4 State ex inf. Halès v. Walker. residing within the district proposed to be organized." Notice of the filing of said petition by publication or posting is required to be given to "all resident owners of land in said proposed district who may desire to oppose the formation thereof to appear on the first day and file their written remonstrance thereto" (Sec. 10938). The first point made by appellants in their brief is, that said act is unconstitutional, because it does not require persons owning property or lands within the proposed boundaries of the district, but who reside outside of such boundaries, to be notified of the proceedings to incorporate such district, but such notice is required to be given only to owners of land residing in such district. That the proceeding to incorporate a special road district is a judicial proceeding, and, therefore, requires notice to all parties in interest, citing State ex inf. v. Colbert, 273 Mo. 198. In the Colbert Case, decided by Division Two, the court had before it the question whether a road district was duly incorporated under Section 10612 et seq. (Laws 1913, p. 678). In that case, no remonstrance was filed to the incorporation of the district, as prayed in the petition filed in the county court. The county court, notwithstanding no remonstrance was filed, and without an amended petition, in its order and judgment of incorporation changed the boundaries of the district. This, the Supreme Court held could not be done under the statute, because, no remonstrance being filed, the statute required the district to be incorporated "with the boundaries given in the petition, or with such boundaries as may be set forth in an amended petition, signed by owners of a majority of the acres of land affected thereby." The court held that the proceeding to incorporate was a judicial proceeding, and that the county court went beyond the authority given it by the original petition and notice, and exceeded its jurisdiction. It is true, the court arguendo quotes from the decision of the case of Embree v. Road Dist., 240 U. S. 1. c. 247, as follows: "As the district was not established by the Legislature but by an State ex inf. Hales v. Walker. exercise of delegated authority, there was no legislative decision that its location, boundaries and needs were such that the lands therein would be benefited by its creation and what it was intended to accomplish, and this being so, it was essential to due process of law, that the landowners be accorded an opportunity to be heard upon the question whether their land would thus be benefited." And further at page 249: "We conclude, therefore, that the statute did provide for according the landowners an opportunity to be heard, when the district was created, upon the question whether their lands would be benefited, and also, that the order establishing the district shows that the statute was complied with in that regard.” But neither in the Embree Case, nor in the Colbert Case, was it held that an act for the incorporation of a road district, which gave the right to remonstrate and provided for notice of the application for incorporation to the resident landowners only and not to non-residents within such district, would be unconstitutional. Special road districts are public corporations and the Legislature can create them the same as other municipal or public corporations, with such powers of taxation, not exceeding the limits fixed in the Constitution, and in such manner as it deems necessary or expedient. [Harris v. Bond Co., 244 Mo. 666.] So we have expressly held (Coyne v. Rugh, 225 S. W. 985) that no notice of any kind is constitutionally required in the incorporation of a town or city by the county court. It is sufficient to enable the court to create such a corporation, unless the statute requires notice, if, as required by law,. a majority of the inhabitants of the district proposed to be incorporated shall present a petition to the county court praying that they may be incorporated. It is not necessary to permit inhabitants not signing such petition to appear and contest it. The statute that created the right provides the remedy and prescribes the procedure. It is complete within itself, and it alone, therefore, determines who may be parties. [1 C. J. 988, note 72.] State ex inf. Hales v. Walker. "It is said that taxpayers who are opposed to incorporating a given territory into a city should be accorded the right to be heard in a proceeding instituted for that purpose, because, if sustained, it subjects them to the burdens of municipal taxation. In answer to this contention it is sufficient to say that the giving or withholding of such right is a matter that rests wholly within the discretion of the Legislature. It is not essential to the validity of the proceeding that all taxpayers who may be affected thereby have their day in court. The Legislature has the power to incorporate territory into a city with or without the consent of its inhabitants (St. Louis v. Allen, 13 Mo. 400; Taylor v. Carondelet, 22 Mô. 105, 110), provided it does it by general law (Const., art. 9, sec. 7). And while the county court, in passing upon the petition, is performing a judicial