was to be heard. For, say, Aristodemus, to what purpose should odors be prepared if the sense of smelling had been denied? or why the distinctions of bitter and sweet, of savory and unsavory, unless a palate had been likewise given, conveniently placed, to arbitrate between them, and declare the difference? Is not that Providence, in a most eminent manner, conspicuous, which, because the eye of man is so delicate in its contexture, hath, therefore, prepared eyelids like doors, whereby to serve it; which extend of themselves whenever it is needful, and again close when sleep approaches? Are not these eyelids provided, as it were, with a fence on the edge of them, to keep off the wind and guard the eye? Even the eyebrow itself is not without its office, but, as a pent-house, is prepared to turn off the sweat, which, falling from the forehead, might enter and annoy that no less tender than astonishing part of us. Is it not to be admired that the ears should take in sounds of every sort, and yet be not too much filled by them? That the fore-teeth of the animal should be formed in such a manner as is evidently best suited for the cutting of its food, as those on the side for grinding it to pieces? That the mouth, through which this food is conveyed, should be placed so near the nose and eyes as to prevent the passing unnoticed whatever is unfit for nourishment; while nature, on the contrary, hath set at a distance, and concealed from the senses, all that might disgust or any way offend them? And canst thou still doubt, Aristodemus, whether a disposition of parts like this should be the work of chance, or of wisdom and contrivance?" "I have no longer any doubt, replied Aristodemus; ̈“and, indeed, the more I consider it the more evident it appears to me, that man must be the masterpiece of some great Artificer; carrying along with it infinite marks of the love and favor of Him who hath thus formed it."

"And what thinkest thou, Aristodemus, of that desire in the individaal which leads to the continuance of the species? Of that tenderness and affection in the female towards her young, so necessary for its preservation? Of that unremitted love of life, and dread of dissolution, which take such strong possession of us from the moment we begin to be?" "I think of them," answered Aristodemus, "as so many regular operations of the same great and wise Artist, deliberately determining to preserve what he hath inade."

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"But, further (unless thou desirest to ask me questions), seeing, Aristodemus, thou thyself iart conscious of reason and intelligence, supposest thou there is no intelligence elsewhere? Thou knowest thy body to be a small part of that wde extended earth which thou every where beholdest: the moisture contained in it thou also knowest to be a small portion of that mighty mass of waters whereof seas themselves are but a part, while the rest of the elements contribute out of their abundance to thy formation. It is the soul, then, alone, that intellectual part of us, which is come to thee by some lucky chance, from I know not where. If so be, there is, indeed, no intelligence elsewhere; and we must be forced to confess that this stupendous universe, with all the various bodies contained therein, equally amazing, whether we consider their magnitude or number, whatever their use. whatever their order; all have been produced, not by intelligence, but by chance?" "It is with difficulty that I can suppose otherwise," returned Aristodemus; "for I behold none of those gods whom you speak of as making and governing all things; whereas I see the artists when at their work here among us." "Neither yet seest thou thy soul, Aristodemus, which, however, most assuredly governs thy body; although it may well seem, by thy manner of talking, that it is chance, and not reason, which governs thee?"-Memorabilia, book i., chap. iv.

-A small fragment here and there, even of this kind, cannot give any adequate idea of the great whole; yet it contributes much to aid the reader, who has not the time or opportunity to examine the entire work, in forming an intelligent opinion. It is with this view that we give the following extract from Phædo in Plato, merely premising that in this part of the dialogue the interlocutors are Socrates and Cebes:

