The bar associations of the State have taken action in the matter as follows: At a meeting of the Onondaga County Bar Association held at the Court House in the city of Syracuse, on the 19th day of February, 1895, the following resolution was adopted: The action of the Bar Association of the city of New York was supplemented by that of its committee as follows referring to the act proposed by the State Association and which is in substance the one given below: NEW YORK, March 22, 1895. I hereby certify that at a meeting of the committee on the amendment of the law of the Bar Association of the city of New York, held at its house No. Resolved, That it is the sense of this association that the present Legislature should provide for the appointment of suitable persons to make the necessary investigation and report to the next Legisla-7 West Twenty-ninth street, the annexed proposed ture whether or not, in their opinion, a revision of the Code of Procedure should be had, and if so, to what extent, and in what respect. W. P. GOODELLE, President Onondaga Co. Bar Association. I do hereby certify the following to be a correct transcript from the proceedings of the Rochester Bar Association of date, January 14, 1895: Resolved, That it is the opinion of this association that the Code of Civil Procedure should be revised and simplified. Resolved, That copies of these resolutions be sent to the Senator and Assemblymen from Monroe county, and to the President of the State Bar Association. Dated January 15, 1895. HENRY W. GREGG, Secretary. At a meeting of the law reform committee of the Bar Association of the city of Brooklyn a resolution was unanimously passed heartily endorsing the proposed act providing for the appointment of counsel to examine and report upon a revision of the Code of Civil Procedure. HENRY S. RASQUIN, Corresponding Secretary. At a stated meeting of the Association of the Bar of the city of New York, held on the 12th day of March, 1895, the committee on the amendment of the law presented a report, calling the attention of the association to the condensing and simplifying of the Code of Civil Procedure. bill entitled, "An act to examine and report upon a revision of the Code of Civil Procedure," a copy of which said proposed bill is annexed hereto, was considered, and after discussion by members of the said committee, the said proposed bill was approved and recommended for enactment. I further certify that the said meeting was held on the evening of March 21, 1895. and that a quorum was present. CHAS. BULKLEY HUBBELL, Secretary of the Committee on the Amendment of the Law. As a result of this unanimous action of the Bar Associations of the State and the unanimity of sentiment among the lawyers, Hon. M. E. O'Grady has introduced the following bill in the Legislature: AN ACT authorizing the appointment of three members of the bar to examine and report upon a revision of the Code of Civil Procedure. The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows: SECTION 1. Within ten days after the passage of this act, the governor shall appoint three members of the bar of this State, who shall examine the Code of Procedure in this State and the Codes of Procedure and Practice Acts in force in other States and countries, and the rules of court adopted in connection therewith, and report thereon to the next legislature in what respects the Civil Procedure in the courts of this State can be revised, condensed and simplified. § 2. The persons so appointed shall receive the necessary expenses and disbursements incurred in Mr. Cephas Brainerd presented the following re- the performance of the duties herein imposed when solution: Resolved, That the Association of the Bar of the city of New York recommends the passage of an act by the present Legislature, authorizing the appointment by the Governor of three lawyers, who are to serve without salary, empowered to consider and report at the next session of the Legislature upon the advisability of condensing and simplifying the Code of Civil Procedure, with recommendations as to the respects in which the Code should be revised. Which was adopted. S. B. BROWNELL, Recording Secretary. the same are properly audited by the comptroller of the State, and the same when so audited shall be paid, on the warrant of the comptroller, out of any moneys in the treasury not otherwise appropriated. § 3. The necessary printing in connection with such revision shall be done by the State printer, and copies of the report above provided for shall be distributed to judges of the Court of Appeals, justices of the Supreme Court, county judges and surrogates and to such members of the bar as may request the same, or as the persons so appointed may designate, by December 1, 1895. § 4. This act shall take effect immediately. The proposed revision of chapter 16 of the Code of Procedure presented to the State Bar Association by the committee on law reform has also been put in form of a bill and presented to the Legislature, the article with reference to the writ of habeas corpus having been revised so that the proposed amendment includes sections 1991 to 2148 inclusive. We have heretofore published the revision as to the portions other than the writ of habeas corpus and proceedings to bring up a