corporation whose officers they may be. This must be regarded as the long and well-settled rule." Gray, J., in Casco Nat. Bank v. Clark, 139 N. Y. 307.

Q. A, a creditor, has dealings with B, as agent of C, which A knows. B buys goods as agent which A is aware of. B gives A a note for the price, signed "B agent for C." Whose note is it and against whom can it be enforced?

A. In this case, the principal would be liable to A. Where the names of both principal and agent appear on a negotiable instrument, in such a manner as to render it doubtful to whom credit was given, parol evidence is admissible between the original parties to the instrument, and others affected with notice, to remove the doubt. "Where individuals subscribe their names to a note, prima facie they are personally liable, although they add a description of the character in which the note was given; but such presumption of liability may be rebutted by proof that the note was in fact given by the makers as agents of a principal, or officers of a corporation for a debt of the principal or corporation due to the payee, and that they were duly authorized to make such note as agents or officers." Brockway v. Allen, 17 Wend. 40. In Schmittler v. Simon, 114 N. Y. 177, the court, citing Brockway v. Allen, supra, with approval says: "A like presumption exists in that, as in this case, that the added designation is descriptive personæ, and the right to show the fact otherwise, is dependent upon the knowledge of the other party to the contract that such was the purpose when it was made."

Q. A is the executor of an estate, and gives the ordinary promissory note for goods purchased for the estate, and signs "A, executor." Is there a personal liability on the note against A?

A. Yes. The addition of an official character to the signatures of executors and administrators, in signing instruments and executing contracts has no significance, and operates merely to identify the person and not to limit or qualify the liability. Pinney v. Admrs., 8 Wend. 500. See also sec. 39 of the Neg. Inst. Law (Consolidated Laws, chap. 38).

Q. A delivered to B a certain paper and asked him (B) to sign same, telling him (B) that it was an order for some goods that had been ordered. The paper was in fact a negotiable promissory note. B signed the paper without reading the same. It was subsequently negotiated, and came into the hands of C, a bona fide holder, for value and without notice. When the note became due, C presented the same to B, who refused to pay. C brings action against B. Judgment for whom and why?

A. Judgment for C, as B was negligent in signing a paper which he had an opportunity to read, and C, being a holder in due course, is entitled to recover. Chapman v. Rose, 56 N. Y. 137.

Q. A forges B's name as maker to a promissory note. It comes into the hands of C, a holder in due course. B refuses to pay the same, and C brings action against him. Can he recover?

A. Clearly not. As the note had no valid inception, it could not be made valid by subsequent negotiation. The rule that a forged instrument cannot be validated has long been well settled, and is reembodied in sec. 42 of the Neg. Inst. Law (Consolidated Laws, chap. 38), and is as follows: "Where a signature is forged or made without authority of the person whose signature it purports to be, it is wholly inoperative, and no right to retain the instrument, or to give a discharge therefor, or to enforce payment thereof against any party thereto, can be acquired through or under such signature, unless the party, against whom it is sought to enforce such right, is precluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority."

Q. A gives his note to B for a debt which he owes B. Upon suit on the note by B, A defends upon the ground of no consideration. Judgment for whom and why?

A. Judgment for B. While in a simple contract, this would not be held to be a sufficient consideration, yet under the Neg. Inst. Law, sec. 51, it would be a good consideration. This section provides as follows: "Value is any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract. An antecedent or pre-existing debt constitutes

value; and is deemed such whether the instrument is payable on demand or at a future time."

(NOTE.) "Absence or failure of consideration is matter of defense as against any person not a holder in due course; and partial failure of consideration is a defense pro tanto whether the failure is an ascertained and liquidated amount or otherwise." Sec. 54 of the Neg. Inst. Law.

Q. A makes a note for the accommodation of B. B transfers it for value to C. C, at the time of taking the note, knew that A was only an accommodation party. C sues A on the instrument. Can he recover?

A. C can recover. It has been held before the statute (Grocer's Bank v. Penfield, 69 N. Y. 502) that where a promissory note is made for the accommodation of the payee, without restrictions as to its use, an indorsee taking it in good faith for value can recover thereon against the maker. Sec. 55 of the Neg. Inst. Law is very explicit upon this point. It is as follows: "An accommodation party is one who has signed the instrument as maker, drawer, acceptor or indorser, without receiving value therefor, and for the purpose of lending his name to some other person. Such a person is liable on the instrument to a holder for value, notwithstanding such holder at the time of taking the instrument knew him to be only an accommodation party."

