307 U.S. Argument for Respondents. could prohibit public speaking entirely. They establish only that licenses may be required if proper criteria for their issuance are adhered to. Of such a nature are the Davis, Atwell, Smith, Fincke and other cases relied upon by the petitioners. See, also, State v. Coleman, 96 Conn. 190; Anderson v. Tedford, 85 So. 673; Bloomington v. Richardson, 38 Ill. App. 60; Rich v. Naperville, 42 Ill. App. 222; Chicago v. Trotter, 136 Ill. 430, 433; Anderson v. Wellington, 40 Kan. 173, 178; Matter of Frasee, 63 Mich. 396, 405; State ex rel. Garrabad v. Dering, 84 Wisc. 585, 594-5. Viewed even as a general police regulation (as distinguished from a previous restraint prohibited under any circumstances), the ordinance is void because unreasonable in the light of the underlying facts, which in this instance demonstrate the lack of necessity for conditioning the right to speak in public places upon prevision of disorder. See Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357. The ordinance has been so applied to and enforced against the respondents as to violate the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Jurisdiction existed under Jud. Code § 24 (1). The concurrent findings of minimal amount as a fact should not be disturbed. In cases seeking injunctive relief, the value in dispute is that of the object of the bill. The value of social or political rights is presumptively in excess of the jurisdictional amount. McNichols v. International Typ. Union, 21 F. 2d 497, 498. The rights of which respondents were deprived were by them attempted to be exercised in pursuance of a federally declared policy incorporated in the National Labor Relations Act (29 U. S. C. §§ 151-166). Denial of the rights here involved meant destruction of the opportunity to work or to pursue a calling. That such rights have an economic aspect is settled by Truax v. 161299-39-43 Argument for Respondents. 307 U.S. Raich, 239 U. S. 33. See also International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215, 236. Had respondents brought actions for damages on the law side, each could in good faith have alleged compensatory and exemplary damages in excess of $3,000 and jurisdiction would have definitely attached. Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U. S. 550; Ragsdale v. Rudick, 293 F. 182. See Hynes v. Briggs, 41 F. 468. It is immaterial that respondents joined in a suit to restrain the repeated and continuous trespasses and other tortious acts rather than filed actions for damages. They sought to vindicate their right to be free from unlawful interferences, and the value of that right is determinative of amount in controversy. Past acts and future or threatened probabilities enter into such calculation. Fidler v. Roberts, 41 F. 2d 305. The rule of aggregation to establish jurisdictional amount is applicable. Troy Bank v. Whitehead, 222 U. S. 39; International News Service v. Associated Press, supra; Local No. 7 B. M. P. I. U. v. Bowen, 278 F. 271; Local Union A. A. S. E. R. E. v. Joplin & P. R. Co., 287 F. 473; Sovereign Camp v. O'Neill, 266 U. S. 292. Rights distinctively civil in character are "secured" by each of the three principal clauses of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment. Jud. Code § 24 (14) and 8 U. S. C. § 43 cover the rights so secured. Raich v. Truax, 219 F. 273; affirmed 239 U. S. 33; Giles v. Harris, 189 U. S. 475; Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536; Holt v. Indiana Mfg. Co., 176 U. S. 68; Crane v. Johnson, 233 F. 334, affirmed 242 U. S. 339. [Citing many cases in the lower federal courts.] Thus the right of free passage through the United States is secured by the privileges or immunities clause and the due process clause; the right to be free of physical restraint without arrest according to law, etc., is secured by the due process clause; the right to be free of 307 U.S. Argument for Respondents. unreasonable search and seizure is secured by the due process clause (and perhaps also by the privileges or immunities clause); the rights of free speech, free press and peaceable assembly are secured by the due process clause (and perhaps also by the privileges or immunities clause). To the extent that discrimination was shown— and discrimination pervades the case and the findingsthe equal protection clause is also involved. Since Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, and Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380, it is no longer open to question that these civil rights are as much within the ambit of the due process clause as vested rights of property, which were likewise brought within this clause only as the result of a lengthy and tortuous development. See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578. The contention that the provisions of the Civil Rights Act cover only such rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment as originated in or were created by provisions of the Constitution other than the Fourteenth Amendment itself-thus confining the provisions of the Civil Rights Act to so-called rights of national citizenship and unwarrantably reading the word "secured" in the Civil Rights Act as meaning "created,"-is erroneous. Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, and United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, reflect a narrow view of the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment long since discountenanced by this Court. As to the due process clause, rights of property are now plainly protected. See Butchers Union Slaughter-House Co. v. Crescent City Slaughter-House Co., 111 U. S. 746; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623; Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678; Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26; Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 Yale L. J. 454, 470. It covers also the civil rights involved in this case. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652; Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U. S. Argument for Respondents. 307 U.S. 380; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444; DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353; Warren, The New Liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 Harv. L. R. 431. As for the equal protection clause, it is obvious that the majority opinion in the Slaughter House Cases has been entirely superseded. As for the privileges or immunities clause, it is still of indefinite intent, although it seems due for extension in view of Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404; but it has always been understood as including the right of free passage throughout the United States. Compare Slaughter House Cases and Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270 U. S. 402; Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U. S. 105. There is no conceivable basis in the authorities upon which the petitioners principally rely, for their conception that rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment may be summarily categorized as, on the one hand, rights "secured" because originating in or created by other provisions of the Constitution and thereupon guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment (rights of national citizenship), and, on the other hand, rights not "secured" because not originating in or created by other provisions of the Constitution, but nonetheless guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The purported distinction rests, as we have seen, only on early cases declaring that rights other than those of national citizenship were in no sense. protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and these cases are no longer good law. As the Fourteenth Amendment now protects and guarantees both kinds of rights (assuming that any distinction whatever can be sensibly made), it "secures" them; and by the same token they are covered by the Civil Rights Act. Distinguishing Holt v. Indiana Co., 176 U. S. 68; Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Pollak, 272 F. 137; Gobitis v. Minersville School District, 21 F. Supp. 581. 307 U.S. Argument for Respondents. The civil rights here in issue are secured by the Fourteenth Amendment (and therefore by the Civil Rights Act) in the simple sense that, whereas in the absence of the Amendment a State could impair those rights with impunity so far as the federal Constitution was concerned, they are by the Amendment forbidden to do so. See Smith v. United States, 157 F. 721, cert. den., 208 U. S. 618. The rights are "created" by the Fourteenth Amendment in the sense that the Amendment created a new set of sanctions to protect against their invasion. The rights are created by the First Amendment (possibly also the Fourth). Certainly the rights created by the Bill of Rights were new rights freshly granted or created, since the national Government whose power they effectively limited, was a new entity. The fact that the Fourteenth Amendment, as judicially construed, affords additional protection to the same basic rights, does not militate against the fact that the First Amendment created them. Jurisdiction existed under § 24 (12) of the Judicial Code (conspiracy respecting civil rights). All of petitioners' actions constituted state action. The status of the respondent American Civil Liberties Union (a corporation) and the unincorporated labor unions was correctly adjudged below. The American Civil Liberties Union, is not a business corporation but a membership corporation which reflects the interests of its individual members. Cf. KVOS, Inc. v. Associated Press, 299 U. S. 269, 279. A ruling that corporations are not entitled to the benefit of the liberty clause of the Fourteenth Amendment so far as freedom of speech and press are concerned would be unthinkable. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379. |