"But what do we call that which does not admit death ?" "Immortal," he replied. "Therefore does not the soul admit death?" "No." "Is the soul, then, immortal?" "Immortal." Be it so," he said. "Shall we say, then, that this has been now demonstrated? or how think yon?" "Most completely, Socrates." "What then," said he, "Cebes, if it were necessary for the uneven to be imperishable, would the number three be otherwise than imperishable?" "How should it not?" "If, therefore, it were also necessary that what is without heat should be imperishable, when any one should introduce heat to snow, would not the snow withdraw itself, safe and unmelted? For it would not perish; nor yet would it stay and admit the heat." "You say truly," he replied." "In like manner, I think, if that which is insusceptible of cold were imperishable, that, when anything cold approached the tire, it would neither be extinguished nor perish, but would depart quite safe." "Of necessity," he said. "Must we not, then, of neces-ity." he continued, "speak thus of that which is immortal? If that which is immortal is imperishable, it is impossible for the soul to perish when death approaches it. For, from what has been said already, it will not admit death, nor will ever be dead, just as we said that three will never be even, nor again will the odd, nor will the fire be cold, nor yet the heat that is in fire. But some one may say, what hinders, though the odd can never become even by the approach of the even, as we have allowed, yet, when the odd is destroyed, that the even should succeed in its place? We could not contend with him who should make this objection, that it is not destroyed; for the uneven is not imperishable; since, if this were granted us, we might easily have contended, that on the approach of the even the odd and the three depart; and we might have contended in the same way with respect to fire, heat, and the rest; might we not?" 'Certainly." "Wherefore, with respect to the immortal, if we have allowed that it is imperishable, the soul, in addition to its being immortal, must also be imperishable; if not, there will be need of other arguments." "But there is no need," he said, as far as that is concerned; for scarcely could anything not admit of corruption, if that which is immortal and eternal is liable to it." "The Deity, indeed, I think," said Socrates, and the idea itself of life, and if anything else is immortal, must be allowed by all things to be incapable of dissolution." "By Jupiter," he replied, "by all men indeed, and still more, as I think, by the gods." "Since, then, that which is immortal is also incorruptible, can the soul, since it is immortal, be anything else than imperishable?" "It must of necessity be so." When, therefore, death approaches a man, the mortal part of him, as it appears, dies, but the immortal part departs safe and uncorrupted, having withdrawn itself from death."-The Works of Plato, vol. i., pp. 114, 115.

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This reasoning seems familiar now because it is substantially that which has been adopted by the most eminent

Christian writers; but it was by no means so in the time of Socrates; and that it had a salutary effect on his countrymen, notwithstanding their cruel injustice to himself, is proved by many circumstances. But it is now time that we proceed to the consideration of the charges upon which Socrates was brought to trial and executed. In view of what has already been observed, it is hardly necessary to say that those who accused him were not actuated by either religion or patriotism, but by private malice: they were, in fact, persons who had felt the weight of the philosopher's withering satire as directed against themselves personally or against their friends. Ilis accusers were Lycon, an obscure tragic poet, whose pernicious system of morality he had censured as it deserved, concluding his strictures by the remark that his tragedies were so stupid that fortunately few would be influenced by them; Melitus, a young rhetorician, whose rhetoric he had ridiculed; and Anytus, a leather dresser, whom he had chastised in a similar manner for his avarice in depriving his sons of the benefit of learning, in order that they might continue to earn money for him by their labor. These were his prominent accusers, but they were sustained by a host of sophists and others whose resentment he had incurred by his criticisms. The form of the indictment is still preserved; it runs thus: "Melitus, son of Melitus, of the tribe of Pythos, accuseth Socrates, son of Sophronicus, of the tribe of Alopece. Socrates violates the laws in not acknowledging the gods which the state acknowledges, and by introducing new divinities. He also violates the laws by corrupting the youth. Be his punishment death." This was the mode of procedure in criminal offences at Athens after the fall of the Thirty Tyrants and the restoration of the democracy. The person making the charge had a right to name the penalty, while the accused, upon the other hand, had a right to name some pecuniary fine as an equivalent to be paid in the event of his being declared guilty by the judges.

The character of the whole proceedings against Socrates is well illustrated by the fact that before the trial came on, and after the accusation had been made on oath before the Senate, Anytus sent him a private message assuring him that if he would desist from censuring him he would withdraw his accusation. The philosopher spurned the proposition with the reply, "Whilst I live I will never dis

guise the truth, nor speak otherwise than my duty requires." It is not likely that Socrates himself had the least idea that he would be condemned, since not only was he conscious of his own innocence, but his generous disposition led him to expect good rather than evil even from his enemies. Nor does it appear that his friends took any different view of the case; from their discussions on the subject with each other and the facts that have reached us from other sources, the inference is, that although they had not much faith in the restored democracy, they found it difficult to believe that even an Athenian mob would condemn an old man like Socrates. Had it been otherwise, it is more than probable that they could easily have averted his fate; they certainly had influence enough to save him, but they did not exercise it until it was too late; they never believed, even after the sentence was passed, that it would be carried into execution until the fatal day arrived. The only chance, then, was escape from prison; his friends tried to induce him to abscond accordingly, assuring him that they would see that no obstructions would be placed in his way. But he utterly refused to save his life by any means which he thought. unworthy of him; still more unhesitatingly did he reject the proposition that he should commit suicide rather than die by the hands of the public executioner. But let us hear those who knew Socrates best. None who have paid any attention to the subject have failed to appreciate the truthfulness of Xenophon's indignant reply to the accusers of his

master:

