LIVINGS GIL CHRIST υ. INS. CO. If this view be correct it is clear that the Court TON & ought to have given the direction prayed for by the Plaintiffs. Sitting here under a clause in the policy which enables us to look behind the sentence of condemnation, we see that the property was really neutral; MARY'D. and if the jury believed the evidence, the concealment was of papers which were authorized by the course of trade for the voyage, and so far from giving a hostile character, was the only means of preventing a strong presumption of that character. If we but consider the known course of decisions in the British Courts on questions of this nature, we shall find that, independent of the question of the neutral or hostile character of the ostensible owner, the trade between the belligerent mother country and its colony affects with condemnation the property engaged in it, although such property be neutral, and there be an interposition of a neutral port in the course of the voyage. On examining the papers in this case it will be found that they point, though obscurely, to such an ultimate destination. And at all events the existence of contradictory papers, one sett American, the other Spanish, would, in a Spanish trade, afford an almost irresistible inference in a prize Court that the property was really Spanish-Noscitur ab origine. It would take its character from its origin. But it is immaterial, in my view, whether a prize Court would under such circumstances acquit or con.. demn. When the cover of a Spanish character was allowed, it was allowed for the purposes of protection; and the disclosure of it was not required elsewhere than in the Spanish dominions. One of the risks against which the insured meant to guard himself was, in my judgment, a loss on account of the use of the Spanish character: a loss which might have been more plausibly resisted, if there had been a disclosure instead of a concealment of it. The Court also erred in declaring (in the eighth exception) that the taking on board of any of the papers, which were not necessary by the usage of the trade, if the risk thereby were increased, avoided the Plaintiffs' right to recover. The effect of the whole papers should have been taken together. The evidence did not authorize the Court to consider and separate the effect of TON & CHRIST each single paper. If one unnecessary paper might LIVINGS have increased the risk, if singly considered, and yet, if accompanied by the others, it would not have had that effect, certainly the existence of that paper with the others would not have destroyed the right of the Plaintiffs. Yet the opinion of the Court would have authorized the jury to draw a different conclusion. The Court should have directed the jury that if the papers were authorized by the usage and course of the trade, the concealment of them, under the circumstances, did not vitiate the policy; and that if some were authorized and others not, yet the possession or concealment of the latter with the former did not vitiate the policy, unless the unauthorized, so connected with the authorized, papers increased the risk. The question, presented by the 9th exception, is whether the Defendants are to be considered as having notice that the voyage insured was to be pursued under a Spanish license. The letter of the 26th March, 1806, expressly refers to the letter of 17th of February, 1806, which had been laid before the underwriters; and they must therefore be deemed conversant of all the facts therein stated. A party shall be taken to have notice of all facts of which he has the means of knowledge in his own possession, or is put directly upon inquiry by reference to documents submitted to his inspection. In the letter of the 17th February the ship is declared to have a permission for the voyage, which in this trade can be understood in no other sense than a license. The Court ought therefore to have given the direction prayed for by the Plaintiffs. The Court erred in the opinion expressed in the 11th exception. The course and usage of trade may in all cases be proved by parol, whether such course and usage of trade arise out of the edicts or out of the instructions of the government, and whether the trade be allowed or prohibited by such edicts or instructions. The Court erred also in the latter part of their direction to the jury under the 13th exception. It was immaterial whether the trade was or was not prohibited by the laws of Spain. In either case the underwriters υ. MARY'D. INS. CO. LIVINGS- were bound to take notice of the usage and course of TON & the trade. The public laws of a country, affecting the course of the trade with that country, are considered to CHRIST be equally within the knowledge and notice of all the parties to a policy on a voyage to such country. GIL v. MARY'D. INS. CO. The 20th exception cannot be supported. The opinion of the Court was entirely correct. The 24th and 25th exceptions ought to be considered together in order to present the opinion of the Court below with its full effect. It is clear that any acts done by the assured in the voyage according to the course and usage of the trade, although such acts may increase the