"By the 29th and 30th sections upon any such petition for the dissolution of marriage, it shall be the duty of the Court to inquire whether the petitioner has been in any manner accessory to or conniving at the adultery or has condoned the same,' and this applies to husband and wife alike. There is no provision at all as to condonation of the cruelty or desertion which require to be coupled with the adultery in order to entitle the wife to a dissolution of the marriage; whether the law as to condonation is or is not by the canon law, as acted on in England, the same as to cruelty as to adultery, it is not made so in the recent statute.

"In Palmer v. Palmer, 29 L. J. (P. M. & Ad.) 124; 2 Sw. & Tr. 61, the Judge Ordinary refused to strike out a paragraph in which the wife, to a plea of condonation, replied that if she had condoned the respondent's cruelty, such condonation was cancelled, and her right to complain of such cruelty was revived by the respondent's subsequent adultery. And some of the observations reported to have been made, like those of the Court in Durant v. Durant, 1 Hagg. Ecc. 733, at p. 761, already cited, are authorities for the doctrine of conditionality of all condonations, whether of adultery or of cruelty, though the decision did not require them.

"In Dent v. Dent, 34 L. J. (P. M. & Ad.) 118; 3 Sw. & Tr. at p. 106, the wife petitioned on account of adultery and cruelty. The husband pleaded condonation of the adultery. On the trial it was admitted that there had been adultery in 1861, that it had been condoned in 1861, the parties lived together and had had children. The Judge Ordinary, Lord Penzance, in summing up, is reported to have directed the jury that the rule of law was that all condonation was conditional, and the condition is, 'In future you shall treat me as a husband ought to treat his wife; and if you hereafter break your matrimonial obligations, and are guilty of adultery or cruelty, the condoned offense is revived. The question for you is, whether there was any subsequent cruelty which did away with that pardoning or condonation. The pardoning having taken taken place in 1861, there is evidence that in 1864 the husband was guilty of cruelty. If you are satisfied of that fact, you will find that though the wife did pardon the husband's adultery, there was subsequent cruelty committed which revived that adultery. The cruelty must have been, within the 27th section, 'such cruelty as, without adultery, would have entitled her to a divorce a mensa et thoro.'

"This is, I think, the only case reported in which the doctrine of revival has been made the ground on which a divorce a vinculo has been granted, and the strong objection arising from its varying the status of married persons does not seem to have been brought to the notice of the learned judge.

"In Blandford v. Blandford, 8 P. D. 19, there had been adultery and desertion; there had been a forgiveness of both that adultery and of the desertion, and a resumption of conjugal intercourse for a few months; after which he adultery with the same person was resumed; there was no condonation of that latter adultery, and the question was whether it could be couple with the previous desertion, though that desertion had ceased before the adultery complained of was committed. This seems to me a very different question than that raised in Dent v. Dent, 34 L. J. (P. M. & Ad.) 118; 4 Sw. & Fr. 106. But it is to be observed that the Judge Ordinary, Sir James Hannen, seems to express approbation of the doctrine laid down in the dictum in Durant v. Durant, 1 Haag. Ecc, 733, at p. 761.

"But assuming it to be now established English law that any matrimonial offense, though forgiven, may be revived by any other matrimonial offense of which the Court take cognisance, it is a very modern law, and not, I think, so obviously just and expedient that we ought to infer, contrary to all the Scotch authorities for the last three centuries, that it either was or ought to have been introduced into the law of Scotland in the 16th century.

