority shown in him to pay money to the bookkeeper. The objection was overruled, and the witness answered that he did, and stated the amount he had so paid. We think in each of these three instances the ruling was correct. It was within the discretion of the court to permit the plaintiff in this way to show what he actually did, and what he actually paid, as one step in his proof; leaving the question whether he was authorized or employed to act or pay, expressly or impliedly, by the defendant, to be proved later on. The plaintiff claimed that by a verbal agreement between Banigan and all the stockholders of the defendant, made and consummated on the 14th day of November, 1893, Banigan became and was the sole owner, for a short time, of the property and stock of the defendant corporation; that on that day, and while Banigan was thus sole owner of the property and stock, Banigan verbally employed the plaintiff to go on with the business of the defendant as treasurer and general manager; that at Banigan's request the plaintiff did so; and that this action of Banigan in thus employing the plaintiff was ratified by the defendant at its next annual meeting, in January, 1894. There were no official written memoranda, of any kind, of this purchase or of this employment. The defendant objected to any and all evidence of this purchase by Banigan, and of the employment of the plaintiff by Banigan as treasurer and general manager. The court, in effect, ruled that evidence might be then given of said purchase and employment on the 14th day of November, 1893, on condition that it should be afterwards shown that what Banigan did in employing the plaintiff was ratified by the defendant. The plaintiff then testified, in substance, that he was on said day, while Banigan was sole owner as aforesaid, employed by Banigan as treasurer and general manager of the defendant, and that he then and there began, and thereafter continued to perform, the duties incident to said positions. We think the evidence of this purchase and employment was conditionally admissible, as held by the court, for what it was worth, upon the disputed question as to whether the plaintiff had ever filled the position of general manager, which latter question had some slight bearing upon the further question as to whether the plaintiff had, with the express or implied authority of the defendant, performed the duties of general manager after April, 1896, when he ceased to be treasurer. But what Banigan said at this same interview about other matters outside of the transaction of purchase and employment, to which the plaintiff, against the defendant's objec tion, was permitted to testify, was clearly not admissible, although it probably did the defendant no harm. The letter from Banigan to the plaintiff of November 17, 1893, was clearly inadmissible. It was written after Banigan had ceased to be the owner of the stock and property of the defendant; it was a statement of what he had done, and what he desired to have done, concerning matters irrelevant and immaterial; and it was mere hearsay evidence. The fact that Banigan was dead when it was offered in evidence did not make it admissible in this case. The extracts from the records of the executive committee and from the records of the directors' and stockholders' meetings of the United States Rubber Company were also inadmissible, because they were they were immaterial and irrelevant. They all went merely to show that the rubber company had become the owner of stock of the defendant,—a fact about which there was no dispute, and which sufficiently appeared from the books of the defendant, which furnished the proper evidence of that fact. So far as these extracts afforded evidence of anything else, the evidence was mere hearsay. The extract (Exhibit R) from the annual report of the president of the rubber company made in April, 1894, was manifestly offered because it contained a statement that the plaintiff was "now the manager" of the defendant. This was clearly hearsay evidence, and should have been excluded. The plaintiff and his son were both allowed, against the objection of the defendant, to testify, in substance, that the business and profits of the business had largely increased between November 15, 1893, and the time when the plaintiff ceased his connection with the defendant. This was admitted as bearing upon the value of the services of the plaintiff upon a quantum meruit, if it became necessary to make such a claim. This evidence was inadmissible, unless it was also shown that the claimed increase was due in whole or in part, or in some way, to the services of the plaintiff, and no attempt was made to show this. We think the court erred, as the matter stood, in permitting this evidence to go to the jury. Because of these several erroneous rulings upon evidence, we think the defendant is entitled to a new trial. In this view of the case, it becomes unnecessary to state or consider the claimed errors relating to the charge of the court to the jury. With reference to the appeal from the action of the court below in denying the defendant's motion for a new trial, we are of opinion that the court did not err in denying that motion. Upon the other appeal, there is error, and a new trial is granted. The other judges concurred. SIMONDS v. SHIELDS et ux. (Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. Aug. 1, 1899.) PARTY WALL-CONSTRUCTION OF DEEDSEVIDENCE-COSTS-VERDICT. 