risk, do not vitiate the policy. This opinion was pronounced by this Court on the former argument of this case, in reference to the Spanish papers to which the present application of the Defendants obviously pointed. The Court therefore erred in granting the prayer of the Defendants, and in refusing that of the Plaintiffs. The last (the 28th) exception cannot be sustained. The proposition is conceived in too general terms, and might mislead the jury. Any acts or omissions of the insured or his agents which, according to the known edicts or decisions of the belligerents, though not according to the law of nations, would inhance the danger of capture or condemnation, might, if such acts or omissions were unreasonable, unnecessary or wanton, form a sound objection to the right of recovery. The insured can have no right to jeopardize the property by any conduct which the fair objects of the voyage, or the usage of the trade do not justify. 1813. March 15th. Although the YOUNG v. GRUNDY. THIS was an appeal from a decree of the Circuit consideration Court for the District of Columbia, sitting in Alexan of a promisso 1y note fail, by dria, as a Court of Equity. YOUNG v. Young brought a bill in equity against Grundy to be relieved from a judgment at law, obtained by Grundy against him on a promissory note given by him in Vir- GRUNDY. ginia, to one William Chambers from whom it passed, by several intermediate indorsemeuts, to Grundy. It reason of the was given in 1795 for part of the purchase money of a payee to perlarge tract of land in Virginia, which Chambers and form his part others contracted to sell and convey to Young. It was ment upon failure of the of the agree new agree old one be afterwards discovered that Chambers and others had been which it was imposed upon, and that they had title only to a very given, yet if a small part of the land they had sold to Young; where- ment as a subupon a new agreement was entered into on the 6th Sep- stitute for the tember, 1798, between Chambers and others and Young, entered into by which the original contract was rescinded and com- between the pensation made to Young for the injury he had sustain- original parties ed by their breach of contract, and provision was made this failure of to reimburse him the monies he had paid and to take the original up paper of his, equivalent to that which was then out- creates no equistanding, and which he had issued for the original pur- ty in favor of chase money. Young, in his bill contended, that Chambers and others had not complied with this new agreement, but that they owed him more than enough to cover this note. In the Court below the injunction was dissolved, and upon final hearing the bill was dismissed. Young appealed to this Court. E. I. LEE, for the Appellant, Contended, that there was an original defect of consideration for this note, which, according to the laws of Virginia, followed it into the hands of the present.holder. Laws of Virginia, vol. 1, p. 36-1, P. Wms. 497, Turton v. Benson-1, Dall. 23, Wheeler v. Hughes' ex'r. 2, Wash. 233, Norton v. Rose-6, Cranch, 204, Stewart v. Anderson. SWANN, contra. There is no ground of equity as to Grundy. There was no original want of consideration. Young held the bond of the payee to convey the land, and had to the note, consideration the maker of the note against the indorsee, even in Virginia. v. YOUNG his remedy upon that bond. The new contract was a substitute for the old one, and was made after Grundy GRUNDY. became the holder of the note without notice of any defect of consideration. By the new agreement it was understood that Young should take up this paper, unless it was taken up by Chambers and others. who had an option to take up this or any other equivalent paper of Young's. 1813. March 16th. March 16th....LIVINGSTON, J. delivered the opinion of the Court as follows: Whatever equity the Complainant may once have had against the payee or holder of the note for l 433 15 which was assigned to George Grundy, in consequence of the non-performance of the agreement of the 15th of May, 1795, this Court is of opinion that all such equity was done away by the contract of the 6th September, 1798. This last contract was made for the express purpose of making the Complainants a compensation for the loss they had sustained, by the non-performance of the other, and was evidently received as an equivalent or substitute therefor. By this latter contract then they were placed, as it respected the holders of all their notes, precisely in the same situation as if there had been no want or failure of consideration of the agreement made in 1795. Whether the agreement of 1798 has been complied with it is not material to inquire, because, previous thereto, this note was held by Grundy, who cannot be affected by any claim which the Complainant may have against the other Defendants in consequence of any subsequent transactions between the parties. The Court is of opinion that the decree of the Circuit Court be affirmed with costs. PALMER v. ALLEN. Absent....TODD, J. ERROR to the Supreme Court of Errors of the state of In the district of Connecticut Connecticut, in any action of assault and battery and false |