separate thing from the inn, for there may be inns which do not require licenses simply because no intoxicating liquor is sold on the premises. Again there are inns having a very limited accommodation for guests sleeping and lodging on the premises, and some may have no sleeping accommodation at all. But an inn is essentially a place for travellers resting in and taking refreshments, though there is no law which defines what the kind of refreshment is to be. Some landlords may believe in water and oatmeal cakes, or in lemonade, or milk, or bread and cheese; and now, since the teetotallers and vegetarians have become formidable- bodies, it is pretty clear that excellent refreshment can be had without any kind of intoxicating liquor. But few landlords can resist the fascination of keeping a stock of gin and brandy, wine and ale, in order to minister to the wants of their customers, and thereby swell their own profits. Again, there is a further distinction caused by the inn being divided into two parts; one of which is an inn proper for board and lodging, and the other part is a mere victualling or eating house or shop. Each innkeeper can please himself as to these internal arrangements, and probably the question may some day arise, whether, in a house which is licensed, and which is radiant with shining casks and many colored drinks, the traveller, who has borne the burden and heat of the day, on arriving at his inn, can insist on having his gin or brandy and water as part of the necessary refreshment for his peculiar inner-man, and whether the innkeeper would be indictable for refusing this luxury. These and many similar nice questions must be left to the judges and justices of the future, who may have to deal with a new race of innkeepers who will be strong minded men, and may insist that gin is not good for his guest, nor even a Welsh rabbit, and may insist on giving the traveller some other article better adapted to longevity and good order.

The complications caused by innkeepers taking out licenses for intoxicating liquors were made evident by the case of R. v. Rymer, 2 Q. B. D., 136. One of the incidents of keeping an inn is, that the innkeeper is bound to supply some kind of refreshment to all comers, whether by day or night, if he has accommodation, and professes to use his premises for that purpose. And he is indictable for refusing this accommoda

But the only class of

tion without reason to the first comer. persons to whom he owes this duty are travellers, and travellers only, and his neighbors cannot insist either on meat or drink, if he chooses to refuse it, with or without reason, any more than other shopkeepers are bound in such circumstances. In R. v. Rymer, a gentleman living about two-thirds of a mile from the Sea House Hotel at Worthing, chose once or twice to go about with his dog, and called at the refreshment bar called the Carlton, which was part of the licensed premises. He held his dog by a chain, and asked for a glass of whisky, which was refused, though he tendered the money. The only refusal seems to have been that some other customers complained of the dog as rather savage, and sometimes vomiting in the shops. The owner of the dog was in no sense a traveller. But he chose to indict the innkeeper for refusing to give him his refreshment. The case was tried at Quarter Sessions. The chairman told the jury that the defendant was bound to supply the whisky demanded by the prosecutor, but if they thought the dog was a nuisance to the business, then there was a good ground for refusal. The jury found the innkeeper guilty, and that the dog was not a savage dog, and the question was sent to the Court of Crown Cases Reserved, for the opinion whether the conviction was right. The court held that the conviction was wrong, because it was essential to prove that the prosecutor was a traveller, and as to the dog, the court was inclined to hold that that reason for refusal would have been sufficient if the first ground of liability had been made out.

That case did not involve any new law, but applied the law to somewhat complicated circumstances, and it did not decide whether whisky was or was not refreshment, or whether the defendant could have declined to give that kind of refreshment.

Another recent case of Strauss v. County Hotel Company, J. P., p. 69, involves what would have been a somewhat similar point as to the refreshment room attached to a railway station hotel. The plaintiff was a traveller who arrived at the Carlisle railway station. He was in the habit of staying there occasionally. The hotel adjoins the station, and part of the station is used as a refreshment room, both being held under

one lease and one license, though the refreshment room is quite separate from the hotel. The plaintiff, on arriving about mid-day, intended to stay in the hotel the same evening, and engaged the hotel porter on the platform to take charge of his luggage. On calling at the hotel, the plaintiff found a telegram addressed to him, on reading which he changed his intention of staying there, and did not engage a room. He met the porter and directed the latter to put his luggage in the lockup-room of the hotel till he returned. In the afternoon of the same day, the plaintiff called for his luggage, but part of it was missing. An action being brought, the plaintiff was nonsuited, on the ground that he had never been a guest of the hotel, and so that the defendant was under no duty to keep his luggage safe. The case was afterwards brought before the High Court as to the correctness of the nonsuit, and the Queen's Bench Division held that the judge was right, for that the relation of host and guest had never been constituted, and so that the liability never commenced. Whether there was or would have been any liability for being a bailee of the articles did not require to be decided.

