A COURSE of LECTURES will be delivered on FORENSIC MEDICINE, at the WESTMINSTER HOSPITAL, to commence on Tuesday, May 3, at two o'clock, when the Introductory Lecture will be delivered. The Legal Portion of these Lectures by W. HODGES, Esq., of the Inner Temple, Barrister at Law; the Medical Lectures by FREDERICK BIRD, Esq., M.D., A.L.S. A Syllabus of the Lectures may be obtained at the Westminster Hospital. Fee for the Course, Two Guineas. Free Admission to the Introductory Lecture. This day is published, in 8vo., price 16s., boards, A PRACTICAL TREATISE on the LAWS, CUS TOMS, and REGULATIONS of the CITY and PORT of LONDON, as settled by Charter, Usage, and Bye Law or Statute. By ALEXANDER PULLING, Esq., of the Inner Temple. V. and R. Stevens & G. S. Norton, Law Booksellers and Publishers, (Successors to the late J. & W.T. Clarke, of Portugal-street), 26 and 39, Bell-yard, Lincoln's Inn. THIRD EDITION. LETTER TO LORD LYNDHURST upon the sub ject of the Appellative Jurisdiction of the House of Lords, LAWA Solicitor in thing West of, England, having AW.-A Solicitor in the West of England, having the arrears of business in the Common Law Courts, the Local Courts' Bill, and the Registry Courts, and Trials of ControPARTNERSHIP with a gentleman of assiduous and perse-verted Elections. By THOMAS DAX, Esq., one of the vering habits, and who has a knowledge of general business. Masters of the Court of Exchequer. Address (by letter) to X. X., at Mr. Merrett's, Newspaper Vendor, St. John's Square, Clerkenwell, London.-Applicants not answered within a week, may conclude the advertiser is in treaty with some other party. CHANCERY REPORTS. "The suggestion of Master Dax, in his very able letter to the Lord Chancellor, to have a jurisdiction for causes of inferior amount within the jurisdiction of the superior courts, is a very valuable one; and we would impress it upon our readers, and those persons in authority who have the conduct of the altera. tions now about to be made."-Legal Observer. V. and R. Stevens & G. S. Norton, Law Booksellers and Publishers, (Successors to the late J. & W. T. Clarke, of Por tugal-street), 26 and 39, Bell-yard, Lincoln's Inn. NEW BOOK OF PRACTICE. THE PRACTICE of the SUPERIOR COURTS, "We cannot venture on further extracts, but enough have This day is published, Part 2, Vol. 1, royal 8vo., price 78. sewed, been given to justify our warm recommendation of the work.” REPORTS of CASES argued and determined in the HIGH COURT of CHANCERY in IRELAND, during the time of Lord Chancellor SUGDEN; commencing with Michaelmas Term, 1841. By HENRY CONNOR and JAMES A. LAWSON, Esqrs., Barristers at Law. ***This part contains all the cases of Hilary Term, 1842. Dublin: Andrew Milliken, 104, Grafton-street, bookseller to the Hon. Society of King's Inns. London: Messrs. Stevens & Norton; S. Sweet; and all the Law Booksellers. THE Early in May will be published, in 1 vol., royal 8vo., HE PRACTICE of the HOUSE of LORDS and of the PRIVY COUNCIL upon APPEALS, WRITS of ERROR, and DIVORCE, with a Selection of Leading Cases. By JOHN MACQUEEN, Esq., of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister at Law. Also, in 1 vol., royal 8vo., A PRACTICAL TREATISE on the LAW of EVIDENCE. By SIMON GREENLEAF, Barrister, and Professor of Law at Harvard University. A. Maxwell & Son, Law Booksellers and Publishers, Bellyard, Lincoln's-inn. A GREENING'S LEADING STATUTES, No. 2. This day is published, in royal 8vo., price 4s., SELECTION of LEADING STATUTES, intended principally for the use of Students, containing "THE FOREST CHARTER,' ""THE PETITION OF RIGHT, (3 Car. 1, c. 1)," "THE STATUTE FOR ABOLISHING THE STAR CHAMBER, and containing important Enactments as to the Writ of HABEAS CORPUS, (16 Car. 1, c. 10)," "THE PRINCIPAL HABEAS CORPUS ACT, (31 Car. 2, c. 2)," "The Habeas Corpus Act of 56 Geo. 3, c. 100." Illustrated by passages selected from Blackstone, Bacon, and other authentic sources, and by references to the late important cases on the subject. By HENRY GREENING, Esq., of Lincoln's Inn, Special Pleader. V. and R. Stevens & G. S. Norton, Law Booksellers and Publishers, (Successors to the late J. & W. T. Clarke, of Portugal-street), 26 and 39, Bell-yard, Lincoln's Inn. -Law Magazine, Nov. 1, 1840. C. Reader, Law Bookseller, Bell-yard, Lincoln's Inn. Of whom may be had, LUSH'S WILLS' ACT, 2nd edit., price 2s. 6d. bds. And LUSH'S ACT for ABOLISHING ARREST on MESNE PROCESS, price 58. bds. C. CHEAP LAW BOOKS. WILDY, Law Bookseller, Lincoln's Inn Gateway, Carey-street, (within the Gates), begs to inform the Gentlemen of the Profession, that he has now on sale the following REPORTS:-Vesey, jun., to Craig & Phillips, 51 vols. and 2 parts; Maddock to Simon, 18 vols.; Keen & Beavan, 4 vols. and 2 parts; Durnford & East to Adolphus & Ellis, 61 vols.; Bosanquet & Puller to Manning & Granger, 33 vols.; Espinasse to Moody & Robinson, 15 vols. and 3 parts; Carrington & Payne, 9 vols.; Bligh's New Series, 10 vols. and 3 parts; and a large Collection of OLD REPORTS, too numerous for the limits of an Advertisement; also, the last editions of Bacon's Abridgment, 8 vols., 47. 