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"1. The persons concerned in getting up the proposed statue were not friends of the plaintiff's deceased aunt, and, as plaintiff alleged, did not know her.

2. They were proceeding with their plan without consulting with the plaintiff or other immediate members of the Schuyler-Hamilton family, and without their consent to the making of any statute.

3. The circulars issued by or in behalf of the defendants contained a statement that Mrs. Schuyler was the founder of or the first woman in the enterprise for securing the home of Washington, and that this statement was inaccurate, because a prominent woman in South Carolina was in fact such founder and justly entitled to the honor arising therefrom. This mistake, it was asserted, has caused adverse comment in the newspapers as to the attitude of the family of plaintiff in permitting such a claim to be made when they must have known it was without foundation.

4. It was disagreeable to the plaintiff, because the making of such a statute would have been disagreeable and obnoxious to his aunt were she living. She had, as plaintiff said, a great dislike to have her name brought into public notoriety of any kind, as she was a singularly sensitive woman and of a very retiring nature, anxious to keep her name from the public prints or newspapers.

5. That plaintiff's aunt had not been personally acquainted with Susan B. Anthony, and he was quite sure she had not sympathized with or approved the position taken by Miss Anthony upon the question of the proper sphere of woman and her treatment by the law, and it was disagreeable and annoying to have the memory of Mrs. Schuyler joined with principles of which she did not approve.

"After taking all the objections into careful consideration, we cannot say that we are in the least degree impressed with their force. The first ground of objection, even if well founded in fact, is not of the slightest importance. Whether the defendants were friends or not of Mrs. Schuyler in her lifetime does not seem to us to have any legitimate effect upon the question. No surviving relative, male or female,

would have, in our judgment, the least ground of complaint that an action, confessedly meant to do honor to the memory of a noble woman, was proposed by those who in her lifetime had not the honor of her personal acquaintance or friendship, but whose proposed action was nevertheless the outgrowth of admiration of her character as a friend and benefactor of the sex of which she was herself so great an ornament.

"The second ground of objection, we think, is equally untenable. The fourth ground may properly be considered as a part of it. It is true that these defendants have assumed to take the preliminary steps leading to the making of the proposed statue without having consulted with or obtained the consent of the plaintiff. The whole of the plaintiff's claim of the right of privacy in this case rests upon the lack of this consent.

"It is stated that Mrs. Schuyler was not in any sense a public character during her life, and consequently had not surrendered to any extent whatever her own right of privacy.

"It is not a question of what right of privacy Mrs. Schuyler had in her lifetime. The plaintiff does not represent that right. Whatever right or privacy Mrs. Schuyler had died with her. Death deprives us all of rights in the legal sense of that term, and when Mrs. Schuyler died her own individual right to privacy, whatever it may have been, expired at the same time.

"A woman like Mrs. Schuyler may very well in her lifetime have been most strongly adverse to any public notice, even if it were of a most flattering nature, regarding her own works or position. She may have been (and the evidence tends most strongly to show that she was) of so modest and retiring a nature that any publicity, during her life, would have been to her most extremely disagreeable and obnoxious. All these feelings died with her.

"It is therefore impossible to credit the existence of any real mental injury or distress to a surviving relative grounded upon the idea that the action proposed in honor of his ancestor would have been disagreeable to that ancestor during his life.

"We cannot assent to the proposition that one situated as the plaintif in this case can properly enjoin such action as the defendants

propose on the ground that as mere matter of fact his feeling would be thereby injured. We hold that in this class of cases there must, in addition, be some reasonable and plausible ground for the existence of this mental distress and injury.

"It must not be the creation of mere caprice nor of pure fancy, nor the result of a supersensitive and morbid mental organization, dwelling with undue emphasis upon the exclusive and sacred character of this right of privacy. Such a class of mind might regard the right as interfered with and violated by the least reference even of a complimentary nature to some illustrious ancestor without first speaking for and obtaining the consent of his descendants. "Feelings that are thus easily and unnaturally injured and distressed under such circumstances are much too sensitive to be recognized by any purely earthly tribunal.