function, and its pronouncement thereon is a judgment, yet all the agencies invoked by the statute the majority of the taxable inhabitants, their petition, and the county court-taken collectively, is but the instrumentality through which, in the manner prescribed, the legislative power is exercised in creating cities of the fourth class." [Coyne v. Rugh, 225 S. W. 985.] In Bank v. Clark, 252 Mo. 20, Section 9255, Revised Statutes 1909, which gave the privilege of protesting against the passage of a resolution to improve a street by special taxation to resident owners of property liable to be taxed therefor only, and not to non-resident owners, was held invulnerable to attack, as either violative of the Constitution of Missouri or of the United States. The same ruling was made by the Supreme Court of the United States in Field v. Barber Asphalt Co., 194 U. S. 618. So, in Buchan v. Broadwell, 88 Mo. 31, the charter of Kansas City was upheld, which required the city council "upon a petition of residents of Kansas City, who own a majority of front feet on a street to be graded" to grade said street at the expense of all the property owners on the street, whether residents or non-residents. But, under the statute in question, whenever any road State ex inf. Hales v. Walker. is to be built by special taxation, notice is required to be given by at least two publications in some weekly newspaper published in the county, which must state when the county court will be in session to consider protests against such improvement, and that "any one" owning or interested in land in the district may file such protest. [Secs. 10945, 10946, R. S. 1919.] Furthermore, special tax-bills are issued for the collection of special taxes imposed for building roads in such districts which are collected by suit (Sec. 10948), when all the legal defenses a property owner may have may be asserted, which, therefore, in itself, affords him due process of law. [Embree v. Road Dist., 257 Mo. 593.] We rule this point against appellants. II. Was the petition properly signed? We hold that it was. The names of the signers, it is true, are not placed at the end of the petition; but the statute does not expressly state they shall be so placed. That each property owner duly signed his name in the body of the petition, as shown in our statement of the case, Signing Petition. intending to become a party to the petition, there can be no doubt. The county court in its order and judgment expressly held, that the petition was duly signed. There was no evidence, and is no claim here, that the signatures appearing in the body of the petition were not the actual signatures of the petitioners. The act of the Legislature was intended to promote a great and beneficent public good, to-wit, good roads, and it should receive a liberal construction to the end that the purpose. of the Legislature should not be thwarted by mere irregularities in the form of things, when the substance of the law has been complied with. We rule this point against appellants. III. Is the fact that only two of the parties filing the petition were correctly named in the notice, fatal to the judgment or order of incorporation? We think not. The State ex inf. Hales v. Walker. law provides as follows: Notice: Said notices shall contain the names of at least three signers of said petition and set out the boundaries Three Petitioners. of said proposed district, and shall notify all resident owners of land in said proposed district who may desire to oppose the formation thereof to appear on the first day of such regular term of court and file their written remonstrance thereto." [Sec. 10938.] The notice stated, "You and each of you are hereby notified that heretofore on the 5th day of December, 1919, J. R. Baum, Wm. Rice, Roy Stokes and others residing within said proposed district filed in the office of the County Clerk within and for Bates County, Missouri, a petition," etc. J. R. Baum and Wm. Rice were petitioners, but the name of Roy Stokes was not signed thereto, although Ada Stokes was so signed. The purpose of the statute, in requiring the names of at least three of the petitioners to be inserted in the notice, was to identify the petition, so that persons interested might find and examine it. Inasmuch as the notice gave two of the names of the petitioners correctly and the surname of the other correctly, as well as the date of the filing of the petition and other details required by the statute, we cannot see how any one could have been misled as to the petition or proceeding referred to in said notice. We think the law was substantially complied with and the proceeding was not affected by what, at most, was a mere clerical error. We overrule appellants' contention on this point. IV. But it is strenuously urged that the judgment and order of incorporation of the county court was void, because it changed the boundaries of the district from the boundaries described in the petition of the Boundaries. property owners, without an amended petition, as required by the statute. That, in this regard, the statute construed by the court in State ex inf. v. Colbert, 273 Mo. 205-6, and the statute before us, are Changing |