the imputation finds much to warrant it in the conduct and practice of many members of the bar. Is it not a fact that many members of the bar do not, in the pursuit of their profession, consider themselves at all subject to be controlled by the ordinary rules of morality? And do they not habitually in their dealings and practice as professional men set at naught the plain rules of right and duty? Do they not frequently practice falsehood and deceit to ensnare the unwary and to compass their ends? Alabama that note is subject to all the rules governing any other commecial paper or bills of exchange there must be a protest or notice of non-payment, he cannot be charged unless there is protest or notice, but if the party who holds the note was to move out of the State of Alabama, and bring suit in the United States Court, the result would be that Col. Hargrove would be charged as a maker, not as an endorser, and no protest necessary. These various views of the law are held by the different courts. are very few courts that hold with the Alabama court. New York and some few other states are the only states that hold with Alabama if they are deposited as collateral for pre-existing debt. I move as an amendment that the Com-education? The great point with many young mittee on Legislation take into consideration and report on the feasibility of legislation to procure uniformity of commercial law, and the law governing commercial paper. There At the same meeting of the Alabama State Bar Association, the annual address was delivered by Samuel M. Meek, Esq., who made some excellent suggestions in regard to the reform which might be instituted by the bar. The subject of the address was the Power and Influence of the Bar. There were many thoughtful lines in this address and part of it runs as follows: "Every enlightened and candid lawyer must concede that the character of the bar is not what it ought to be. It is a fact, that a large number of people in every community, and many of them people of great intelligence, regard a lawyer not only as a trickster, but as a fellow who in the practice of their vocation will speak without any regard to the truth, and will do anything short of a violation of a positive | criminal law. Of course the people make exceptions of some members of the bar. But such is certainly the opinion of a great many citizens of every community in regard to many, perhaps a majority of the members of the bar. Now, the question is, is there any just foundation for this opinion? Do any considerable number of lawyers, by their habitual practice and conduct, afford just ground for this opinion, and thus, so far as their examples go, fix upon the bar generally this stigma? I am afraid that every candid lawyer would have to admit that "And to what are we to ascribe this departure by many members of the bar from the path of rectitude? Must we not ascribe it, in many cases, to the defective methods of legal men is to get to the bar to procure license to practice law,-which very many do without the necessary preliminary study and preparation; and entering the profession without any just conception of its true nature and proper functions, and regarding it as merely a position to enable them to get money, by any available means and methods, they wholly disregard that high moral standard which is the basis of all professional character and excellence. "Surely every candid lawyer must say that the bar needs reform-that the unworthy members ought to be cast out, and that only those possessing the proper qualifications and character and learning should be allowed to enter or remain in its ranks. "Nor, in this matter of reform, ought the bench to be overlooked-that needs reform too. A seat on the bench ought to be the crowning final of an honorable career at the bar-the fitting reward of ripe professional experience and untarnished integrity and unsullied honor. Indeed, in proportion as the bench is elevated, the character of the bar will be raised, and unworthy persons will not easily find places in its ranks. "The law is practically what the bench and bar make it. If the bench be learned and upright and dignified, and if the standard of the bar be elevated and lofty-if its members esteem it as their first and highest duty to advance truth and justice, then the law will be what it ought to be-will be in practice what it is in theory-a great system of rules and principles for the vindication of right and the administration of justice among men the Sir Matthew Hale, who, under the forms of highest of human functions. "You know that even religion itself is practically, in a great measure, only what its priests and ministers make it. If these, instead of being enlightened in mind and upright in character, and pure and holy in life, be ignorant and vicious, then religion will degenerate into a miserable superstition, and instead of elevating and purifying its votaries, will only degrade and debase them." These views, so well expressed by this able lawyer and distinguished jurist, the reflecting mind I think will admit, to a great extent, to be true. That there are bad and unprincipled men members of our noble profession-some of them, too, deeply learned in its scientific principles, and men of high intellectual attainments, for none of us are faultless-all of us will admit. When admitted, they, perhaps, had the