Lord Young said in this case: 'But, if it is fitting that I should consider the reason and policy or public utility of our rule as we have certainly heretofore regarded it, I must say that I think it is well founded on these considerations. It is, in my judgment, unfitting on public or moral grounds that a man should knowingly take an adulterous wife back to his bed on any other footing than absolute forgiveness of the past. I have pointed out and, indeed, this case illustrates, that her past transgressions, though condoned, may be used in evidence of a subsequent transgression as throwing light on the facts relied on to prove it, but beyond this, I find no reason why her forgiven offenses may be brought against her judicially. Subsequent adultery may well be presumed and so held proved against her by evidence which, but for her previous conduct, would have been properly thought insufficient. But if with all the aid that can legitimately be taken from her past conduct the alleged subsequent adultery is not proved, or is disproved, I cannot assent to the proposition as reasonable or useful that she may nevertheless be divorced if the evidence, which does not prove or even disproves adultery, shows imprudence or levity of conduct on her part. To hold this would be to hold that a man who knowingly and forgivingly resumes cohabitation with an adulterous wife may thereafter have her divorced for imprudence or levity of conduct, that being in law the condition of their cohabitation. This result is not varied or disguised by saying that she is not divorced for the

levity, but for the adultery, the forgiveness of which her levity is forfeited. I ought, perhaps, to observe that cruelty stands on quite another ground. Cruelty is cumulative, admitting by degrees and augmenting by addition, so that it may be condoned and even forgiven for a time and up to a certain point without any bar in sense or reason to bringing it forward when the continuance of it has rendered it no longer condonable.'

"This exactly expresses my own opinion. I will not attempt to improve upon the language in which it is expressed. This being so, I advise your Lordships to affirm the interlocutor appealed against, and to dismiss the appeal, and, as it is by a husband against the wife, with costs as between agent and client."

We doubt whether the same result would have been reached in this country. Certainly no such result, in view of our statutes, would have been reached in this state. The case proceeded upon the admitted fact that Mrs. Collins committed adultery with Eayres, and that the husband, with full knowledge of the fact, agreed to forgive the offense and live with her as formerly, but on the express condition that she would never again speak or write to Eayres. It is further found that in violation of this agreement she did, a few months thereafter, and while she was living with Collins, meet Eayres repeatedly, hold conversations with him, walk with him, she having hold of his arm; that they were seen to go along an unfrequented path, enter an unfinished building, in which they remained some ten minutes, but it was found as a fact that she had not, in any of these interviews, since the condonation, committed adultery. Her explanation was that she was endeavoring to get from Eayres a ring and some letters that she had sent him during their illicit intercourse. This not being, by the law of Scotland, ground of divorce, and not having the effect of reviving the condoned offense, the husband was held to be without relief. In Ohio, we apprehend, that such clandestine meetings would be gross neglect of duty, for the idea that misconduct must continue for three years to constitute that as a ground of divorce is exploded. Besides, the view that the condoned adultery would be revived so as to afford ground of divorce, which is maintained in many cases, may be adhered to if a similar case should arise.

DIGEST OF CASES.

Assent of Grantee Relation-Deed-Delivery—Intent.—The assent of he grantee is necessary to the delivery of a deed, whether such delivery is actual or constructive. A conveyance does not take effect as a deed until delivery with the intent that it shall so operate. Such intent is a question of fact to be determined from the circumstances of the transaction, and cannot always be determined as a matter of law. Delivery of a deed is not complete until the grantor has so dealt with the instrument delivered as to lose all control over it. Whether he has so dealt with it depends upon the intent to be deduced from all the surrounding circumstances. The delivery of a deed to a third person not authorized by the grantee to receive it, and without his knowledge, cannot operate to defeat the rights of creditors of the grantor, attaching subseqent to such delivery and prior to the time when the grantee manifested his assent, although such deed was beneficial to the grantee. The subsequent assent of the grantee, under such circumstances, does not operate by relation, to pass the title as of the time of delivery to such third person. Hibberd v. Smith. Sup. Ct. Cal. 3 West Coast Rep. 446.

Criminal Law-Insanity-Drunkenness-Violence of Prisoner-Restraint.-Temporary insanity produced immediately by intoxication is no excuse for homicide, Where the accused uses violence towards officers of the court while in presence of the court he may be lawfully restrained by hand-cuffs. Upstone v. The People. Ill. Sup. Ct., Nov., 1883. 18 Rep. 208.