14s. 6d.; Barton's Precedents, 7 vols., 27. 12s. 6d. ; Jeremy's Digest, from 1817 to 1841, 41.; Law Magazine, 26 vols., new halfcalf, 87. 158.; Petersdorff's Abridgment of the Common Law 77. 78.; and various Modern Elementary and Practical Works, Reports, 15 vols., 61. 108.; Viner's Abridgment, 30 vols., all perfect and in good preservation, the whole of which will be offered at very REDUCED PRICES, for cash. Gentlemen in Town or Country wishing to Sell or Exchange the whole or any portion of their Libraries, may rely upon obtaining the fullest value on applying as above. Within the Gates. Observe, **Orders for THE JURIST given to any Newsman, or letters STEVENS & G. S. NORTON, (Successors to J. & W. T. Clarke, t (post-paid) sent to the Office, No. 3, CHANCERY LANE, or to V. & R. of Portugal Street), 26 and 39, BELLYARD, will insure its punctual delivery in Loudon, or its being forwarded on the evening of publica tion, through the medium of the Post Office, to the Country, London: Printed by WALTER M'DOWALL, PRINTER, 4, PENBERTON ROW, and Published by STEPHEN SWEET, BOOKSELLER and PUBLISHER, 3, CHANCERY LANE. Saturday, April 23, 1842. No. 277. LONDON, APRIL 30, 1842. PRICE 18. The following are the Names of the Gentlemen who favour THE JURIST with Reports of Cases argued and decided in the several Courts of Law and Equity: LONDON, APRIL 30, 1842. churchwarden or chapel-warden, who ought to receive and collect the same, by warrant under the hand and A QUESTION arising out of the Law relating to Church- seal of such justice, to convene before any two or more Rates has recently been discussed in the Court of such justices of the peace any person so refusing or negQueen's Bench, to which it is important we think to lecting to pay such rate, and to examine upon oath into. call the attention of our readers, as its decision will as the merits of the said complaint, and by order, under certain the truth or falsehood of an impression which their hands and seals, to direct the payment of what has long prevailed, that where the sum claimed for a should be due and payable in respect to such rate, so church-rate is less than 10%., and the validity of the as the sum ordered and directed to be paid as aforerate or liability of the defendant is not disputed, but it said did not exceed 10%. over and above the reasonable is merely sought to enforce the payment, the magis- costs and charges; and, after providing an appeal to the trates have, by virtue of the 7th section of the 53 Geo. 3, next quarter sessions, the section provides, that nothing c. 127, an exclusive jurisdiction. The cognisance of therein contained should extend to alter or interfere church-rates belongs to the Spiritual Courts, and before with the jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical Courts to the passing of the above statute, they could only be sued hear and determine causes touching the validity of any for and recovered in those Courts. (Degge, p. 1, c. 12; | church-rate or chapel-rate, or from proceeding to enGibson, 195; and 5 Rep. 66). But the proceedings in force the payment of any such rate, if the same should such Courts being attended with great delay and ex- exceed the sum of 10%., from the party proceeded against; pense, and the sum sued for in most instances but and provided likewise, that, if the validity of such rate, small, the costs of the suit bore a very inordinate pro- or the liability of the person from whom it was deportion to the debt itself; in consequence of which, manded to pay the same, were disputed, and the party when any person refused to pay a church-rate, it was disputing the same should give notice thereof to the either not enforced at all, or, if enforced, the proceedings justices, the justices should forbear giving judgment were very oppressive, and much scandal was caused by thereupon; and the person or persons demanding the them. To remedy this, among other evils of a like same might then proceed to the recovery of their decharacter, the 53 Geo. 3, c. 127, was passed; and by mand, according to due course of law, as theretofore sect. 7 of that act, reciting, that it was expedient that | used and accustomed. The first question which sugchurch-rates or chapel-rates of limited amount, unduly gests itself in construing this proviso is, what is a suffirefused or withheld, should, in certain cases, be more | cient notice of disputing the rate; In R. v. Milnrow, easily and speedily recovered, it was enacted, that if any one duly rated to a church-rate or a chapel-rate, the validity whereof had not been questioned in any Ecclesiastical Court, should refuse or neglect to pay the same sum at which he was so rated, it should and might be lawful for any one justice of the peace of the same county, riding, city, liberty, or town corporate, where the church or chapel was situated, in respect whereof such rate should have been made, upon the complaint of any VOL. VI. P (5 M. & S. 248), the party summoned said to the justices, "I will bring an action against any person who ventures to levy the rate; I think I have no right to pay, I have no claim or seat in