Solomon v. Moberly Light & Power Co. narily furnished for electric lights. There was a conflict in the testimony on this subject, and we are concluded by the verdict of the jury in respect to same. Turning to the other branch of the case, the evidence tends to show that deceased was an electrician, was familiar with the proper method of installing wires in houses, and was familiar with the danger of being shocked by the use of electricity. He was a neighbor of Mrs. Moore's and received an emergency call from her home for assistance. Mr. Oliver Ricker, the brother of Mrs. Moore, was found under an automobile in his garage unconscious. A controversy arose among those who came to assist Mrs. Moore in her distress, as to whether the car had run over Ricker or whether he had been injured by electricity or in some other manner. After Ricker had been removed from under the car to another room, and was still unconscious, Dr. Megee arrived, and a discussion arose as to what caused Ricker's condition. The deceased was of the opinion that Ricker had been injured by the car, but the doctor said he looked like a man who had been gassed. The deceased, in order to ascertain the cause of Ricker's injury, started to the garage, followed by some of the others present. Dr. Megee said that before deceased started to the garage he said to him, "Don't go yet, Harry, and wait a minute." This was about all that was said by the doctor, and there is nothing in the evidence to indicate that deceased heard or understood what the doctor had said, as the latter did not speak very loud. The deceased, at, the time of his death on August 8, 1921, was in his sock feet and wearing a hickory shirt. The evidence tends to show that he entered the garage, held the socket attached to a cord, in his right hand, with an electric light bulb at the end of same; that he looked under and around the car, and suddenly walked in front of the automobile, or thereabouts, stiffened up, suddenly gave a kind of gurgling sound, continued to hold onto the socket, fell over against the north side and died. The evidence also tended to show that Solomon v. Moberly Light & Power Co. deceased had walked across the lawn with dew on the grass; that he was standing on the dirt floor of the garage when killed, and that his wife and Mr. Guthrie each received a shock when they touched his clothing. The testimony of plaintiff's expert witnesses tended to show, that the death of deceased could not have been produced by a voltage of 110, under the circumstances aforesaid, and that in their opinion he was killed by a voltage greatly in excess of 110. There was conflicting testimony upon this subject. The court gave instructions to the jury, modified some of those asked by defendant, and refused other instructions requested by appellant. The rulings of the court during the progress of the trial, and such other matters as may be deemed important, will be considered in the opinion. I. Under proposition one of appellant's "Points and Authorities" it is said: "It was error for the court to permit plaintiff to amend one month after the verdict had been returned and judgment entered, After Verdict. the third count of her petition (the one she elected to stand on), by adding thereto the assignment of negligence contained in her first count (the count she had abandoned by her election).' Amendment Appellant made no objection to the introduction of evidence under either count of petition on the ground that defendant had not been charged with either actual or constructive knowledge of the unsafe and negligent condition of said wire. Nor was a demurrer filed as to either count of said petition. A number of witnesses testified in behalf of plaintiff, without objection, as to the negligent condition of the wires, and as to the length of time they had been in that condition. In other words, the case was tried throughout, as it would have been had said count three contained the language inserted by said amendment. The plaintiff, under the circumstances aforesaid, was entitled under Sections 1274 and 1277, Solomon v. Moberly Light & Power Co. Revised Statutes 1919, to have her petition amended to conform to the facts proven, and the court committed no error in permitting it to be done. Even if the petition had not been amended below, and leave had been asked to amend it here, we would have followed the settled practice of this court by treating the petition as amended, and disposing of the case accordingly. [Ehrlich v. Mittelberg, 252 S. W. 1. c. 676 and cases cited; Morton v. Lloyd Const. Co., 280 Mo. 1. c. 375-6, 217 S. W. 1. c. 834; State ex inf. v. Clardy, 267 Mo. 1. c. 381, 185 S. W. 1. c. 187; State ex rel. v. McQuillin, 246 Mo. 1. c. 594, 151 S. W. 444; Baker v. Railroad, 122 Mo. 1. c. 547-8; Darrier v. Darrier, 58 Mo. 1. c. 233.] In the recent case of Ehrlich v. Mittelberg, 252 S. W. 1. c. 676, in discussing the subject now before us, we said: "Aside from the foregoing, the facts which appellant insists should have been alleged in petition were