Common Carriers Bill of Lading-Negligence-Release of Responsibility against Insurable Damage-Public Policy-Implied Release-The Objection Defined. If a condition in a bill of lading, relieving the carrier from liability for "any damage that can be insured against," is to receive an unqualified construction, and be deemed to include a loss arising from the negligence of the carrier, it is obnoxious to public policy, and therefore void. Public policy demands that the right of the shipper to absolute security against the negligence of the carrier, and of all persons engaged in performing his duty, shall not be taken away by any.arrangement or agreement between the parties to the service. The same reasons that forbid the recognition of an express contract between the carrier and the shipper, exempting the former from liability for his own negligence, forbid a contract between them which is designed to work the same result. That which cannot be done directly, will not be permitted to be done indirectly. The objection to a condition releasing the carrier from liability for an insurable damage lies in its tendency to impose upon the shipper the burden of protecting himself against a risk which it is the carrier's duty to assume, and which the law will not permit him to evade. It is better that the carrier should be paid a higher freight, consequent upon his insuring himself against damage to which his own negligence may contribute, than that he should be given immunity by the shipper. The Hadji. U. S. C. C., S. D. N. Y., 20 Fed. Rep. 875.

Criminal Law-Jeopardy-Arson—Building—Contents.-Where one is charged with arson in burning a mill and the mill and all its contents are destroyed, an acquittal is a good defense to a subsequent charge for burning the contents of the mill. State v. Colgate. Kan. Sup. Ct., Mch., 1884. 18 Rep. 210.

Common Carrier-Railroads are Such as to Each Other.-A railway company engaged in the transportation of freights for hire as a common carrier, is bound to transport or haul upon its road the cars of any other railroad company when requested so to do, and will hold the same relation as a common carrier to such cars, that it does to ordinary freight, and in case of loss will be held to the same measure of liability to the owner of the cars as would attach in respect to any other property. Peoria etc. R. Co. v. Chicago etc. R. Co. Пl. Sup. Ct., 1884. 19 Cent. L. J. 111.

Fire Insurance-Change of Title of Insured property.-Where one of the provisions of an insurance policy given to a partnership is that “if the title of the property is transferred, incumbered or changed * the policy shall be void," a dissolution of the partnership, and a sale by one partner to the other of his interest, is a change of title to the property, and will render the policy void. Hathaway v. State Ins. Co. Iowa Sup. Ct., July 22, 1884. 20 N. W. Rep. 164.

Fraudulent Conveyance-Necessity of Levy of Execution.—In a creditor's suit, where the creditor asks equitable assets to satisfy his judgment, there must be a return of an execution at law of “nulla bona." But where the creditor asks to set aside a conveyance as fraudulent he need only proceed at law far enough to`secure a lien on the property sought to be reached, and it is not necessary to issue execution. Wadsworth v. Schisselbaur. Minn. Sup. Ct., May, 1884. 18 Rep. 215.

Libel-Privilege-Judicial Proceedings.-A newspaper publication of a petition for the disbarment of an attorney itself prima facie libellous, is not privileged, when the same has not been acted upon by the court, but only "filed," and then returned to the petitioner without even an entry on the docket. Cowley v. Pulsifer. Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., June 27,

1884. 18 Rep. 211.

Master and Servant-Negligence-Scope of Employment.-M. was a cloak-room clerk in defendants' employ, and assisted at the parcels' office; he "used to take up parcels for passengers from the cloak-room to the train, when there was no porter there, and that was a regular thing for him to do." A passenger had asked him to take a parcel to the train, which he did, and, as he was running back, he ran against another porter, who in turn came against the ticket-collector, and the ticketcollector upset the plaintiff's wife, causing injuries which resulted in her death. FIELD, J., nonsuited the plaintiff, holding that there was no evidence to go to the jury of any negligence on the part of the defendants or their servants, and that there was no evidence that, at the time