the church;" and the Court decided that to be sufficient to prevent the justices from proceeding. But in Rex v. Wrottesley, (1 B. & Adol. 648), where the attorney of the party stated to the justices that the validity of the rate was disputed, and a caveat had been entered for the purpose rule is, that a statute creating a new jurisdiction ought to be construed strictly, and the jurisdiction of the superior courts is not to be ousted but by express words or necessary implication. (10 Rep. 75; Stra. 258). In Ricketts v. Bodenham the court thought, that, by the words "that nothing contained in the act should extend to alter or interfere with the jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical Courts to hear and determine causes touching the validity of a rate, or from enforcing the of trying the question, but did not state the objections to the rate, the court held, that the justices ought to hear the complaint; and Lord Tenterden said, "If, upon hearing, the party satisfies the justices there is a bonâ fide intention to dispute the rate, the proceeding before them will go no further." It would seem, therefore, that, although the justices have no power to decide upon the validity of the rate or the liability of the party summoned, yet they are incidentally to inquire into it for the purpose of judging of the bona fides of the inten-payment if the same should exceed 107.," a distinction tion to dispute. Suppose the party should state to the justices an objection manifestly untenable, are they, nevertheless, to proceed? The intention to dispute may be perfectly bonâ fide, although the grounds upon which that intention is founded are insufficient. The proviso does not seem calculated to effect the object for which it was inserted, and it would, we apprehend, be desirable that the party disputing the rate should be obliged to find sureties for the payment of the costs of the suit in the Ecclesiastical Court, if he should be unsuccessful, as is done in other proceedings before magistrates. But the question to which we desire most to call the attention of our readers is, as we said before, whether, in cases where the rate claimed is less than 107., and the validity of it or the liability of the party is not disputed, the jurisdiction of the justices is co-ordinate with or exclusive of that of the Ecclesiastical Court. From the passing of the 53 Geo. 3, c. 127, until 1830, it was the understanding of both the profession and the public that the justices had an exclusive jurisdiction. The doubt, however, arose in Ricketts v. Bodenham, (4 Adol. & Ell. 433), which was an application for a prohibition to the Ecclesiastical Court, on the ground, that the statute took away the jurisdiction; and the Court in that case seem to have thought, that the jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical Courts was, by implication, taken away; but the application was refused, on the ground that, upon examining the proceedings, the validity of the rate appeared to be disputed. The point was again raised in Thorogood's case, (12 Adol. & Ell. 183; 4 Jur. 937), where the Court said, it was not necessary for them to decide upon it, as it lay on the defendant to shew the exception to the jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical Court, and not on that Court to negative its exist ence. And in Reg. v. Baines, (12 Adol. & Ell. 210), the decision was to the same effect. In the recent case of Richards v. Dyke, not yet reported, and in which the Court has taken time to consider its judgment, the question was raised by a demurrer to a declaration in prohibition, on the ground that, as the rate demanded of the plaintiff in prohibition was less than the sum of 107., and there was no dispute as to the validity of the rate, or the plaintiff's liability, the Ecclesiastical Court had no jurisdiction; and it was contended, in argument, that the object of the statute was to give a greater facility for the recovery of churchrates; and as the Ecclesiastical Court was not expressly deprived of jurisdiction, it could not be taken away by inference only; against which it was urged, that the object of the legislature was to put an end to the scandal which had been caused by the suits in the Ecclesiastical Courts. With respect to the proviso upon which this doubt arises, it is to be observed, that the was made between suits in which the validity of a rate An analogous case to the present may be found in the acts relating to the recovery of tithes. By the 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 74, it is expressly provided, that no proceedings shall be had in the superior courts for the recovery of tithes under the yearly value of 10%., but that the person to whom the same is due shall proceed before the justices; although the 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 6, which first gave the justices jurisdiction, provided by sect. 8, that where the party insisted upon a right to be freed from the payment of the tithe, the justices should forbear to give judgment. If it were necessary in the last case expressly to exclude the jurisdiction