necessary attainments, both in learning and morals, but belonging to a fallen and falling race, the temptations of the flesh overcame them and they fell! Peter and Judas, when they first attained the companionship of the Savior of mankind, were thought to be worthy, but the weaknesses of poor human nature they were unable to shake off; there moral structure being weak, in an evil moment the one denied Him and the other betrayed Him. I do not mention these instances as a justification, but simply to show that the paths trodden by poor fallen humanity are "devious and winding," and that it requires the utmost caution and the most constant watchfulness to keep all things straight. Hence, while we are forced to admit that there are bad and reckless and unprincipled men in our profession, yet I most emphatically deny that in its ranks immorality more frequently exists than in the other various avocations of life. The science of the law is a physical science, and has its foundations in reasons and justice. Its ethical standard today is as elevated and pure as in any previous period of the world's history. The law has often been made an engine of oppression, and the great and learned Coke and the justly abused and notorious Jeffrey are shining examples of the methods pursued in their days. The most illustrious example of judicial blindness and cruelty is to be found in the career of law, executed devout and spiritually minded women, upon the charge of witchcraft. Our profession, from the earliest times, has been subjected to the severest criticisms that ingenuity and malice could invent. The great Bard of Avon reveals the prevailing sentiment of his times, when he makes one of his characters in Henry VI exclaim: "The first thing to do, let us kill all the lawyers." The great, good and stainless John Marshall, while chief justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, was charged, while in a fit of passion, from which none of us are exempt, by no less a personage than the immortal Thomas Jefferson, with having prostituted his high office and stained the judicial ermine for sordid purposes, and he pronounced him unfit to occupy the high office which for so great a time he adorned. With all these brilliant examples before us, and knowing as we all do, the gross injustice to which our profession, as a profession, has been subjected, we can only move onward in the thorny path before us with a firm tread, undismayed and unchecked by the howlings of prejudice and the shafts of passion. To the unthinking, ignorant and howling multitude, if their ravings are noticed at all, we proudly point to the names that decorate the sky of our profession and crowd its ranks in the daily pursuit of their high vocation, and to the illustrious men who wear the judicial ermine of the various States and of the Supreme Court of the United States which for more than a century "has blazed the way through the unexplored forest of a Republican form of government" - have preserved the judicial ermine from soil or corruption, and commanded the respect and admiration of mankind. We must look above and beyond these base reflections. "For 'tis a base, ignoble mind, That mounts no higher than a bird can soar." The times in which we live are crowded with great and ever-varying events, and it demands all the bold energies of fearless manhood to meet and control them. This Alabama of yours, in which as one of her sons I feel so much pride, in all the elements which constitute a great and noble State in fertility of soil, in salubrity of climate, in beauty of scenery, in mineral wealth and agricultural resources, in manhood and womanhood-stands proudly pre-eminent in the sisterhood of American States. And it is with pride and pleasure that I can say that your bar, as a bar, for all the elements which adorn and dignify professional life-for learning, integrity, devotion to duty, fearless manhood and unflinching moral worth, occupies an envious position-second to none, not even of the older States of the American Union. Your judiciary have ever been pure, elevating and ennobling, setting worthy examples for the younger members of the profession. Your Supreme Court has been adorned and dignified by many of the most eminent jurists who ever sat upon the American Bench, and to-day, be it said to her credit, the judicial utterances and opinions of the Supreme Court of Alabama are sought for with avidity by the members of the profession throughout the entire South. This is the position of your judiciary to-day, and while it perhaps would not be proper to say more than this of your living judiciary, I cannot refrain from referring to a few of the great names of the past, whose illustrious example is worthy of all imitation, and whose works and deeds have covered them with a renown which will live as long as learning is appreciated and virtue adored. What Alabama lawyer does not look with admiration upon the names of Abner S. Liscomb, who for fifteen years was a judge of your Supreme Court, eleven years Chief-Justice, and afterwards, after his removal to Texas, was elevated to the Supreme bench of that Stateof Collier and Ormond and Goldthwaite; of Dargan and Clay and Hitchcock, of Chilton and Peck and Stone, and others too numerous to mention? These names, gentlemen, shed a lustre over your State, and give a dignity to your bar which not even