IMPROVEMENTS IN THE PRACTICE OF LIFE ASSURANCE.

To Attorneys and Solicitors.

55, Chancery-lane, 9th April, 1842.

FOR the convenience of persons in the Western and Central Districts of London, and particularly of Gentlemen

connected with the Law, THE LONDON, EDINBURGH, AND DUBLIN LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY have opened a Branch Office at 55, Chancery-lane, where Prospectusses, Forms of Proposals, and every other information connected with the business of the Company, may be procured; and where Examinations of Parties whose Lives are proposed for Assurance may be taken, and Policies effected, as at the Chief Office of the Company, in Charlotte-row, Mansion-house.

Your attention is solicited to some of the distinguishing features of this Company, which have been introduced after mature deliberation, and which will be most conveniently pointed out by referring to Policies, as Money Transaction and Family Provision Policies.

MONEY TRANSACTION POLICIES.-Your professional experience and acquaintance with the records of the Courts of Law and Equity, must have convinced you that considerable changes were required in the practice and rules of Life Offices, to render this class of Policies valid and unimpeachable documents of security, which no unforseen circumstances or future accidents could invalidate. This Company has endeavoured, and they think successfully, to render their Policies as indefeasible and negotiable securities as is possible, consistently with a due regard to the safety of the contracting parties; and to effect this object the Company has introduced the following clause into their Deed of Settlement:

CLAUSE 18. That every Policy issued by the Company shall be indefeasible and indisputable, and the fact of the issuing of the same shall be conclusive evidence of its validity; and it shall not be lawful for the Company to delay payment of the money auured thereby, on the ground of any error, mistake or omission, however important, made by or on the part of the person or persons effecting the same; and that, on the contrary, the amount receivable under the same shall be paid at the time stipulated by the Policy, to the person entitled thereto, as if no such error, mistake or omission had been made or discovered, unless the Policy shall have been obtained by fraudulent misrepresentation."

FAMILY PROVISION POLICIES.-In the well-founded belief that Life Assurance business is profitable, persons making provisions for their families, and contemplating a long duration of time between the date of the Policy and the claim to arise under it, generally prefer Assurances which may carry with them a right to participate in the profits to be realized by the Company during the currency of their Policies. By the Deed of Constitution of this Company, the participating Assured are entitled to the WHOLE OF THE MUTUAL PROFITS, as if they had been Assured in a purely Mutual Society; and they hare, at the same time, the security not only of the Funds of the Company, arising from the accumulated premiums, but also the proprietary funds and subscribed Capital of the Company. To the Shareholders are allotted only those profits which are realized by the investment of their own paid capital, and from the excess of the premiums derived from the Non-participating Assurances. This mode of Division of Profits is peculiar to this Company.

In order to provide against the defeat of a Policy in the hands of a CREDITOR, by the DEBTOR, whose Life is Assured leaving the country, and going beyond the prescribed limits, the Company grant WHOLE WORLD POLICES, whereby, on condition of receiving an extra premium, varying in amount according to the circumstances of the case, but fixed and determined at the time of issuing the Policy, the debtor, on whose Life an Assurance has been effected, is entitled to go to or reside in any part of the world, without invalidating the Assurance.

To enable a party to effect an Assurance at the LEAST POSSIBLE EXPENSE, and to entitle him to discontinue it at a less sacrifice than by any other plan, a seven years' Half-premium system has been introduced; and, upon comparing the following scale with any other which has been devised for reducing present payments, it will be seen how much more economically a loan transaction can be fortified by this kind of Policy than by any other. The Half-premium system possesses a further advantage over temporary Assurances, or those for a Term of Years, from the Assured having the option of continuing for Life the Policy which he may have procured for a mere temporary purpose.

THE COMMISSION allowed to Attornies is 107. per cent. upon the first, and 57. per cent. upon all future premiums; and the Commission continues to be payable to the Attorney, who completed the Assurance with the Company, although the future premiums may be paid by others.

The usual weekly Board day is Thursday, but Policies may be obtained any day betwixt the hours of 10 and 5.

DIRECTORS.

ALEXANDER ROBERTSON, Manager.

KENNETT KINGSFORD, Esq. Savage Gardens, Chairman,
BENJAMIN IFILL, Esq. Welbeck-street, Deputy Chairman.

ALEX. ANDERSON, Esq. York-place, Portman-square.
JOHN ATKINS, Esq. White Hart-court, Lombard-street.
JAMES BIDDEN, Esq. Spread Eagle-court.
CAPT. F. BRANDRETH, Scots Fusilier Guards.

JAMES HARTLEY, Esq. Mecklenburgh-square.
JOHN M'GUFFIE, Esq. Osnaburgh-street.
JOHN MACLEAN LEE, Esq. Seething-lane.