1. Plaintiff, in a deed to defendants, reserved the right to allow a cornice to project over defendants' land, and granted defendants the right to build against or upon his wall. Defendants, in a deed executed at the same time, granted plaintiff the right in regard to the cornice, and reserved the right to build on plaintiff's foundation wall. Held, that these deeds give defendants no right to remove bricks from plaintiff's wall, and insert timbers for the support of their building. 2. Defendants introduced, as authority for inserting timbers into plaintiff's wall, a deed granting them the right to build against or upon his wall. Plaintiff offered in evidence a deed whereby defendants reserved the right to build on the foundation of plaintiff's wall, and also offered witnesses to prove that this foundation projected beyond the wall. Held, that this deed and testimony were admissible, as bearing upon the construction of the deed from plaintiff. 3. When a jury has returned a verdict in which they award costs, it is proper for the court to return it to them with instructions that they have no power as to costs, without reading the verdict to the attorneys. Appeal from superior court, New London county; John M. Thayer, Judge. Action by Charles F. Simonds against William H. Shields and wife. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed. The finding shows: That the plaintiff and defendants own adjoining lands, the plaintiff's lying south of the defendants'. That the Clarendon House, owned by the plaintiff, is a four-story brick building, the face of the north wall of which is the divisional line between his land and that of the defendants, and the cornice upon which extends 18 inches north over the defendants' land. There is a building of the same height upon the defend ants' land, called the "Hempstead House." In erecting an addition upon the south side of their building, the defendants, at several points between the basement and cornice of the plaintiff's building, removed a number of bricks from said north wall of plaintiff's building, and inserted in the openings thus made the ends of floor and roof timbers to the depth of 4 inches, for the support of their (the defendants') said addition. The defendants justified their said acts under a certain deed, which they offered in evidence, from one Dr. Hooker to the Hempstead sisters, to the rights and title of the grantees in which the defendants had succeeded, and to the property and rights of the grantor in which the plaintiff had succeeded, and which deed contained the following provision: "Reserving to myself the right to project my cornice over the land thus conveyed eighteen inches, and there to remain, unless they, the said grantees, wish to build higher; and I hereby agree that they may use my wall to build against or upon, if they wish to build; and, in case it becomes necessary for them to do so to accommodate any building they may erect higher than mine, they may take off my jet, and I will provide suitable gutters and conductors to carry off the water from my own roof." The plaintiff thereupon offered in evidence a deed from said Hempstead sisters to said Hooker, claiming that it appeared to have been executed at the same time with said first-named deed, and between the same parties, and that it concerned the same transaction, and that the two instruments should be read together, to determine the real intention of the parties. The following language of said deed was claimed by the plaintiff to be material to the question in issue: "And the said Dr. Hooker is to have the privilege to project his eaves of his house, when he builds, 18 inches north of said first-described line, on condition that he carry off the water in a gutter, and not permit it to fall on our remaining land, and we reserve to ourselves the right to build on the foundation wall which said Hooker may build up to set his house upon; and it is agreed and understood that, if we choose to build higher than the said Dr. Hooker's building, we have the right to take off his jet and build higher, as we may see fit, and the said Hooker in that case is to provide a suitable trough and conductor to carry off the water from his roof." The defendants objected to the admission of said deed in evidence, and excepted to the ruling of the court admitting the same. Against the defendants' objection, the plaintiff was permitted to testify in rebuttal that the north foundation wall of his building was constructed so that it projected four inches north of the face of said north brick wall. The defendants excepted to said ruling. The defendant William H. Shields afterwards, without objection, testified that said foundation wall did not so project where he examined |