"A shy, sensitive, retiring woman might naturally be extremely reluctant to have her praises sounded, or even appropriate honors accorded her while living, and the same woman might, upon good grounds, believe with entire complacency and satisfaction that after her death a proposition would be made and carried out by her admirers to do honor to her memory by the erection of a statue or some other

memorial.

"We think that so long as the purpose is to do honor to the memory of one who is deceased, and such purpose is to be carried out in an appropriate and orderly manner by reputable individuals and for worthy ends, the consent of the descendants of such deceased person is not necessary, and they have no right to prevent, for their own personal gratification, any action of the nature described.

"The third ground of objection is based upon a claim made in the circulars issued by defendants that Mrs. Schuyler was the founder of the Mount Vernon Association, while in truth she was connected with it only as a vice regent from this State. If corrected, all ground of complaint of that nature would disappear.

ing toward the placing the statues of these two ladies together as representatives of the same ideas, or as in any way, even the remotest, united in the same works, or in inculcating the same principles in regard to the rights of

women.

"The fact, if it be a fact, that Mrs. Schuyler did not sympathize with what is termed the 'Woman's Rights' movement is of no importance here. The proposed placing of the two statues would, if carried out, have had no tendency to show that Mrs. Schuyler did so sympathize. Many of us may, and probably do, totally disagree with these advanced views of Miss Anthony in regard to the proper sphere of woman, and yet it is impossible to deny to her the possession of many of the ennobling qualities which tend to the making of great lives.

"While not assuming to decide what this right of privacy is in all cases, we are quite clear that such right would not be violated by the proposed action of the defendants. The plaintiff's cause of action is, we think, wholly fanciful. The defendant's contemplated action is not such as might be regarded by reasonable and healthy minds as in the slightest degree distressing or tending in the least to any injury to those feelings of respect and tenderness for the memory of the dead which most of us possess, and which ought to be considered as a proper subject of recognition and protection by civilized courts.

"Upon the whole, we are of the opinion that the plaintiff has made a mistake in his choice of this case as an appropriate one in which to ask for the enforcement of the right of privacy. The judgment must be reversed as to the parties appealing and the complaint dismissed to them, with costs."

RAILROAD COMPANY -STREET RAILWAYS- MORTGAGES. A claim for damages for personal injuries, caused by the negligence of a street railway company five months before the appointment of a receiver in mortgage foreclosure proceedings, is not entitled to priority of payment over the mortgage debt out of the earnings accruing during the receivership. Such a claim is not based upon any considerations inuring to the benefit of the mortgage security, or tending to keep the road a going concern.—(St. Louis Trust Co. v Riley [U. S. C. C. of App.], 70

"The fifth ground is an equally vague and shadowy one. Whether Mrs. Schuyler sympathized with the work or the views of Miss Anthony, we must say, seems to us utterly foreign to the subject. There was no proposition look | Fed. Rep. 32.)

REPORT OF COMMISSIONERS TO REVISE of various laws relating to the subject. The prac

THE CODE.

(Continued from Dec. 21, 1895.) PRACTICE IN OTHER STATES.

We are commanded by the act authorizing our appointment to examine the Code of Procedure of this State, and also the codes and practice acts of other States and countries. A comparative study of procedure in other States would, doubtless, be profitable in attempting to revise or reconstruct the civil procedure of this State, and we shall try to make such an examination as the law requires before submitting a scheme of revision. But the early date at which this report is required prevents any extended study of other systems of procedure. We deem it proper, however, to submit at this time a statement showing briefly which States have codes of procedure, and in which of them procedure is governed by general practice acts, rules of the courts, or the common law. The following table shows the broad field spread out before us by the statute, and which we are directed to explore:

Alabama has no separate code of civil procedure. Part 3 of the Code of Alabama, entitled "Proceedings in Civil Actions," containing 1, 125 sections, constitutes a complete scheme of civil procedure, beginning with actions and parties, and ending with appeals and fees.

Arizona has no separate code of civil procedure. The titles of the Revised Statutes are arranged alphabetically, and many of them relate to civil procedure.

