genuineness of any documents or the truth of any matters of fact, serves a sworn denial thereof and if the party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of any such document or the truth of any such matter of fact, he may apply to the court for an order requiring the other party to pay him the reasonable expenses incurred in making such proof, including reasonable attorney's fees. Unless the court finds that there were good reasons for the denial or that the admissions sought were of no substantial importance, the order shall be made.

(d) FAILURE OF PARTY TO ATTEND OR SERVE ANSWERS. If a party or an officer or managing agent of a party willfully fails to appear before the officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with a proper notice, or fails to serve answers to interrogatories submitted under Rule 31, after proper service of such interrogatories, the court on motion and notice may strike out all or any part of any pleading of that party, or dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or enter a judgment by default against that party.

(e) FAILURE TO RESPOND TO LETTERS ROGATORY. A subpoena may be issued as provided in the Act of July 3, 1926, c. 762, § 1 (44 Stat. 835), U. S. C., Title 28, § 711, under the circumstances and conditions therein stated.

(f) EXPENSES AGAINST UNITED STATES. Expenses and attorney's fees are not to be imposed upon the United States under this rule.

46A.

SCOPE OF EXAMINATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION.

A party may interrogate any unwilling or hostile witness by leading questions. A party may call an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation or of a partnership or association which is an adverse party, and interrogate him by leading questions and contradict and impeach him in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse party, and

the witness thus called may be contradicted and impeached by or on behalf of the adverse party also, and may be cross-examined by the adverse party only upon the subject matter of his examination in chief.

46B.

RECORD OF EXCLUDED EVIDENCE.

If an objection to a question propounded to a witness is sustained by the court, the latter upon request shall take and report the evidence in full, unless it clearly appears that the evidence is not admissible on any ground or that the witness is privileged.

May 22, 1939.

HAGUE v. C. I. O., 307 U. S. 496.

The following summaries of the briefs in the case of Hague v. C. I. O., ante, p. 496, will be of interest to the profession.

Messrs. Charles Hershenstein and Edward J. O'Mara, with whom Messrs. James A. Hamill and John A. Matthews were on the brief, for petitioners.

The State has absolute control over the use of the streets and public places, for the benefit of the public at large, which it may delegate to a municipality. Under the law of New Jersey no one has the right to hold a public meeting in the streets or public places of a municipality without the consent of the local authorities. Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, affirmed, Davis v. Commonwealth, 167 U. S. 43; West v. Monmouth Beach, 107 N. J. L. 445; Burlington v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 56 N. J. Eq. 259, 261; Long v. Jersey City, 37 N. J. L. 348, 352; Harwood v. Trembley, 97 N. J. L. 173, 175; Dillon, Municipal Corporations, 5th ed., § 1163; Mettler v. Ottumwas, 197 Iowa 187; Glasgow v. St. Louis, 87 Mo. 678; In re Unger, 1 Okla. Cr. 222; cf. Commonwealth v. McCafferty, 145 Mass. 384; Fifth Avenue Coach Co. v. New York, 194 N. Y. 19; Denny v. Muncie, 197 Ind. 28; Stevens Point v. Bocksenbaum, 225 Wis. 373; Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374; Chicago Park District v. Lattipee, 364 Ill. 182; Garneau v. Eggers, 113 N. J. L. 245; Wilbur v. Newton, 16 N. E. 2d 86. See Thomas v. Casey, 121 N. J. L. 185.

Jersey City has properly enacted its ordinance requiring that a permit be obtained, issuable in the discretion of the Commissioner of Public Safety, where no riot, disorder or disorderly assemblage is likely to ensue from

Argument for Petitioners.

307 U.S.

the holding of such meeting. Davis v. Commonwealth, 167 U. S. 43; s. c. 162 Mass. 510; cf. Bradley v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 289 U. S. 92, 95; Allen & Reed, Inc. v. Presbrey, 50 R. I. 53, 56.

Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, and kindred cases are not applicable and do not overrule or modify the Davis decision. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, makes clear that the prevention of disorder is a proper, constitutional test. In that case it was merely held that there is freedom to distribute written matter in whatever orderly manner may be necessary or expedient for the purpose. The distribution there in question was of a religious tract. This kind of distribution is commonly from house to house, only incidentally involving use of the streets. And even were it on the street, there was no indication that such distribution would involve an expropriation of the entire street area such as ordinarily ensues when a mass meeting is there held, with its obstruction of traffic, littering of streets, and general disorder, if not riot. The clear implication from that case is that maintenance of public order is a proper ground for regulation.

If the right of free speech and assembly is sought to be exercised in public streets and places in conflict with the right of the public at large to free and untrammeled use of such places, and in contravention of the discretion of the public officials entrusted with their administration, the right is necessarily dissipated; not because it is any the less intrinsically a fundamental right, but because, under the circumstances, its exercise becomes a perversion, and an invasion of the rights of the community generally. The liberty referred to in the Fourteenth Amendment, is, in the language of Mr. Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325, "a concept of ordered liberty." Distinguishing DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353.