of the superior courts, we think it a reasonable construction of the section relating to church-rates to hold, that, without such an express enactment, the jurisdiction of the superior courts is not taken away. If, however, the Court of Queen's Bench, before whom the question that the churchwardens are not to be compelled to prois now pending, shall decide, as we think they will, ceed before the Justices, we apprehend it will be a proper case for the interference of the Legislature; for it cannot but be dangerous, at the present time, to leave in the churchwardens a power to sue in the Spiritual cision of the Court may be, it would be desirable that Courts for any sum, however small. Whatever the dethe matter should be set at rest by a legislative enactment. COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. This Court will, on Saturday the 14th day of May NEW ORDERS. a bill pro confesso, the first of these Orders declares, that where the defendant shall not have put in his anThe profession, it is to be hoped, are now beginning to swer in due time after appearance, and the plaintiff shall relax the hostility with which, it was alleged, they rebe unable, with due diligence, to procure an attachment garded the Orders of August last. We say alleged, beto be executed against him, by reason of his being out cause we were never disposed to believe that the profes- of the jurisdiction, or being concealed, or for any other sion did really feel hostile to the alterations in practice cause, such defendant shall, for the purposes of this which those Orders were intended to bring about. The Order, be deemed to have absconded to avoid process, principle upon which they were founded was, or ought i. e. without such proof of his having actually abscondto have been, sufficient to conciliate the minds of all ed to avoid process as was required by the 3rd section honest practitioners, and to have secured their ready fendant of the consequences of his neglect, and that he of Sir E. Sugden's Act. And in order to warn the deassistance in putting a fair construction upon them. Surely, to an honest man, it were worth the labour may not have the plaintiff's case established against which he must bestow upon the subject, in order to unhim without due notice, the Order provides, that where derstand the practical working of them, if he should find, a defendant who may, under the above definition, be that, in their results, they would tend to contribute to the deemed to have absconded, shall have appeared by his benefit of the suitor, by abridging the length and lessen-own clerk in court, or where, an appearance having been his own clerk in court, (in each of which cases he may entered for him, he shall have afterwards appeared by be supposed to be personally conusant of the proceedings in the cause), the plaintiff may proceed [in the manner therein prescribed] to get his bill taken pro confesso. So, in cases where a defendant, who may be deemed to be in the same predicament, shall have had an appearance entered for him, but shall not afterwards have appeared by his own clerk in court, the plaintiff, upon the insertion of a notice to that effect in the Lonthe most feasible mode of making the defendant aware don Gazette, in manner therein prescribed, (which is of the consequences of his neglect), may proceed to get his bill taken pro confesso. ing the difficulties of the suit. Surely if, in addition to their various duties and important avocations, judges and other eminent persons will consent to devote their time to the consideration of abuses, and the application of appropriate remedies, the humble practitioner cannot be heard to complain, that the promulgation of these remedies throws upon him the hard necessity of extending his labours, in order to appreciate and understand them. Some complaints, violent and clamorous indeed, were uttered against the Orders as soon as they appeared before perhaps they were read-certainly before they were understood. They were, forsooth, the crude production of a judge retiring from the legal world, and eager to leave to the profession an earnest of his extrajudicial labours. They were promulged at the wrong time. They would interfere with the working of the new Vice-Chancellor's courts, and again, the new ViceChancellor's courts would interfere with the working of the Orders. One writer tells us that they are still sub judice, although in the next line he proceeds to pass a severe sentence upon them*. We would ask those from whom these complaints came, were they candid? Were they not premature? We feel confident that the practical working of the Orders will be the best confutation of such hasty objectors. In furtherance of the principle upon which the Orders of August last were based, another budget of Orders, bearing date 11th April, 1842, has made its appearance, and as they tend to enlarge or restrict, or in some way to modify the operation of the former Orders, we have thought that it may be serviceable to some of our readers to point out the reasons which it is presumed gave rise to them. This Order then places the process of taking