Arkansas: Chapter 119 of the Revised Statutes (1884), entitled "Pleadings and Practice," contains 407 sections, and is in the nature of a code of civil procedure. The chapters of the statutes, however, are arranged alphabetically, and many other chapters relate to civil procedure.

California has a code of civil procedure containing 2,104 sections. This State has adopted the entire code system, including a civil code, a code of civil procedure, a penal code, a code of criminal procedure, and a political code.

tice in the State, except as modified by statute or rule of court, is under the common law. The Superior Court is empowered by rules to make alterations in the manner of pleading, of entering and transcribing pleadings, judgments, and other proceedings in actions at law, and in relation to the payment of costs.

Florida has no separate code of civil procedure. The second part of the Revised Statutes (1892), entitled "Of Civil Courts, Their organization and Proceedings Therein," containing 340 sections, is practically a code of civil procedure.

Georgia has no separate code of civil procedure. Part 3 of the Code of Georgia (1882), entitled “The Code of Practice," containing 310 sections, is practically a complete code of civil procedure.

Idaho has no separate code of civil procedure. Part 3 of the Revised Statutes (1887), entitled "Code of Civil Procedure," with 2,350 sections, embraces a practically complete scheme of civil pro

cedure.

Illinois has no separate code of civil procedure. Chapter 110 of the Revised Statutes (1885), is entitled "Practice," but cannot be considered a complete code of civil procedure, as it is only a compilation of various statutes, modifying or superseding the common law practice, which otherwise prevails.

Indiana has no separate code of civil procedure. Chapters 2 and 3 of the Revised Statutes (1894), entitled "Civil Procedure" and "Courts," containing 1,392 sections, constitute a complete code of civil procedure. The Appellate and Supreme Courts are empowered to make rules in relation to proceedings where not specially provided for by law.

Iowa has no separate code of civil procedure. Part 3 of the Annotated Code (1888), entitled "Code of Civil Practice," containing 1,415 sections, is practically a complete code of civil procedure. The judges of the District Court are empowered to adopt rules as to filings of pleadings or motions, other than as provided by the Code, and generally to adopt such rules as they may deem expedient, not inconsistent

Colorado has a code of civil procedure, contain- with the Code. ing 445 sections.

Connecticut has no separate code of civil procedure. The practice act (L. 1879, Ch. 83) is the basis of the civil procedure. Many chapters of the Revised Statutes, however, relate to matters generally included in a code of civil procedure, including service of process, place of trial, parties and appearances, pleadings and set-off, practice, evidence, trials, costs, new trials, appeals and executions.

Kansas has a code of civil procedure (L. 1863, ch. 80), consisting of 732 sections. This code is also the code of Oklahoma.

Kentucky: The Civil Code contains 767 sections, and covers civil procedure. The Court of Appeals is empowered to make rules in relation to arguments, etc., before it.

Louisiana has a code of practice, containing 1, 161 sections, and it is a complete scheme of civil procedure. The Code of Practice was originally enDelaware has no separate code of civil procedure. acted in 1825. The State of Louisiana has also a Title 16 of the Revised Laws is entitled "Of Civil | civil code, being a compilation of the substantive Actions in General," but it is merely a compilation civil law.

Maine has no separate code of civil procedure. Practice, except as modified by statute, is under the common law. Various parts of the Revised Statutes (1883), however, relate to matters generally included in a code of civil procedure; such as commencement of civil actions, attachments, arrest, the limitation of personal actions, proceedings in courts, executions and bail.

Maryland has no separate code of civil procedure. The practice in the State, except as modified by statute, is under the common law. Various articles of the Public General Laws (1888), relate to matters usually included in a code of civil procedure, such "pleadings, practice and process at law;" Appeals," "Attachments," etc., arranged alphabetically.

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Massachussetts has no separate code of civil procedure. Part 3 of the Public Statutes (1882), is entitled "Of courts and judicial officers and proceedings in civil actions," and is practically a complete scheme of civil procedure. The Revised Statutes enacted that "the courts shall respectively, from time to time, make and promulgate uniform codes of rules, for regulating the practice and conducting the business of such courts in cases not expressly provided for by law."