the tooth of time can eradicate. We publish in this issue of the LAW JOURNAL a letter from John A. Finch, Esq., of Indianapolis, on special verdicts under a new statute in Indiana. The value of such practice, it is evident, is great where prejudice may enter into the decision of a jury and the practice is rather simple, though we can appreciate that the interrogatories by counsel to the court for its consideration might be multitudi nous, which is the only unfortunate possibility we can see in the system. It remains to be seen how many States will follow the statute which has been adopted by Indiana. There has been so much opportunity within the last year to discuss the principles of the Monroe doctrine, and it is a subject which demands careful consideration and calm judgment from lawyers of this country, and which can be only properly carried out by a complete and perfect acquaintance with the principles which it involves, that we publish almost in entirety the article in the Nation of Oct. 31st on the Monroe Doctrine. The article is as follows: But being now requested to cover the whole ground, we answer frankly to the first question, that, in our opinion, we should remonstrate or interfere in the proceedings taken by powers other than American with American nations on this continent other than our own,' in all cases arising under the Monroe doctrine? What is the Monroe doctrine? Here it is, taken textually from President Monroe's message: "We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power, we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States. * * But in regard to these continents, circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can any one believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition, in any form, with indifference.' (Message of December 2, to all judgment on the affair. 1823.) Consequently, if any European power should seek to set up or impose on the people of any South American state, by force of arms, any government or form of government which the people did not demand or were opposed to, or should seek to "oppress them or control their destiny" in any manner, we should hold it to be the duty of our government to repel by as much force as might be necessary any such attempt. The invasion of Mexico by the French was an attempt of this order, and Mr. Seward acted properly in giving them peremptory notice to quit as soon as we had forces available to compel compliance. This is an answer to questions 1 and 2. The third question, apropos of the Venezuelan trouble, requires more extended treatment. England is already a neighbor of Venezuela, and holds conterminous territory by a title which nobody denies. The frontier runs for a long distance through a tropical wilderness. There have, for this reason, been disputes of long standing over the exact line, as there are between nearly all Spanish-American States. They are aggravated in this case by the fact that this wilderness is a gold country. All this raises the strong probability either that neither side is quite right, or that the truth of the matter is hard to get at. The Venezuelans are no more moral than the British, and no less greedy, and if we acknowledge the right of Great Britain to hold territory on this continent, we must acknowledge her right to protect that territory against invasion or appropriation. We cannot ask her to consider herself in the wrong because she is the more powerful, or confess that weakness, any more than might makes right, because we should never think of applying such a rule to ourselves. We have always, in all disputes with these little South American States, imposed on them our own view of the justice of the case. Witness our treatment of Chili in 1892. The dispute is in part historical, in part topographical; or, in other words, one to be settled by lawyers and surveyors, not by big guns. It has been so treated by all our diplo matists, and is so treated still, and the ascertainment of the facts is an essential preliminary A person who writes on it as Senator Lodge does in the magazines, or as the young men in the Tribune office do, with hardly any knowledge of these facts, is as ridiculous as your lawyer would be if, the minute you employed him on a difficult real estate litigation, and before he had looked at your papers and proofs, he began to make it hot for your adversary in the newspapers by calling him a notorious robber and defrauder of widows. All this sound and fury, besides making us a ludicrous spectacle as a nation, seriously embarrasses our officials who are charged with the duty of deciding what part we shall take in foreign disputes, and who have all the available and most correct information about it on their tables. Whatever their faults and shortcomings, they are our chosen and accredited representatives, and the business of deriding them because they do not take a hand in other people's quarrels should begin only after they have publicly revealed their folly or stupidity. As to our duty in such quarrels, neither the Monroe doctrine nor any other doctrine known among civilized men gives us the right to protect the South American States against the natural consequences of their own insolence and folly. If they quarrel with a bigger power, rob its subjects, or assault and insult its representatives, they must take the consequences, which are usually