Greer v. Turner.

That Greer had so held and in like manner settled in 1876. They show the settlements, and set forth specific amounts. They deny their responsibility for the rents of 1873. They admit having received from Watkins, that winter, thirty-three bales of cotton, but claim that he was indebted to them, otherwise, for advances and supplies, to an amount larger than the value of the cotton, and they appropriated it to that debt. They deny the waste and cutting of timber. Greer denies his responsibility for the rents of 1877, saying that, in February of that year, he formally abandoned to the trustee, all possession of the property. They claim a balance as still due them under the deed of trust.

Turner then amended his complaint, charging that Greer, after the former decision of this court, to avoid responsibility for the rents of 1877, abandoned to Watkins the possession of all the property, except the landing and warehouse, which he retained and used until April. He then abandoned them also to Watkins, who was wholly insolvent.

He also charges Greer & Baucun with waste and injury to the lands from bad husbandry. These allegations were duly traversed.

The receiver reported, in effect, that he had collected and brought into court $1,100, the full value of the land rents for 1877, and that he estimated the value of the ferry rents at $150, and the warehouse at $600, in all $750, which he was unable to collect; and further, that he had let the premises for 1878 for the aggregate sum of $1,790.65.

The cause was heard on the seventh of Angust, 1878. The Chancellor found that complainant, Turner, had made a valid tender of the whole debt on the seventh of March, 1873, whereby he acquired a right to the possession of the property,

Greer v. Turner.

and the rents and profits; that Watkins, being in possession, had attempted to convey the property to Greer, in February, 1873; that the trustee had, in the fall of 1873, at their request, put Greer & Baucum in possession of the property, as beneficiaries under the trust; and that they had received a part of the produce of 1873 from Watkins, without any sufficient proof of any other debt to which they might appropriate it.

Upon such findings, he held that Greer & Baucum were liable, on account with complainant, for the rents of the premises from the date of the tender to the end of the year 1875, regardless of any contract made by them with the trustee; that Baucum had at that time transferred all his interest in the secured debt to Greer, who remained in possession until some time in April, 1877, and then abandoned the possession to Watkins, who was insolvent, making himself thereby liable to account with complainant for the rents of 1876, and so much of the rents of 1877 as could not be collected by the receiver. Further, that Greer & Baucum were entitled to compensation for such repairs as were necessary for the protection of the crops, but not for improvements, clearings and new houses; and also for taxes paid by them, at the value of the scrips used by them for the purpose; and that they were chargeable for any damages incurred by reason of willful neglect, improper culti vation and bad husbandry. A special Master was appointed to take and state an account in accordance with the facts and principles announced, taking the sum of $3,536 as due, without any interest from the time of the tender; estimating the net rents and profits from 1873 to 1877 inclusive, together with wanton waste-making separate statements for each year; and to report the excess, if any.

The defendants excepted to each and all the findings and

Greer v. Turner.

rulings of the court, and complainant excepted, on his part, to so much as denied him interest on the rents, and confined his damages to willful waste, and allowed defendants compensation for taxes and repairs.

The Master reported with an account stated. In making it, he had estimated the area of land in cultivation each year, charging defendants therefor at the rate of $3.50 per acre for the year 1873, and $3 per acre for subsequent years, down to 1876 inclusive. The rents of the ferry were charged each year at $300, and of the warehouse at $600; nothing was charged for waste, and credits run through the account for taxes and repairs.

His statement shows that the secured debt was satisfied in 1875, by such application of rents, and that there had accrued a debit on the other hand against Greer, which, added to those of succeeding years, made a balance against him of $3,462.25. The charge for 1877 had been taken at $750, thus allowing for the $1,100 collected by the receiver on the lands, and holding Greer liable for the uncollected rents on the ferry and warehouse.

The complainant excepted to this report for many reasons, substantially as follows: Because no allowance was made for the cotton received from Watkins; the rental values were too small; no interest was calculated on the rents; the allowance for taxes and repairs was excessive, without evidence and unauthorized, in favor of mere trèspassers; and because no allowance was made him for dam. age to the premises. All were overruled.

Defendants excepted substantially because the rental charges were excessive; the allowance for repairs too small; Greer had been charged with rents of 1873, and 1877 with ferry rents and rent of the gin. These exceptions were overruled.

. Greer v. Turner.

On the part of defendants other exceptions were sustained, to wit: That they had been charged with rents upon too much area; that Greer had not been allowed the cost of a cotton press put there by himself, nor for taxes of 1875, and had been charged with rents on a part of the land which he had himself cleared.

The Chancellor reformed the account accordingly, taking off thirty five acres from the area each year-making, at $3 per acre, $525. He allowed a further credit to Greer of $114 for taxes of 1875, and $303 for the press-thus reducing the balance found against Greer to $2,520.25; for which a decree was rendered.

Baucum was found to have given up the premises before the debt was satisfied. The whole legal and equitable title to the lands was vested in Turner.

The costs of the suit, up to the time of filing the mandate of this court below, were decreed against Greer, Baucum and Watkins; and after that, against Greer & Baucum alone.

The cause is again brought here on the appeal of defendants, and Turner makes his cross-appeal.

1CHANCERY PRACTICE:

Filing sup

OPINION.

It is contended that upon the filing of the mandate from Flemental this court, the Chancellor should have proceeded, at once, after re- to enter such a decree as was indicated in the opinion; and from the that no supplemental complaint should have been enter

complain t

turn of case

supreme court.

tained.

The usual directions on remanding a cause, when this court deems it advisable to remand at all, are for further proceedings consistent with the law declared, and facts found, by the written opinion.

This becomes the law of the case, and as to facts found,

Greer v. Turner.

res judicata. Consistently with these it is not generally intended to trammel the proper courts of original jurisdiction, by precluding them from any steps which may be within the proper scope of the suit, and necessary to complete justice between the parties in reference to its subjectmatter. The matters of this supplemental complaint could not have been considered on the first submission below, nor here, on the former appeal. They occurred pendente lite. Chancery delights in closing in one suit, all litigation concerning the subject-matter down to the time of final submission. Otherwise, it would be interminable.

If the Chancellor had refused to consider this supplemental bill its matter would have afforded grounds for another suit, with additional delays and expenses. It is equitable on its face.

The Chancellor exercised a proper discretion in refusing to strike it out, and did not err in overruling the demur

rer.

MORT

GAGEE:

Must account for

payments

It is the law of this case, that Turner can not demand of 2. Watkins the rents of 1873. It consists with this, however, to hold that the secured creditors, who have no other right rents, and or interest in the lands than as a security for the debt which on the debt they had acquired from Mrs. Dougan, should be chargeable with such rents as they might have got, or with payments made by Watkins which they should have appropriated in exoneration of Turner's equitable estate.

They were not entitled, with or without the consent either of Watkins or the trustee, to use Turner's land for any other purpose. It did not concern them that Turner could not recover the rents of 1873 off Watkins.

If they received them from Watkins as rents, or should have done so, they should be applied to the lien of the Dougan debt, although they may thus inure to Turner's benefit.