486 Opinion of the Court. specifically sets forth the grounds on which appellant claimed the decision to be unlawful. These include the commission's determination of the various classes of facts usually considered in cases in which prescribed rates are challenged as confiscatory. The petition contains no hint of claim that the commission denied appellant procedural due process. Nor was that specified in the petition for judicial review. Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1, on which appellant relies, was decided after filing of that petition and before argument in the California court. That court rightly held it not in point. Process of Law in Violation of Guarantees of the III. Failure to Give Fair Return on Fair Value of Carquinez Bridge. 1. Calculations of Commission in Computing Its Rate. 2. Errors in Commission's Computations. (1) Rate Base. (2) Money Available for Return on Rate Base (under 50¢ toll). 3. Return Under Rate Fixed by Commission. 4. In View of the Cost of Money to American Toll Bridge Company, a Return of Only 6.6% or 6.9% on the Fair Value of the Carquinez Bridge Would be Confiscatory. 5. Summary as to Fair Return, Carquinez Bridge. IV. Failure to Give Fair Return on Fair Value of Carquinez and Antioch Bridges. 1. Rate Base. 2. Return Under Rate Fixed by Commission. 3. Effect of Commission's Decision Would be to Confiscate Property of American Toll Bridge Company in Both. Carquinez and Antioch Bridges. V. Under Commission's Tolls American Toll Bridge Company Would be Unable to Meet Its Requirements to Its Bondholders and Stockholders. VI. Impairment of Contract Obligations. VII. False Analogy With Publicly Owned and Operated San Fran cisco Bay Bridges. VIII. Violation of Constitutional and Statutory Rights. Opinion of the Court. 307 U.S. Appellant also claims that the commission denied it procedural due process by excluding the Antioch bridge rates from the proceeding. It moved to include with this proceeding an investigation of the Antioch bridge tolls. In support of the motion, it suggested that the bridges are part of a single system but compete with each other; that operations of the Antioch are less satisfactory financially than those of the Carquinez; and that reduction of Carquinez tolls would force reduction of Antioch tolls. In the first instance, at least, determination of the proper unit for rate making was for the commission. The Antioch bridge is not used or useful to render any service covered by the Carquinez tolls; appellant's duty to operate either bridge is independent of its obligation to operate the other. The record discloses no basis on which it reasonably may be held that by limiting the investigation to the Carquinez tolls the commission abused its discretion, and clearly there is no foundation for the claim that in excluding the Antioch the commission denied appellant procedural due process. See Gilchrist v. Interborough Co., 279 U. S. 159, 206, 209. Wabash Valley Electric Co. v. Young, 287 U. S. 488, 495-8. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Miami, 98 F. 2d 180. International Ry. Co. v. Prendergast, 1 F. Supp. 623. Cf. Coney v. Broad River Power Co., 171 S. C. 377; 172 S. E. 437. There is no foundation for the claim that the commission's procedure violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. There remains for consideration the contention that the prescribed rates are confiscatory. The burden is on appellant to show that enforcement of the order will compel it to furnish the service covered by the reduced rates for less than a reasonable rate of return on the value of the property used, at the time it is being used, for that service. And, in the absence of clear and convincing proof that the reduced tolls are too low to yield that return, it 486 Opinion of the Court. may not be adjudged that the State by enforcement of the measure complained of will deprive appellant of its property without due process of law. Chicago & G. T. Ry. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U. S. 339, 344-345. San Diego Land & Town Co. v. Jasper, 189 U. S. 439, 441, 446. Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 212 U. S. 1, 8, 16. The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 433, 452. Brush Electric Co. v. Galveston, 262 U. S. 443, 446. Aetna Insurance Co. v. Hyde, 275 U. S. 440, 448. The terms of the order must first be given attention. It directs appellant to change the items of its schedule of charges, reading as follows: "Passengers (7 years of age and older) on foot or in vehicles . . . $.10. Auto only . . .60" so as to read: "Passengers (7 years of age and older) on foot or in vehicles . . . .05. Auto only .45." Thus, the order extends only to automobiles and passengers. The Carquinez franchise specifies, until otherwise ordered by the commission, tolls applicable to other classes of traffic crossing