proven without the objection, and stood unchallenged at the trial. Under such circumstances, it would not be proper for this court to treat the petition as void, even if it defectively stated a cause of action attempted to be pleaded therein. On the contrary, as respondents would have been entitled in the trial court to amend their petition to correspond with the facts proven, we will treat the petition here as having been properly amended." The authorities supra were cited in support of above quotation. The foregoing assignment of error is accordingly overruled. II. It is contended by appellant that "deceased was a mere trespasser, licensee or volunteer, and defendant was under no legal obligation other than to do him no willful or wanton harm,” etc. Licensee. We have carefully read and fully considered the list of cases cited by appellant in support of above contention. We are of the opinion that the deceased, under the facts in this case, was neither a trespasser, licensee nor volunteer Solomon v. Moberly Light & Power Co. and, hence, the principles of law discussed in the cases cited, are not applicable to the facts of the present controversy. Turning to the testimony of Mrs. Maude Moore, the sister of Oliver Ricker, we are informed that she sent her boy to the garage to put away his wheel. The lad soon returned and gave it as his opinion that something was wrong with his uncle, Oliver Ricker, as he was under the car. Mrs Moore ran to the car, and found the head and shoulders of her brother under the car close up to the wheel. She ran outside and called for deceased and Eagan, who were near neighbors. Two other gentlemen, with the above, were the first persons there. The deceased came to the garage and with the assistance of Eagan lifted the car, while the other men dragged her brother out. The latter was taken into the house and, while lying there unconscious, a controversy arose between those present, as to whether he was hurt by the car, or by gas or electricity. The deceased, who was an electrician and familiar with the wiring of the garage, went back to the latter to ascertain how Mr. Ricker had been injured and, while on this errand, was killed. He was there upon the express invitation of Mrs. Moore, for the purpose of aiding and assisting her in a time of emergency. He was not there on any business of his own, but was performing a neighborly act in behalf of Mrs. Moore and solely upon her invitation. We are of the opinion, based on the facts before us, that deceased at the time and place of his death, was an invitee of Mrs. Moore, and was entitled to the same protection against the negligence of the defendant complained of, as would have been accorded to Mrs. Moore, had she been injured while performing the same acts which resulted in the death of plaintiff's husband. [Godfrey v. K. C. L. & P. Co., 253 S. W. 1. c. 236; Main v. Lehman, 243 S. W. 1. c. 93; Oakley v. Richards, 275 Mo. 1. c. 276, 204 S. W. 505; Williams v. Gas & Electric Co., 274 Mo. 1, 202 S. W. 1; Sudmeyer v. Ry. Co., 228 S. W. 64; Campbell Solomon v. Moberly Light & Power Co. v. United Rys., 243 Mo. 141, 147 S. W. 788; Clark v. Railroad, 234 Mo. 396, 1. c. 418-19, 137 S, W. 583; Glaser v. Rothschild, 221 Mo. 180-1; Von Trebra v. Gaslight Co., 209 Mo. 1. c. 658 and fol.; Hollis v. Merchants' Assn., 205 Mo. 1. c. 520-1; Ryan v. St. Louis Transit Co., 190 Mo. 621; Young v. Waters-Pierce Oil Co., 185 Mo. 634; Geismann v. Mo.-Edison Electric Co., 173 Mo. 1. c. 674; Godfrey v. K. C. L. & P. Co., 247 S. W. 451; Beckwith v. City of Malden, 253 S. W. 17; Grady v. L. L. P. & T. Co., 253 S. W. 202.] Regardless of the rulings in other jurisdictions, the law is so well settled in the foregoing authorities of our own State, in respect to above proposition, that we have not deemed it necessary to quote therefrom. The above assignment is accordingly overruled. Contributory III. Under other propositions of appellant's "Points and Authorities" it is claimed that deceased was guilty of contributory negligence; that he voluntarily assumed a position of danger and was, at the time of his injury, meddling without right with the electrical equipment in Ricker's garage. The cases cited do not deal with facts similar to those at bar and, even if they did, we would not hesitate to follow the rulings of our own courts, as promulgated in the well considered cases heretofore cited. We have held in the preceding proposition that the jury were justified in finding from the evidence that deceased was an invitee at the time and place of his death, and that he was lawfully there assisting the owners of the home and garage, and was not there to transact any business of his own. It will appear from the preceding statement, that Mr. Ricker was lying in the house unconscious, with the question undetermined as to whether he was run over by the machine or gassed. It was important to know, in treating Ricker, whether he was injured by the machine or otherwise. The deceased, as their invited friend, in attempting to aid Ricker and his |