a bill Pro confesso upon the same footing with the practice established by the 21st and 44th Orders of August, 1841, viz. upon the default of the defendant to plead, answer, or demur, of filing a note traversing the case made by the bill, upon which, if the cause should come to a hearing, the plaintiff can take a decree absolute in the two processes is altogether different. In the latter case, first instance. The result of decrees taken under these the plaintiff must take such a decree as he can support by his pleadings and evidence; but a decree pro conthe case made by it to be true. It is obvious that, in fesso is made upon the reading of the bill and taking establish his case by proofs, and in others it will be some instances, it will be to the plaintiff's advantage to more advantageous for him to have his case admitted to be true: either course is now equally open to him. The 3rd section of Sir E. Sugden's Act, which allowed a defendant who had absconded, and against whom the to come in and answer the bill at any time within seven bill had been taken pro confesso, or his representatives, years, before which time the decree could not be made the discretion of the court to make the decree pro conabsolute, is abrogated by this Order; and it is left to fesso in the first instance, or at such time and upon such further notice as, under the circumstances of the case, it may think proper. The 6th and 9th Orders of August, 1841, shortened the process of contempt for compelling an answer after appearance, by abolishing the intermediate steps of attachment with proclamations, writ of rebellion, and the order for the Serjeant-at-Arms, which were found to be unnecessarily long and expensive, and declared, that the plaintiff should be entitled, upon the sheriff's return of non est inventus, to a writ of sequestration, in the same manner as, under the old practice, he was entitled to shall have appeared by his own clerk in court, the plainIt will be observed, that where the absconding party such writ upon the like return made by the Serjeant-tiff may give notice to the clerk in court that he will at-Arms. This alteration in the practice unquestionably conferred a great boon upon the plaintiff, while the requirements of the 9th Order protected the defendant from being taken by surprise. Nevertheless, it fell short of the great desideratum which it was framed to meet; inasmuch as, in cases where the plaintiff was desirous of having his bill taken pro confesso, it still left him under the necessity of carrying out the process of attachment to its final issue, and also of awaiting the return of the Serjeant-at-Arms, before he could fully avail himself of the benefit of Sir Edward Sugden's Act, 1 Will. 4, c. 36, s. 15, rule 1. In order, therefore, to facilitate the process of taking * Daniel's Considerations &c, p. 12. move on a certain day, (being not less than fourteen days after the service of such notice), that the bill may be made before the sheriff's return of non est inventus, be taken pro confesso. This motion it should seem may but it must be supported by sufficient evidence to satisfy the court that the defendant ought to be deemed to have absconded. No intimation is given by this Order (as of what will be deemed sufficient evidence to satisfy the was done by the 8th and 9th Orders of August, 1841) court; but it is presumed, that an affidavit will be required of the same description as that prescribed by the Woolley, (4 Sim. 122); Wright v. Green, (2 R. & M. first rule of Sir E. Sugden's Act. See Handfield v. 93); Pugh v. Pugh, (2 M. & K. 358). But where the defendant has had an appearance entered for him, and has not afterwards appeared by his clerk in court, the plaintiff must publish in the London Gazette a notice, that, on a day not less than four weeks from the first insertion of such notice, he will move to take the bill pro confesso. The notice is to be repeated once in every week from the first insertion, up to the time for which the notice is given. The affidavit required in this case will be similar to the one required in the other case; and proof of the due insertion of the notice in the Gazette must be added. In both cases, it is submitted, the certificate of the Six Clerk that the answer has not been filed will be requisite. Order II. The practice with respect to infant defendants, in order to compel them to appear or answer, was, it will be remembered, to bring them to the bar of the court, and there to assign them a guardian, to appear and put in their answer. This practice had become, to say the least of it, useless and unmeaning. It was necessary that the infant, of however tender an age, or at however great a distance he might live, should appear (puling perhaps in his nurse's arms) at the bar of the court, there to have assigned to him a guardian ad litem, who might, as in the case of an appointment of a guardian upon petition, be as well assigned to him in his absence. Under the old practice, the court would dispense with the infant's appearance in the case only of inability through illness to attend, or where he was abroad. Jongsma