a divorce, which was not true. After you left you wrote letter after letter breathing, not love, but criminal sensuality, and you induced the girl to come here to her ruin. You knew her age and begged her to put on long dresses to make her look older. Yours is a crime aimed at by the laws of all nations. The family circle must be protected from such as you, who are nothing more than fiends dressed in human shape. There is no reason that your sentence should be any less than the full term the law allows, and you are sentenced to five years in the penitentiary." It is true that the crime is one aimed at by the law of all nations, and the sentence will be hailed with satisfaction by everybody who recognizes the need of protection for his family against such villains. The attending circumstances are important. It drew to the place a large and noisy and boisterous crowd. The nature of the thing itself is important. It was run by a steam engine. The whistle blew every few minutes. The music played, the gallery ran around, the crowd hallooed, etc., until ten o'clock at night. That it was a mere idle amusement, perfectly legitimate in a proper place or at a proper time, is not wholly unimportant. That which calls together a disorderly crowd in a public place was held to be a public nuisance in King v. Moore, 3 Barn. & Ald. 184. The making of loud music, with instruments or otherwise, in the night time, to the disturbance of a neighborhood, was held to be a public nuisance in Rex v. Higginson, 2 Burrows, 1233; Com. v. Oaks, 113 Mass. 8; Com. v. Smith, 6 Cush. 80. Those who participated did not regard it as a nuisance. Some of the witnesses attended. Some permitted their children to attend. They thought it a harmless amusement for the children. It did them good, rather than harm, and the proprietor was careful, polite, and kept good order. This, I take for granted, is true, at a proper time and in a proper place. Other witnesses lived at a distance. They, of course, were not annoyed, and they thought it was not a nuisance to those who lived near by. Four witnesses who lived close by say that it was a nuisance, disturbed and annoyed them at their homes, and prevented or interrupted their sleep. One witness, who lives on the same street, five lots below, says it was a con. siderable annoyance, and, to some extent, kept him awake. Quite a number of witnesses who live or do business near by were not annoyed by it, and do not regard it as a nuisance. From all this, and from the general character of such machines in operation, with their usual accompaniments, it is not hard for one to form a pretty accurate opinion on the question involved; that is, that when kept up day and night, for days together, in such a place, it was a decided nuisance to some people, of ordinary sensibility, who lived or had their place of sleeping adjoining or close to the vacant lot, while to those who lived at a distance, those who participated, and some of those who lived close to the place, it was not a nuisance did not annoy them to In line with the piano case decided in New York city is the "merry-go-round" case of West Virginia, in Town v. Davis, decided in the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, 21 S. E. R., 906, it was held that a "merry-goround," run by a steam engine, the whistle of which blew every few minutes, accompanied by a band. and attended by a large, noisy and boisterous crowd till after ten at night, disturbing some of the people living near it, is such a nuisance as a town council has power to abate. The court said, in part: "Many of the questions raised by the plaintiff in error have already been discussed and considered. Was the riding gallery a nuisance at that particular place and time? is the only one that remains. That depends on the place, the time, the circumstances, the manner in which it was operated and the effect it produced. Did the noise and crowd, and other effects of this riding gallery, invade any public or private right? Did it materially interfere with and impair the ordinary physical comfort of any one of normal sensibility and ordinary mode of living, in his home or place of business? The place has much to do with it. It seems to have been on a vacant lot in a populous part of the town, with at least four dwellings near by. The time is important. It was operated up to ten, and half after ten in the night, tending to prevent and disturb sleep, and had been kept up continuously for six days. I any material extent." "STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION." A paper read by the Hon. F. S. Monnett, of Bucyrus, before the Ohio State Association. as on must inquire whether it is a Federal statute, or whether it is purely a State statute, for the rule of interpretation, as seen hereafter, varies according to the class referred to. Another division IN as much as whole treaties have been written con utes that is necessary to be understood befof stat expositors of the law, it is difficult to furnish you anything new; in fact, on this subject, I anticipate you would rather have something not new. But as long as Legislatures meet annually, and personal and proprietary rights are affected by their acts, just so long will this branch