This last case, therefore, did not throw much new light on the complicated questions which so often beset the relation of host and guest.-Justice of the Peace (Engl.)

FACTORS' LIENS.

In view of the complications frequently arising in adjusting the rights of consignor and consignee, and the necessity of knowing what are the adjudications, and opinions of text writers as to the liens of factors, we here submit a collation of authorities on the subject. We quote from Parsons on Contracts, volume 3rd, chapter on lien, Sec. 1.

*

"Liens exist by common law, or are created either by usage, by statute, or by express agreement of parties. * * No lien can be acquired by any fraudulent act, or by paying freight and charges upon property belonging to another for the purpose of getting wrongful possession of it, nor by acquiring possession of property wrongfully and expending money or labor upon it, nor generally by the voluntary and unauthorized act of the party claiming the lien.

"Nor is any lien acquired when the party has entered into a special agreement, which shows that he relied solely on the personal credit of the bailor.

"When the party giving possesion of the property has no power to dispose of it, no lien will attach; and it has been repeatedly decided, that at common law, a factor with authority to sell property cannot pledge it so as to create a lien against the owner.

"But statutes, both in this country and in England, have made such acts effectual against the principal, if bailee claiming the goods acts in good faith, and without knowledge that the factor has no knowledge to pledge."

In the case of Martin Davis & Co. against Simmons in the United States Court for the District of Kentucky, Hon. John W. Barr, Judge, decided, Feb. 8, 1882, it was held that when the factor was indebted to the consignor for previous consignments, and concealed that fact from another factor to whom the goods were delivered to be sold and the net proceeds to be used to protect the drafts of the original consignor, accepted by said first consignee, and the proceeds were so applied, the second consignee was allowed a credit for such application, as between him and the original consignor. But no such credit was allowed the second consignee for payments on such acceptances in excess of the net proceeds unless made with the consignor's authority. (The case is not a reported case, and these are merely points covered by the judgment.)

As to what constitutes authority to authorize a factor receiving consignments from another factor, to dispose of the goods or proceeds in a particular manner, or as to what amounts to a ratification of such acts, depends upon a variety of circumstances.

In regard to the general doctrine of principal and agent, it is said in Clark, Executor, v. Van Remidick, 9 Cranch 155, that "A subsequent assent is equivalent to an original authority." We quote also the following, viz:

"Even if

Story on Agency, Par. 258, pages 317-318, says: no such prior relation of principal and agent has existed between the parties, yet if a party who has acted for another gives notice to the principal and the latter makes no reply

or no objection, it will, in many cases, afford a presumption that he ratifies the act."

And in paragraph 328, same work, Justice Story says: "In many cases a ratification will be inferred from other collateral circumstances. Thus if the principal, whose goods have been sold without his authority, sue the purchaser for the debt due therefor, that would amount to a ratification."

And in foot note 2, citing Woodbury v. Larned, 5 Minn. 339, he further says: "Accepting the benefit of the acts of an unauthorized agent is a ratification of his authority."

Veazie v. Williams, 8th Howard, 157, says: "The principal in such case is profiting by the acts of the agent, and is hence answerable civiliter for the acts of the agent, however innocent himself of any intent to defraud. * * * Whether the principal knew all those acts or not is not the test in this case as in 2d East, 92 notes, and 13 East, 634, notes, &c. * ** But the test here is was the purchaser deceived, and has the vendor adopted the sale made by deception and received the benefits of it. For, if so, he takes the sale with all its bur dens. See Wilson v. Fuller 3rd Ad. and E. N. S. 68; Story's Equity, vol. 1, 193, and Parsons on Contracts, vol. 1, 51-52."

Story on Bailments, Par. 328, says: "A relaxation of the strict rule of the Roman law, founded upon the convenience of commerce, seems to have worked its way into the modern jurisprudence of continental Europe, in which it is said to be a general rule that possession constitutes a title; and that persons making advance of money upon movable goods are not required to inquire to whom the property belongs, and are fully protected for the advance they make.

The rule, though expressed in such general terms, ought probably to be received with the qualification that the possession is bona fide, and not by a tort, and that the pledgor has an apparently good title or right of possession.

But at all events there seems to be no doubt that, by the law of Continental Europe, it is universally recognized that factors have a right to pledge the goods intrusted to them, and may thereby bind the goods to the full extent of any advance made upon them," &c.

And in paragraph 325 of the same volume, Judge Story "The general denial of the right of factors to pledge

says: