It has been suggested that the practice in Justices' Courts and in Surrogates' Courts does not properly belong in the Code of Civil Procedure; also, that the detailed rules of evidence in our present Code more properly belong elsewhere; that the various provisions of a local character should be taken from the Code and included in the charters of the municipal corporations to which they relate; that the subject of the organization and jurisdiction of the various courts, and the election and appointment of various officers of the courts, is no part of a proper system of procedure. It has also been suggested that the code of practice should be confined to the rules regulating proceedings in actions generally in Courts of Record, and that actions of a special character, and special proceedings, should be treated in an independent code.

If these suggestions should be adopted, it would involve the separation of several subjects and sections from the present Code, and their incorporation in other statutes, but it need not necessarily involve a revision or change in the phraseology of various sections; it would require a re-arrangement of the law, without changing its language. We are not unmindful of the uncertainty, if not positive mischief, produced by frequent changes in the phraseology of a statute, especially where it has received judicial construction; and the language of a statute which has become familiar to the practitioner should be retained, unless a change will tend to make the law more clear.

In connection with our work as Commissioners of Statutory Revision, we have found numerous instances of omission either in the general statutes, or in the Code of Civil Procedure, and several subjects of general or minor importance are included in other statutes which, possibly, ought to be incorporated in the Code; and in formulating plans for the general revision of the statutes, in connection with possible code revision, it seems to us that the subject should be considered as a whole,

and that Code revision should be considered in connection with its bearing upon general statutory revision, and vice versa. Our statute law is now too fragmentary, and we think an attempt should be made to produce a harmonious system upon lines which may be considered feasible and practicable, but we are unwilling to engage in a general revision of the Code, without first attempting to ascertain the opinion of the bar upon the subject. The determination of this question of a revision of the Code will have an important bearing upon our work of general statutory revision.

Please kindly inform us, upon the enclosed blank, whether or not you are in favor of a general revision of the Code, and if you are not in favor of a general revision, whether you are in favor of some re

vision, and if so, upon what particular lines. Any suggestion that you may make upon this subject will be appreciated by the commission. CHARLES Z. LINCOLN,

Little Valley.

WILLIAM H. JOHNSON,

Oneonta.

A. JUDD NORTHRUP,

Syracuse. Commissioners of Code Revision.

Abstracts of Recent Decisions.

ACCOUNTING ON OFFICIAL BOND.- -Where a court of equity has jurisdiction of a bill for account against the principal on a bond or his representatives the sureties on the bond can properly be made parties for the purpose of the accounting but no decree for payment can be made against them. (Mayor, etc., of Borough of Rutherford v. Alyed [N. J.], 32 Atl. Rep. 70.)

ADVERSE POSSESSION PRESCRIPTION. One in possession of lands under a pre-emption entry and patent from the United States is not charged with notice that the lands were swamp lands twenty years prior to the patent, and, as such, had passed under a prior act of Congress granting swamp lands to the State, nor with notice that the land was within the territorial limits of a town, where neither of these facts nor the date of entry appears on the face of the receiver's receipt or patent; and, therefore, such patent is a "just title," and sufficient to sustain a plea of prescription, under Code La. arts. 3481-3484. (Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Smith [U. S. S. C.], 15 S. C. Rep. 994.)

CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS-EXPULSION OF PASSENGER-DAMAGES.-The extent of the injury of a passenger who has been wrongfully expelled from a railroad train, and the amount of damages recoverable, do not depend at all upon the intentions or good faith of the conductor in executing a rule of the company, but only upon what was done and the consequent injury. (Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Russ [U. S. C. C. of App.], 67 Fed. Rep. 662.)

CONTRACTS-CERTIFICATE OF ENGINEER.—A provision in a construction contract that the engineer or architect of the owner shall finally determine, as between the contractor and owner, what work has been done, and the amount to be paid for it, is valid, and should be enforced, in the absence of fraud or palpable mistake. (Mundy v. Louisville & N. R. Co. [U. S. C. C. of App.], 67 Fed. Rep. 633.)

CORPORATION CORPORATE STOCK

ASSESS

MENT. A subscription for capital stock of a corporation cannot be cancelled except for fraud or

mistake, without the consent of all the stockholders. (Pacific Fruit Co. v. Coon [Cal.], 40 Pac. Rep. 542.)

DEED ABSOLUTE

MORTGAGE.- Defendant held a second mortgage on plaintiff's land. On default on the first mortgage, both mortgagees threatened to foreclose, whereupon plaintiffs conveyed the land absolutely to defendant, who took possession, and leased part of the premises for a small rental to plaintiffs, and assumed the payment of the first mortgage, and each of the parties executed to the other a release of all claims. Held, that the evidence was not sufficient to show the deed a mortgage. (Ahern v. McCarthy [Cal.], 40 Pac. Rep. 482.) DEED-GENERAL 66 WARRANTY. "-The general warranty" clause in a conveyance is equivalent to the several special covenants in use under the common law, and is sufficient to compel the grantor, before receiving the full amount of the purchase money, to discharge all liens on the property. (Smith v. Jones [Ky], 31 S. W. Rep. 475.) DEED RIGHT OF WAY. A condition in a deed of a right of way for erection of a station, the character of which is not specified, is complied with by erection of a board shed, without the placing of an agent there, it being in structure and management like most of the stations on the road. (Caldwell v. East Broad Top Railroad & Coal Co. [Penn.], 32 Atl. Rep. 85.)

REFORMATION OF INSTRUMENT.

- Plain

EQUITY tiff made a certain payment to defendant bank, and received in exchange a note signed by a firm composed of the officers of the bank, and the business of

which was transacted in the bank's office. He sub

sequently gave a check to his wife, which was also exchanged at the bank office for a similar note. Plaintiff and his wife could both read and write, and had transacted considerable business with banks. Plaintiff retained the notes for two years, and, upon failure of the firm, began suit to reform the notes and change them into certificates of deposits of the bank, on the ground that he intended to deposit his money with the bank: Held, that plaintiff was not entitled to a decree. (Murphy v. First Nat. Bank of Cedar Falls [Iowa], 63 N. W. Rep. 702.)

collection and distribution of the assets of an insolvent corporation, to hear and determine an ancillary suit instituted in the same cause by its receiver, in accordance with its order, against debtors of such corporation, so far as in said suit the receiver claims the right to recover from any one debtor a sum not exceeding $2,000. (White v. Ewing, U. S. S. C., 15 S. C. Rep. 1018.) FEDERAL COURTS

FOLLOWING STATE DECISIONS. - Where State statutes, affecting the title to large tracts of land, have been construed by the State Supreme Court, and the title so established has been reaffirmed by the United States Supreme Court, which decisions have remained unchallenged for many years, comity does not compel a federal court, when the title is again called in question, to

follow a later decision of the State courts adverse to the title established by the carlier decisions. (Wilson v. Ward Lumber Co. [U. S. C. C. Mo. ], 67 Fed. Rep. 675.)

JURISDICTION

CITIZENSHIP.

FEDERAL COURTS — - An allegation that the citizenship of a party or parties is unknown is insufficient to sustain the jurisdiction of the federal courts, as the requisite citizenship must distinctly appear. (Tug River Coal & Salt Co. v. Brigel [U. S. C. C. of App.], 67 Fed. Rep. 625.)

FRAUDS, STATUTE OF -Agreement RelaTING TO LAND. Where the owner of the lot and the street number appears on the agreement, the omission of the name of the city or town in which the lot is located does not render the description indefinite. (Price v. McKay, N. J.. 32 Atl. Rep. 130.)

HUSBAND AND WIFE-CONVEYANCE-VALIDITY.— In an action to set aside a conveyance made by a husband as in fraud of his deceased wife's interest in community property, evidence showing what property the husband and wife respectively had at the time of their marriage, and what property they afterwards acquired, is admissible. Declarations by the husband after his wife's death as to what was community property, and his statements claiming as his other property belonging to his wife or the community, are also admissible to show fraud in connection with the community property in controversy. (Smitheal v. Smith, Tex., 31 S. W. Rep. 422.)

INSURANCE - PROOF OF Loss-WAIVER.-Where an insurance company demands, as part of the proofs of loss, an inventory destroyed in the fire, and which it was not entitled to under the policy, the alternative given the assured being that, if it was not furnished, only a compromise would be entertained, it waives formal proof of loss. (Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Center, Tex.. 31 S. W. Rep. 446.)

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION-PROBABLE CAUSE.-In an action for malicious prosecution. it is for the

court to determine whether certain admitted or clearly proven facts constituted probable cause. (Smith v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., [Cal.], 40 Pac. Rep. 540.)

EVIDENCE.

V.

MASTER AND SERVANT-NEGLIGENCE -A night watchman was found dead under an unrailed bridge connecting two buildings, which he customarily crossed in the performance of his duties. Held, in an action to recover damages for his death, evidence was admissible which tended to show what kind of a man he was in respect to health, vigor, activity and sobriety, and his bodily mental peculiarities. (Overman Wheel Co. Griffin [U. S. C. C. of Ap.], 67 Fed. Rep. 659.) MORTGAGE TRUST DEED-INJUNCTION.-The existence of a lien for a small paying tax is not such a cloud on the title as to warrant the enjoining of a sale under a deed of trust given for the price thereof, as the trustee can be compelled to pay the tax out of the purchase money. (Patch v. Morrisett [Va.], 22 S. E. Rep. 173.)

tract between a city and a water company provided that the latter should put in such further number of fire hydrants upon street mains as may be ordered by said city council, "provided that the cost and expense of all such further number of hydrants and of the putting in of the same shall be paid by said city." Held, that the city was liable only for the actual sum expended by the company in putting in such hydrants, and not for what such work was reasonably worth. (Bull v. City of Quincy [Ill.], 40 N. E. Rep. 1035.)

KARLSBAD, AUSTRIA, August 5, 1895.

Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

It is well known that in England Commercial and Business Companies, in fact, nearly all Corporations for Profit, are organized under what are known as the Companies Acts. The general principles on what the legislation embodied in those acts is founded, and the beneficial effect thereof to England are well set forth in the following article in the London Times of August 3d instant.

THE COMPANIES ACTS.

The report of the departmental committee appointed by the Board of Trade "to inquire what amendments are necesssary in the acts relating to joint-stock companies incorporated with limited liability," has been published. The report is of considerable length and an addendum follows it, in which Mr. Justice Vaughan Williams gives reasons for dissenting from some of the conclusions of his colleagues. The appendix to the report consists of two parts. Part I. contains evidence supplied by various persons and public bodies as to matters on which the committee desired information; suggestions from various persons or bodies as to changes in the existing law; and also the judgments in a certain important case. Part II. consists of the draft bill prepared by the committee.

Experts in company law will, doubtless, have much to say on the draft bill recommended by the committee. Many suggestions that have been eagerly pressed by reformers, have been put aside as impracticable. In particular, the committee have not seen their way to approving of the establishment of the principle of compulsory reserve liability, which, however, is strongly supported by Mr. Justice Vaughan Williams. Neither do they