of the law be one of great and vast importance to the profession. The fundamental division of our government, under its various constitutions, both national and State, into three distinct heads: legislative, judicial and executive, while apparently simple, has grown to be a subject of constant litigation to determine the boundaries of each governmental function and to prevent the one from usurping or intruding upon the other. No more startling illustration of the difficulties and the intricacies involved, in observing these distinctions, is there than that of the effort of the highest tribunal of the land to construe the income tax. Here we observe a court of last resort, and of the choicest scholars, dividing at one time equally upon great and vital questions of construction of the fundamental law of the land, and subdividing many times on minor questions in the same decision, and finally reversing themselves and revising their former opinion within a few weeks after their original decision. If thus the doctors of the law do disagree, we disciples of the law may go free. So that it may not always be the mark of an inefficient prosecuting attorney if he cannot off-hand, on the street corner, give an infallible construction to some county officer of a new law involving the rights of person or property, for the rules now laid down by adjudication and precedent have grown so numerous that to apply any considerable number to a given case before finally deciding it, is an arduous task in itself. To analyze this subject and bring it within the limit assigned the speaker, we will analyze the subject itself. Statute law has been defined as the will of the Legislature of a State, or the will of the nation expressed by the Legislature, expounded by the courts of justice. The Legislature, as the representative of the nation, expresses the national will by means of statutes, which with the exposition by the court, form the body of the statute law. (Willberforce Statute Law, p. 8.) Bouvier defines it as the written will of the Legislature, solemnly expressed according to the forms necessary to constitute it the law of the State. Before undertaking to interpret a statute, and apply the ordinary rule of interpretation, you plying the rules of interpretation is, first, whether a statute is simply declaratory, which does not profess to make any alteration in the existing law, but merely to declare or explain what it is; or, second, remedial, meaning those statutes which are made to supply such defects, and to abridge such superfluities in the common law as arise either from the general imperfection of all human laws, whether from the change of time and circumstances, or from the mistakes and unadvised determination of unlearned judges, or from other cause. This modification being effected either by enlarging the common laws where it is too narrow or restraining it where it is too lax. The English Parliament occasioned a division of remedial statutes into two sub-heads, commonly called enlarging and restraining statutes. Such is Wharton's definition, and substantially Blackstone's, of remedial statutes. The other branch of my subject perhaps needs a brief definition. What is "interpretation," and what "construction" of statutes? Interpretation differs from construction in that the former is the art of finding out the true sense of any form of words; that is, the sense which their author intended to convey; and of enabling others to do the same. While construction, on the other hand, is the drawing of conclusions respecting subjects that lie beyond the direct expressions of the text, from elements known from and given in the text. Interpretation only takes place if a text conveys some meaning or other. But construction is resorted to when in comparing two different writings of the same individual, or two different enactiuents of the same legislative body, there is a contradiction found where there was evidently no intention of such contradiction, or where it happens part of the statute contradicts the rest. When this is the case, and the nature of the document or whatever else it may be, is such as not to allow us to consider the whole as being invalidated by a partial or other contradiction, then resort must be had to construction. I have used Judge Cooley's distinctions as cited in his Constitutional Limitations, 49-50. In common use, however, the word "construction" is generally employed in the law in a sense embracing all that is probably covered by the terms "construction" and "interpretation," and in the broader sense the words "construction" and "interpretation" are used as synonymous and interchangeable. A lawyer in construing a statute, or in looking for precedents and judicial construction of statutes, must bear in mind the difference between the Federal statutes and the State statutes, and the judicial detrminations under each class, for there is a marked difference - a fundamental difference, in respect to implied powers between the Federal and State constitution. departure from the plain meaning of a statute on the ground of its unwisdom or public policies. (Sedg. on State on Constitutional Law, 231; Cooley, 197.) Lord Blackburn said no court is entitled to deThe