v. Pfiel, 9 Ves. 357; Lushington v. Sewell, 6 Mad. 28; Smith v. Palmer, 3 Beav. 10). This absurdity is removed by the order now under consideration, which provides for the security of the infant defendant; that, upon default made by him in not appearing to or not answering the bill, the court may upon motion order that the senior Six Clerk not towards the cause, may be assigned guardian of such infant defendant, by whom he may appear to and answer, or may answer the bill and defend the suit. Order IV. By this Order is postponed sine die the operation of the first five Orders of August, 1841. These five Orders have been universally condemned, as establishing a method of serving writs, notices, orders, &c., not requiring personal service, which would (we may now say confessedly) have been found, in its practical application, to be inconvenient and cumbersome. They were, it will be remembered, suspended, by an Order of the 19th November, 1841, until the first day of Easter Term, 1842; and, from the further suspension of these, we may fairly infer that the system proposed by them had received its death-blow, and, as far as the public are concerned, the old question as to the feasibility of abolishing the present method of service, and establishing a method more simple and not less certain as to its object, still remains undecided. Order V.-This Order is intended to obviate the expense of an application to the court for leave to file a note, under the 21st Order of August, 1841, by which (it will be remembered) the plaintiff was enabled, at the expiration of the time allowed to a defendant to plead, answer, or demur, not demurring alone, to file à traversing note, a copy of which was to be served on the defendant, in the same manner as a subpoena. These requisitions, it is presumed, have been considered adequate to the protection of the defendant. If the plaintiff do not comply with them, the consequence of his miscarriage will fall upon himself, and the expense of an application to the court has accordingly been dispensed with. Order VI.-This effects certain emendations in the 10th, 11th, 12th, and 47th Orders of August, 1841, The 10th Order had abolished the ancient but cumbrous writ of execution, which was, in the process of enforcing obedience to a decree or order, what the writ of subpoena is in enforcing an appearance or answer. It had also abolished the writ of attachment for the purpose of enforcing obedience to any order or decree. This motion must be supported by proof that the de- This Order in effect restores to that process the writ of fendant is an infant; and if he has not appeared, that attachment, which in some cases may be a preferable the subpoena was duly served. Six days' notice of the mode of enforcing obedience to an order, inasmuch as motion must, after the expiration of the time for an- it is a less expensive and perhaps a less hostile proswering or appearing, be served upon or left at the ceeding than the sending the Serjeant-at-Arms, and dwelling-house of the person with whom or under may, in a case of no great contumacy, suffice to enforce whose care the infant is at the time of service; the compliance, It is, therefore, provided by the 11th master for instance with whom, or the tutor of the col- Order, that if any party, who is by any order or decree lege in which, the infant may be residing. The notice ordered to pay money, or to do any act in a limited must also be served upon or left at the dwelling-house time, i. e. where the presence of the party is not essenof the father or guardian (if any) of the infant, unless tial to the performance of the decree, shall, after due the court shall think fit to dispense with such last-men-service of such order or decree, refuse or neglect to obey tioned service. This last requisite is for the better protection of the infant, whose father or guardian is primâ facie the proper person to support his interests. But it is easy to imagine cases in which the court might with advantage dispense with the intervention of the father or guardian; for instance, where he is a person of profligate habits, to whose protection the court would not safely assign the protection of the infant's interests; or where, by reason of his absence from the country, he would be unable to watch over them. Order III.—When a defendant had not caused an appearance to be entered for him by his own Clerk in Court, the plaintiff, if desirous of serving him with any notice requiring personal service, was obliged to obtain a special order for that purpose. This Order does away with that unnecessary expense and delay, and provides that the plaintiff shall, without special leave of the court, be at liberty to serve any notice of motion, or other notice, or any petition, personally or at the dwelling-house or office of any defendant, who, having been served with a subpoena to appear and answer, shall not have caused an appearance to be entered by his Clerk in Court at the proper time. * See contra, Tappen v. Norman, 11 Ves. 563, where it was said a commission must go. the same, the party prosecuting such order or decree |