Michigan has no separate code of civil procedure. The Annotated Statutes (1882), titles 29 to 38 inclusive, containing 2,685 sections, practically constitutes a code of civil procedure. The judges of the Supreme Court are empowered to modify and amend the practice in cases not provided for by statute.

Minnesota has no separate code of civil procedure; but the General Statutes (1891), chapters 61 to 85, include practically all the subjects ordinarilly embraced in a code of civil procedure, and contain 1,595 sections. Chapter 85 is entitled "The Probate Code," and was enacted in 1889. The judges of the district courts and the Courts of Common Pleas are empowered to adopt uniform rules of practice in civil actions, not inconsistent with law. Mississippi has no separate code of civil procedure. The chapters of the Annotated Code are arranged alphabetically, and many of them relate to matters generally embraced in a code of civil procedure. The Supreme Court may establish rules in relation to practice, not inconsistent with law.

Missouri has no separate code of civil procedure, but chapter 33 of the Revised Statutes (1889), is entitled "Code of Civil Procedure," and contains 311 sections.

Montana has a code of civil procedure, consisting of 3,484 sections, which was adopted February 14, 1895. Montana has also adopted a political code, a civil code, and a penal code, all of which were adopted in February, 1895. The criminal procedure constitutes Part 2 of the penal code.

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These codes are substantially the same as the codes in California.

Nebraska: Part 3 of the Consolidated Statutes (1891) is entitled "The Codes of Civil and Criminal Procedure." The code of civil procedure contains 1,039 sections. The Supreme Court is empowered to make rules not inconsistent with the provisions of the code.

Nevada has no separate code of civil procedure. Chapter 20 of the General Statutes (1885), being the General Practice Act of 1869, containing 970 sections, is a complete scheme of civil procedure. The Supreme Court is empowered to adopt rules of practice not inconsistent with law.

New Hampshire has no separate code of civil procedure. Several chapters of the Public Statutes (1891) relate to civil procedures, such as "of actions, process, service of process," "of proceedings in courts," etc. The common law practice is in vogue except as modified by statute. The Supreme Court is empowered by statute to establish rules of practice not inconsistent with law; and the practice is largely governed by the rules of the Supreme Court. (Published in 56 New Hampshire Reports.)

New Jersey has no separate code of civil procedure. The Revised Statutes of New Jersey (1887) contain many provisions in relation to practice, but, except as modified by statute, the common law practice prevails.

New Mexico has no separate code of civil procedure. The compiled laws (1884), title 33, entitled "Civil Procedure," contains 624 sections, but it is not a complete scheme of civil procedure, the first section providing that the common law shall be the rule of practice and decision.

New York has a code of civil procedure.

North Carolina has a code of civil procedure constituting chapter 10 of the code of 1883. It is a complete code of civil practice, containing 505 sections. The Supreme Court is empowered to adopt rules of practice not inconsistent with law. The practice is largely governed by the rules of the Supreme and Superior Courts.

North Dakota, in 1895, adopted a complete code system, consisting of a political code, civil code, code of civil procedure, probate code, justices' code, penal code, and code of criminal procedure.

Ohio has a code of civil procedure, constituting a chapter of the Revised Statutes, and containing 1,746 sections. The probate practice is not contained in the Code. The Supreme Court is empowered to make rules not inconsistent with law.

Oklahoma territory adopted the Kansas Code in its entirety August 14, 1893.

Oregon has no separate code of civil procedure, but the acts relating to practice have been arranged

as a code in the publication of the Annotated Laws (1887), and constitute a complete scheme of civil procedure, in 1,199 sections.

Pennsylvania has no separate code of civil procedure. The common law generally prevails, and has been modified by statute perhaps as little as in any State of the Union. Many acts, however, relate to matters usually embraced in a code.

Rhode Island has no separate code of civil procedure, The Judiciary Act of 1893 regulates the practice in the courts to a great extent, but is not a complete scheme of civil procedure. The common law practice still prevails, except as modified by

statute.