Constitution of the United States consists in part from the intention of the Legislature as apa grant of enumerated powers; hence, in interpret-pearing from the words of the act because it is ing it and the statutes under it, the courts presume thought unreasonable. Chief Justice Payton, of the existence of no power not expressly or impliedly Mississippi, laid down the rule that courts have no conferred. On the other hand, a State constitution other duty to perform than to execute the legisproceeds on the idea that all legislative functions lative will without any regard to their own views are in the Legislature, and hence the general assem- as to the wisdom or justice of the particular enactbly of the State may exercise all the powers which ment. It is also a universal principle of construcare properly legislative, and which are not taken tion that courts must find the intent of the Legisaway by its own or the Federal Constitution. Con- lature in the statute itself. Unless some ground gress can pass no laws but those which the constican be found in a statute for restraining or enlargtution authorizes, either expressly or by clear im- ing the meaning of its general words, they must plication, while the State assembly has jurisdiction receive a general construction, and the court canof all subjects on which its legislation is not pro- not arbitrarily subtract there from, nor add thereto. hibited. The powers not granted to the Union to There are some apparent exceptions to this broad legislate are withheld, but the State retains every rule. No limitation must be inferred which will attribute of sovereignty which is not taken away. defeat the object of the law. Thus, where two (21 Penn. St. 147, 16; 17 Id. 118-119; 52 Id. 474; hundred thousand dollars were appropriated for Cooley C. L. 10-11.) buildings, which must cost three times that amount, it was no limitation as to the expenditures. The rules of construction of statutes are the same in courts of law and equity. There is always a legal presumption that the Legislature intends nothing unconstitutional, and if an act is susceptible of two constructions, that one must be adopted which is constitutional. But an unconstitutional consequence cannot and must not be avoided by forcing upon the language of the act a meaning which upon a fair test is repugnant to its terms. (24 Cal. 518; 12 Iowa, 1; 21 Id. 221.) It is an elementary rule of construction that words and phrases of an act are used in their popular and common conception, unless the subject matter or context indicate that they are used in a technical sense. If an act is passed with reference to a particular trade or business, then the words have the meaning as defined by that trade or business, even though the meaning may differ from the common or ordinary meaning. If the language is clear and admits of but one meaning, there is no room for construction. It is not allowable to interpret that which has no need of interpretation. In such a case any departure from the language used would be an unjustifiable assumption of legislative powers. (48 Fed. Rep. 293; 6 Wall. [U. S.] 395; 5 Wheat. 95; 79 Am. Dig. 350.) And where the language is susceptible of but one meaning, it must receive that meaning, although such construction lead to results that are absurd and mischievous. Courts are not to tamper with the clear and unequivocal meaning of words used, although the consequences may not be such as were contemplated by the Legislature. There can be no Conjunctive sentences describing different branches of the same offense will be construed as conjective or disjunctive, as the object and sense of the law must distinctly require. It is, therefore, only in cases where the words of the statute are capable of two meanings, or where, by giving them their literal interpretation the statute will be inconsistent or ambiguous, that courts have a right to resort to the secondary rules of construction to aid in determining the real intentions of the Legislature. (7 N. Y. 97; 11 Id. 593; 10 Pett. [U. S.] 524.) Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in more than one sense, and to adhere rigidly to its literal and primary meaning would be to miss its real meaning in many instances. It is observed in Blackstone that if a literal meaning had been given to the laws forbidding a layman to lay hands on a priest, and punish all who drew blood on the streets, the layman who wounded a priest with a weapon would not have fallen within the prohibition, and the surgeon who had bled a person on the street to save his life would have been liable to punishment. So likewise, the German who was greatly annoyed by having his out lot run over by trespassers and the village cow and horse, placed the following sign thereon; "Any man, woman, child, horse, cow or dog caught trespassing upon these premises will have his or her tail cut off, as the case may be." He never, literally, carried out his threat. So in construction of statutes, the rules of grammar are less important than the intentions of the legislature. The sense and spirit of the statute will always prevail over the strict and grammatical construction of its words. If the terms of a statute are ambiguous, order to make the validity