person to testify, which are to be found in this week's issue. BRITISH TRANSPORT OF FRENCH WAR THE still, the rules of European international law as to [\HE fact that an agreement has been entered into between the French government and a British firm of ship-owners to transport certain war material to Madagascar invites consideration of more than one interesting question of the incidence and of the limits of international law. The announcement that to avoid controversy the French government has decided that the ships should sail under the French flag by no means disposes of the interest of these questions. The chief among them are: First, has international law been violated by breach of neutrality, having regard, on the one hand, to the general rules of the law of nations on that head, and, on the other, to the treaty obligations of the British government? and, secondly, has the British neutrality law been violated? Taking the last question first, the rules of British neutrality are to be found in the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870. That statute forbids, among other acts, the dispatching any ship to be employed in the military or naval service of any State at war with any friendly State (§§ 8-13). Augmenting the warlike force of any such ship is also forbidden (§ 10), as are naval and military expeditions against friendly States. If, therefore, the French expedition were directed against a friendly European State instead of against the Hova rulers of Madagascar, there can be little doubt that the British secretary of state would issue his warrant against the ship-owners and the ships. The general rules of international law are substantially the same, and indeed furnish the foundation of the British law of neutrality. In later times, such furnishing of ships for hostile purposes has been held a breach of neutrality, the most famous instance being furnished by the Alabama incident. There are, how-who was being tried for larceny. Even the prisoner ever, features of the present situation which remove the controversy between the French government and the Hovas from the plane of those in which the ordinary rules of international neutrality under the general law and the British statute are applicable. These features are that the British government is under treaty obligation to recognize the French Protectorate over Madagascar; and, to go deeper A San Antonio, Texas, lawyer was appealing most eloquently to the jury on behalf of his client, himself was moved to tears, and was wiping his eyes with a handkerchief, when his attorney turned and ask the jury to gaze on the honest features of his client, and say if they could believe that it was possible for a man with such an honest face to be guilty of theft. Suddenly the lawyer paused, gasped for breath, and ejaculated: "Well, I'll be blowed if the blankety blank scoundrel hasn't swiped my pocket handkerchief.”—Argonaut. Abstracts of Recent Decisions. ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS-COLLATERAL SECURITY-A creditor of an insolvent who holds collateral security must either surrender the collateral, or have its value determined by the court. MASTER AND SERVANT — CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. An engineer who, to make necessary repairs, goes out on the running board of his locomotive while it is running at seventeen or eighteen miles an hour, and while it is unusually dangerous because of the defects in the engine, when the en and his claim will be allowed for the difference be-gine and train can be stopped or the speed slack tween the amount thereof and the value of the collateral. (National Union Bank v. National Mechanics' Bank [Md.], 30 Atl. Rep. 913.) ATTACHMENT-UNRECORDED DEED-NOTICE.-An attaching creditor who, before the completion of his levy and the perfection of his attachment by the issuance of a proper warrant, discovers an unrecorded deed of certain realty from his debtor to another, for a valuable consideration, will be deemed to have such notice thereof as to deprive his subsequent judgment of priority. (Merchants' Building & Loan Ass'n v. Barber [N. J.], 30 Atl. Rep. 865.] ened in a short distance, is guilty of such contributory negligence as will preclude a recovery for his death, caused by being thrown from the engine. (Southern Pac. Co. v. Johnson [U. S. C. C. of App.], 64 Fed. Rep. 951.) - INDEPENDENT CON MUNICIPAL CORPORATION TRACTOR.-The defendant city contracted for the construction of certain sewers according to plans and specifications furnished by defendant. This work did not necessarily involve an injury to plaintiff's land. The defendant did not employ and had no power to dismiss workmen, though by the contract they were to be residents of the city. The superintendent of sewers and inspector, city officers, were authorized to give instructions so that certain results might be obtained, but had no control over the contractor's men. Held, that the contract being with an independent contractor, plaintiff could not recover from the defendant city for BUILDING CONTRACT-PERFORMANCE.