a fine, with some sort of security till it is paid. There are eighteen Spanish-American States, with a population of about 50,000,000. Not one of them has ever exhibited the slightest desire to accept our influence or control except when it got into a row with some European power. They are independent sovereign States, de facto and de jure. We are in no way responsible for them, aud our policy towards them has always been marked by a little dislike and a good deal of contempt, so that the notion that we are injured or insulted if anybody makes them pay their debts or indemnify people whom they have robbed or outraged, is worthy only of schoolboys who want to see a naval battle or read about it. Whether Great Britain is proposing or "trying wrongfully to take and hold a large share of Venezuelan territory and hold it permanently shop, who, it is claimed, was negligent and caused the plaintiff to sustain a broken leg, was a Mr. Hemmingway. In the decision, Judge Smith says: Gentlemen, I have taken some pains to examine this question. There is a case where a foreman had charge of removing a hatchway. He had the sole right to employ and discharge men. The hatchway could be safely removed only by two or three persons acting together. The foreman ordered one person to remove the hatchway and although he was foreman in charge of the work his act was held to be the act of a fellow servant. There is another case where there had been as England's own" is something which we do not know, and we do not know anybody in the United States who does know. There cannot be less trustworthy witnesses on this subject than the Jingoes and the young newspaper men. Not only do they not know the truth, but they do not want to know it, if it is favorable to England. And we shall never make beneficent or rational contributions to international law until this presumption against England gets out of the heads of people who write or think on this class of questions. To a great many Americans "abroad" or "foreign powers" always means England, and England is a monster who is always trying to seize more territory. When these publicists want to annex something, some blasting of rocks, and a foreman was in they always declare that England wants it too, charge of the blasting, and one of the fuses did and sit down and wait for the appearance of not go off, and the foreman directed his men to the British fleet. This is funny, but it disturbs proceed, nevertheless to work near where this the judgment, and makes a great deal of our fuse was. Afterwards the fuse did go off and talk on international affairs sound irrational. injured the parties. Although they were workEngland is very much like other nations excepting directly under the charge of the foreman in having a larger fleet. This superstition causes, too, a widespread but comic popular belief that anybody who opposes any bit of aggression or fanfaronade on our part, is either in the pay of Great Britain or is secretly working for her interest and aggrandizement, and he is, therefore, not listened to. This, together with the boyish eagerness for a big fighting force, like a fleet, that will not entail risk or inconvenience to people on shore, is rapidly causing us the loss of the great place in the international forum which we occupied in the beginning of the century, and which the founders of the government thought we would solidify and improve as we grew stronger. We need more men in public life, in the press, who seek national greatness in the sphere of mind and law, and resist the popular longing for more bloody corpses, desolated towns and the general "hell of death and destruction," called war. At the circuit term of the Supreme Court in in Ithaca, Judge Walter Smith in granting a non-suit recently made the following decision which is on the face of it most important. The action was a suit for damages brought by one Ludlow against the Groton Bridge Company. The plaintiff was injured while in the employ of the bridge company. The foreman of the and he had the sole charge of the work, it was held that where the place was rendered unsafe by the negligent act of a fellow servant, that that was not the act of the master for which he could be held responsible; and it was held that the foreman was a fellow servant. There is another case where a foreman who had charge of men and of placing them and directing them, had put a man under an embankment to work, which embankment was unsafe, and which the foreman had reason to believe was unsafe because it had been made unsafe by the acts of the foreman himself; and it was held that notwithstanding the act of the foreman, and his having charge of the location of the men, and its being the duty of the master the act of the master, but was the act of a fellow to furnish a safe place to work, his act was not servant. The later cases have all established the rule that it matters not what may be the position of the servant, whether high or low, whether a foreman or a mere day laborer, that his act is not to be judged by the position as representing the master or representing a coservant; but whether he be the master or a co servant, whether he be the alter ego of the master or a co-servant, is to be determined purely by the acts done. So far as furnishing safe apparatus is concerned, the act of the humblest mechanic who furnishes the apparatus |