The fundamental notion of public international law is the territoriality of sovereignty. In private international law, the student's attention is frequently directed to exception to this principle-to the extra-territorial application of certain laws. This conception of personal laws extending their empire and authority so as to attach to the person everywhere was first asserted by the Italian jurists of the thirteenth century. As Sir W. Rattigan formulates the problem, Private International Law "solves the difficult questions arising from the inquiry, as to what extent the native law is bound to respect the foreign law, and the conditions under which the latter must always yield to the former."

Sir W. Rattigan, in his chapter on the Law of Things, says that "the jurisprudence of Continental Europe, following that of the old Civil Law, knows no other classification of things except mobilia and immobilia." It is significant to observe that this

division into mobilia and immobilia does not occur in the eighth title of the First Book of the Digest -de divisione Rerum et qualitate. The French Code Civil, adopted in Italy after 1866, certainly does say (art. 516): "Tous les biens sont meubles ou immeubles." But this is invariably translated: "All property is either personal or real." In excellent French dictionaries like Gasc's, the substantive immeuble has the meaning of real estate, landed estate, or property, but not immovable thing. The criticism so frequently directed against the English division of property, that it designates leaseholds for a term of years as chattles real, and therefore a personal property, is adopted by Sir W. Rattigan, who quotes Lord Selborne's dictum in Freke v. Lord Carbery, that land, whether held for a chattel interest or a freehold interest, is, as a matter of fact, immovable and not movable. But it may be observed that the Code Civil goes nearly the same length in unduly extending the meaning of the term real property, as the English law does in restricting it to freehold interest in land. Thus, by Code Civil, under certain circumstances, cattle, pigeons, warren rabbits, and farming implements may be designated real property (cf. art. 524). One of the most interesting chapters in this work is the chapter on Immaterial Rights of Copyright, Tradesmarks and Patents. These rights have been

declared to be necessary in the case of Jeffreys v. Boosey. It only remains to say that the elaborations and wealth of reference of this little manual will render it no less useful to the practitioner than its lucidity of exposition will render it attractive to the student.-Law Times.

Abstracts of Recent Decisions.

ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS-VALIDITY. - Where an assignment purports to convey all the debtor's property to be equally distributed among all his creditors, and the same is accepted by the assignee, and by a majority in number, if not in amount, of all the creditors, it cannot be held fraudu lent on its face, although it contains provisions which might be objectionable if the assignment were one granting preferences; nor can such assignment be signor, not shown to have been participated in by

set aside because of the fraudulent intent of the as

the assignee and the accepting creditors. (Porter v. James [U. S. C. C. of App.], 67 Fed. Rep. 21.) FEDERAL COURTS BOOKS AND PAPERS.-The right given by Rev. St. § 724, to compel the production of books and papers in action at law, is not limited to requiring their production at the trial, but the court may, in its discretion, grant an order for inspection, with permission to copy, prior to the date of the trial. (Lucker v. Phoenix Assur. Co. of London [U. S. C. C., S. Car.], 67 Fed. Rep. 18.)

PRACTICE -PRODUCTION OF

FEDERAL COURTS--SUPREME COURT-DENIAL OF RIGHTS UNDER FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.-When the ground of jurisdiction is the alleged denial of a title, right, privilege or immunity, secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, it must appear that such title, right, privilege or immunity was specially set up or claimed at the proper time and in the proper way; and cannot be recognized as properly made, when set up for the first time in a petition for rehearing after judgment. (Sayward v. Denny [U. S. S. C.], 15 s. c. Rep. 777.)

MECHANIC'S LIEN-COMMUNITY PROPERTY.-The husband may contract for the erection of buildings on the community real estate, so as to subject it to mechanic's liens therefor. (Douthitt v. McCulsky

PRINCIPAL AND SURETY

SUBROGATION.-Where

a surety for the payment of a debt receives a security for his indemnity and to discharge such indebtedness, the principal creditor is, in equity, entitled to the full benefit of that security. (South Omaha Nat. Bank v. Wright [Neb.], 63 N. W. Rep. 126.)

TRESPASS ON LAND.-Where a complaint alleges a continuing trespass by defendant, through its

version of timber growing thereon, in a single count, the entire cause of action is local, and only a federal court within the State in which the land lies has jurisdiction. (Ellenwood v. Marietta Chair Co. [U. S. S. C.], 15 S. C. Rep. 771.)

New Books and New Editions.

MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW. Mr. Thomas Alfred Walker, fellow and lecturer of Peterhouse, Cambridge, Eng., has produced a most valuable and interesting addition to the subject of International Law.

The book is designed as a comprehensive general introduction to detailed study of the subject, and such a work the author has certainly produced showing moreover a thorough and clear knowledge of the subject in hand. The style is extremely clear and the treatment careful.

It should prove a work of great interest not only to the legal profession or any student, but also to the general public.

Published by C. J. Clay & Sons, London, Eng.; McMillan & Co., N. Y.

MUNICIPAL HOME RULE.

Prof. Goodnow, the present occupant of the chair of administrative law in Columbia College, has added to his already high reputation as an authority on administrative law by his latest work, "Municipal Home Rule."

The book is a study in the administration of cities which cannot fail of a wide and favorable reception, coming as it does in the midst of the present agitation of the subject.

Published by MacMillan & Co., N. Y. Price, $1.50.

HALL'S INFRINGEMENT OUTLINE.

Glenn's International Law is the ninth and latest, hand-book of the now widely known Hornbook Series, from the press of the West Publishing Co., of which series we had occasion to write at some length two weeks ago.

The general merit of the series cannot but be enhanced by the present work, which is a most broad and admirable treatise of international law, stating the controlling principles of the law in a readily accessible style, and giving copious references to the many ramifications of these principles met with in actual practice.

The author, who is a member of a profession from which additions to the number of our text-book authorities would scarcely be dreamed of, Captain Edwin F. Glenn, acting judge advocate of U. S. army, deliberately and in praiseworthy contrast to so many authors, disclaims any original work in this ancient field of the law, and emphatically states that he has "freely copied from authorities of recognized standing," claiming for his work the greater merit in a treatise of this kind of careful compilation and clear and accurate statement. Published by the West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn.

AMERICAN ELECTRICAL CASES, VOLS. II & III. The second and third volumes of this valuable

compilation of cases of a branch of the law the importance of which is only of late beginning to be felt, have just been issued by Matthew Bender, Albany, N. Y., being edited by William H. Morrill, the well-known writer on legal subjects.

unusual merit, embracing as they do, the decisions The wide scope of these volumes makes them of of the Federal Courts and of almost every State in

the Union from 1886-1892. The cases in these volumes are arranged most advantageously for reference, not being, as usual in such works, placed in chronological order, but grouped together according to the subjects of the decisions.

In his preface to Volume III, the author comments on the rapid increase of adjudications in

"Hall's Patent Estate."

Mr. Hall has based his "Outline solely on the opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States, and the volume is of corresponding value to any patent practitioner of this country, or any one desiring in brief form a short treatise on this branch of the Patent Law.

For a volume of its size, 86 pages, it contains an unusually large number of references to well-established cases.

Published by Banks & Bros., New York and Albany.

applied electricity by reason of the many new questions arising from the interference of the powerful currents of power and light companies with the weaker currents and more delicate apparatus of telephone companies.

The question as to the rights of abutting owners as affected by the maintenance in highways of apparatus required by users of electricity, occupy an important place in Volume III.

These reports are of the greatest value to every lawyer of the present age of electricity.

Published and sold by Matthew Bender, Albany, N. Y.

The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, AUGUST 10, 1895,

Current Topics.

[All communications intended for the Editor should be addressed simply to the Editor of THE ALBANY LAW JOURNAL. All letters relating to advertisements, subscriptions, or other business matters, should be addressed to THE ALBANY LAW JOURNAL COMPANY.]

THE

HE question is being raised in a somewhat peremptory way as to the right of a corporation owing its charter to another State to do business according to methods condemned by the laws of a State in which it has established itself. There is a popular impression that a corporation organized, say, under the laws of New Jersey, has a constitutional right to do business in the State of New York. But what may be called the interchangeability of American citizenship guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States does not extend to those artificial persons known as corporations. These, being the mere creation of local law, can have no legal existence beyond the limits of the sovereignty where they were created. In the language of the United States Supreme Court: A corporation "must dwell in the place of its creation, and cannot migrate to another sovereignty. The recognition of its existence, even by other States, and the enforcement of its contracts made therein, depend purely upon the comity of those States a comity which is never extended where the existence of the corporation or the exercise of its powers are prejudicial to their interest or repugnant to their policy."

This latter statement is not so obviously true as when it was written in deciding the case of the Bank of Augusta v. Earle, because it was not then common to combine corporations "to limit production, stifle competition and monopolize the necessaries of life." As Mr. Justice Brown remarked in his recent address at Yale, the extent to which this has already been carried is alarming, the extent to which it may hereafter be carried is revolutionary. But there is no reason why a combination in unlawful restraint of trade, which could not be legally formed under the laws of Massachusetts, VOL. 52 No. 6.

should be tolerated here merely because it was organized in another State. If it were a lottery company it would be promptly suppressed, however clear might be its right to do business in the State of its origin. A State that desires to check the spread of monopolistic combinations has the remedy in its own hands. It need not allow its people to be imposed on for a day longer than they are willing to be.

The law on the subject is very fully set forth in the opinion of the United States Supreme Court delivered by Justice Field in the "leading case "of Paul v. Commonwealth of Virginia. It is there laid down that as a corporation has no absolute right of recognition in any other State save that of its origin, but depends for such recognition and the enforcement of its contracts upon the assent of other States, it follows that such assent may be granted upon such terms and conditions as those States may think proper to impose. They may exclude. the foreign corporation entirely; they may restrict its business to particular localities, or they may exact such security for the performance of its contracts with their citizens as in their judgment will best promote the public interest. cretion. It is clearly an anomaly that corporations should be allowed to do business undisturbed in States where their charters would be annulled were they of domestic origin. If the laws of any State have been deliberately framed to favor the formation of trusts and monopolies, or if they are so administered as to protect the existence of such combinations, there is no reason whatever why other States should allow their laws to be similarly per

verted.

The whole matter rests in their dis

One of the first cases decided in England in some years as to the dispossession of the real property of one party by another was in Marshall v. Taylor which was determined by the English Court of Appeals recently. Lord Halsbury in writing the opinion of the court says:

"So far as the facts found by the Vice-Chancellor are concerned, I am not disposed to interfere with anything he has found. But I cannot concur with him in the inference he has drawn from those facts. With reference to the origin of this strip of land, 4 feet wide and

80 feet long I do not feel very strongly either one way or the other; but, if I were compelled to give a judgment upon it, I think I should hold that the plaintiff originally possessed it. I am afraid I am more influenced perhaps than I ought to be by the exact coincidence of the measurements. I do not know whether there was or was not originally a drain there, and I place no reliance at all upon any supposed presumption that arises from the position of the hedge and the ditch. I do not know whether it was a ditch or not. Very likely it was a small grip formed by the lie of the land, and the wash of the rain water rushing down gradually enlarged it until it became what people agreed to call a ditch; but the undoubted fact remains that at one period the plaintiff's predecessor in the title did cover it in and did make a drain, although that fact also is qualified by this, that, in making the drain, it was made a drain for both houses, and one perhaps might infer that it was done at the joint instance of both parties, as it undoubtedly did drain both houses. We do not know anything at all about the facts except that it was done by the plaintiff's predecessor in title, and it might possibly have been done by him at the expense, or with the assent, of the defendant's predecessor in

but in no sense was there any exclusive possession, as I read the facts, and the arbitrator there found there was no exclusive possession calculated to make the possession of the land change so as to put it in him, and dispossess the real owner. But such a piece of land and such a user seems to me to have no relation at all to such a thing as we are now discussing. The true nature of this particular piece of land is that it is inclosed. It cannot be denied that, according to the ordinary course of procedure, the person who now says he owns it could not get to it. I do not deny that he could have crept through the hedge, or, if it had been a brick wall, that he could have climbed over the wall, but that is not the ordinary and usual mode of access. That is the exclusion-the dispossession which seems to me to be so important in this case. It is true that for a certain number of years say fifteen years which is, I think, the longest period of which there is actual evidence, the owner of the adjoining garden (perhaps the original owner of this piece of land) was in the habit, by his agent, of going into the other garden and clipping the hedge. But the very same witness who proves that, proves that he had at some time deposited the clippings on the midden belonging to the defendant, and that sometimes he left them at other parts of the ground; but, as was very candidly and fairly admitted, he was doing acts which by no possibility could be acts done as of right. Neither, as far as I can see, was there any right to go through the gate. fact that he could have got through the hedge indicates, to my mind, that there could have been no right to go through the gate, which admittedly belongs to the present defendant. Then are we to infer, although it is accompanied by a request to be allowed to go through the gate of the present defendant, accompanied by acts which undoubtedly are done by permission, that there is still a possession in the plaintiff which entitles him to say he has never been dispossessed, because he did clip this hedge? I confess that does not appear to me to be a reasonable inference. When one comes to see what the property of the defendant is that part of this piece of land is covered with cobble stones and made a part of the yard; that over part of it trees have been planted; that over another

But, coupling the description on the defendant's conveyance with the undoubted fact that it was the plaintiff that in fact did cover in this thing which has now become a sewer (I hardly know how to describe it), the inclination of my opinion undoubtedly is that it did once belong to the plaintiff. But then the question arises whether, under the Statute of Limitations, the occupation of it since that time has not been such as to exclude the plaintiff and to give it to the defendant. I come to the conclusion that it has. It is impossible, I think, to speak with exact precision about the degree of possession or dispossession that will do unless you have regard, as Cotton. L. J. said in Leigh v. Jack (ubi sup.), to the nature of the property. In that case, which the Vice-Chancellor himself quoted, the person who set up a possession inconsistent with the rights of the person to whom the property originally belonged, had a strip of land on either side of an intended road, and he incumbered that intended road with various articles of his trade,

The very