of the act depend upon the intention resulting from such inquiries. (113 U. S. 27; Id. 703; 36 N. Y. 285.) On the other hand, the legislative journals are it becomes the duty of the court to give such con-permitted to be used, not, however, as evidence of struction to it as may fairly be said to be in accordance with the intentions of the legislature. On a literal construction of his promise, Mohammed II's sawing the governor's body in two was no breach of his engagement to save his head; nor did Tammerlane's burying alive the garrison violate his pledge to shed no blood. So the Earl of Argyle fulfilled in the same spirit his promise to the Laird of Glenstane, that if he would surrender he would see him safe to England, for he hanged him after safely taking him across the Tweed to English banks. Lord St. Leonard is on record as saying, "Nothing is so difficult as to construct properly an act of Parliament, and nothing so easy as to pull it to pieces." Chief Justice Pollock said: "There is no important word in the English language which does not admit of various interpretations." Lord Coke classifies the rules interpreting an ambiguous statute under four heads: First. What was the law before the act was passed? Second. What was the mischief or defect for which the law had not provided? the meaning of a statute, for this must be determined from the language of the act itself, and the facts connected with the subject on which it is to operate. Yet, in a case where a statute, the construction of which was requested, was so worded as to be apparently contradictory in some of its provisions, the Supreme Court of the United States interpreted the same by reference to the journals of Congress from which it appeared that the particular phraseology was the result of an amendment without due reference to the wording of the original bill. (23 Wall. 307-321.) Under the head of "External Circumstances," usage has been taken into consideration in construing a statute. Long usage may determine the meaning of the language where one of two ambiguous constructions has been adopted. It is another elementary rule of construction that all parts of a statute which relate to the same subject matter must be construed together; that the plain or palpable parts must interpret the ambiguous ones. If one section of an act, for instance, required that notice should be given, standing alone, a verbal notice would probably be sufficient, but in a subsequent section it provided that such notice Third. What remedy the legislature had ap- should be served on a person or left at his usual The reason of the remedy. place of residence, which would obviously show that a written notice was intended in the first section. It is a legitimate rule of construction, from the context in surveying the whole act, to allow one portion to restrict the generality of certain of its provisions. So it may expand the narrowness of pointed. Fourth. Surrounding facts and circumstances, with certain restrictions, are allowed to place the interpreters in the position of those whose words are interpreted. Hence, evidence of such intrinsic circumstances may become admissible to show the intent of the legis others if the real intention of the legislature may be lature. (7 Barb. N. Y. 416.) gathered from broader expressions in other parts of the statute. To carry out the second rule of Coke, and in order to understand the scope and object of the enactment, the interpreter must ascertain what was the mischief or defect for which the law had not provided. That is, he must call to his aid all those external or historical facts which led to the enactment. He must refer to the history of the time to ascertain the reasons for and the meanings of the provisions of the statute. He may even look to the state of public opinion, or judicial and legislative opinions on the particular subjects at, and prior to, the time of the enactment. But this rule has never gone so far as to allow a court to take the testimony of the views of the individual members of the legislature in debate to ascertain the meaning of the statute by them. Neither can the motives of legislators in supporting an act be inquired into by the court in The examination of the context is allowable to correct omissions and errors if the omission or error is explained in a subsequent section, thereby supplying the omission. The context is to be consulted to avoid inconsistencies; and under this rule it is the duty of the interpreter to give effect to every word, clause and provision of the enactment. Hence, the most important purpose of examining all the parts of a statute together, and with reference to one another, is that of giving, by the means of such comparison, a sensible and intelligent effect to each, without permitting any one to nullify any other, and to harmonize every detailed provision of the statute, with the general purpose or design which the whole is intended to subserve. With this end in view, the rule extends to all amendments which, for this purpose, are regarded as constituting but one enactment. (Here refer to aid, but does not control, unless other means fail; the legislation on water works.) This same rule applies as to acts, and their supplements, and