Q. A purchased some goods of B, and gave his promissory note in payment therefor. B refused to take the note of A unless he had a good indorsement thereon. A went to the X Manufacturing Company who to accommodate A indorsed said note. B had the note discounted at the Y Bank. Upon maturity of the said note, the same not being paid, the bank seeks to hold the X Manufacturing Company for the amount of the note. Can they do so?

A. No. A corporation engaged in manufacturing cannot indorse notes for the accommodation of another, and as the bank discounted the note before maturity, it cannot hold the manufacturing company liable. Nat. Park Bank v. G. A. M. W. & S. Co., 116 N. Y. 281.

Q. A, the cashier of the X Bank, sent to the Y Bank to be discounted, a bill of exchange payable to the order of "A, cashier,"

indorsed by him with the same addition to his signature. The Y Bank sues the X Bank as indorser on the bill. Judgment for whom and why?

A. Judgment for the Y Bank. It was uniformly held before the statute, that circumstances such as these, imported that the indorsement was that of the bank in the regular course of business, and not that of the cashier individually. Bank of Genesee v. Patchin Bank, 19 N. Y. 312. Sec. 72 of the Neg. Inst. Law has preserved this rule. It is as follows: "Where an instrument is drawn or indorsed to a person as 'cashier' or other fiscal officer of a bank or corporation, it is deemed prima facie to be payable to the bank or corporation of which he is such officer; and may be negotiated by either the indorsement of the bank or corporation, or the indorsement of the officer."

Q. A, holder of a note on which there are six indorsements, strikes out the second and third. Thereafter he sues X and Y who are the fourth and fifth indorsers respectively on the note, the same having been dishonored. Can he recover? State the rule.

A. No. Sec. 78 of the Neg. Inst. Law answers this question. It is as follows: "The holder may at any time strike out any indorsement which is not necessary to his title. The indorser whose indorsement is struck out, and all indorsers subsequent to him, are thereby relieved from liability on the instrument."

Q. A gives to B his promissory note for $500, payable in thirty days to B's order. The note is procured through fraud. B transfers the note for value without indorsement to C. Thereafter C gets notice of the fraud and gets B to indorse the note. C then sues A on the note. Can he recover? Give reasons.

A. C cannot recover. A subsequent indorsement made after notice of the maker's defense to the instrument, although the paper was transferred for value without notice of the defense, will not relate back to the time of the transfer so as to cut off the equities of the maker against the payee. Goshen Nat. Bank v. Bingham, 118

N. Y. 349. This rule continues in effect under sec. 79 of the Neg. Inst. Law, which reads: "Where the holder of an instrument payable to his order transfers it for value without indorsing it, the transfer vests in the transferee such title as the transferer had therein, and the transferee acquires, in addition, the right to have the indorsement of the transferrer. But for the purpose of determining whether the transferee is a holder in due course, the negotiation takes effect as of the time when the indorsement is actually made."

Q. A makes a note to B or order. It is duly indorsed by B, C, D and E, the last indorsing it over to B, the original holder. Default and due notice, etc. B sues the maker and all the indorsers. Advise all parties.

A. B cannot recover against C, D and E. B's rights against them as last indorsers are merged in his liability as first indorser to them. His only remedy is against A. This rule prevents circuity of action, and is stated in sec. 80 of the Neg. Inst. Law as follows: "Where an instrument is negotiated back to a prior party, such party may, subject to the provisions of this chapter, reissue and further negotiate the same. But he is not entitled to enforce payment thereof against any intervening party to whom he was personally liable."

Q. A gives a negotiable note to B for $35. Subsequently a demand arises in favor of A against B for $30. B transfers the note before maturity for value and without notice to C. C sues A on the note. A sets up a counterclaim against C which he has against B. C demurs. Judgment for whom and why?

A. The demurrer must be sustained. C is a holder in due course, and the counterclaim which would have been available against B, cannot be set up against him. This rule is contained in sec. 96 of the Neg. Inst. Law. It is as follows: "A holder in due course holds the instrument free from any defect of title of prior parties and free from defenses available to prior parties among themselves, and may enforce payment of the instrument for the full amount thereof against all parties liable thereon."