J. MARMADUKE ROSSETER, Esq. Kennington-terrace.

SH. H. CANNAN, Esq. Finsbury-square.
Auditors, ROBERT E. ALISON, Esq. Cornhill.
Solicitors,-Messrs. PALMER, FRANCE & PALMER, Bedford-row.

Just published, by S. Sweet, 1, Chancery-lane; and V. & R. Stevens & G. S. Norton, 26 and 39, Bell-yard, Lincoln's Inn.
Just published in 1 Vol. 12mo., price 12s. boards.

THE PRACTICE of the HIGH COURT of CHAN-
CERY, with an Appendix; containing all the General
Orders issued on and since the 3rd of April, 1838; and also
the recent Statutes relative to Practice. By S. ATKINSON,
Esq., of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister at Law.

NEW EDITION OF ARCHBOLD'S CRIMINAL
PLEADING AND EVIDENCE.
ARCHBOLD'S PLEADING and EVIDENCE in CRI-

MINAL CASES; with the Statutes, Precedents of Indict-
ments, &c. and the Evidence necessary to support them. The
Eighth Edition, by JOHN JERVIS, Esq., Barrister at Law,
with a Patent of Precedence.

FORMS of PRACTICAL PROCEEDINGS in the

COURTS of QUEEN'S BENCH, COMMON PLEAS, and EXCHEQUER of PLEAS. By THOMAS CHITTY, Esq., of the Inner Temple. Complete in one vol. price 21s.

THE THEORY and PRACTICE of CONVEYANCING. By S. ATKINSON, Esq., Barrister at Law. The Second Edition. In Two Vols. price 21. 88.

the Committee; Mr. L. Laidman, (the Collector), 119, Chan- A Tenth Edition, enlarged and much improved, with the

cery-lane; and Mr. Aldridge, at the Master's Office, Temple,
until the 16th day of May, inclusive. Dinner on table at
half-past five precisely.

This day is published, price 218. in boards,
TREATISE on the LAW of SHERIFF, with
A
Practical Forms and Precedents. By RICHARD
CLARKE SEWELL, Esq., D. C. L., Barrister at Law, Fel-
College, Oxford.

low of teagdalen, Low go befler and Publisher, 7, Fleet-street. C Tew Edition of Vols. 3 and 4, consisting of Parts 5, 6,

The following are the Names of the Gentlemen who favour THE JURIST with Reports of Cases argued and decided in the several Courts of Law and Equity:

where an action had been brought against the officer of the Court for damages, the Court of Chancery, in restraining the action, has referred it to the Master to ascertain what damages the plaintiff at law ought to receive. There is no pretence in such cases for saying that Equity interferes to remedy any defect in the adminis

precisely the same remedy by its own order that the Court of Common Law would give, and no more.

might be made at law, yet the Vice-Chancellor held that no ground for ousting the jurisdiction of Equity. Lord Lyndhurst, it is true, discharged the order made by the Vice-Chancellor in this case, on the ground that, if the facts alleged were true, the equities disclosed would furnish a clear defence in a Court of Law, in which the question could be tried in a much more satis-tration of justice by the Court of Law; since it gives factory manner. That decision of his Lordship did not, as it appears to us, deny the jurisdiction of Equity, but only went to say, that in that particular case it was not But the most conclusive instances in support of the convenient to exercise it, and that on the ground, not doctrine that we are contending for, are the cases under that the remedy at law would be the same, but that it the Interpleader Act, 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 58. That act would be better. The decision of Lord Lyndhurst did reciting that it often happens that a person sued at law not therefore touch at all the question whether Equity for the recovery of money or goods wherein he has no had lost any of its original jurisdiction; nor has the case interest, and which are also claimed of him by some of Gordon v. Calvert any application to that point, as third party, has no means of relieving himself from such the question in that case was not so much whether adverse claim, but by a suit in Equity against the plaintiff Equity had or had not lost jurisdiction, as whether the and such third party, usually called a bill of interconduct of the defendant was such as to give the plain-pleader, which is attended with expense and delay, for tiff an equity to restrain him from urging his legal rights. On the other hand, there are many cases in which the existence of a concurrent jurisdiction generally is fully recognised, and some in which the very point under discussion arises. In Adamson v. Evitt, (2 Russ. & My. 66), the grantee of an annuity was induced, by false representations by the grantor's agent, to become the purchaser of an annuity; and there it was admitted that the plaintiff could have sustained an action for damages in the nature of an action of deceit against the defendant. But the Court said-"This Court nevertheless, with respect to the fraud, would have a concurrent jurisdiction with a Court of Law."

remedy thereof, proceeds to give power to Courts of Common Law, upon application by a defendant in an action of assumpsit, debt, detinue, or trover, stating that the right is in a third party, to order such party to appear and maintain or relinquish his claim, and in the meantime to stay the proceedings in such action.