South Carolina has a code of civil procedure, containing 453 sections. The justices of the supreme court are empowered to make rules of practice not inconsistent with the code of procedure.

South Dakota: The code of civil procedure of the territory of Dakota became the law of South Dakota upon its admission as a State. This code contains 1,598 sections. It is distinct from the probate and justices' codes, which, together, contain 438 sections.

Tennessee has no separate code of civil procedure. Part 3 of the Code of Tennessee (1894) is entitled "The Redress of Civil Injuries," containing 1,998 sections, and is a complete scheme of civil procedure, with the exception of probate practice, which is contained in another chapter of the code.

Texas has no separate code of civil procedure. The chapters of the Revised Statutes (1887) are arranged alphabetically and many of them relate to civil procedure. The Supreme Court is empowered to make rules of practice for the government of itself and other courts of the State.

Utah: Part 10 of the Compiled Laws (1888) is "The Code of Civil Procedure." Part 11 of the Compiled Laws relates to procedure in probate courts. The two parts together contain 1,380

sections.

Vermont has no separate code of civil procedure. Part 1 of title 11 of the Revised Laws (1988) is entitled "Courts and Judicial Proceedings," and contains 918 sections. Many other chapters of the Revised Laws also relate to matters of practice usually included in a code. The Supreme Court is authorized to make necessary rules of practice in such

court.

Virginia has no separate code of civil procedure. Title 48 of the Code of Virginia (1887) is entitled "Proceedings in Civil Actions," and contains 290 sections. Many other titles of the code, however, relate to matters usually included in a code of civil procedure. The practice is under the common law, except as modified by statute.

Washington has a code of procedure consisting of 1,712 sections. It includes criminal as well as civil

procedure. The criminal procedure is included in 208 sections. The Supreme Court is authorized to adopt rules of practice not inconsistent with law.

West Virginia has no separate code of civil procedure. The Code of West Virginia (1891) contains many chapters relating to procedure in the courts, but except as modified by statute, the common law practice prevails.

Wisconsin has no separate code of civil procedure. Part 3 of the Annotated Statutes (1891) is entitled "Courts and Judicial Officers and Actions and Proceedings in Civil Matters," and contains 1,942 sections. It is practically a complete scheme of civil procedure. The Supreme Court is empowered to make rules of practice in the Supreme Court, the Surrogate Courts, County Courts, and other courts of inferior jurisdiction.

Wyoming Title 38 of the Revised Statutes (1887) is entitled "Civil Procedure." It contains 813 sections and is practically a complete code of civil procedure, with the exception of the practice of the probate courts, which constitutes title 37 of the Revised Statutes, and contains 367 sections.

The District of Columbia has no separate code of civil procedure. The practice in the District is largely under the common law. Both the courts of law and equity are empowered to adopt rules of practice, and the proceedings are largely governed by the rules so adopted. Chapter 55 of the Compiled Laws of 1894, entitled "Pleading and Practice," contains 80 sections relating to this subject.

United States: Chapter 18 of title 13 of the Revised Statutes relates to civil and criminal procedure and contains 132 sections, of which 98 concern civil procedure. By section 914, it is provided that "the practice, pleadings and forms and modes of proceeding in civil causes, other than equity and admiralty causes, in the circuit and district courts, shall conform, as near as may be, to the practice, pleadings, and modes of proceedings existing at the time in like causes in the courts of record of the State within which such circuit or district courts are held, any rule of court to the contrary notwithstanding."

All writs and processes issuing from the federal courts must be under the seal of the court from which they issue and must be signed by the clerk, and if issued from the Supreme Court or a circuit court bear test of the chief justice, or if from a district court, of the judge thereof.

The Supreme Court, by section 917, is given power to regulate the practice of circuit and districts courts in suits in equity or admiralty. By section 918, the several circuit and district courts are authorized to make rules regulating their own practice, if not inconsistent with any law of the United States, or any rule prescribed by the Supreme Court. Section 914, adopting the practice

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