-A building contract provided that the payments should be made on the architect's certificate, and that the second payment would be due when all the work was completed, and the final payment thirty days later. It was provided that no certificate given, except that for the final payment, should be conclusive evi-injuries caused by the negligence of the contractor's dence of the performance of the contract. Held, that a certificate for the second payment did not dispense with the necessity for the final certificate. (Beharrell v. Quimby [Mass.], 39 N. E. Rep. 407.) CARRIERS-INJURIES TO PASSENGERS.-In an action against a carrier for personal injuries caused by the negligence of defendant's servant in driving the coach into a post, thereby causing the horses to run away, evidence of negligence on the part of the servant in deserting the coach after the collision is admissible. (Caveny v. Neely [S. Car.], 20 S. E. Rep. 806.) servant's. (Harding v. City of Boston [Mass.], 39 N. E. Rep. 411.) NEGLIGENCE DEFECTIVE SIDEWALKS. In an action against a city for injuries caused by a defective sidewalk, evidence of the condition of the sidewalk two days after the injury is admissible where there was no change therein. (Lohr v. Borough of Philipsburg [Penn.], 30 Atl. Rep. 822.) MUNICIPAL POWERS. The exclusive power over street improvements conferred by the Legislature on the CORPORATIONS-INSOLVENCY-RECEIVER.-While legislative department of the various city govern the mere insolvency of a corporation is not enough to authorize the appointment of a receiver at the suit of general creditors, yet when it clearly appears that on account of such insolvency, and the misconduct of its officers, the corporation is no longer able to proceed with its business, or its assets are in process of being fraudulently misapplied, to the injury of creditors, who are without other adequate means of relief, it becomes the duty of the court to appoint a receiver. Under such circumstances, the property of the corporation becomes a special fund, out of which creditors are entitled to satisfaction of their demands, and hence is the subject of an equitable lien or trust for their benefit. (Doe v. Northwest Coal & Transportation Co. [U. S. C. C., Ore.], 64 Fed. Rep. 928.) ments cannot be delegated to any officer or committee, but must be exercised by that department itself as a body. (Bolton v. Gillerau [Cal.], 38 Pac. Rep. 881.) JUDGMENT - ACTION NEGLIGENCE INJURIES OVER. The lessee of a wharf who pays a judgment recovered against him for injuries caused by the negligence of his sub-lessee, without negligence on his part, may recover indemnity from the sublessee without having notified him of the pendency of the prior action. (Oceanic Steam Nav. Co. v. Compania Transatlantica Espanola [N. Y.], 39 N. E. Rep. 360.) an action PASSENGER ELEVATOR. In against the owner of a building for the death of a child through the sudden and negligent starting of a passenger elevator by the elevator boy, evidence that the boy had on previous occasions started the elevator in a like sudden and negligent manner is not admissible. (T. & H. Pueblo Bldg. Co. v. Klein [Colo.], 38 Pac. Rep. 608.) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-ACTION BY ASSIGNEESET OFF.--In an action by an assignee of a note under seal against the maker, defendant having proved the purchase before suit brought of an overdue note of the payee of the note sued on, to defeat the rights of set-off, the burden of proving notice to defendant, at the time he bought the note, that the note sued on had been assigned to plaintiff, is on plaintiff. (Burford v. Fergus [Penn.], 30 Atl. Rep. 844.) NOTE RELEASE OF INDORSER.-A note indorsed by defendant as an accommodation was transferred by the plaintiff payee to a bank, and, when due, was substituted, without defendant's knowledge, by two new notes by the same makers, and indorsed by plaintiff and another, the original note being surrendered to the makers: Held, that defendant was discharged from liability, although the makers of the original note afterward delivered it to plaintiff, that he might hold defendant as an indorser. (Green v. Skinner [Miss.], 16 South. Rep. 378.) NEW TRIAL-INADEQUACY OF DAMAGES.-Where, in an action for personal injuries, the jury finds, in effect, that the plaintiff has been injured through the negligence of the defendant, without any contributory negligence on his own part, and the evidence, without conflict, shows that his injuries were substantial, yet the jury awards him practically no damages at all, the verdict will be set aside and a new trial awarded. (Carter v. Wells, Fargo & Co. [U. S. C. C., Cal.], 64 Fed. Rep. 1005.) PUBLIC LAND GRANT BY STATE - NAVIGABLE WATERS.-The State holds the lands under the navigable or tide waters of the State as sovereign, and not as proprietary, and cannot grant them to private persons, to be by them reclaimed for private use. Coxe v. State [N. Y.], 39 N. E. Rep. 400.) municipal improvements, where the court which conducts it determines the district on which the assessment shall be laid, and therefore who shall be parties, and in a single judgment each piece of property is assessed for an amount bearing the same proportion to the full amount to be collected that its benefits bear to the full amount of benefits. (In re City of Chicago [U. S. C. C., Ill.], 64 Fed. Rep. 897.) TAXATION-RECOVERY OF TAXES PAID.