NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-LEGAL ASSIGNMENT -RIGHTS OF SURETIES.-Where a master in chancery takes notes in settlement of deferred payments for land officially sold by him, the fact that he unlawfully assigned the notes, and received the money from the assignee, which he embezzled, does not give the sureties on his official bond, who have been compelled to make good the loss, a right to compel the makers of the notes to pay them a second time, after they have paid them, in good faith, to the assignee. (Latham v. Foley [Ill.], 38 N. E. Rep. 557.)

PARENT AND CHILD-ACTION BY STEPFATHER. -One who marries a widow, and treats her child as his own, stands in loco parentis, and cannot recover for necessaries furnished the child while a minor. (Livingston v. Hammond [Mass.], 38 N. E. Rep. 968.) RAILROAD COMPANY-INJURIES AT CROSSING-EVIDENCE. In an action against a railroad company for personal injuries caused by a collision with a train at a crossing, evidence that another wagon crossed just before plaintiff attempted to do so, and that some unknown person told him to " come on," is admissible as res gesta to disprove negligence on his part. (Austin & N. W. R. Co. v. Duty [Tex.], 28 S. W. Rep. 463.)

COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORA-
TIONS BY SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON, LL. D.
It is announced that this work will be published
very shortly and that the first three volumes will be
ready about March 1, 1895. The prospectus contains
an analysis of the work, which will contain the follow-
ing subjects: Organization and Internal Government;
Capital Stock and Subscription thereto; Remedies
and Procedure to enforce Share Subscriptions; Shares
Considered as Property; Liability of Stockholders to
Creditors; Directors; Rights and Remedies of Mem-
bers and Shareholders; Ministerial Officers and
Agents; Formal Execution of Corporate Contracts;
Notice, Estoppel, Ratification; Franchises, Privi-
leges, and Exemptions; Corporate Powers and the
Doctrine of Ultra Vires; Corporate Bonds and Mort-
gages; Torts and Crimes of Corporations; Insolvent
Corporations; Dissolution and Winding Up; Receiv-
ers of Corporations; Actions by and Against Cor-
porations; Foreign Corporations. This work will be
published by Bancroft-Whitney Company, San
Francisco, Cal.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE SALE OF PATENT RIGHT. - A contract between plaintiff and defendant provided that defendant was to work for plaintiff in perfecting certain electrical devices, and that when a company should be formed to manufacture them, 50 shares of stock were to be issued to defendant, or a sum of money paid in lieu thereof, in consideration of which defendant agreed to convey to plaintiff his patent rights in the devices. Defend ant perfected the machines, and the company was formed, but no stock was issued to defendant, nor was any money paid to him: Held, that plaintiff was not entitled to specific performance of the contract to convey the patent rights. (Electric Secret Service Co. v. Gill Alexander Electric Manuf'g Co. INCOME TAX LAW OF 1894, BY JOHN A. Glenn, of [Mo.], 28 S. W. Rep. 486.)

PHILADELPHIA, PENN.

This is a very well arranged treatise of the different sections of the income tax, and by its arrangement should explain many of the difficulties experienced in putting a proper construction on the law. Each section is subdivided so that the articles taxed appear most clearly. The index digest is alphabetically arranged according to the subjects, and the plainness with which it demonstrates the different subjects of the law makes it a most valu

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT-JURISDICTION. Where, in an action in a State court, the parties plead and claim rights under statutes of a foreign State, but the defeated party does not plead the construction given such statutes by the courts of such foreign State, or put in evidence the laws of the printed books of the adjudged cases of such State, or prove the common law of such State by the parol evidence of persons learned in that law, as required by the law of the State where the actionable addition to the work. The work is compiled is tried, such party cannot appeal from the highest court of the latter State to the Supreme Court of the United States on the ground that such court did not give the full faith and credit to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of such foreign

by John A. Glenn, who was formerly corporation tax clerk in the auditor-general's department. It is published by T. & J. W. Johnson & Co., 535 Chestnut street, Philadelphia, Penn. The price is 25 cents.

The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, FEBRUARY 9, 1895.
Current Topics.

[All communications intended for the Editor should be ad

dressed simply to the Editor of THE ALBANY LAW JOURNAL. All letters relating to advertisements, subscriptions, or other

business matters, should be addressed to THE ALBANY LAW JOURNAL COMPANY.]

general relief, but only such relief could be afforded under that prayer as would be agreeable to the case made by the bill and consistent with that specifically prayed. And as to the injunction asked, that relief was ancillary to and in aid of the primary equity, or ground of suit, and, if that failed, would fall with it. That ground here was the existence of contracts to monopolize interstate or international trade or commerce, and to restrain such trade or commerce, which, by the provisions of the act, could be rescinded, or operations thereunder arrested. In commenting upon the statute, 21 James I, c. 3, at the commencement of chapter 85 of the third institute, entitled Against Monopolists, Propounders, and Projectors,' Lord Coke, in language often quoted said:

any person or persons, bodies politique, or corporate, are sought to be restrained of any freedome or liberty that they had before, or hindred in their lawful trade.'

N January 21, 1895, the Supreme Court of the United States, Chief Justice Fuller writing the opinion, finally determined the Matter of the United States v. E. C. Knight Company, Spreckels Sugar Refining Company et al. The facts of the case have been discussed in the former opinions in the appeals which have been argued before the United States courts and are that the American Sugar "It appeareth by the preamble of this act Refining Company entered into an agreement (as a judgment in Parliament) that all grants of with the defendant companies whereby it monopolies are against the ancient and fundaagreed to buy the property of the defendant mentall laws of this Kingdome. And therefore companies, issuing as the purchase price stock it is necessary to define what a monoply is. A of the American Sugar Refining Company. It monoply is an institution, or allowance by the was claimed that this agreement was contrary King by his grant, commission, or otherwise to to the act of Congress July 2, 1890, which was any person or persons, bodies politque, or coran act to protect trade and commerce against porate, of or for the sole buying, selling, makunlawful restraints and monopolies, and the billing, working, or using of anything, whereby prayed for a cancellation of the alleged illegal agreement and injunction restraining the defendants from entering into said agreement. The opinion is most interesting, as it thoroughly discusses what is a monopoly, and is as follows: "By the purchase of the stock of the four Philadelphia refineries, with shares of its own stock, the American Sugar Refining Company acquired nearly complete control of the manufacture of refined sugar within the United States. The bill charged that the contracts under which these purchases were made constituted combinations in restraint of trade, and that in entering into them the defendants combined and conspired to restrain the trade and commerce in refined sugar among the several States and with foreign nations, contrary to the act of Congress of July 2, 1890. The relief sought was the cancellation of the agreements under which the stock was transferred; the redelivery of the stock to the parties respectively; and an injunction against the further performance of the agreements and further violations of the act. As usual, there was a prayer for VOL. 51 No. 6.

"Counsel contend that this definition, as explained by the derivation of the word, may be applied to all cases in which one person sells alone the whole of any kind of marketable thing, so that only he can continue to sell it, fixing the price at his own pleasure,' whether by virtue of legislative grant or agreement; that the monopolization referred to in the act of Congress is not confined to the common law sense of the term as implying an exclusive control, by authority, of one branch of industry without legal right of any other person to interfere therewith by competition or otherwise, but that it includes engrossing as well, and covers controlling the market by contracts securing the advantage of selling alone or exclusively all, or some considerable portion, of a particular kind. of merchandise or commodity to the detriment of the public; and that such contracts amount to that restraint of trade or commerce declared

to be illegal. But the monopoly and restraint denounced by the act are the monoply and restraint of interstate and international trade or commerce, while the conclusion to be assumed on this record is that the result of the transaction complained of was the creation of a monopoly in the manufacture of a necessary of life. In the view which we take of the case, we need not discuss whether because the tentacles which drew the outlying refineries into the dominant corporation were separately put out, therefore there was no combination to monopolize; or, because, according to political economists, aggregations of capital may reduce prices, therefore the objection to concentration of power is relieved; or, because others were theoretically left free to go into the business of refining sugar, and the original stockholders of the Philadelphia refineries after becoming stockholders of the American Company might go into competition with themselves, or, parting with that stock, might set up again for themselves, therefore no objectionable restraint was imposed.

"The fundamental question is whether conceding that the existence of a monopoly in manufacture is established by the evidence, that monopoly can be directly suppressed under the act of Congress in the mode attempted by this bill. It cannot be denied that the power of a State to protect the lives, health and property of its citizens, and to preserve good order and the public morals, "the power to govern men and things within the limits of its dominion," is a power originally and always belonging to the States, not surrendered by them to the general government, nor directly restrained by the Constitution of the United States, and essentially exclusive. The relief of the citizens of each State from the burden of monopoly and the evils resulting from the restraint of trade among such citizens was left with the States to deal with, and this court has recognized their possession of that power even to the extent of holding that an employment or business carried on by private individuals, when it becomes a matter of such public interest and importance as to create a common charge or burden upon the citizen; in other words, when it becomes a practical monopoly, to which the citizen is compelled to resort and by means of which a tribute can be exacted

from the community, is subject to regulation by State legislative power. On the other hand, the power of Congress to regulate commerce among the several States is also exclusive. The Constitution does not provide that interstate commerce shall be free, but, by the grant of this exclusive power to regulate it, it was left free except as Congress might impose restraints. Therefore it has been determined that the failure of Congress to exercise this exclusive power in any case is an expression of its will that the subject shall be free from restrictions or impositions upon it by the several States, and if a law passed by a State in the exercise of its acknowledged powers comes into conflict with that will, the Congress and the State cannot occupy the position of equal opposing sovereignties, because the Constitution declares its supremacy and that of the laws passed in pursuance thereof; and that which is not supreme must yield to that which is supreme. Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic,' said Chief Justice Marshall, but it is something more; it is intercourse.' It describes the commercial intercourse between nations and

parts of nations in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse.' That which belongs to commerce is within the jurisdiction of the United States, but that which does not belong to commerce is within the jurisdiction of the police power of the State. (Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1210; Brown v. Maryland, 12 id. 419, 448; The License Cases, 5 How. 599; Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691; Bowman v. Railway Co., 125 id. 465; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 id. 100; In re Rahrer, 140 id. 545, 555.)

"The argument is that the power to control the manufacture of refined sugar is a monopoly over a necessary of life, to the enjoyment of which by a large part of the population of the United States interstate commerce is indispensable, and that, therefore, the general government in the exercise of the power to regulate commerce may repress such monopoly directly and set aside the instruments which have created it. But this argument cannot be confined to necessaries of life merely, and must include all articles of general consumption. Doubtless the power to control the manufacture of a given thing involves in a certain sense the control of its disposition, but this is a