the bridge, namely, bicycles, carts and wagons, commercial or delivery automobiles and motor trucks, ditchers, harvesters, etc., cattle and stock, motor stages to which commutation rates are applied when operated as specified, freight, hearses, horses, motorcycles, and trailers. Appellant fails to establish, by allocation or apportionment to the traffic covered by the tolls so reduced, the operating expenses, cost of depreciation, taxes, and contributions to the sinking fund for amortization of investment that are fairly attributable to the service covered by the order; it also fails to establish the amount of property value that is justly assignable to that traffic. Obviously, the return to be yielded by the reduced tolls cannot be found without comparison of the revenues to be derived from the service with the amounts of operating expenses and other charges rightly to be made against them. Inadequacy of revenues from all traffic does not tend to show that the rates on automobiles and persons prescribed by the commission's order are too low. The Minnesota Rate Cases, supra, 452–453. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 349, 372, 378, 381. It follows that appellant is not entitled to a decree that the order is confiscatory. More need not be written to dispose of the issues presented in this case. But in view of appellant's earnest contentions, it is not inappropriate to say that the record, considered in the light of its argument, fails to show that the rate reduction will so lessen revenues from the Carquinez bridge that there will remain less than sufficient, under the due process clause, to constitute just compensation for its use-a reasonable rate of return on the value of the bridge property. Judgment affirmed. MR. JUSTICE BLACK, MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS Concur in the result. HAGUE, MAYOR, ET AL. v. COMMITTEE FOR INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT. No. 651. Argued February 27, 28, 1939.-Decided June 5, 1939. In a suit to enjoin municipal officers from enforcing ordinances forbidding the distribution of printed matter, and the holding without permits of public meetings, in streets and other public places, Held: 1. The case is within the jurisdiction of the District Court. Pp. 512-513, 525. 2. The ordinances and their enforcement violate the rights under the Constitution of the individual plaintiffs, citizens of the United States; but a complaining corporation can not claim such rights. P. 514. 3. The ordinances are void. Pp. 516, 518. 4. Provisions of the decree enjoining forcible removal of plaintiffs or exercise of personal restraint over them without warrant, or confinement without lawful arrest and production for prompt judicial hearing, saving lawful search and seizure, or interference with their free access to streets, parks or public places of the city, are not vague and impracticable. P. 517. 5. The decree properly enjoined interference with the right of plaintiffs, their agents etc., to communicate their views as individuals to others on the streets in an orderly and peaceable manner, reserving the right of defendants to enforce law and order by lawful search and seizure or arrest. P. 517. 6. In so far as the decree relates to distribution of literature and holding of meetings, the decree should enjoin enforcement of the void ordinances, and not undertake to enumerate the conditions under which those activities may be carried on. P. 518. Per ROBERTS, J., with whom BLACK, J., concurred. The CHIEF JUSTICE Concurred in part (p. 532). 1. The District Court lacked jurisdiction under Jud. Code § 24 (1). P. 508. (a) In suits under § 24 (1) a traverse of the allegation as to the amount in controversy, or a motion to dismiss based upon the absence of such amount, calls for substantial proof on the part of the plaintiff of facts justifying the conclusion that the suit involves the necessary sum. P. 507. (b) The record in this suit is bare of any showing of the value of the asserted rights to the complainants individually. P. 508. (c) Complainants may not aggregate their interests in order to attain the requisite jurisdictional amount. P. 508. 2. The District Court had jurisdiction under Jud. Code, § 24 (14). P. 513. (a) Freedom to disseminate information concerning the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, to assemble peaceably for discussion of the Act and of the opportunities and advantages offered by it, is a privilege or immunity of a citizen of the United States secured against state abridgment by § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment; and R. S. § 1979 and Jud. Code § 24 (14) afford redress in a federal court for such abridgment. P. 512. (b) Natural persons alone are entitled to the privileges and immunities which § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment secures to 161299-39- -32 |