"Now as to the first of these accusations-that he acknowledged not the gods whom the republic held sacred-what proof could they bring of this, since it was manifest that he often sacrificed both at home and on the common altars? Neither was it in secret that he made use of divination; it being a thing well known among the people that Socrates should declare that his genius gave him frequent intimations of the future; whence, principally, as it seems to me, his accusers imputed to him the crime of introducing new deities.* But surely, herein, Socrates introduced nothing newer or more strange than any other, who, placing confidence in divinations, make use of auguries, and omens, and symbols, and sacrifices. For these men suppose not that the birds, or persons whom they meet unexpectedly, know what is good for them; but that the gods, by

* As this passage is translated very differently by different authors, we copy the original for the benefit of the classical student: “ Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὡς οὐκ ἐνόμιζεν οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς ποιῳ ποτ' ἐχρήσαντο τεκμηρίῳ; θύων τε γὰρ φανερὸς ἦν πολλάκις μὲν οἶκοι, πολλάκις δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν κοινῶν τῆς πόλεως βωμῶν, καὶ μαντική χρώμενος οὐκ ἀφανὴς ἦν· διετεθρύλητο γὰρ ὡς φαίη Σωκράτης τὸ δαιμόνιον ἑαυτῷ σημαίνειν· ὅθεν δὴ καὶ μάλιστά μοι δοκοῦσιν αὐτὸν αἰτιάσασθαι καινα δαιμόνια εἰςφέρειν.”

their means, give certain intimations of the future to those who apply themselves to divination. And the same also was his opinion, only with this difference, that, while the greater part say they are persuaded or dissuaded by the flights of birds, or some accidental occurrence, Socrates, on the contrary, so asserted concerning these matters, as he knew them from an internal consciousness; declaring it was his genius from whom he received his information. And, in consequence of these significations (communicated, as he said, by his genius), Socrates would frequently forewarn his friends what might be well for them to do, and what to forbear; and such as were guided by his advice found their advantage in so doing, while those who neglected it had no small cause for repentance.”—Memorabilia, book i., chap. i.

With arguments still more convincing, if possible, Xenophon vindicates his master from the charge of not paying sufficient respect to the oracles, or to the power of divination. He shows that, while he would not go to extremes like the ignorant and superstitious, he had at least a becoming regard for all important rites and practices enjoined by the religion of the state:

"Socrates, therefore, esteemed all those as no other than madren who, excluding the Deity, referred the success of their designs to nothing higher than human prudence. He likewise thought those not much better who had recourse to divination on every occasion, as if a man was to consult the oracle whether he should give the reins of his chariot into the hands of one ignorant or well versed in the art of driving, or place at the helm of his ship a skilful or unskilful pilot.

"He also thought it a kind of impiety to importune the gods with our enquiries concerning things of which we may gain the knowledge by number, weight, or measure; it being, as it seemed to him, incumbent on inan to make himself acquainted with whatever the gods had placed within his power. As for such things as were placed beyond his comprehension, for these he ought always apply to the oracle, the gods being ever ready to communicate knowledge to those whose care had been to render them propitious."-Memorabilia, book i., chap. i.

After Xenophon has given a full account of the conduct of his master from his own knowledge, justly maintaining that a man of such a character could not be guilty of any crime, either against religion or morality, he proceeds to quote some of his dialogues in illustration of his own assertions. One of these dialogues he introduces with the following remarkable words: "Yet was not Socrates ever in haste to make orators, artists, or able statesmen. The first business, as he thought, was to implant in the minds of his follow. ers virtuous principles (since, these wanting, every other talent only added to the capacity of doing greater harm), and more especially to inspire them with piety towards the gods."* This, too, is proved from Socrates' own language. But let us see what follows. The philosopher is engaged in proving

Memorabilia, book iv., chap. iii.