-A corporation which has paid a tax assessment upon its capital stock, levied erroneously, but within the jurisdiction of the assessing officers, and so not ille gally, cannot recover the amount so paid. (United States Trust Co. of New York v. Mayor, etc., of City of New York [N. Y.], 39 N. E. Rep. 383.) WATERS-STREAMS ON PUBLIC LAND—APPROPRIATION FOR MINING PURPOSES.-In localities where rights by prior appropriation of the streams on public lands for mining and irrigating purposes became lawful through the acquiescence of the government and the customs of the locality, the common-law rights of riparian owners were modified to the extent of the rights so acquired. (Isaacs v. Barber [Wash.], 38 Pac. Rep. 871.) New Books and New Editions. COURTS AND THEIR JURISDICTION. By John D. Works, formerly one of the justices of the California Supreme Court, and author of “Indiana Pleading and Practice" and of "Removal of Causes from State to Federal Courts." It would seem only necessary in reviewing this work to simply give the contents, since it can readily be seen that it treats of a subject which has not recently been dealt with, while the distinction of its author marks it out as a book of some importance. The initial chapter treats of Courts, and is followed by a chapter on the General Principles Affecting Jurisdiction; then follows chapters on Means of Acquiring Jurisdiction, Venue, Judges, and Common Law, Equity and Statutory Jurisdiction. The work contains over 900 pages, and its arrangement is excellent, giving the references at the foot of the page. The index may certainly be called "unabridged," as it is the most complete that has been published in a book of this size in many years, containing as it does 150 pages, and showing additional evidence of the care with which the work has been compiled. The chapter on "Common Law, Equity and Statutory Jurisdiction " is extremely interesting and clear, and in itself is of great value to lawyers and students. The price is $6, net. Published by the Robert Clarke Co., 61-65 West Fourth street, Cincinnati, Ohio. When the omnipotent lie shall be throned, and sceptered and crowned, you think we ought all of us to fall down and worship it as the hope of our political salvation. You teach us, and perhaps we will learn, that under such a rule we are better off than if the truth had prevailed and Justice been triumphant.” (Jeremiah S. Black to the Electoral Commission, Feb. 27, 1877. Cong. Rec., Part IV, vol. V, p. 190, 44th Cong.) "In Rama was there a voice heard, lamentation and weeping and great mourning, Rachel weeping for her children and would not be comforted because they are not." (Matt. ii, 8.) The majority of the Supreme Court of the United States, intrusted with the great responsibility of standing between the rights, equalities and privileges of the Constitution and the socialistic, vicious and pernicious acts of Congress, have refused to boldly assert their position and protect their county from the insidious evils of a nefarious statute. The issue in the legal fight which has ended so unsatisfactorily, and unjustly, was not whether certain individuals should bear the burdens of taxation, but rather whether the stamp of approval of socialism should be placed on a statute of this country, whose Constitution recognizes no classes, but only the equality of its citizens. There never should have entered into the determinations of some members of the court ment, the limitation of future Congresses may the question as to whether the residents of their be fixed at a much larger sum parties possessing that amount alone being found to bear the burdens of government; or the limitation may be designated at such an amount as a board of 'walking delegates' may deem neces sary. "There is no safety in allowing the limitation to be adjusted except in strict compliance with the mandates of the Constitution, which require its taxation to be uniform in operation and, so far as practicable, in proportion to their property, equal upon all citizens. Unless the rule of Constitution governs, a majority may fix the limitation at such rate as will not include any of their own number." (Judge Stephen J. Fleld in his opinion on the unconstitutionality of the Income Tax Act of 1894.) "You can look all through this awful business with a learned spirit; no passionate hatred of this great fraud can cloud your mental vision or shake the even balance of your judgment. VOL. 51 No. 15. sections should be relieved of their just part of the expenses of government, but the adjudication of each should have been actuacted by the same spirit of loyalty of country which inspired other members of the same court to declare, that the Income Tax Act of 1894 was wholly against the clear intent, meaning and phraseology of the Constitution. There was with the right and duty of the Supreme Court no reason why a learned jurist should quibble of the United States, by declaring, that the power of the tribunal of passing on the constitutionality of acts of Congress, should be discreetly and carefully exercised, and it was a hollow mockery for the court to hold that the federal government has power to lay "direct taxes, and duties, imposts and excises " according to certain clear regulations, and then distort the meaning of words and phrases to please their local interests. The very action of the |