It is plain from the recital, that the statute is expressly intended to give relief in those very cases where before relief could be only had in Equity; and if therefore the mere fact of Courts of Law acquiring a jurisdiction formerly exercised by Equity, were sufficient to oust the jurisdiction of Equity, this is precisely the case for the application of that doctrine. Yet, although, as Again, in the cases on arbitration: if a reference is observed by Mr. Chitty, (Practice of the Law, vol. 2, made a rule of a Court of Law, not under the statute 9 p. 343), the statute makes a considerable inroad on the & 10 Will. 3, although a complete remedy against the prior exclusive jurisdiction of a Court of Equity, it has award by setting it aside may be obtained by a proper never been contended for one moment that it abrogates application to the Court of Law, yet Equity has also it. On the contrary, there have been in Equity since jurisdiction to set aside the award. (Brown v. Brown, that statute, several cases of interpleader in which the 1 Vern. 157, before the statute; and Lord Lonsdale v. jurisdiction has been exercised without question; (SiereLittledale, 2 Ves. 451, since the statute). The jurisdic-king v. Behrens, 2 My. & C. 581; Paule v. Von Melle, 8 tion of Equity, where an agreement out of Court to refer is made a rule of a Court of Law under the statute, is ousted, it is true; but that is by the express words of the statute itself, and not simpliciter, on the ground of the Court of Law having assumed jurisdiction. (Nicholls v. Chalie, 14 Ves. 265; Gwinett v. Bannister, Id. 530; and see in particular Nicholls v. Roe, 3 Myl. & K. 431).

Another strong case to shew that the existence of jurisdiction in another Court does not oust that of Equity, is Duncan v. Macalmont, (5 Jur. 262), which was upon a bottomry bond alleged to be fraudulent; and it was admitted that full relief could be obtained in the Court of Admiralty by a proper suit. Yet Lord Langdale, M. R., held that Equity had jurisdiction, because it could more conveniently sift the matter than could be done under the particular form of proceeding then adopted in the Admiralty Court.

Again, another class of cases bearing on this subject is that in which Equity asserts, not merely concurrent but exclusive jurisdiction to give a remedy against its own officers to parties injuriously affected by the act of those officers. (Aston v. Heron, 2 M. & K. 290, and the cases there collected). In several of those cases,

Sim. 327); and it has never occurred either to the Court or the counsel, to conceive that the effect of the 1 & 2 Will. 4 is to oust such jurisdiction, or to establish anything more than a concurrent jurisdiction in Courts of Law.

With regard to the principle upon which the jurisdiction of Equity is founded, it is said, that equitable jurisdiction is essentially founded on the assumption of there being some defect in the administration of justice in other Courts. Undoubtedly that is, in fact, the origin, and it is so stated by Lord Redesdale, of the extraordinary jurisdiction of Equity; and the doctrine is still so far sustained, that, at this day there can be no doubt that a Court of Equity would assume a new head of jurisdiction on any subject on which it should appear that a Court of Law would be incapable of doing full justice. But it does not at all follow that the jurisdiction so assumed, should cease by reason of the Court, which, in the origin, could not do justice, assuming some new forms of proceeding enabling it to do so. For the existence of jurisdiction is as firmly based upon the fact of its having been for a long period exercised, as upon its accordance with any real or supposed principle. In other words, jurisdiction rests in many cases upon prac

tice; and if we find that a jurisdiction has been constantly, and from a remote period, exercised, it is not necessary, we apprehend, to inquire what is the reason or principle of it. It is sufficient, that it has been exercised for a long time without challenge, for it to have acquired a legal and indefeasible existence.

Besides, the whole foundation of the doctrine that the jurisdiction of Equity is ousted by the assumption of a concurrent jurisdiction by a Court of Law falls, when we consider that such ouster of jurisdiction can only be contended for on the assumption that the relief obtainable at Law is precisely similar to, or at least for all purposes as complete as, that obtainable in Equity, an assumption which never can be strictly and completely true, so long as the modes of procedure in Equity and at Law remain, as they now are, totally dissimilar; since it is obvious, that though the same legal effect may result, in a case of concurrent jurisdiction, from a judgment at Law as from a decree in Equity, yet the practical effect on the parties may be much modified by the mode of procedure through which the legal effect is to be obtained.

Reviews.

precedent could be produced, the clerks should agree in framing a new one; and if they would not agree, it was to be referred to parliament.

"The provision was soon taken advantage of, and ac'tions, unheard of before, abounded in the courts. A ferryman overloaded his boat whereby it upset, and 'the plaintiff's horse was drowned; it was held that an action lay. Sheriffs were sued for illegally quashing the essoin, for making a false return, for directing a wrong officer to summon a panel; actions for deceit and slander, for professional negligence, for loss of goods by a bailee, for illegally taking toll, and a va"riety of others were successfully maintained. (3 Reeves, '89 to 93; Id. 243).

These were all actions of trespass on the case; or as 'it was styled in the Latin of the courts of law, trans'gressio super casum. Much discussion arose as to what was their real nature; and as they were all founded on an extension of the writ of trespass, it was settled that the new action of trespass on the case only applied to such injuries as were 'quasi trespasses.' (3 Reeves, 243)...

6

All the early cases of assumpsit reported, appear to have 'been special actions. (3 Reeves, 396). When the common indebitatus counts were first used, does not appear 'to have been well ascertained. It is said by Mr. Ser'jeant Williams, that there were no such counts in the time of Charles II. (2 Wms. Saund. 350, 374). No 'doubt they were not then in use; but Mr. Reeves ad'duces two instances very like common counts, reported A Treatise on Simple Contracts, and the Action of Assump-in the 33 Hen. 8, New Cases 5. And he says, that sit. By WILLIAM Fox, Esq., of the Inner Temple, when, in a subsequent reign, the validity of such Special Pleader. [Stevens & Norton, 1842.] 'counts was much discussed, many records of that earlier period were produced to shew that it was no new device. (4 Reeves, 383). Holt, C. J., is reported to have said, that he was a bold man who first ventured on them, (2 Wms. Saund. 374); perhaps, in the 'present day, he would be thought timid who could see any thing to fear in so harmless a simplification of a 'common form."

The author of the above work ventures in his advertisement to hope that it will prove a useful compendium for practical purposes, but we doubt whether he has not confined himself within too narrow limits to entitle his book to that distinction; for they have obliged him to treat his subject in so general a manner, that the practitioner cannot safely rely on his statement of the law, and must consult other text books. As far, indeed, as he has gone, the law is, with the exception of some trifling inaccuracies, correctly stated; but when we tell our readers that the law relating to the common count on the sale of goods occupies only four pages of a duodecimo volume, far from closely printed, and that relating to the count for use and occupation barely two, they may judge for themselves how the subject must be discussed. In fact, the book will be most useful to those whom the sight of a larger work would frighten from its perusal, and who may in our author's pages find a good outline of a very useful branch of the law. To them and to the student we may safely recommend it, as it is written in an easy, intelligible style; and the subject is divided and arranged in such a manner as to facilitate the task of the reader. The following extract from the history of the action of assumpsit, will convey an idea of the author's manner:

"Previously to the statute of Westminster 2, 13 Ed. 1, the actions of case, assumpsit, and trover, did not 'exist; and whenever circumstances arose which would 'now be the subject of those actions, the suitor was 'without a remedy, unless, indeed, he could find one in 'Chancery. The clerks who had the framing of writs were too much attached to ancient precedents, says Sir 'William Blackstone; and unless the case for which 'the writ was sought fell exactly within the scope of "those which already existed, the fear of innovation 'prevented them from framing a new one. (3 Bl. Com. '51; 2 Reeves, 202.

To quicken their diligence, says the learned judge, 'the 24th section of the above statute was framed, 'which enacted, that whenever in one case a writ should be found, and in a like case (consimili casu) falling 'under the same right, and requiring a like remedy, no

We had noted down a few inaccuracies; but we refrain from mentioning more than one. At page 17 our author, in attempting to define the limitation to the rule which makes a party sharing the profits of a trade a partner in it, states it to be, that if he is to have a share of the profits and something more, he is not constituted a partner thereby. We apprehend this is not the effect of the cases which he cites; and, indeed, it is difficult to understand how the addition of something more to a share of the profits can prevent the latter from creating a partnership. There is no case which decides that if a party had a third or other share of the profits and an annual allowance besides, on account of his devoting more attention or skill to the business than the other members of the firm, he would not be a partner. The author would have done better if he had merely stated the decisions on the subject, without attempting to deduce any rule from them. Having found fault with him in this instance, we must do him the justice to remark, that he has very properly, in his observations on moral considerations supporting a promise, called attention to the effect which the decision in Eastwood v. Kenyon, (11 A. & E. 438), may have upon the cases in which seduction and past cohabitation have been considered sufficient to support an express promise. In that case, the court, in an elaborate judgment, after reviewing all the previous cases on the subject, decided, that a pecuniary benefit, conferred by the plaintiff and accepted by the defendant, was not such a consideration as would support a subsequent express promise by the defendant to reimburse the plaintiff; and they said that the conclusion arrived at in Wennall v. Adney (3 B. & P. 249) seemed to be correct in general," that an express promise can only revive a precedent good consideration, which might have been enforced at law through