still more, to codes and revisions. Various sections referring to the same subjects, if practicable, should be construed together as one, or as one act or chapter, or as continuous sections of the same act. And one chapter is to be read with another relating to the same subject, as one body of law, though collected from independent laws on previous enactments, where all have been re-enacted by revisory acts. On this same principle, and under this head, are constructions by context; earlier acts relating to the same subject-matter have been examined by the court in reference to the limiting power of certain words, enlarging. restraining or qualifying terms, so as to effectuate the previous intentions of the law. A by-law which authorized any person to be Chamberlain of the City of London would be construed so as to harmonize and not to conflict with an earlier act or general statute which limited the appointment to a person possessed of certain qualifications. And the court held that any person would be understood to mean only an eligible person. So the various statutes of New York and Ohio relating to, and enlarging the powers of married women, though passed in different years, were held to be construed as one act. (62 Barb. N. Y. 531.) Where an act conferring jurisdiction of a certain offense upon a police court, provided that the fine to be imposed should not exceed one thousand dollars, nor the imprisonment be more than one year, it was held that, on comparison with other statutes in pari materia, this provision was a limit upon the punishment by either fine or imprisonment, but did not intend to authorize the imposition of both for the same offense. (15 Barb. N. Y. 627.) So an act enlarging the jurisdiction of justices of the peace, and prescribing no forms of proceedure, must be construed together with earlier acts upon the same subject and as adopting the forms of practice prescribed by them. (105 Pa. St. 610.) Where a part of an act has been repealed it must, although of no operative force, still be taken into consideration in construing the rest, provided it tends to elucidate an ambiguous word or passage. Some courts have laid down the rule that punctuations by the legislature may be practically ignored, and that punctuation is no part of a statute. And further, that there is no punctuation in it which ought to control the interpretation. (105 U. S. 77; 65 Pa. S. 311; 17 Wall. 496–502.) The Supreme Court of Ohio in the case of Albright v. Payne, 43 Ohio St. 8, lays down the broad rule in construing a statute, that punctuation may and in rendering the meaning of a statute punctuation may be changed or disregarded. Judge Follett adds in his opinion, that ancient inscriptions and writings show that words were grouped together without break or punctuation mark, the location and form of the word being the only indication of the meaning. The use of spaces and marks was adopted very slowly, but mostly since the beginning of the 16th century. In the English case of Barrow v. Wadkin, it was said that "It seems that in the rolls of Parliament the words are never punctuated, and that punctuation was not allowed to throw light on printed statutes in England." In Cushing v. Workick, 9 Gray, 382, it was held that "Punctuation is not to be regarded in construing a statute." Punctuation has not arrived at perfection anywhere. In the Ewing case, 11 Pet. 41, the court held, "Punctuation is a most fallable standard by which to interpret a writing. It may be resorted to when all other means fail, but the court will first take the instrument by its four corners in order to ascertain its true meaning. If that is apparent on judicially inspecting it, punctuation will not be subject to changes. In the Pancoast case, 1 Ohio, 385, the court in speaking of a construction claimed by a party, say: "This construction is founded upon a mere grammatical criticism which is never received to change or control the intention of the legislature, where that intention is otherwise freely expressed. Something may depend upon punctuation in the statute books, which may be incorrect, and ought never to vary the true sense." And in that case they disregarded and left out a comma. Judge Day, in the Hamilton case, 15 Ohio St. 428, says: "Courts will, however, in the construction of statutes for the purpose of arriving at the real meaning and intention of the law makers, disregard the punctuation, or re-punctuate if need be, to render the true meaning of the statute." Judge Okey made the same observation in the 31 Ohio St. 337; 223 Ohio St. 140. Much learning has been expended in English courts, as well as in the State courts, as to what effect a title to a statute may have in construing an ambiguous statute. Lord Coke insisted that the title to a statute was not only no part of the statute, but should be excluded from consideration in construing the statute. Lord Cottonham said the title should not be resorted to in construing an enactment. This rule has been very much changed and modified by our judges in this country, both State and federal. While the title is not regarded as part of the act, it is, nevertheless, regarded as a legitimate aid in ascertaining the intentions of the legis |